Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Missouri trial court declined to permit Petitioner to represent himself. After conviction at trial, an unsuccessful direct appeal, and an unsuccessful attempt to collaterally attack his convictions in state court, Petitioner filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 in federal court. The district court granted Petitioner’s petition, finding Petitioner had unequivocally invoked his right of self-representation, and the Missouri trial court failed to conduct a proper hearing under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that given the state court’s factual findings, the Missouri Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court jurisprudence in finding Petitioner was not unequivocal in his request to proceed pro se. Petitioner conditioned his self-representation request on his speedy trial motions being denied and wanted counsel to depose witnesses even after being informed counsel could not do so if he was pro se. From these facts, a court could reasonably conclude Petitioner’s waiver of the right to counsel was not unequivocal. View "Darrell Bolden v. David Vandergriff" on Justia Law

17 people were killed a commercial tourism duck boat operating on Table Rock Lake in the Ozarks, sank during a storm. The government charged the captain and the managers of the duck boat company, with felony counts of “seaman’s manslaughter” under 18 U.S.C. Section 1115 and misdemeanor counts of operating a vessel in a grossly negligent manner. The government alleged that the charged offenses occurred on “Table Rock Lake, a navigable water of the United States within the Western District of Missouri and within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.” The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, adopting a report and recommendation that concluded the prescriptive reaches of Sections 1115 and 2302(b) is defined by admiralty law and do not cover the alleged conduct. The government appealed the dismissal.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a review of the statute’s history leads to the conclusion that the origins of seaman’s manslaughter are in the admiralty jurisdiction of federal courts. Here, the government objected to the district court’s reliance on Edwards as binding precedent regarding the status of Table Rock Lake and argued that the evidence of commercial activity on Table Rock Lake presented, in this case, established that the lake is navigable in fact. However, before deferring to Edwards, the district court reviewed all of the evidence submitted by the parties and found that the nature and frequency of commercial shipping on the lake had not substantially changed since the Edwards decision. Thus, the court wrote that it detects no clear error in the district court’s finding or conclusion. View "United States v. Kenneth McKee" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for knowingly possessing with the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine. The district court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal, and he appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant argued that he did not knowingly possess the meth because it was concealed in the rental car before he rented it. But the evidence, viewed most favorably to the verdict, supports the conclusion that Young knowingly, and constructively possessed the meth. He was the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle. Further, Defendant rented a car, traveled across the country, took $8,500 in cash advances, had two cell phones and text messages about buying and selling meth, and transported five bundles of meth—about five pounds—in concealed compartments in a rental car (with one bundle wrapped in a sack from WSS where Defendant had recently shopped). The evidence viewed most favorably to the verdict, sufficiently establishes that Defendant knowingly possessed and intended to distribute the meth. Moreover, the court wrote that the government presented sufficient evidence linking Defendant to the concealed drugs. Thus, the evidence, viewed most favorably to the verdict, sufficiently establishes that Defendant knowingly possessed and intended to distribute the meth. View "United States v. Quennel Young" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions and sentences arising out of an attempted robbery that resulted in a woman’s death.   The Eighth Circuit vacated Defendants’ convictions and sentences on Count One and directed the district court to dismiss Count One. The court affirmed the remaining convictions, vacated Defendants’ remaining sentences under the sentencing package doctrine, and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that the record contains overwhelming evidence of both Defendants’ guilt. Considering the evidence and counsel’s (mostly) appropriate arguments, the court wrote that it cannot say the district court erred in failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte or abused its discretion in determining the prosecutor’s statement did not satisfy the requisite prejudice to warrant a new trial. Further, the court wrote that given the evidence in the record, the two alleged predicate offenses for the firearms conspiracy were so inextricably intertwined that no rational juror could have found Defendants possessed firearms in relation to one predicate but not the other. The court reasoned that while it would have been preferable for the jury to have been given special interrogatories or a special verdict form to facilitate effective appellate review, considering the nature of the jury instructions and the evidence submitted to the jury, the court found that Defendants’ substantial rights were not affected by the jury’s general verdict in this particular case. View "United States v. Tawhyne Patterson, Sr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, then a conductor and now an engineer for Union Pacific Railroad (“Union Pacific”), brought this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) when Union Pacific refused Plaintiff’s requests that he be allowed to bring his Rottweiler service dog on board moving Union Pacific freight trains as a reasonable accommodation to ameliorate the effects of Plaintiff’s undisputed disabilities, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and migraine headaches resulting from his prior service in the military. At the end of a week-long trial, the district court denied Union Pacific’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. The jury then returned a verdict for Plaintiff, awarding compensatory but not punitive damages. The district court granted Union Pacific’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury’s verdict.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed that “benefits and privileges of employment” (1) refer only to employer-provided services; (2) must be offered to non-disabled individuals in addition to disabled ones; and (3) does not include freedom from mental or psychological pain. Further, the court noted that mitigating pain is not an employer-sponsored program or service. As such, providing a service dog at work so that an employee with a disability has the same assistance the service dog provides away from work is not a cognizable benefit or privilege of employment. View "Perry Hopman v. Union Pacific Railroad" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of sexual exploitation of a child and receiving images depicting the sexual exploitation of a child. The district court sentenced him to 540 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed, asking that the Eighth Circuit vacate his convictions and remand for a new trial because the district court failed to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his cellphone, excluded other evidence that he sought to admit at trial, and gave an incorrect jury instruction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court first held that the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s suppression motion nor abuse its discretion in rejecting his request for a Franks hearing. The court wrote that it agreed with the court that it had no more than a marginal relationship to the issue of Defendant’s guilt while presenting a considerable risk of unfair prejudice. Defendant claimed that the aiding-and-abetting instruction is erroneous because it omits an additional, fourth element included in the Eighth Circuit’s Model Jury Instructions: that the defendant “have [Intended] [known] (insert mental state required by principal offense).” The court concluded that the district court did not plainly err by omitting the fourth aiding-and-abetting element from the model jury instructions. The court explained that it is aware of no case in which the court specifically discussed this element, much less declared it mandatory. View "United States v. Derrick Walker" on Justia Law

