Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1344(2), and theft of government funds.  The district court sentenced Defendant to 96 months imprisonment on each count to run concurrently. On appeal, Defendant challenged her sentence, arguing that the district court erred in denying her acceptance of responsibility, erroneously admitted and considered certain tax information, and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court’s factual findings are supported by the record. First, Defendant stipulated sending falsified letters in support of herself to the probation officer and the government. Specifically, Defendant stipulated to writing one letter purportedly from her pastor and three letters purportedly from medical providers and signing each letter without their authorization or knowledge. Fraudulent conduct is inconsistent with accepting responsibility for bank fraud. Second, the evidence at sentencing showed that Defendant lied to the probation officer about the source of the funds that she used to pay restitution. Thus, the court held that the district court did not err in admitting and considering Defendant’s 2018, 2019, and 2020 tax filings. Moreover, the court held that Defendant’s 96-month sentence is substantively reasonable. The district court stated that it had considered all of the Section 3553(a) factors and offered a lengthy explanation for why it was imposing an upward variance under those factors. View "United States v. Kelli Hogue" on Justia Law

Defendant assaulted a 77-year-old St. Louis taxi driver, stole his taxi, and drove it to Chicago. He pleaded guilty to transporting a stolen vehicle and now appeals his 42-month sentence, an upward variance from his advisory guidelines sentencing range of 15 to 21 months imprisonment. Defendant argued the sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court did not properly account for Defendant’s mental health issues and gave too much weight to the fact that the offense occurred on the first day he was released on parole following a 2015 Illinois second-degree murder conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by varying upward based in part on Defendant’s Illinois murder conviction and the fact that he committed this offense on his first day of parole. The court explained that the record does not support Defendant’s further argument that the district court placed too little weight on the mitigating impact of his serious, untreated mental health issues. The court expressed sympathy for Defendant’s mental health condition, criticized the failure to provide him mental health treatment while incarcerated in Illinois, and noted that the federal Bureau of Prisons has resources to provide mental health treatment in its facilities. But the court concluded that the circumstances and timing of Defendant’s vicious assault on E.G. demonstrated that he poses a significant danger to the community and that a sentence close to time served would not sufficiently protect the public. View "United States v. David Twine" on Justia Law

After an officer initiated a traffic stop of Defendant and recovered approximately six pounds of methamphetamine from the vehicle Defendant was driving, he was charged with one count of possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. After the district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea. Prior to sentencing, Defendant filed two pro se motions to withdraw his guilty plea, which the district court denied. The district court sentenced Defendant to 168 months imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. Defendant appealed the denials of his motion to suppress and his motions to withdraw his guilty plea.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that considering the factors together, the unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated in this case by the discovery of Defendant’s expired license and lack of insurance. Thus, despite the unlawful stop of Defendant, the “deterrence benefits” of excluding the evidence do not “outweigh its substantial societal costs,” and the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion. Further, the court held that given Defendant’s grounds for withdrawal of his guilty plea are contradicted by the record, the court found no error in the district court’s decision to decline an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the motions. Finally, the court found no error that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. View "United States v. Felix Forjan" on Justia Law

While driving under the influence of alcohol one night in Indian country, Defendant crossed the centerline and crashed into another car, killing two people and seriously injuring two others. Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of involuntary manslaughter, and the district court sentenced him to two consecutive 84-month prison terms. He challenged the sentence on appeal. Defendant maintained on appeal that the district court failed to provide an adequate explanation for its decision to depart upward on the ground that his criminal-history category underrepresented his likelihood of reoffending.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that even if the district court's explanation of Section 4A1.3(a)(1) departure was plainly insufficient, Defendant has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have received a more favorable sentence absent the court's error. The district court expressly anchored its chosen sentence to the maximum punishment set by Congress, not to the Guidelines. The record shows that the sentence chosen, much like the one the government recommended, was a product of an evaluation of the Section 3553(a) criteria, in particular, the nature and circumstances of the offense and Defendant’s criminal history. Further, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Moses Runs Against" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court enhanced the sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Defendant has one prior conviction for domestic battery and two prior convictions under the Arkansas robbery statute. On appeal, Defendant agreed that his domestic battery conviction is a “violent felony” for purposes of the ACCA but disputes the district court’s holding that his convictions under the Arkansas robbery statute are as well.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that given the close similarity between the terms “violent felony” and “crime of violence,” it follows that an Arkansas robbery conviction would also be a violent felony for the purposes of the ACCA. The court wrote that an Arkansas robbery conviction is a crime of violence under the Guidelines. It thus follows that an Arkansas robbery conviction is a violent felony under the ACCA. View "United States v. Christopher Mallett" on Justia Law

