Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff fled when Defendant police officer stopped him based on an outstanding warrant for fifth-degree theft. At the nearby police station, Plaintiff briefly refused to obey Defendant’s command to exit the squad car and proceed to the station for booking. When the handcuffed Plaintiff finally exited the car and stood up, Defendant struck him with his fist on the back of the head and neck. Plaintiff brought this action for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and asserted pendent Iowa state law claims for tortious assault and battery. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing both claims on the ground that the force used was objectively reasonable. Alternatively, the court ruled that Church was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal Section 1983 claim because any constitutional violation was not clearly established. Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that genuine issues of disputed facts preclude a determination, on this summary judgment record, of whether the alleged unlawful use of excessive force was objectively reasonable and, if not, whether the violation was clearly established at the time of the incident in question. Accordingly, the court reversed the dismissal of all claims, including Plaintiff’s pendent state law claims. View "Derek Westwater v. Kevin Church" on Justia Law

Following a six-week trial in 1998, a federal jury convicted Defendant of twelve crimes he committed as part of the 6-0 Tres Crips, including the five murders (Counts 51-55) and conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine (Count 2). Under the mandatory sentencing guidelines then in effect, the district court imposed statutory maximum life imprisonment sentences on those counts. Defendant sought Section 2255 relief under Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, which made relief under Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 available to eligible defendants sentenced prior to 2010. Invoking the concurrent sentence doctrine, the district court denied First Step Act relief. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion by employing the concurrent sentence doctrine to avoid resentencing Defendant.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that in reviewing the district court’s use of the concurrent sentence doctrine for an abuse of discretion, the district court applied the doctrine consistent with controlling Eighth Circuit decisions. The court explained that when, as here, the district court ruling on a First Step Act motion initially sentenced the defendant and later granted a sentence reduction, the court’s “plain statement” that it declined to exercise its discretion to grant a further reduction “closes the matter.” The district court properly treated the concurrent sentence doctrine as “a species of harmless-error review.” As it applied the proper analysis in invoking the doctrine, and its analysis is consistent with our First Step Act precedents, there was no abuse of its broad First Step Act discretion. View "United States v. Robert Jefferson" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of aggravated sexual abuse, and the district court sentenced him to 440 months in prison. Defendant appealed his conviction. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant claims the district court erred “by failing to instruct the jury that it had to agree on the specific act of sexual abuse in order to convict.” However, Defendant cites no authority that failure to give a specific unanimity instruction. To the contrary, the Eighth Circuit has held that jurors need not agree on a specific sexual act to reach a unanimous verdict.   Further, Defendant contends the district court erred in admitting hearsay statements regarding the reports of abuse. The court wrote that the statement was limited in scope to the victim’s disclosure of the abuse, not the specifics of it. But even if the statements were inadmissible hearsay, their admission would be harmless given the other evidence against Defendant.   Moreover, Defendant maintains he was deprived of his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial because the government’s closing argument “distorted its burden of proof and unfairly mischaracterized Defendant’s theory of the case.” Even if the closing were improper, under plain error review, the Eighth Circuit wrote it will “reverse only under exceptional circumstances,” which requires that Defendant show “a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different absent the alleged error.” The evidence and the district court’s instructions show this is not an exceptional case where the conviction is overturned based solely on a prosecutor’s statements during closing argument. View "United States v. Adam Poitra" on Justia Law

Appellees raised a First Amendment challenge to South Dakota’s statutory deadlines to submit petitions to initiate South Dakota statutes and to amend the South Dakota Constitution. After a bench trial, the district court agreed the filing deadline for petitions to initiate statutes violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, but the filing deadline for petitions to amend the state Constitution does not. The district court then permanently enjoined three South Dakota officials from enforcing the unconstitutional deadline and crafted a new filing deadline.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the filing deadline in South Dakota Codified Laws Section 2-1-1.2 violates the First Amendment, reversed the holding that the filing deadline in South Dakota Codified Laws Section 2-1-1.1 does not violate the First Amendment, and remanded with instructions to modify the permanent injunction. Further, the court denied the dueling motions to strike party submissions. The court explained that South Dakota’s filing deadline of one year before a general election “imposes a burden on political expression that the State has failed to justify.” In other words, South Dakota failed to provide evidence connecting the one-year deadline to its asserted interests. Further, in applying the same legal framework and record available for the filing deadline under South Dakota Codified Laws Section 2-1-1.2, the court concluded that the filing deadline under South Dakota Codified Laws Section 2-1- -15- 1.1 also violates the First Amendment. Finally, the court found that prescribing a new filing deadline is outside the scope of the district court’s authority. View "SD VOICE v. Kristi Noem" on Justia Law

The United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) permanently disqualified Euclid Market Inc. (“Euclid Market”) from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) after it determined Euclid Market had unlawfully trafficked SNAP benefits. After the USDA issued its final decision, Euclid Market filed an action in federal court under 7 U.S.C. Section 2023, requesting the district court set aside the USDA’s final decision. The district court found Euclid Market did not meet its burden to show the USDA’s action was invalid and entered judgment in favor of the government. Euclid Market appealed. Euclid Market argued that the district court erred by requiring it to produce transaction-specific evidence for every transaction raised by the USDA to meet its burden of proof.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded. The court agreed with Euclid Market that the transaction-specific standard is erroneous and that the district court applied such a standard in this case. A store’s failure to provide transaction-specific evidence for every transaction does not inherently doom its case. Concluding otherwise would create unnecessary tension with the fundamental principles of evidence. Further, a hardline rule that a store cannot prevail without transaction-specific evidence for each transaction raised by the USDA is inconsistent with the district court’s rightful discretion in weighing all of the relevant, admissible evidence to determine the validity of the disqualification by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Euclid Market Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

