Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A jury found Defendant guilty of three counts of wire fraud, one count of theft of government money, and two counts of Social Security fraud. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he had had the requisite criminal intent to commit the offenses. He also appealed the district court’s order for restitution in the amount of $168,456.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion, vacated the restitution and forfeiture orders, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that a jury could reasonably disregard Defendant’s asserted reason for these inconsistencies—that he did not believe that he had to report “work” below a certain income threshold—and find that he acted with the intent to defraud the SSA by receiving benefits for which he was not eligible. Further, the court reasoned that reliance on the SSA’s determination alone does not allow the court to meaningfully review the calculation of the amount of loss when, as here, that amount is challenged by the defendant. The government was thus required to present evidence to show that Defendant engaged in substantial gainful activity in November 2009. The court held that the district court erred in accepting the statement of loss in the absence of evidence establishing the date that Defendant became ineligible for benefits. View "United States v. James Workman" on Justia Law

After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Defendant of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. Prior to trial, the district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress twelve ounces of cocaine that investigators found in a warrantless search of the rental car Johnson was driving as he arrived at the Omaha home of local distributor A.M. Prior to sentencing, the government filed an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Section 851 seeking a statutory enhancement based on Defendant’s prior Texas state court conviction for a “serious drug felony.” Overruling Defendant’s written objection, the district court applied the enhancement and sentenced Defendant to a mandatory minimum 120 months’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing the court erred by denying his motion to suppress and by applying the sentencing enhancement and that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he conspired to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, as we must, there was more than sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Defendant was a key part of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine and that it was reasonably foreseeable to Johnson the conspiracy distributed 500 grams or more of cocaine. Moreover, the court held that Defendant makes no attempt on appeal to show good cause for his failure to raise an Oliver objection to the district court. View "United States v. Isaac Johnson" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Defendant for conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A). Arrested on November 17, she was detained for 37 days before appearing before a magistrate judge on December 23. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment and suppress her statements from a post-arrest interview. The district court denied both motions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained the 37-day delay between Jones’s arrest and her initial appearance before a magistrate judge violated Rule 5(a). However, to determine whether a delay in presentment violates substantive due process, this court determines whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, the government’s conduct “offends the standards of substantive due process” and “shocks the conscience.” Defendant asserted that law enforcement officers in South Dakota have a “pattern” of delaying defendants’ initial appearances, citing two cases where defendants moved to dismiss indictments based on delays in their initial appearance. However, the court held two mistakes do not establish a pattern of outrageousness sufficient to show deliberate indifference and support a due process violation.   Further, Defendant argued that her Miranda waiver was involuntary because the agent’s pre-warning statements were an unlawful two-step interrogation under Missouri v. Seibert and that her confession was involuntary under United States v. Aguilar. The court held the district court properly concluded that these brief, narrow-scope pre-warning statements were not a two-step interrogation in violation of Seibert and that Defendant’s statements were voluntary. View "United States v. Tracy Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to a charge of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute it. In the district court, Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop of a vehicle that she was driving. The district court denied the motion, and Defendant reserved the right to appeal that ruling.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that there was no error in denying the motion to suppress. The court explained that the seizing officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant as she drove away from the residence on August 24. Officers had abundant reason to believe, based on informant reports and surveillance, that the owners were distributing methamphetamine from their residence. Police seized drugs from four short-term visitors who were stopped shortly after leaving the residence in June. As of August 24, investigators had reliable information that the owners were distributing a shipment of methamphetamine that arrived two days earlier, including a quantity that was seized from a downstream customer that very morning. A detective saw Defendant enter the residence at 10:00 p.m. and depart six minutes later. Although Defendant was previously unknown to investigators, her short-term visit to the suspected drug house conformed to the pattern of the drug trade and gave police reasonable suspicion to believe that she was carrying drugs as she departed. Accordingly, the police had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant was involved in criminal activity as she departed the residence, so the traffic stop was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Elizabeth Pounds" on Justia Law

At sentencing, the district court, varying upward from the advisory guidelines sentencing range, imposed a sentence of 120 months imprisonment plus four years of supervised release upon Defendant. Defendant appealed. He argued the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conspiracy conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction and remanded for resentencing. The court concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The court agreed with Defendant that the district court committed procedural sentencing error when it adopted the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) and, without adequate notice varied upward for reasons that contradicted the PSR’s factual findings. However, the court found that the jury was in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Thus, the court did not disturb the jury’s credibility findings on appeal. Similarly, the court concluded that there is sufficient evidence to uphold Defendant’s conspiracy conviction. Finally, the court wrote that it cannot conclude that the inconsistencies between the PSR findings and the findings on which the district court based its upward variance, combined with the lack of prior notice, resulted in procedural sentencing error that was harmless. View "United States v. Deshonte Dickson" on Justia Law

