Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants (D1 and D2) were each convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) after the district court denied their motions to suppress. On appeal, Defendants challenged the district court's denial of their motions to suppress. D2 also challenged the court's withholding of the juror questionnaires that were completed during voir dire.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of D2's motion to suppress, finding that officers arrested him after he fled from them, at which point they had probable cause to arrest him for fleeing with intent to avoid arrest. However, the court remanded D2's case to the district court for the limited purpose of disclosing the completed questionnaires to defendant D2. Based on the record, the court could not conclude that the district court's questioning was adequate to determine if juror bias contributed to D2's conviction. View "United States v. Ronald Finley, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendants (D1 and D2) were each convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) after the district court denied their motions to suppress. On appeal, Defendants challenged the district court's denial of their motions to suppress.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of both Defendants' motions to suppress. Pertaining to D1, the court concluded that the district court did not err in finding that a reasonable police officer would have found that D1 was fleeing with the intent to avoid arrest. The interaction occurred during the day in a public area, and police officers were wearing tactical vests emblazoned "Police" and displayed badges. The officers also made repeated commands that were consistent with their intent to arrest him. View "United States v. Ronald Finley, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff argued with a police officer during a protest in downtown St. Louis. Defendant- Lieutenant saw the confrontation and, fearing for the other officer’s safety, pepper-sprayed him. Plaintiff alleged that the force used was both excessive and retaliatory the district court granted qualified immunity. Plaintiff brought excessive force and First Amendment retaliation claims against the Lieutenant and a municipal liability claim against the City of St. Louis.   The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims at summary judgment and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over what remained. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff’s arguments are just general complaints about the Lieutenant’s “true motivations, intentions, and testimonial fabrications.” None of these arguments make any difference because “evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force.” Further, even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, causation is missing. As Plaintiff acknowledged, the Lieutenant “was not even in the area” when he criticized the Bicycle Response Team. Nor did Plaintiff “have any interaction with him” during the mere seconds between the beginning of the incident and the use of pepper spray. Accordingly, the court’s conclusion that the Lieutenant did not violate Plaintiff’s First or Fourth Amendment rights also forecloses his constitutional claims against the City of St. Louis. View "Derek Laney v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested pursuant to an absconder warrant for failing to report to his supervising parole officer. Law enforcement received a tip that Defendant was staying at a certain residence and arrested him in the vicinity of the residence. Law enforcement then executed a warrantless search of that nearby residence. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search. The district court granted the motion to suppress, finding that law enforcement did not have reasonable suspicion that Defendant lived at the residence. The government appealed the order granting the motion to suppress, arguing that law enforcement had probable cause or at least reasonable suspicion that Defendant resided at the place searched.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting Defendant’s motion to suppress because law enforcement needed probable cause that Defendant was residing at the home in order to execute the warrantless search. The court explained that the informant’s tip had far fewer indicia of reliability to support probable cause without corroboration. True, the CI had given reliable information at least once before, but the record contains no details as to the basis of the tip about Defendant. View "United States v. Justin Thabit" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant both work for the State of Iowa. Plaintiff is a urologist at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics; Defendant is a professor at the University of Iowa College of Law. After Defendant criticized Plaintiff’s expert testimony in a case unrelated to this one, Plaintiff sued Defendant under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that Defendant retaliated against him for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim on multiple grounds, including that Plaintiff failed to allege plausibly that Linder’s conduct was under color of state law.  Plaintiff argues that his complaint contains ample facts that together plausibly allege that Defendant acted under color of state law. These include that Defendant (1) identified himself as a state employee when he criticized Plaintiff in the newspaper articles, (2) relied on “the prestige of his official position with [UI] to gain credibility with his audience,” and (3) “used the instrumentalities and resources of the State of Iowa to facilitate his retaliatory conduct.