Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence of 1,680 months imprisonment for seven counts of child-exploitation and child pornography offenses. Specifically, he challenged the jury selection, the jury instructions, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the reasonableness of the district court’s sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained here the magistrate judge conducted extensive voir dire, and the parties had ample opportunity to examine the jurors. Throughout the process, the magistrate judge took care to rehabilitate wavering jurors by focusing them on what they were being asked to do as jurors—listen to the evidence and fairly and impartially judge the facts. Ultimately, the magistrate judge accepted Juror 3’s responses as indicating that he would be able to put aside his visceral reactions and impartially consider the evidence. On this record, that finding was not a “manifest error,” and the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove Juror 3.   Further, the court explained that the district court carefully considered the 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) factors and sentenced Defendant within the guidelines range, the calculation of which Defendant does not challenge. The district court noted Defendant’s “extremely dangerous” conduct in pulling a loaded handgun from his waistband and pointing it at a law-enforcement officer’s head when he was arrested. The court then emphasized that Defendant’s offense conduct was “particularly disturbing.” It also found by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant had sexually abused his ex-girlfriend’s daughter. It did not err in considering this conduct, even though Nosley was acquitted of it in state court. View "United States v. Nathan Nosley" on Justia Law

The United States Air Force required all service members to be vaccinated against COVID-19, subject to certain exemptions. In this case, thirty-six members of the Air Force, Air Force Reserve, or Air National Guard sued the Secretary of Defense and others, alleging that the government’s denial of their requests for religious exemptions violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Airmen sought a nationwide preliminary injunction prohibiting the Air Force from taking steps to discharge any of the Airmen and from denying travel, training, or other career opportunities to them. The district court denied the motion and later dismissed much of the case, although one aspect of the complaint remains pending in the district court. The Airmen appealed the order denying the request for preliminary injunctive relief.
The Eighth Circuit, in light of intervening developments that have granted the Airmen all of the relief requested, dismissed the appeal. The court explained that none of the Airmen is subject to a COVID-19 vaccination requirement, and no adverse action may be taken against the Airmen for refusing to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. A statutory change that discontinues a challenged practice usually makes an appeal moot. View "Tanner Roth v. Lloyd Austin, III" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Defendant to 75 months imprisonment. The government appealed the district court’s decision not to enhance Defendant’s sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e)(1). The government argues on appeal that the definition of MDMA at Minnesota Rules, part 6800.4210, is identical to the federal definition of MDMA. They argue that the district court should have deferred to the expert agency’s interpretation of the term “isomers,” which is contained in the Rule, rather than allowing the statute to expand the definition.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court found that the version of the Minnesota statute applicable to Defendant’s 2011 felony drug convictions prohibiting isomers of methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) was overbroad. The court explained for the enhancement to apply, the court would have to read “isomers” in Minnesota Rules, part 6800.4210, item C, as excluding certain isomers, namely, those excluded in the federal regulations. However, if the court read “isomers” as being limited to optical, positional, and geometric isomers, it would render superfluous the language of Minn. R. 6800.4210, “whether optical, positional, or geometric.” A common sense reading of the statute suggests that Minn. R. 6800.4210 limits some isomers, while Minn. Stat. Section 152.02, subd. 2(3) (2009) limits all isomers. Therefore, Defendant does not have the requisite three ACCA convictions for enhanced sentencing. View "United States v. Lorenzo Heard, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to the charge that he was an unlawful user of a controlled substance in possession of a firearm. He was charged with this offense on December 15, 2020, and arrested on December 17. A warrant search of his residence on December 20 found marijuana, cannabis flowers, cocaine, digital scales, drug packaging, stockpiles of magazines and ammunition, and a handgun. Defendant pleaded guilty to the Section 922(g)(3) offense in October 2021. The government agreed not to file charges related to the December arrest and warrant search (the “December 2020 search”), and to request a within-guidelines-range sentence. In calculating the advisory guidelines range, the PSR increased the offense level because Defendant used drugs and the Glock handgun in connection with his Section 922(g) offense. The district court overruled Defendant’s objections to the enhancements, adopted the PSR in full, and imposed a 72-month sentence. Defendant appealed the sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that even without evidence of Defendant’s activities at the residence in the intervening period, during which he was tried and convicted of state drug offenses, the court concluded this evidence is consistent with the findings of relevant conduct in Anderson (“a career of drug dealing”), and in Lawrence (“continuous pattern of drug activity”). Thus, the district court did not commit error, much less “clear or obvious” plain error, when it failed to find that Defendant’s conduct revealed by the December 2020 arrest and search, as set forth in the PSR and in Special Agent’s testimony, was not relevant conduct under Section 1B1.3 of the Guidelines. View "United States v. Gregorio Soto, Jr." on Justia Law