After a jury convicted Defendant, former Sheriff of Franklin County, Arkansas, of depriving two jail detainees of their constitutional rights by subjecting them to unreasonable force that resulted in bodily injury, the district court sentenced Defendant to 48 months imprisonment, followed by 2 years of supervised release. Defendant challenged both his conviction and his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court’s finding that Defendant attempted to influence Ball’s testimony was not clearly erroneous and sufficiently supports the district court’s application of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement. The district court sentenced Defendant to a within-Guidelines sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment. Defendant argued in a cursory fashion that his sentence is “greater than necessary,” given the alleged de minimis nature of his victims’ injuries and the purported bias of the witnesses at trial. However, the district court discussed Section 3553(a) factors in-depth and considered the proffered mitigating and aggravating circumstances in crafting the sentence. View "United States v. Anthony Boen" on Justia Law

WinRed, a “conduit” political action committee (PAC), centralizes donations to Republican-affiliated candidates and committees. WinRed helps them set up a WinRed.com webpage where donors contribute. WinRed collects and distributes the earmarked contributions. WinRed.com’s technical and maintenance services are at least partly performed by a separate entity, WinRed Technical Services, LLC (WRTS). The relationship between WinRed and WRTS is not clear, but the Eighth Circuit accepts WinRed’s affidavit that it operates exclusively in the domain of federal elections. The district court dismissed WinRed, Inc.’s request for a declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction preventing the Attorneys General from (1) investigating WinRed’s activities with respect to contributions; and (2) bringing a deceptive-practice action against it for those activities.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that WinRed gives two reasons to look beyond the statutory text. Neither succeeds. The court held that WinRed errs from the start by attacking a disclaimer mandate where none exists. Minnesota’s consumer-protection law prohibits deceptive practices, and federal law does not preempt Minnesota’s enforcing it against WinRed. Because an enforceable state law underlies General Ellison’s investigation, the investigation may proceed. View "WinRed, Inc. v. Keith Ellison" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on separate counts of producing, receiving, and possessing child pornography. He moved to suppress all evidence obtained after the warrantless seizure of his cell phone, including the images found on the phone, the evidence seized at his house, and the images found on the hard drive. Defendant also moved to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement. The district court denied Defendant’s motion in its entirety. Shrum entered conditional guilty pleas to one count of producing child pornography and one count of receiving child pornography and was sentenced to 210 months of imprisonment. Defendant timely appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant argued that his cell phone was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Sergeant had probable cause to believe Defendant’s phone contained contraband or evidence of a crime. The Sergeant had seen photos of text messages between A.B. and Defendant that indicated they had engaged in sexual activity, perhaps as recently as on the camping trip the night before. Further, there was a fair probability that those text messages, or related evidence of unlawful conduct, would be found on Defendant’s phone. Exigent circumstances were also present. When the Sergeant did find the victim, it appeared that she had just showered, suggesting to the Sergeant that she may have washed away physical evidence of sexual contact. Given the totality of the circumstances, the court agreed with the district court that the good-faith exception applies. View "United States v. Keith Shrum" on Justia Law

While in jail, Plaintiff clawed at his own eye with enough force to tear it out. Plaintiff sued nearly everyone involved, including St. Charles County, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court concluded that none of the individuals involved had violated his Fourth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment rights. Nor, in the absence of a constitutional violation or a county-wide custom of unconstitutional conduct, was St. Charles County liable for his injuries. The question is whether qualified immunity is available to those who may have prevented the injury.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that the record is devoid of evidence that the Officer and Sergeant consciously disregarded a serious medical need. And even if the Nurse’s failure to administer Plaintiff’s medications approached criminal recklessness, the court wrote, it cannot say that the law was so “clearly established” that she was on “fair notice” she was violating it. Further, Plaintiff cannot point to any court that has held that an officer was deliberately indifferent because he placed a pepper-sprayed inmate in a new cell with a sink. View "Jamie Leonard v. Steven Harris" on Justia Law

Officers in an armored police vehicle shot tear gas at three people near the scene of a protest in downtown St. Louis. The district court concluded that all three had a First Amendment retaliation claim.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court agreed that one Plaintiff has a valid First Amendment retaliation claim, but qualified immunity shields the officers from the claims brought by the others. Two of the Plaintiffs claimed that the First Amendment covers what they did, which was to observe and record police conduct during the St. Louis protest. The court wrote that even if it were to assume they are correct, observing and recording police-citizen interactions was not a clearly established First Amendment right in 2015. Further, in regard to Plaintiffs’ peaceful-assembly theory. The court reasoned even if the officers “unreasonably believed” that the group was refusing to comply with their earlier directions to disperse, their official orders—not retaliatory animus—caused them to use the tear gas.   However, in regard to the third Plaintiff, the court explained at this stage, there is enough evidence to establish the “personal involvement” of everyone in the armored vehicle. To be sure, Plaintiff could not see who launched the tear gas canister. But with multiple “officers present,” the jury could find that each one of them participated in the decision or that one did it “while the others failed to intervene.” Under these circumstances, the claims against the individual officers can proceed. View "Sarah Molina v. Daniel Book" on Justia Law