Plaintiff saw Defendant, an officer, pointing a firearm at her 12- and 14-year-old sons down the street from their family’s home. When Plaintiff approached to ask what happened, Defendant repeatedly ordered her to “get back.” After Plaintiff questioned the order, Defendant briefly pointed his taser at her. Plainitff then complied with his orders. Her sons were eventually cleared of any wrongdoing. Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against Defendant, claiming he used excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant on the claim after concluding he was entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant was placed in a position where he had two possibly armed suspects detained in front of him and a third unknown individual approaching from behind, creating a potentially serious safety risk. Adding to the circumstances, when Defendant ordered Plaintiff to “get back,” she moved to the side, but she did not immediately comply by moving backward. Rather, she questioned the order and moved sideways. Ordered to get back a second time, she again questioned the order and remained where she was until after the taser was drawn. Accordingly, the court wrote that under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant momentarily pointing his taser at Plaintiff to gain control of the scene was not unreasonable. View "Casondra Pollreis v. Lamont Marzolf" on Justia Law

After Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, the district court at sentencing found that the methamphetamine Defendant possessed was pure, leading to a higher Sentencing Guidelines range than Defendant believed was appropriate. Defendant takes issue with the court's finding and also says that the government breached an agreement not to seek a Guidelines range that was based on pure methamphetamine.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to obtain a conviction, the government had to prove merely that Defendant’s conspiracy involved a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine, so it makes sense that the government charged him that way. But for sentencing purposes, the Guidelines consider whether that substance was pure methamphetamine or not. The government did not rest merely on Defendant’s guilty plea to demonstrate that the methamphetamine was pure; it had the methamphetamine tested to confirm that it was pure, and Defendant has expressly disavowed any challenge to the accuracy of the laboratory testing. The district court, therefore, did not err. View "United States v. Jason Russell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced an action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, challenging the legality of the search and alleging several federal and state claims against various individuals pertaining to the “repeated, intentional harassment by officers of the Kansas City Missouri Police Department (“KCPD”) over the course of more than three years.” The issue of punitive damages had been raised earlier in the proceedings. During the instructions conference, Plaintiff objected to the district court’s failure to submit instructions on punitive damages, asserting the evidence established the defendants acted with reckless indifference to his constitutional rights. On appeal, Plaintiff contends the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on punitive damages. He suggests that we should review his alleged error de novo. Without specifying a review standard, Defendant argues the merits of Riggs’ punitive damages claim.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that a finding that an officer violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights establishes liability under Section 1983, but it “does not necessitate a finding of callous indifference warranting punitive damages.” The court wrote that Plaintiff has failed to convince the court that the district court’s failure to sua sponte raise the issue of punitive damages after the verdict was received “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings” such that there would be “a miscarriage of justice if left uncorrected.” View "Micah Riggs v. Robert Gibbs" on Justia Law

In 2002, a jury convicted Defendant of drug-related crimes, including conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. Based on prior felony drug convictions, the district court imposed a mandatory life sentence on the conspiracy count. In the First Step Act, Congress eliminated mandatory life sentences for this offense. However, Congress did not make Section 401(a) sentence reductions retroactively available to persons who were convicted and sentenced before the First Step Act’s enactment. Defendant moved to reduce his sentence through a motion for compassionate release. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Section 3582(c)(1)(A) relief is foreclosed by United States v. Crandall, 25 F.4th 582 (8th Cir. 2022). The issue on this appeal is whether Defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under Section 3582(c)(1)(A).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that in Crandall, the court held that a non-retroactive change in law regarding sentencing, such as Section 401(a)(2) of the First Step Act, “whether offered alone or in combination with other factors, cannot contribute to a finding of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ for a reduction in sentence under Section 3582(c)(1)(A).” The court explained that the Court’s reasoning in Conception would apply when a motion for compassionate release establishes an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief other than a nonretroactive change in the law, such as the defendant’s medical condition, age, or family circumstances, and the court is exercising its discretion to grant relief. But “Concepcion is irrelevant to the threshold question” of whether Defendant has shown an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for Section 3582(c)(1)(A) relief. View "United States v. Rodrigo Rodriguez-Mendez" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of rioting and aiding and abetting arson for his participation in civil unrest in downtown Minneapolis. The district court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of 60 months of imprisonment for rioting and 100 months of imprisonment for aiding and abetting arson, followed by two years of supervised release. Defendant appealed, challenging the admission of certain surveillance video and the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, the district court decided the challenged surveillance video was not so unfairly prejudicial, misleading, or confusing so as to substantially outweigh its probative value. The court reasoned that the district court’s explanation belies Defendant’s contention that the district court neglected to conduct the balancing test required by Rule 403. The court wrote it convicted the court the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the challenged video. Further, here, the district court provided extensive reasoning, much of which expressly addressed Defendant’s mitigation arguments. The court explained that this explanation is sufficient to satisfy the court that the district court considered Defendant’s arguments and had a reasoned basis for imposing the 100-month sentence. Accordingly, the court found that as to his claim the sentence is substantively unreasonable, Defendant has not articulated any reason for the court to reach such a conclusion in light of the presumption of reasonableness that attaches to the bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence. View "United States v. Victor Edwards" on Justia Law