After a three-day trial, a jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm and, in a separate count, of being a felon in possession of ammunition, following a shooting in north Minneapolis. The district court imposed concurrent 115-month sentences on each count. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of the interstate commerce element of the firearm offense, insufficient evidence of possession of ammunition and that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The government’s appeal brief noted that the two counts are multiplicitous and should have been merged for sentencing purposes.   The Eighth Circuit agreed the firearm and ammunition convictions are multiplicitous as submitted to the jury. Therefore, one must be vacated to eliminate plain error prejudice, the two $100 special assessments. The court otherwise affirmed. The court reasoned in these circumstances, it was plain error not to merge the two counts for sentencing purposes, and the appropriate remedy is to remand with directions to vacate one of the multiplicitous convictions. The court left to the district court which of the two counts to vacate. The court wrote it does not require full resentencing or a new trial. View "United States v. Johnnie Haynes" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s1 denial of his pro se motion to terminate supervision or modify conditions of supervised release. Defendant argued that the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 and his Fifth Amendment due process rights when it denied Defendant’s motion in a sealed document without the procedural protections of appointed counsel, a hearing, and the opportunity to review and challenge the U.S. Probation Office’s recommendation. Additionally, he challenged the terms of his supervised release as overbroad and unconstitutional.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not violate Rule 32.1(c)(1) by failing to provide Defendant with counsel and a hearing before it denied his motion to terminate supervision or modify the conditions of his supervised release. By its plain language, Rule 32.1(c)(1) applies only if a district court “modif[ies] the conditions of . . . supervised release.” Here, the district court refused to modify Defendant’s conditions of supervised release. Under Rule 32.1’s plain language, neither a hearing nor counsel was required before the court denied Defendant’s motion. Further, because Defendant suffered no prejudice from the information contained in the Supervision Summary, no due-process violation occurred. View "United States v. James Norris, Jr." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress and his request for a Franks hearing. The court explained that because Defendant was not unlawfully questioned, his contention that he could not have knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights because of the allegedly unlawful questioning necessarily fails. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and his request for a Franks hearing. Defendant asserted that the district court correctly held that “law enforcement’s two warrantless K9 sniffs of the curtilage of his home were violations of the Fourth Amendment.” Defendant also argued that the district court erred, however, in ultimately denying his motion to suppress based on its application of the Leon good faith exception.    The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the two dog sniffs occurred in September 2019; at that time, we “had neither expressly overruled Scott nor explained how Jardines applies to apartment doors in a common hallway.” The applicable standard is an objective—not subjective—one. Applying this standard, the district court correctly denied Defendant’s suppression motion. The court agreed with the government that Defendant’s challenges to the search warrant affidavit’s omission of certain details about the two dog sniff amount to “an attempt to relitigate the merits of the curtilage issue.”   Further, the court held that the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statements given while he was in custody. As the district court correctly explained, “Police asked Defendant a series of simple questions to confirm his identity and ensure officer safety. They were not seeking to elicit incriminating responses from Defendant. He was read his Miranda rights prior to his further questioning in the bathroom and upon the continued questioning at the police station.” His contention that he could not have knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights because of the allegedly unlawful questioning necessarily fails. View "United States v. Donell Hines" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and heroin. The district court sentenced him to 180 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing the court erred in applying a two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement and that his sentence is unreasonable.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court described specific portions of the testimony that either Defendant “struggled to explain” or were simply “fanciful” and noted that Defendant’s testimony under oath directly contradicted his earlier statements to law enforcement made immediately after his arrest. The court wrote that the district court properly addressed each element of perjury, and the court’s findings are sufficient to support an obstruction-of-justice enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence.   Further, the court wrote that the district court may “assign relatively greater weight to the nature and circumstances of the offense than to the mitigating personal characteristics of the defendant,” and the record demonstrates that the court properly considered Section 3553(a) factors. Under these circumstances, Defendant’s sentence was not unreasonable. View "United States v. Joel Garcia" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of two child pornography-related offenses. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court’s admission of social media evidence at trial, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the court’s application of a 5-level enhancement at sentencing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed his convictions but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that taken together, this circumstantial evidence provided a sufficient basis for the district court to permit the jury to decide whether the MeWe account belonged to Defendant. Further Defendant asserted that the district court erred in applying an enhancement under USSG Section 4B1.5(b)(1) because he was not convicted of a “covered sex crime.” With the 5-level enhancement, Defendant’s advisory Guidelines range was 262 to 327 months of imprisonment; without it, the range would be 180 to 188 months. Under these circumstances, Defendant has shown “a reasonable probability that but for the error he would have received a more favorable sentence.” View "United States v. Vincent Perez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied for and was denied disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). Plaintiff appealed the decision to the District of Minnesota, arguing in part that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) who oversaw the case lacked authority because SSA Acting Commissioner Nancy Berryhill was not properly serving as Acting Commissioner when she ratified the ALJ’s appointment. The district court agreed.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court found that Berryhill was properly serving as Acting Commissioner when she ratified the appointment. Plaintiff argued the district court’s decision can be affirmed because Berryhill was never directed to serve by the president. In essence, he argued the 2016 succession memo became null and void when administrations changed in 2017. The court concluded that this argument fails. The general rule is that presidential orders without specific time limitations carry over from administration to administration. Plaintiff provides no authority indicating succession orders are any different from other presidential orders. The text of the FVRA likewise does not change the default position that presidential orders, including succession memos under the FVRA, carry over from one administration to the next. View "Brian Dahle v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law