Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This appeal concerns the scope of a landlord’s duty under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 to make “reasonable accommodations” for the “handicap” of a tenant. The City of Dubuque approved a measure allowing the local public housing authority to provide residents of mobile-home parks with housing choice vouchers that could be used to supplement their rent payments. Under this voucher program, the federal government provides funds to local public housing agencies, which in turn may distribute them to low-income tenants. As the rent on Plaintiff’s lot increased, she received a voucher and sought to use it to supplement her rent payments, but the companies declined to accept the voucher. Plaintiff requested an injunction requiring the companies to accept her housing choice voucher, and she sought damages for alleged emotional distress. Plaintiff also brought claims under state laws.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the injunction. The court concluded that while the statute requires a landlord to make reasonable accommodations that directly ameliorate the handicap of a tenant, the obligation does not extend to alleviating a tenant’s lack of money to pay rent. The court wrote that the term “reasonable accommodation” is not defined in the statute, but it was adopted against the backdrop of a predecessor statute and must be viewed in the context of a law that forbids discrimination “because of a handicap.” View "Suellen Klossner v. IADU Table Mound MHP, LLC" on Justia Law

Following her conditional guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1) and 846, Defendant appealed from the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence and statements she made in connection with warrantless parole searches of her person and residence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that based on the totality of the information available to the officers, the court agrees with the district court that law enforcement had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in illegal drug distribution sufficient to justify the warrantless parole searches. The court found that here, law enforcement gathered a variety of information from March 2020 to May 19, 2020, regarding Defendant and her involvement in illegal drug distribution, and officers were permitted to rely on their collective knowledge to support the decision to conduct a parole search. View "United States v. Heather Schaefer" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of kidnapping and two counts of transporting a minor across state lines for sexual purposes. He now appealed his conviction, challenging several of the district court’s rulings. These include the exclusion of evidence of the victims’ prior sexual activity, the admission of prior misconduct evidence, the admission of a prior sex-offense conviction, the rejection of Defendant’s requested jury instructions, and the denial of his motion for a new trial.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that applying the four-prong test for 404(b) evidence, it found that the district court did not abuse its discretion. As to the first prong, the 2004 conviction is relevant to material issues, including Defendant’s intent or plan to commit the crimes at issue and his identity as the assailant. The kidnapping at the heart of the 2004 conviction took place within a year of the criminal activity alleged here. On the third prong, the 2004 conviction is supported by sufficient evidence. Further, the court explained that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Again, the district court performed the requisite balancing under Rule 403 and included a limiting instruction. Moreover, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior sex-offense conviction under Rule 413. View "United States v. Myron Brandon" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of possession with intent to distribute 500 or more grams of methamphetamine. The district court sentenced him to 262 months in prison. Defendant appealed the conviction, challenging the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress. Defendant argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his Miranda waiver was not “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court found Defendant was “alert, aware of his criminal liability, and appropriately responding to questions” while talking with the officers. It credited the officers’ testimony that he “appeared coherent and did not tell them that he was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs.” His behavior was “consistent with someone who understood the nature of his crimes,” and he “did not appear to be intoxicated.” Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err in finding “no evidence that Defendant’s alleged intoxication caused his will to be overborne.” Further, the court held that the district court did not err in determining that Defendant did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent. Finally, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not reopening the suppression hearing. View "United States v. Anthony Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant, a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special Agent, pleaded guilty to accepting bribes. In calculating his offense level, the presentence investigation report (PSR) applied a cross-reference in the Sentencing Guidelines for bribery. The cross-reference applies “[i]f the offense was committed for the purpose of facilitating the commission of another criminal offense.” The PSR found that the bribes were accepted for the purpose of facilitating a conspiracy to distribute between 15 and 45 kilograms of methamphetamine. Over Defendant’s objections, the district court agreed with the PSR and applied the cross-reference in determining Defendant’s offense level.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that despite its stated low regard for the confidential informant’s (“CI”) credibility, the district court credited his testimony over Defendant. That determination is “virtually unreviewable on appeal.” The CI’s testimony recounted acts Defendant undertook that assisted in the CI’s drug-trafficking business. The CI testified that in response to the Postal Service’s interception of one of his drug packages, Defendant advised him to use trucks instead of the mail to transport drugs as well as change both his phone and his address. This occurrence evinced Defendant’s intent to be paid in return for helping the CI avoid detection by law enforcement. The CI presumably wanted to avoid detection for much the same reasons as all drug traffickers: the better quality of life found outside prison and the continued ability to run his illegal business. Defendant helped him remain free; by doing so, he assisted in the CI’s drug-trafficking business. For doing so, he received $31,000. Defendant’s story “just defies logic,” and the district court appropriately chose to disregard it. View "United States v. Nathan Koen" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of attempted enticement of a minor using the internet, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2422(b). Defendant appealed, asserting three claims: the district court (1) abused its discretion when it allowed the prosecution to impeach him using evidence not disclosed prior to trial; (2) committed plain error when it allowed the prosecutor to attack his credibility during rebuttal closing argument; and (3) imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even if the evidence should have been excluded, any error was harmless because it neither affected Defendant’s substantial rights nor had more than a slight influence on the verdict. Here, the prosecutor argued that the Agent’s testimony refuted Defendant’s claim that his conduct was an attempt to commit suicide by cop. That said, the prosecutor’s florid language in the rebuttal argument presents a close question related to propriety. Even assuming the argument was improper, there is no reasonable probability that Defendant would have been acquitted without the statements. Given the overwhelming evidence against Defendant, he cannot show the remarks were clearly injurious or that prejudice resulted. Finally, the court wrote that after considering and weighing Section 3553(a) factors, the district court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence, which is presumed to be reasonable. View "United States v. Christopher Truax" on Justia Law

