Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 lawsuit stemming from her son’s death while under the supervision of employees at an Arkansas jail. She alleged that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to her son’s serious medical needs. The district court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that it disagreed with the district court’s opinion that a layperson would recognize seizure-like activity as a serious medical need that one of the Defendant’s deliberately ignored. The court reasoned that a reasonable jury could not conclude from this description of events that Defendant was aware of a serious medical need. Second, a reasonable officer would not necessarily infer that seizure-like activity in these circumstances required him to take additional action. The decedent was behaving normally at booking, though very thirsty and reportedly under the influence of methamphetamine. It isn't unreasonable to believe that whatever medical episode he experienced during transport (if he actually experienced one) had fully resolved itself by the time Defendant encountered him.   Further, the court explained that in these circumstances, Defendants can't be faulted for presuming that the medical staff best knows the quantity and quality of information needed for assessments. And even though the decedent was obviously sick, recognizing that someone is sick is not the same as knowing that he is receiving inadequate care from a trained medical professional. View "Donna Reece v. S. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. On appeal, Defendant challenged an order of the district court denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed and concluded there was no error. The court explained that probable cause “is not a high bar: It requires only the kind of fair probability on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” In this case, the detective was not required to exclude all reasonable possibilities that Defendant was ignorant of the scale; he needed only a fair probability that she knew what was in the console. The combination of Defendant’s control over the vehicle, her proximity to the console, her history of an arrest for drugs, and her association with a backseat passenger who possessed drugs was sufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest. View "United States v. Jessica Mathes" on Justia Law

Appellant brought a variety of state and federal claims against the City of Waynesville (the City), the Waynesville Police Department (WPD), WPD Chief, WPD Officers, and Pulaski County Prosecutor (collectively, Appellees). The district court dismissed most of Appellant’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and later granted the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on Appellant’s remaining claims. Appellant appealed the grant of summary judgment. Appellant conceded that his unreasonable seizure and conspiracy-to-cause-false-arrest claims do not involve the officer. Additionally, Appellant clarified that his appeal of the unreasonable search claim is limited to “the district court’s determination about the computer and home searches.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that, at minimum, it was objectively reasonable for the police Chief and Officer to believe that Appellant had committed or was committing a violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 455.085.2, Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 565.090.1 or Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 565.225.2-3. Accordingly, arguable probable cause exists, meaning that it was not clearly established that arresting Appellant on these facts would violate his right to be free from unlawful seizure. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Appellant’s unreasonable-seizure claim because Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity.   Further, the court concluded that reasonable suspicion supported the search of Appellant’s house. Moreover, because there is only one minor inaccuracy in the otherwise thorough search warrant affidavit for Appellant’s computer, and the issuing judge found that there was enough evidence to support a finding of probable cause, that judgment is entitled to deference on appeal. View "Dennis Ryno v. City of Waynesville" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of possessing at least five kilograms of cocaine. Defendant retained new counsel and moved for judgment of acquittal or a new trial, raising numerous issues. The district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed. His principal argument, raised for the first time in the post-verdict motion, is that law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment by using expired tracking warrants to locate him when he was arrested returning to the Twin Cities from a trip to Chicago with thirteen pounds of cocaine in his vehicle.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it is undisputed that the Fourth Amendment argument at issue was an issue reasonably available for a pretrial motion to suppress that Defendant did not raise. However, the court agreed to review for plain error.  The court reasoned that nothing seriously affected the fairness or integrity of this prosecution. Whether the tracking warrants expired when Defendant was arrested, interviewed, and released on October 7 is an issue the court does not decide. However, it is hardly free from doubt, so any error in not reaching the issue was not plain. Moreover, Defendant fled when the police attempted to stop him on November 1, leading them on a hazardous high-speed chase that provided probable cause to arrest Defendant for resisting arrest, failing to stop after a collision, and reckless driving. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal or a new trial based on the alleged expiration of the tracking warrants. View "United States v. John Pickens, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 2021 conviction for various sex-trafficking offenses. He argues that the Government was prohibited from prosecuting him based on a “No Further Prosecution” clause in a prior 2018 plea agreement that resolved heroin-related charges against him.The Eighth Circuit dismissed the indictment and vacated Defendant’s conviction. The court concluded that the prior plea agreement’s promise of no further prosecution encompasses the sex-trafficking convictions appealed here. The court explained that it considers three actors in considering a defendant’s demand for specific performance of a plea agreement after the defendant has pleaded guilty: (1) the possible prejudice to the defendant, (2) the conduct of the government, and (3) the public interest. Here, the prejudice is clear. Defendant pleaded guilty in 2018 to one drug offense in exchange for the Government dismissing the remaining drug offenses and promising not to bring further charges arising from or directly relating to the investigation. The Government reneged on that promise by pursuing the sex-trafficking prosecution, which relied on facts that were part of and arose out of the 2018 investigation. As a result, Defendant faced charges he would not otherwise have faced had the Government stuck to its bargain. The public also has an interest in safety from criminal behavior and in the prosecution of crimes. But that does not outweigh constitutional due-process interests, and the Government’s breach of the plea agreement violated Defendant’s due-process rights. View "United States v. Marlin Thomas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of 15 child pornography-related offenses. On appeal, Defendant argued his possession and receipt of child pornography convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, and he contends his sentence violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Defendant raised an additional argument in a pro se supplemental brief, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions.   