Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A grand jury indicted Defendant. He moved to dismiss for violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The district court denied his motion. A unanimous jury found him guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute (and distribute) a controlled substance. Defendant appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court found that the motion to dismiss, and even the limited evidentiary hearing, addressed only contested inferences and legal conclusions, not facts. Further, the period from Defendant’s indictment to his arrest is 19 months of the total 29-month delay. The 10-month period of post-arrest delay was primarily due to motions for continuance submitted by the government and Defendant’s co-defendants (for health concerns). For 8 of the first 19 months, Defendant’s warrant had been removed from the NCIC database. The district court found no evidence that the government negligently or intentionally delayed prosecution. Although this court treats this finding with special deference, human or technical error resulting in the removal of Defendant’s warrant from the NCIC database was the fault of the government. But this error is attributable only to negligence. There is no evidence that the government intentionally caused any delay. Moreover, the court wrote that Defendant did not offer evidence that the delay resulted in a loss of evidence or witness testimony or any impediment to his ability to mount a defense. View "United States v. Roger Cooley" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of receipt of child pornography. The parties stipulated in the plea agreement that his offense level would be reduced by two levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2G2.2(b)(1) because he did not intend to distribute the illegal material. The district court sentenced Defendant to 120 months of imprisonment, a sentence within the calculated Guidelines range of 97–121 months. Defendant appealed, arguing that the government breached the plea agreement by arguing at sentencing that he had distributed the material. Defendant did not object at sentencing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed and held that the district court did not plainly err. The court explained that Defendant bears the burden of proving that his substantial rights were affected. Defendant pointed to no evidence that the district court’s ultimate sentence of 120 months was the result of the government’s statements about distribution software and the neutral state of the evidence. The language of the district court specifies the quantity of images, the nature of the images, and the victimization of the family friend’s daughter as the basis for its sentence. It would be speculation to assume the court’s phrase “attendant circumstances” meant it relied on the government’s mention of torrenting software. The specific facts mentioned, without more, support the sentence imposed. Defendant received the benefit of his plea bargain—the two-level reduction in offense level for not distributing. Because Defendant cannot show that the result would have been different in the absence of the alleged error, he fails to show entitlement to reversal on the basis of plain error. View "United States v. Jonathan Wells" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with second-degree murder and tampering with evidence. A jury acquitted Defendant of the murder charge but found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense, and tampering with evidence. The district court sentenced Defendant to a total term of 300 months imprisonment. Defendant raised three issues on appeal: (1) the denial of his motion to suppress custodial statements; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence on the manslaughter and tampering counts; and (3) the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary. Considering all the circumstances surrounding the ongoing search for the victim and conditions in which Defendant was held and questioned by law enforcement, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. Further, the court explained that a close review of the record establishes that a jury could have reasonably concluded that Defendant was guilty of manslaughter. The jury heard evidence that Defendant and the victim were the only two adults present at the cabin; that the victim’s blood was found both inside and outside the cabin; that Defendant had scratch marks on his face and upper body; and that Rooney and the victim were fighting in the time leading up to her death. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Defendant put the victim’s body in the fire, which destroyed any evidence of the cause of death. Finally, the court found that Defendant’s claim that his sentence was substantively unreasonable is unavailing. View "United States v. Jonathan Rooney" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to a firearms offense. The district court imposed a sentence of thirty-two months’ imprisonment. Defendant argued that the district court committed procedural error in calculating his base offense level.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the guidelines define “crime of violence” as “any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Commentary to the guidelines provides that “crime of violence” includes the crimes of aiding and abetting or conspiring to commit such an offense. Defendant contends that carjacking does not categorically involve the use of threatened force because the “intimidation” element in the statute does not require a communicated threat of force. The Eighth Circuit has explained, however, that “bank robbery by intimidation requires proof that the victim ‘reasonably could infer a threat of bodily harm’ from the robber’s acts.” Defendant also argued that his conspiracy to commit carjacking offense does not qualify as a crime of violence because conspiracy offenses do not require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. His argument is foreclosed by the commentary to USSG Section 4B1.2 and the court’s precedent. View "United States v. Melvin Shields" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court sentenced him to 110 months in prison. He appealed his sentence. Defendant argued the district court erred in determining he had a “controlled substance offense” under U.S.S.G. Sections 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) and 4B1.2(b).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is no equal protection violation “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis” for the application of United States v. Henderson. Because Henderson was neither unexpected nor indefensible, its interpretation of the guidelines had a rational basis. The district court did not plainly err in not sua sponte finding that applying Henderson violated Defendant’s equal protection rights. Moreover, the court wrote that the district court considered Section 3553(a) factors and thoroughly explained its decision. It did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Christopher Evans" on Justia Law