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff failed to plead adequately that Defendant’s retaliatory actions were under color of state law. Contrary to Plaintiff’s insistence, our case law is clear that a state employee, merely by publicly identifying himself as such, does not act under color of state law. Further, even assuming that a public university professor acts in his official capacity or within the scope of his employment when he comments on public affairs, it would not necessarily follow that he acts under color of state law. View "James Brown v. Marc Linder" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of committing a carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury. Under a separate count, they were convicted of using and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, the carjacking. Defendants appealed certain evidentiary and jury instruction issues, and also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the discharging a firearm conviction.The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions for carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury, finding no error in the district court's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions. However, the court concluded that Defendant's discharging a firearm conviction must be reduced to using a firearm. The court explained that the carjacking offense was complete at the moment of the taking, so the fact that the firearm was used after that point could not be used to support the discharging a firearm offenses. View "United States v. Ranson Long Pumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of his peers for possession of child pornography. Defendant challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and admission of certain evidence. Defendant challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, arguing the warrant was not sufficiently particular and lacked the requisite nexus.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained In this case, multiple child pornography images were flagged by a search engine, those images were affiliated with four IP addresses, and those IP addresses were registered to the address that was searched. In addition, the state court was aware that Defendant had a previous conviction for possession of child pornography and lived at the address flagged for child pornography. Considering these circumstances, the court concluded there was a sufficient nexus between the evidence to be seized and the place to be searched. Further, the court agreed with the district court that Defendant’s prior conviction for possession of child pornography has probative value because of its similarity to the charged offense.   Finally, the court explained that the non-Rule 414 evidence connecting Defendant to the child pornography on his tablet was overwhelming. And the government’s case was only marginally strengthened by the excess propensity evidence. Accordingly, the court held any error in admitting evidence under Rule 414 was harmless. View "United States v. Gene Schave" on Justia Law

Police Lieutenant deployed pepper spray into Plaintiff’s face, during a protest in St. Louis, Missouri. Plaintiff sued the police lieutenant and the City of St. Louis, alleging, federal claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for retaliatory use of force in violation of the First Amendment, as well as tort claims under Missouri law. The district court denied the lieutenant’s motion for summary judgment based on his defenses of qualified and official immunity and reserved ruling on whether the City is entitled to sovereign immunity on the state tort claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of summary judgment as to the lieutenant, vacated, in part, the denial of summary judgment to the City, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court explained that the lieutenant contended that at the time he pepper-sprayed Plaintiff, it was “not clearly established that a use of force that does not violate the Fourth Amendment violates the First Amendment.” The lieutenant forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the district court. In any event, the argument does not undermine the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s right to be free from a retaliatory use of force was clearly established at the time of the incident.  However, the court vacated the denial of summary judgment on the state tort claims and instruct the district court on remand to reach the merits of the sovereign immunity issue. View "Alison Dreith v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm but preserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant appealed and asked the court to reverse the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that in addition to crediting law enforcement’s testimony, the magistrate judge discredited witness testimony to the extent it varied from the officers’ description of events. The magistrate judge noted that the witness originally told the Sheriff there were only two people in the house when there were actually three. The magistrate judge also noted that the witness appeared to admit he lied when he “dropped his head” after the Sergeant confronted him about the discrepancy. Defendant insists the magistrate judge “infers too much.” But, again, the magistrate judge’s credibility determination after personally hearing and observing the witness’s testimony is virtually unassailable on appeal. And the Sergeants’ testimony was not inconsistent or implausible. View "United States v. Michael Mitchell" on Justia Law

After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Defendant’s conditionally pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. The court sentenced Defendant to 126 months imprisonment, varying upward six months from the mandatory minimum of 120 months, his advisory guidelines range. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, raising three Fourth Amendment issues emanating from a postal inspector’s warrantless seizure of an undeliverable Express Mail package sent to “Defendant Rm 512” at a hotel in Des Moines, Iowa. He also appealed his sentence, arguing it is substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately justify the upward variance.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Here, the district court carefully explained why it imposed a six-month upward variance, stating that a mandatory minimum sentence would “ignore” Defendant’s “ridiculously problematic” and “offensive” behavior during his pre-sentence detention for this offense. The court did not abuse its discretion by varying upward to account for dozens of serious security and disciplinary violations. View "United States v. Manuel Flores" on Justia Law