The Eighth Circuit held that Apprendi requires the resentencing of Defendant for the possession of child pornography conviction. In all other respects, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that there was sufficient evidence submitted to the jury establishing the victims were minors, including (1) W.S. testified he was 11 years old; (2) K.A. testified she was 15 and she informed Defendant she was 15 years old, and (3) N.W. and A.C. informed Defendant they were 13 years old, and their birth certificates introduced at trial corroborate their ages. Also, the material depicting all victims demonstrates they were minors based on their physical characteristics. However, here the jury made no finding of a qualifying minor victim, so the statutory maximum sentence the district court can impose is 10 years. Because the district court’s sentence on the possession conviction runs afoul of Apprendi, the court vacated the sentence and remanded it for resentencing. View "United States v. Kyle Soto" on Justia Law

While on supervised release after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, Defendant reportedly assaulted his girlfriend and therefore violated the conditions of his release. At the ensuing revocation hearing, the government did not call Defendant’s girlfriend to testify but instead related her statements through a different witness. The district court revoked Defendant’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months. Defendant maintains that the government's introduction of this hearsay denied him his due-process right to confront adverse witnesses.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that any error the district court may have committed in allowing the government to introduce this hearsay was harmless. The court reasoned that Defendant’s admission that he participated in a physical altercation with his girlfriend, coupled with the apparent injuries that resulted and the threatening messages sent in the immediate aftermath, supports a reasonable inference that he intentionally or knowingly committed the assault. Thus, the government has offered sufficient evidence apart from the girlfriend’s statements to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant committed a grade A violation of the conditions of his supervision. View "United States v. Calvin Starr" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that Police officers in the St. Peters Police Department created a text messaging group to update each other about local Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests. Although the text group was intended for official purposes, specifically for officers to share up-to-date information about local BLM protests, they also shared “unrelated” content. Plaintiff sent the group a video from an animated sitcom called “Paradise PD.” It showed a black police officer who accidentally shot himself with a media headline stating, “another innocent black man shot by a cop.” According to Plaintiff, the video was satire and a parody of the BLM protests. The next morning, the Police Chief berated Plaintiff, ordered him to resign, and told him that if he refused, Plaintiff would open an investigation and recommend to City Administrator that Plaintiff be fired. Plaintiff resigned and filed a lawsuit under Section 1983, alleging that he was retaliated against for exercising his First Amendment right to free speech. Defendants moved to dismiss, and the district court granted their motion.   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court reasoned that based on the allegations in the complaint, the group text was used to send both work-related and unrelated messages, and Plaintiff’s video was such an unrelated message. The court explained that while Plaintiff has met the threshold showing required to advance his First Amendment claim, the court expressed no opinion on the merits of that claim. View "Brian Bresnahan v. City of St. Peters" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a U.S.C. Section 1983 action against the City of Florissant, Missouri. They allege the City is liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), because Florissant police officers, acting pursuant to an unlawful custom or policy, violated First and Fourteenth Amendment rights at five protests in June and July 2020 when they declared an unlawful assembly and ordered the dispersal of protestors who had not committed the Missouri crimes of unlawful assembly or refusal to disperse. Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s Memorandum and Order dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim on the ground that a municipality’s police power “to declare that an assembly is unlawful and to order individuals to disperse is not tethered to Missouri’s statutes codifying the criminal offenses of unlawful assembly and failure to disperse.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (“FAC”) improperly limited Florissant’s broad civil authority to manage protests in the public interest to situations violating the criminal offenses of unlawful assembly and failure to disperse. The court reasoned that the alleged customs of declaring unlawful assemblies and ordering protesters to disperse in “the absence of an agreement of one person acting in concert with six or more other persons to imminently violate a criminal law with force or violence” do not state a claim of constitutional injury under Monell. Thus, the FAC failed to plausibly allege a constitutional violation by any city employee and therefore failed to state a claim of Monell liability. View "Khalea Edwards v. City of Florissant" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute at least 50 grams of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine and as part of his plea agreement he agreed to waive some of his rights to appeal his conviction and sentence. He nonetheless appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in applying the Sentencing Guidelines despite their harsh and disparate treatment of methamphetamine offenders, erred in treating the Guidelines as mandatory, and imposed an unreasonable sentence.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that the appeal waiver bars most of his appeal. As for the remainder, the court affirmed. The wrote that because the appeal waiver precludes appeal of the court's "abuse of discretion, or the imposition of an unreasonable sentence," the court dismissed this claim of error.   Further, even assuming that the district court erred in not sua sponte declaring the relevant methamphetamine Guidelines unconstitutional, the court concluded that any error was not plain. Defendant has cited scattered opinions from district courts across the country that take issue with the difference in treatment between those caught with pure methamphetamine and those with mixtures containing methamphetamine, but he hasn't shown that any of these courts held the relevant Guidelines unconstitutional. Those decisions instead appear to come from district courts that have taken these matters into consideration when selecting a sentence. Defendant has not pointed to any Supreme Court or circuit court authority to support his contention. View "United States v. Rene Lugo-Barcenas" on Justia Law