Defendant, a Canadian citizen, conditionally pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits any alien who is unlawfully present in the United States from possessing a firearm. The district court sentenced him to 78 months imprisonment. On appeal, he argued that Section 922(g)(5)(A) is unconstitutional under the Second and Fifth Amendments. He also raised various challenges to his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that it found no abuse of discretion in the court’s consideration of the Section 3553(a) factors and Defendant’s sentence is not substantively unreasonable. The court explained that besides Defendant’s status as an international fugitive facing murder and fentanyl-trafficking charges in Canada, the district court cited Defendant’s possession of high-capacity magazines not accounted for in the guidelines, his purchase of numerous firearms and magazines over an extended period of time, and his failure to be deterred from continued criminality as aggravating factors that supported an upward variance. The court explicitly addressed mitigating factors, such as Defendant’s youth and troubled upbringing, but concluded that these did not outweigh the significant aggravating factors.   Further, the court explained that even assuming that Defendant is correct that the district court could have ordered his federal sentence to run concurrently under Setser, his argument fails. The district court never stated or implied that it lacked discretion to order Defendant’s sentence to run concurrently with his possible Canadian sentence. Nor did it state that Setser’s reasoning was inapposite. View "United States v. Dayne Sitladeen" on Justia Law

Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) appealed the District of Minnesota’s dismissal order entered in favor of the members of the Minnesota Board of Pharmacy (Board) based on a lack of standing. PhRMA’s lawsuit alleged a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim challenging the Alec Smith Insulin Affordability Act (Act). The Act, enforced by the Board members, requires, among other things, that pharmaceutical companies provide certain prescription medications to qualifying applicants at no cost.   PhRMA filed this suit on behalf of itself and three of its members—Eli Lilly and Company, Novo Nordisk Inc., and Sanofi—that manufacture most of the insulin sold in the United States and are subject to the Act. PhRMA alleged that the Act’s provisions violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. PhRMA sued the Board members, in their official capacities, seeking (1) a declaration that the Act is unconstitutional and (2) an injunction barring its enforcement.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing PhRMA’s suit for lack of standing. The court further rejected the Board members’ alternative grounds for affirmance on the basis of lack of associational standing and the sovereign immunity bar. The court reasoned that this case involves an allegation of a physical, per se taking with a request for equitable relief, neither of which “require the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” View "Pharmaceutical Research v. Stuart Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty by a jury on a three-count indictment charging him with failure to file a tax return and tax evasion for personal returns in 2014 and 2015. After considering and denying Defendant’s post-trial motions for a new trial and acquittal, the district court sentenced Defendant to 36 months imprisonment and ordered him to pay over $350,000 in restitution. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion when it (1) allowed for the expert testimony of the Special Agent (SA), (2) denied Defendant’s motions for a new trial and acquittal, and (3) ruled for the government on a Jencks Act issue.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court found that here, the SA did not directly testify to Defendant’s mental state but rather to the modus operandi of tax evasion criminals. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the SA’s expert testimony. Further, the court found that had the SA testified about specific cases that he had worked on in the past, these statements may have been related. But the general testimony given by the SA describing common types of tax evasion does not trigger Jencks Act disclosure of all statements from prior investigations related generally to tax evasion. Finally, the court explained that regardless of whether the government was required to prove that UAD was a C corporation or “a corporation not expressly exempt from tax,” the court held that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to convict on the indictment. View "United States v. Gary Primm, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of child pornography for using the social-media website Pinterest to trade child pornography. He claimed that the evidence was insufficient to show that he distributed or accessed the material. Further, on appeal, he argued that the district court should have kept the jury from hearing about his Pinterest profile, search history, and chat records. Defendant contends that uploading the image to the “Little” board does not count as “distribution . . . by computer.” Second, he argued that even assuming someone distributed child pornography, the government never proved it was him.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant knew that there was at least one other user who had access to the “Little” board. From that evidence, the jury was free to draw the common-sense conclusion that he had access to the pornographic image that Defendant posted. Nothing more was necessary to “distribute . . . child pornography . . . by computer.”   Further, in regard to Defendant’s alternative-perpetrator defense, the court held that the government proved its case. First, it showed how Defendant set up the account. The government’s theory was that he created his profile while at work and then uploaded the image from his friend’s house using an Android phone. To support that theory, his friend confirmed that Defendant was in each of those places during the dates and times in question and that he had given him an Android phone. Second, the government connected the Pinterest account to Defendant. View "United States v. Timothy Caruso" on Justia Law