Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant received a 262-month prison sentence after a jury found him guilty of selling methamphetamine. The Second Circuit appointed counsel, who has attempted to file an Anders brief and asked to withdraw.   The Second Circuit determined that it cannot decide the appeal until counsel files a brief that satisfies Anders’s requirements. The Supreme Court has been clear that an “attorney must be zealous and must resolve all doubts and ambiguous legal questions in favor of his or her client.” Here, the brief appears to make inferences against Defendant. For example, it argues that “he waived his right to make a sufficiency of the evidence argument on appeal” by failing to make a motion when prompted. It turns out, however, that trial counsel agreed that he did not “want to waive any appeal” when questioned by the district court. Accordingly, the court held that the motion to withdraw is held in abeyance pending the filing of a compliant brief. View "United States v. Ramien Collins" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted and convicted of abusive sexual contact. Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the district court constructively amended his indictment in violation of his right to a grand jury. Defendant argued that the district court constructively amended the indictment by providing a definition of groin that included genitalia. According to Defendant, his Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury was violated because the jury could have convicted him of a different offense (touching the genitalia) than the one he was indicted for (touching the groin). The district court denied the motion.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court’s definition indicated that the groin “often” includes the genitalia, which is different than the groin always including the genitalia. These terms naturally overlap as a function of human anatomy.   Moreover, Defendant argued that the six locations outlined in Section 2246(3) are discrete, so referencing one location (genitalia) in the definition of another (groin) constructively amends the indictment. The court disagreed. If this were true, then a separate part of the court’s definition would have the same problem because it references the “inner thigh,” one of the six locations defined in Section 2246(3). Defendant points to United States v. Burch, where the court conformed the jury instructions to the indictment by limiting the definition of “sexual contact” to what was alleged in the indictment (“touching of the genitalia”). But Burch only supports that each Section 2246(3) location is narrower than “sexual contact,” not that each location is independent of each others. View "United States v. Neeraj Chopra" on Justia Law

The Swampbuster Act and United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) regulations work together to provide farmers with the right to request reviews of wetland certifications. The Swampbuster Act’s review provision (“Swampbuster Review Provision”) provides that a prior wetland certification “shall remain valid and in effect . . . until such time as the person affected by the certification requests review of the certification by the Secretary.” In turn, a regulation (“Review Regulation”) provides procedural requirements a farmer must follow to make an effective review request.   Appellant filed an action alleging that: (1) the Review Regulation contravenes the Swampbuster Review Provision; (2) the Review Regulation was never submitted to Congress or the Comptroller General as required by the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”); and (3) the NRCS’s decisions to refuse to consider Appellants 2017 and 2020 review requests violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Review Regulation imposes reasonable procedural requirements a farmer must follow to make an effective review request and thereby delimit a prior wetland certification. Because the Swampbuster Review Provision is silent as to the nature of an effective review request, the Review Regulation does not conflict with the Swampbuster Review Provision. Further, the court wrote that the CRA’s judicial review provision precludes review of Appellant’s CRA claim. Finally, the court held that the NRCS’s decisions to refuse to consider Appellant’s review requests were not arbitrary and capricious because Appellant failed to comply with the Review Regulation. View "Arlen Foster v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture" on Justia Law

Defendant loaded a pickup truck with a 20-pound pipe bomb, two assault rifles, and a sledgehammer and drove with two confederates from Illinois to the Dar al-Farooq Islamic Center in Bloomington, Minnesota. The trio smashed a window of the Imam’s office before the parishioners’ dawn prayer and threw gasoline, diesel fuel, and the pipe bomb inside. The bomb detonated. The jury convicted Defendant of five federal offenses. Four are at issue on appeal: Count 1, intentionally damaging religious property because of its religious character; Count 2, obstructing by force the free exercise of religious beliefs; Count 3, conspiracy to commit Counts 1 & 2 by means of fire or explosive; and Count 4, carrying or using a destructive device during or in relation to a crime of violence. Defendant appealed, raising these same issues and arguing, with regard to the second, that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), overruled the district court’s analysis of why Sections 247(a)(1) and (a)(2) are not overbroad predicate felonies.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it agrees with the government that Section 247(a) is a legitimate exercise of Congress’s power to punish offenders who “rely on the channels and instrumentalities of commerce in committing criminal acts.” Further, the court held that considering this offense under the modified categorical approach, the elements fall within the force clause as defined in Section 924(c)(3). Finally, the court held that Defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice of any kind, either transitory or permanent, to the ability of her counsel to provide adequate representation in the criminal proceedings. View "United States v. Emily Hari" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of possessing firearms and ammunition as an armed career criminal in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced him to 324 months in prison. He appealed his conviction. Defendant contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the eyewitness identification because it was “based on the impermissibly suggestive photo array line-up and the likelihood of misidentification.”    The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Even if the line-up were impermissibly suggestive, as Defendant contends, it was sufficiently reliable (i.e., there was not a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification). The court explained that by balancing these factors, there was “very little likelihood of misidentification.” As the district court found, the two eyewitnesses interacted with Defendant both at the shooting and at the bar before the shooting, giving them “ample opportunity” to see him. The eyewitnesses also consistently identified Defendant’s physical characteristics, including his lighter skin tone and the tattoo on his neck. Finally, the eyewitnesses expressed 100% certainty about their identifications. Thus, the court found that the district court did not err in declining to hold a hearing on the motion to suppress. Defendant claimed irreconcilable defenses: his defense relies on mistaken identity (he claims he was not at the apartment at the time of the shooting), while his brother claims both he and Defendant were at the shooting, but he did not possess a gun or shoot anyone. Therefore Defendant’s argument is flawed. View "United States v. Javaar Watkins" on Justia Law

