Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. He argued that evidence should have been excluded from trial due to an unlawful search and seizure, that he had a constitutional right under the Second Amendment to possess a firearm as a convicted felon, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that none of the contentions has merit and therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court found that the officer’s action was permissible under the Fourth Amendment on at least two bases: as an investigative search based on reasonable suspicion of crime and danger and as a search for evidence-based on probable cause under exigent circumstances. Further, the court held that the longstanding prohibition on the possession of firearms by felons is constitutional, and the district court properly denied the motion to dismiss. Moreover, the court wrote that there was ample evidence to support the jury’s finding that Defendant knowingly possessed the firearm. Finally, the court explained that a rational jury could have found that the firearm was placed strategically in a location where it was hidden from view but readily accessible to one who was seated in a wheelchair and carrying drugs in his undergarment. View "United States v. Sylvester Cunningham" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of distributing a controlled substance near a protected location, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced Defendant to 380 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred in instructing the jury and challenges the reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant specifically requested separating the protected location element—Proposed Instruction No. 15—from the remainder of the elements of Count 1—Proposed Instruction No. 12. Defendant then filed objections to certain instructions but failed to object to either Instruction No. 12 or 15 prior to trial. He further failed to do so at trial or in his post-trial motion. Defendant “cannot complain that the district court gave him exactly what his lawyer asked.” Further, the court wrote that Evans controls here. Henderson’s interpretation of the career offender enhancement was “neither unexpected nor indefensible” and “had a rational basis.” The district court did not err in applying this enhancement. The court also explained that “when a district court varies downward and sentences below a presumptively reasonable Guidelines range, it is nearly inconceivable that the court abused its discretion in not varying downward still further.” Here, Defendant offered no convincing reasoning to rebut this presumption. View "United States v. Patrick Webb, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant received a 108-month sentence for possessing a firearm as a felon. He challenged the base-offense-level calculation, a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense, and the overall length of the sentence. At issue on appeal is whether the crime of assault while displaying a dangerous weapon is a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.2(a).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that each of the three ways of committing assault in Iowa requires intent. Thus, contrary to Defendant’s contention, the holding in Borden v. United States is of no help to Defendant. Further, beyond the base offense level, Defendant believes that he did not deserve a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony offense.” The court held that there is Defendant’s guilty plea, which necessarily required him to admit that he possessed the gun. Second, there was a video of him wielding what appeared to be the same gun just days earlier, which shows that he had “authority” and “control” over it. Third, no one disputes that the gun’s location under the front passenger seat placed it within arm’s reach of him. On these facts, the court could not say the district court’s finding that he was “armed” was erroneous. Finally, Defendant challenged the substantive reasonableness of his 108-month prison sentence. The court held that given the 12-month downward variance he received, “it is nearly inconceivable” that the district court “abused its discretion in not varying downward even further.” View "United States v. Catrell Green" on Justia Law

Several current or former members of the North Dakota Legislative Assembly and a legislative aide petitioned for writ of mandamus, seeking relief from orders of the district court directing them to comply with subpoenas for documents or testimony in a civil case brought against the State of North Dakota.   The Eighth Circuit denied the writ and directed the district court to quash the subpoenas for petitioner Devlin to testify and for petitioners Holmberg, Wardner, Poolman, Nathe, Devlin, and Ness to produce documents and other information. The court concluded that the district court’s conclusion to the contrary was based on a mistaken conception of the legislative privilege. In its order enforcing the document subpoenas, the district court reasoned that legislative privilege did not apply because the subpoena sought communications between legislators and third parties. The legislative privilege, however, is not limited to a bar on the inquiry into communications among legislators or between legislators and their aides. The privilege is not designed merely to protect the confidentiality of deliberations within a legislative body; it protects the functioning of the legislature more broadly. Communications with constituents, advocacy groups, and others outside the legislature are a legitimate aspect of legislative activity. The use of compulsory evidentiary processes against legislators and their aides to gather evidence about this legislative activity is thus barred by the legislative privilege. View "In Re: North Dakota Legislative Assembly v." on Justia Law

A handgun was found in Defendant’s jacket pocket while he was being treated in a hospital emergency room for a gunshot wound. After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Conley conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. He appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant argued on appeal that because the Hennepin County Medical Center (HCMC) protection officers’ restraint of him in the stabilization room amounted to an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, evidence of the handgun found in his jacket pocket must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that under the balancing test, “the greater the intrusion on a citizen, the greater the justification required for that intrusion to be reasonable.” Noninvestigatory seizures are reasonable if they are “based on specific articulable facts” and the “governmental interest” in effectuating the seizure in question “outweighs the individual’s interest in being free from arbitrary government interference.” The court explained that here the HCMC protection officers’ seizure of Defendant in the stabilization room was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Further, Defendant voluntarily brought himself to HCMC’s emergency room to seek treatment for a gunshot wound that medical staff considered potentially life-threatening. Given those circumstances, Defendant should have reasonably expected the sort of intrusions that are inherent to the provision of emergency medical care, including the removal of one’s clothes to facilitate treatment and—if compelled by the need to maintain a safe environment—even temporary physical restraint. View "United States v. Dywan