A jury convicted co-defendants K.S and T.H of conspiracy to distribute and distribution of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. Both challenged several district court rulings, and T.H. appealed his conviction. 
 The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that K.S. argued that, instead of co-Defendant’s testimony, the court should have admitted co-Defendant’s letter under the residual hearsay exception. The court explained the residual exception is to “be used very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances.” To fall within the exception, the statement must be “supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.” The district court concluded that the letter was not trustworthy. Although the court did not explain how it reached its conclusion, its “discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence is particularly broad in a conspiracy trial.”   T.H. argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him. The evidence established that the middleman bought methamphetamine from K.H. and sold it to the CI. The CI testified to arranging the buy, and the middleman’s phone records showed calls with T.H. on the day of the purchase. After the middleman bought methamphetamine from someone in the white S.U.V., officers identified T.H. as the driver. The plastic bag the middleman later sold the CI had fingerprints from all three men. Additionally, the jury heard testimony from K.T. and D.S. that T.H. sold drugs in the same car and the same location as the controlled buy. This evidence was sufficient to sustain his conspiracy conviction. View "United States v. Kieffer Simmons" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced him to 84 months imprisonment. Harrison appealed, challenging the admission of evidence of his prior firearm conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained Defendant’s knowledge is at issue here because he did not plead guilty. Thus, Defendant’s prior conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was relevant to prove knowledge. Further, Defendant’s conviction was not too remote in time. Although it occurred 8 years before his arrest in this case, he was incarcerated for more than 3 of those years. Therefore, based on its compliance with the requirements of Oaks, the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior firearm conviction. View "United States v. Robert Harrison" on Justia Law

I.M. and J.R. (collectively, “Appellants”) were convicted by a jury of charges alleged in a ten-count superseding indictment for offenses committed as part of a large drug conspiracy. The district court sentenced them to 360 and 336 months in prison, respectively. On appeal, I.M. challenged both the denial of his motion for severance and his sentence; J.R. challenged the denial of his motion for recusal, the denial of his motions to suppress wiretap and video surveillance recordings and his convictions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court first explained I.M. has given the court no reason to conclude that this was not an adequate safeguard in his case or that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to sever. Thus, the denial of I.M.’s severance motion was not an abuse of discretion. Further, the district court’s statement that I.M.’s “criminal history consists of violent acts and possession of firearms” did not mischaracterize his criminal history. Thus, the district court did not commit procedural error.   Moreover, the court held J.R. has failed to point to any facts establishing that the district judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The district judge’s issuance of some of the warrants, in this case, does not, of itself, require recusal. Any other challenges to the wiretap recordings are also waived because J.R. has failed to meaningfully explain why his motion to suppress should have been granted. View "United States v. Isaac May" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a sentence of ninety-six months’ imprisonment imposed by the district court after Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. Defendant argued that the district court committed procedural error by miscalculating his base offense level under the sentencing guidelines.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it has held that second-degree robbery under this Missouri statute is a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act because the offense requires “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. Because Defendant’s prior conviction for second-degree robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under USSG Section 4B1.2(a)(1), the district court did not err in determining a base offense level of 20 under USSG Section 2K2.1(a)(4). Accordingly, the court held that there was no procedural error. View "United States v. George Gordon" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of being an armed career criminal in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e). The district court sentenced him to 262 months in prison. Defendant appealed, challenging: (1) the admission of evidence (field tests and a photograph); (2) the sufficiency of the evidence; and (3) the sentence (an adjustment and an enhancement).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the evidence was not inadmissible simply because it was prejudicial. Further, the court explained that the jury saw the pistol and photographs of it. An ATF agent, testifying as an expert, testified that it met the federal definition of a firearm. The pistol and the testimony are sufficient to prove that the pistol was a firearm. Accordingly, the court held that the evidence sufficiently proved that Defendant’s .45-caliber pistol was a firearm under 18 U.S.C. Sections 921(a)(3) and 922(g). Finally, the district court found that Defendant was a drug dealer—not merely a drug user—due to the packaging of the drugs, the evidence found in the search and police investigations, and his own testimony that he intended to distribute drugs. As such, the district court did not err in applying the sentencing enhancement. View "United States v. Gregory McCoy" on Justia Law