Minnesota sued a litany of fossil fuel producers1 (together, the Energy Companies) in state court for common law fraud and violations of Minnesota’s consumer protection statutes. In doing so, it joined the growing list of states and municipalities trying to hold fossil fuel producers responsible for alleged misrepresentations about the effects fossil fuels have had on the environment. The Energy Companies removed to federal court. The district court granted Minnesota’s motion to remand, and the Energy Companies appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Congress has not acted to displace the state-law claims, and federal common law does not supply a substitute cause of action, the state-law claims are not completely preempted. The court reasoned that because the “necessarily raised” element is not satisfied, the Grable exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule does not apply to Minnesota’s claims. Further, the court wrote that the connection between the Energy Companies’ marketing activities and their OCS operations is even more attenuated. Thus, neither requirement is met, there is no federal jurisdiction under Section 1349. View "State of Minnesota v. American Petroleum Institute" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. He appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Defendant argued that his unconstitutional arrest stemmed from the Brown County Sheriff’s Office’s reckless conduct, i.e., its failure to establish any procedure to handle recalled warrants. Defendant contends that the office should have implemented a review system, suggesting that “[a] simple, routine process of a weekly review would have caught the error.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that it was employee negligence—not reckless disregard of constitutional requirements—that resulted in the failure to remove Defendant’s recalled warrant from the file and the computer system. The sheriff’s office manager and her co-worker’s negligent conduct “was not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion” of the evidence garnered after Defendant’s arrests. Thus, the court wrote in light of its conclusion that the exclusionary rule does not apply, it need not consider the government’s alternate ground for admission of the evidence, i.e., that Defendant’s resistance to his illegal arrest furnished grounds for a second, legitimate arrest. View "United States v. Elmer Zahn" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, seeking to purchase firearms, successfully petitioned a Minnesota state court to restore his right to possess firearms under the Minnesota restoration of rights statute. He was then granted the right to purchase and a permit to carry by local Minnesota governments. But no federally licensed dealer will sell him a firearm. Federal law will not let them do that, the FBI advised Plaintiff, because “the Minnesota Restoration of Rights does not restore federal firearm rights for felony convictions listed on your Iowa state record.” Invoking the civil remedy Congress created in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Plaintiff then filed this civil action against the United States under 18 U.S.C. Section 925A, seeking an order allowing him to purchase firearms and directing the FBI to correct the allegedly erroneous information that he is ineligible to possess a firearm in Minnesota. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under federal law, Plaintiff may not possess a firearm if he is a person “convicted in any court” of a qualifying crime.” His prior Minnesota and Iowa felony convictions both qualify. Beecham teaches that, in evaluating whether rights have been restored, we look to the “law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.” Lowe held that “only the convicting jurisdiction can restore civil rights.” Therefore, the district court properly held that the restoration of civil rights in Minnesota applied only to Plaintiff’s Minnesota convictions. As the Iowa convictions have not been restored, under federal law, they continue to bar him from possessing a firearm. View "Brent Smith v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of several child pornography-related offenses. He appealed the district court’s denial of his pretrial suppression motion, the application of a sentencing enhancement, and the grouping of his counts at sentencing.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even if Defendant showed cause, he wasn’t prejudiced, which is required for good cause. The Government offered significant evidence at trial that supported Defendant’s conviction, including his incriminating admissions that he received and produced child pornography and explicit content recovered from his and the minor victim’s phones. While the motel room evidence was incriminating in the sense that it worked against Defendant, “[t]he desire to suppress” such evidence is “not by [itself] sufficient to establish good cause to justify relief from a waiver of a defense, objection, or request under Rule 12.” Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant leave to make an untimely pretrial motion.In calculating his sentence, Defendant says that the district court erred when it declined to group three counts together because those counts involved substantially the same harm. But the court explained that even if it grouped Defendant’s offenses the way he suggests, he would still receive a life sentence because his combined offense level would exceed 43, so any error was harmless. View "United States v. Travis Mayer" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and the district court imposed a sentence of 71 months of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, asserting that the government violated the terms of the plea agreement, rendering her appeal waiver invalid and that the district court procedurally erred when determining her advisory Guidelines range. Defendant suggests that the United States impermissibly objected to her receiving an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment “based on” her “pre-plea conduct.”   The Eighth Circuit enforced the waiver and dismissed Defendant’s appeal. The court explained that it is true that the government cannot object to an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment based on a defendant’s pre-plea conduct if it initially agreed at the time the plea was entered that the defendant “qualified for” that adjustment. But here, the government took no position in the plea agreement on whether an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment was warranted. And in any event, the government’s objection at sentencing was based on Defendant’s post-plea conduct, not any conduct that pre-dated the plea agreement. In the waiver, Defendant expressly gave up “any and all rights to appeal . . . [her] sentence,” which includes her appeal of the district court’s denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment. And she does not contend that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary or that enforcing it “would result in a miscarriage of justice.” View "United States v. Lacee Tuttle" on Justia Law