Conley" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of three counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor. On appeal, Defendant challenged the jury instructions, an evidentiary ruling, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that there was no reversible error and therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court first wrote that Defendant is not entitled to relief unless he can show that the error affected his substantial rights. To meet that prong of the plain-error analysis, Defendant must show a reasonable probability that the erroneous instruction affected the verdict. The court saw no reasonable probability that the jury would have found Defendant not guilty of touching C.W.’s genitalia if the instruction had excluded the extraneous terms. Further, Defendant contended the jury could have mistaken C.W.’s sexualized behavior for his own. Here, the district court reasonably declined to exclude the evidence under Rule 403. C.W.’s testimony about age-inappropriate sexual behavior was not presented in the abstract; she connected it directly to Defendant by explaining that she learned the behavior from him. Viewed in that context, the testimony was prejudicial to Defendant but not unfairly so. C.W.’s testimony, if believed, gave the jury reason to conclude that Defendant had sexually abused her. Finally, the court wrote that no physical evidence was required: “A victim’s testimony alone can be sufficient to support a guilty verdict.” View "United States v. Garrett Waters" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Defendant, a former sheriff’s deputy, on six counts: attempting to induce a minor to produce child pornography, enticement of a minor, and transferring and attempting to transfer obscenity to a person under the age of 16. Defendant pleaded guilty to a superseding information charging him with the conduct underlying Counts 3 and 4 under a single count. In exchange, the government agreed to dismiss the original indictment. The parties also agreed to recommend a sentence of 120 months imprisonment. At sentencing, the district court sustained Defendant’s objection to a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2G1.3(b)(3)(A). Defendant challenged his sentence’s length.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court emphasized that the Guidelines did not adequately account for the seriousness of Defendant’s offense and the need to send an accurate message to the community. Given the clarity of the district court’s rationale for its variance, any procedural error in the upward departure was harmless. Accordingly, even if the district court erred procedurally in its departure analysis, any error is harmless considering the court’s rationale for its alternative variance. The court wrote that Defendant has shown no likelihood that his sentence would be more favorable should he be resentenced based on the alleged error. View "United States v. Francis Kistler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff has been incarcerated on death row in Arkansas since 1997. After he was denied relief in state court under Arkansas’s postconviction DNA testing statute, Plaintiff filed this federal lawsuit against several Arkansas officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on both standing and immunity grounds. The district court denied the motion, and Defendants appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while Plaintiff does not expressly allege that the Attorney General currently possesses any of the DNA evidence he wants to test, Act 1780 provides the Attorney General an opportunity to play a critical role in the statute’s implementation. And here, the Attorney General responded to Plaintiff’s Act 1780 petition by opposing it in state court. The Attorney General “thereby caused,” in part, Plaintiff’s ongoing injury of being denied access to DNA testing that might prove his innocence. As such, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an injury in fact that was caused by Defendants and that would be redressed by the relief he seeks in his Section 1983 action. He has standing to bring his procedural due process challenge to Act 1780. Further, the court found that Defendants here are not immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment because Plaintiff seeks prospective declaratory and injunctive relief and has alleged a sufficient connection between the defendants and Act 1780’s enforcement. View "Stacey Johnson v. Tim Griffin" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon. He argued that the district court erred when it instructed the jury on the elements of the offense and when it responded to two questions from the jury during deliberations. He also contended that he had a constitutional right under the Second Amendment to possess a firearm as a convicted felon.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant’s argument is foreclosed by United States v. Stanko, 491 F.3d 408 (8th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it instructed the jury on the first element of the offense. Further, the court held that the instructions provided that in making the determination about knowledge, the jury may consider whether Defendant reasonably believed that his right to possess a firearm had been restored. The instruction allowed Defendant to argue and a jury to find that he lacked the requisite knowledge due to a belief that his rights had been restored. Further, the court concluded that the district court was correct that Section 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional as applied to Defendant based on his particular felony convictions. The court explained that legislatures traditionally employed status-based restrictions to disqualify categories of persons from possessing firearms. Whether those actions are best characterized as restrictions on persons who deviated from legal norms or persons who presented an unacceptable risk of dangerousness, Congress acted within the historical tradition when it enacted Section 922(g)(1) and the prohibition on possession of firearms by felons. View "United States v. Edell Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. While in jail, prior to pleading guilty, he sexually assaulted multiple corrections officers. Later, following his guilty plea, jail personnel discovered him with a six-inch metal shank. At sentencing, one of the assaulted corrections officers testified. She described how Defendant, without her consent, rubbed her thigh and buttocks with his hand while she was serving breakfast. Another jail employee testified about the shank. Based on these accounts, the district court concluded that Defendant did not qualify for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction and in determining that the attempted aggravated-assault offense is a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Defendant’s deviant behavior while incarcerated—molesting corrections officers and carrying a shank—is hardly emblematic of a “sincerely remorseful defendant.” Further, the court wrote that Defendant does not dispute that if the assault offense is a crime of violence under the guidelines, an attempt to commit that offense qualifies as well. Thus, the district court did not err in determining that Defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated assault of a police officer with a deadly weapon was a conviction for a crime of violence that raised his base offense level under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). View "United States v. Christopher Chappell" on Justia Law