Defendant z pled guilty to a drug offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A). The district court applied a two-level sentence enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon in connection with a drug offense under U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(1), while declining safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. Section 5C1.2. The court sentenced him to the statutory minimum of 120 months in prison. Defendant appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Defendant argued that the enhancement should not apply because the firearms in the garage were locked in the safe. But the weapons in the shed, where at least two of the four controlled purchases occurred, were not in a safe—which independently supports the enhancement. Even without independent evidence, the locked garage safe might support the enhancement. Further, Defendant stresses he had legitimate purposes for possessing the firearms. But this does not affect the analysis. Thus, the court held that it is not clearly improbable that the weapons were connected to Defendant’s drug offense. The district court properly applied the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(1). Further, the court held that sufficient evidence supports the conclusion that Defendant possessed the weapons in connection with the offense. Thus, the district court did not clearly err in finding Defendant ineligible for safety-valve relief because enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(1) was proper. Moreover, the court explained that the district court did not commit plain error by following Eighth Circuit precedent and properly assigning the burden of proof for safety-valve relief to Defendant. View "United States v. Michael Voelz" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). At sentencing, over Defendant’s objection, the district court applied an increased base offense level of 24 under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(2), finding Defendant’s two prior convictions for aggravated assault under Iowa Code Section 708.2(3) and his prior conviction for aggravated domestic abuse assault under Iowa Code Section 708.2A(2)(c) qualify as convictions for crimes of violence. Defendant appealed, arguing the district court erred in making these determinations.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under Iowa Code Section 708.2(3), aggravated assault occurs when “[a] person . . . commits an assault, as defined in section 708.1, and uses or displays a dangerous weapon in connection with the assault.” In United States v. McGee, the Eighth Circuit held Section 708.2(3) qualifies as a crime of violence under the force clause because the “display” of a dangerous weapon requires at least the threatened use of physical force. In addition, the court wrote that it is unaware of any Iowa case in which a defendant was convicted under Section 708.2(3) without knowingly or intentionally displaying a dangerous weapon. Accordingly, there is no “realistic probability” the Iowa courts would apply Section 708.2(3) in a situation where the defendant did not knowingly or intentionally display a dangerous weapon. View "United States v. Kaleb Shannan" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of robbing two branches of Regions Bank and brandishing a firearm during one of the robberies. Following trial, Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, for a new trial. He argued that (1) the government’s evidence was insufficient to prove his identity as the bank robber; (2) the government’s evidence was insufficient to prove the Regions Bank branches’ FDIC status, and (3) the verdict was the product of jury coercion after the district court instructed the jury to continue deliberating once a jury poll revealed the initial verdict lacked unanimity. The district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court acknowledged that Defendant “offered numerous persuasive challenges to the credibility of this identification” but ultimately concluded “that the fingerprint evidence and other testimony, in this case, were sufficient to permit a conviction absent any eye-witness identification. The court explained that the evidence offered in the present case exceeds what was offered in Rusan and sufficiently proved the Regions Bank branches’ FDIC status. The government presented testimony and introduced exhibits proving that the deposits of Regions Bank were insured by the FDIC and that the policy was in effect at the time of the robberies. Specifically, the government admitted into evidence the certified and stamped copies of the FDIC certificates. Finally, the court found that the district court’s “inquiries were essentially neutral and not calculated to affect the juror’s judgment. Thus, the court found no error of law or fact in this determination. View "United States v. Briran Blake" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of the People’s Republic of China and a long-time resident of the United States, conditionally pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit economic espionage. He appealed the conviction and sentence. The principal issue is whether the district court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained by a warrantless seizure and forensic search of Defendant’s digital devices as he was leaving Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport, with Shanghai, China, his final destination.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it agreed with the district court’s conclusion that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct non-routine forensic searches of Defendant’s electronic devices and acted reasonably in doing so. The court also concluded that Defendant waived his appeal of the $150,000 fine the district court imposed as part of his sentence. The court explained that no Circuit has held that the government must obtain a warrant to conduct a routine border search of electronic devices. Further, the court held that the officers and agents had background information, much of it corroborated, that provided a basis for assessing Defendant’s actions in May and June 2017. Their experience and training in international economic espionage and theft of trade secrets gave them reasonable suspicion for an extended border search that included a forensic search of electronic devices. Ultimately, the court held that the search was not constitutionally unreasonable. View "United States v. Haitao Xiang" on Justia Law

Two brothers died in a car accident on the way to a school basketball tournament. The brothers were driving to a basketball tournament for their school, Park Christian. The team drove in a three-car caravan: Park Christian's assistant coach and head coach each drove a car of players, with the brothers’ car at the end. During the drive, the head coach cut off a semi-truck, and the semi-truck encroached into the next lane. To avoid a collision, the brothers veered into the median, rolled, and crashed. A Sergeant prepared a Crash Reconstruction Report for the Minnesota State Patrol and found that the brothers’ interaction with the semi-truck caused the accident   Their parents brought claims under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1985(2) against Park Christian School, Park Christian administrators, the State of Minnesota, the Minnesota State Patrol, and Minnesota State Patrol officers. The district court dismissed their claims, and Plaintiffs’ appealed. Plaintiffs’ Rule 60.02(b) motion before the state courts alleged that there was a personal connection between the Sergeant and Park Christian which impacted the fairness and impartiality of the Sergeant's investigation and trial testimony   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Rooker-Feldman does not apply and that collateral estoppel bars the Section 1983 claim. The court wrote that it is doubtful that the Section 1985(2) claim survives collateral estoppel. But for the purposes of this appeal, the court found that the Section 1985(2) claim fails on the merits. View "Raymond Kvalvog v. Park Christian School, Inc." on Justia Law