Defendants injected their patients with Orthovisc, which was not approved by the Food and Drug Administration, while falsely representing it as FDA-approved. A jury convicted them of healthcare fraud and conspiracy to commit offenses against the United States. Defendants appealed, alleging that the district court erred by denying motions for judgment of acquittal on both counts and committing several reversible errors that warrant a new trial. Moreover, Defendants believe a new trial is needed as a result of four other errors by the district court that denied: FDCA-device evidence; their theory-of-defense jury instruction; their FDCA-device argument; and their advice-of-counsel instruction   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendants failed to identify any probative value in communicating to the jury their misunderstanding of the Notice. Further, the court wrote that,  if, as the Defendants argued, the jury instructions and indictment required the government to prove that the non-approved Orthovisc is a device, then this sentence from the theory-of-defense instruction duplicates other instructions submitted to the jury. Defendants cannot identify any prejudice in excluding this misleading, duplicative sentence. Moreover, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting further argument that misrepresents the Notice. Finally, the court held that the district court properly denied the advice-of-counsel instruction. View "United States v. Abdul Naushad" on Justia Law

Defendant received a 262-month prison sentence after a jury found him guilty of selling methamphetamine. The Second Circuit appointed counsel, who has attempted to file an Anders brief and asked to withdraw.   The Second Circuit determined that it cannot decide the appeal until counsel files a brief that satisfies Anders’s requirements. The Supreme Court has been clear that an “attorney must be zealous and must resolve all doubts and ambiguous legal questions in favor of his or her client.” Here, the brief appears to make inferences against Defendant. For example, it argues that “he waived his right to make a sufficiency of the evidence argument on appeal” by failing to make a motion when prompted. It turns out, however, that trial counsel agreed that he did not “want to waive any appeal” when questioned by the district court. Accordingly, the court held that the motion to withdraw is held in abeyance pending the filing of a compliant brief. View "United States v. Ramien Collins" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted and convicted of abusive sexual contact. Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the district court constructively amended his indictment in violation of his right to a grand jury. Defendant argued that the district court constructively amended the indictment by providing a definition of groin that included genitalia. According to Defendant, his Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury was violated because the jury could have convicted him of a different offense (touching the genitalia) than the one he was indicted for (touching the groin). The district court denied the motion.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court’s definition indicated that the groin “often” includes the genitalia, which is different than the groin always including the genitalia. These terms naturally overlap as a function of human anatomy.   Moreover, Defendant argued that the six locations outlined in Section 2246(3) are discrete, so referencing one location (genitalia) in the definition of another (groin) constructively amends the indictment. The court disagreed. If this were true, then a separate part of the court’s definition would have the same problem because it references the “inner thigh,” one of the six locations defined in Section 2246(3). Defendant points to United States v. Burch, where the court conformed the jury instructions to the indictment by limiting the definition of “sexual contact” to what was alleged in the indictment (“touching of the genitalia”). But Burch only supports that each Section 2246(3) location is narrower than “sexual contact,” not that each location is independent of each others. View "United States v. Neeraj Chopra" on Justia Law

The Swampbuster Act and United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) regulations work together to provide farmers with the right to request reviews of wetland certifications. The Swampbuster Act’s review provision (“Swampbuster Review Provision”) provides that a prior wetland certification “shall remain valid and in effect . . . until such time as the person affected by the certification requests review of the certification by the Secretary.” In turn, a regulation (“Review Regulation”) provides procedural requirements a farmer must follow to make an effective review request.   Appellant filed an action alleging that: (1) the Review Regulation contravenes the Swampbuster Review Provision; (2) the Review Regulation was never submitted to Congress or the Comptroller General as required by the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”); and (3) the NRCS’s decisions to refuse to consider Appellants 2017 and 2020 review requests violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Review Regulation imposes reasonable procedural requirements a farmer must follow to make an effective review request and thereby delimit a prior wetland certification. Because the Swampbuster Review Provision is silent as to the nature of an effective review request, the Review Regulation does not conflict with the Swampbuster Review Provision. Further, the court wrote that the CRA’s judicial review provision precludes review of Appellant’s CRA claim. Finally, the court held that the NRCS’s decisions to refuse to consider Appellant’s review requests were not arbitrary and capricious because Appellant failed to comply with the Review Regulation. View "Arlen Foster v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture" on Justia Law