Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, seeking to purchase firearms, successfully petitioned a Minnesota state court to restore his right to possess firearms under the Minnesota restoration of rights statute. He was then granted the right to purchase and a permit to carry by local Minnesota governments. But no federally licensed dealer will sell him a firearm. Federal law will not let them do that, the FBI advised Plaintiff, because “the Minnesota Restoration of Rights does not restore federal firearm rights for felony convictions listed on your Iowa state record.” Invoking the civil remedy Congress created in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Plaintiff then filed this civil action against the United States under 18 U.S.C. Section 925A, seeking an order allowing him to purchase firearms and directing the FBI to correct the allegedly erroneous information that he is ineligible to possess a firearm in Minnesota. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under federal law, Plaintiff may not possess a firearm if he is a person “convicted in any court” of a qualifying crime.” His prior Minnesota and Iowa felony convictions both qualify. Beecham teaches that, in evaluating whether rights have been restored, we look to the “law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.” Lowe held that “only the convicting jurisdiction can restore civil rights.” Therefore, the district court properly held that the restoration of civil rights in Minnesota applied only to Plaintiff’s Minnesota convictions. As the Iowa convictions have not been restored, under federal law, they continue to bar him from possessing a firearm. View "Brent Smith v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of several child pornography-related offenses. He appealed the district court’s denial of his pretrial suppression motion, the application of a sentencing enhancement, and the grouping of his counts at sentencing.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even if Defendant showed cause, he wasn’t prejudiced, which is required for good cause. The Government offered significant evidence at trial that supported Defendant’s conviction, including his incriminating admissions that he received and produced child pornography and explicit content recovered from his and the minor victim’s phones. While the motel room evidence was incriminating in the sense that it worked against Defendant, “[t]he desire to suppress” such evidence is “not by [itself] sufficient to establish good cause to justify relief from a waiver of a defense, objection, or request under Rule 12.” Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant leave to make an untimely pretrial motion.In calculating his sentence, Defendant says that the district court erred when it declined to group three counts together because those counts involved substantially the same harm. But the court explained that even if it grouped Defendant’s offenses the way he suggests, he would still receive a life sentence because his combined offense level would exceed 43, so any error was harmless. View "United States v. Travis Mayer" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and the district court imposed a sentence of 71 months of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, asserting that the government violated the terms of the plea agreement, rendering her appeal waiver invalid and that the district court procedurally erred when determining her advisory Guidelines range. Defendant suggests that the United States impermissibly objected to her receiving an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment “based on” her “pre-plea conduct.”   The Eighth Circuit enforced the waiver and dismissed Defendant’s appeal. The court explained that it is true that the government cannot object to an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment based on a defendant’s pre-plea conduct if it initially agreed at the time the plea was entered that the defendant “qualified for” that adjustment. But here, the government took no position in the plea agreement on whether an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment was warranted. And in any event, the government’s objection at sentencing was based on Defendant’s post-plea conduct, not any conduct that pre-dated the plea agreement. In the waiver, Defendant expressly gave up “any and all rights to appeal . . . [her] sentence,” which includes her appeal of the district court’s denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment. And she does not contend that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary or that enforcing it “would result in a miscarriage of justice.” View "United States v. Lacee Tuttle" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence of 1,680 months imprisonment for seven counts of child-exploitation and child pornography offenses. Specifically, he challenged the jury selection, the jury instructions, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the reasonableness of the district court’s sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained here the magistrate judge conducted extensive voir dire, and the parties had ample opportunity to examine the jurors. Throughout the process, the magistrate judge took care to rehabilitate wavering jurors by focusing them on what they were being asked to do as jurors—listen to the evidence and fairly and impartially judge the facts. Ultimately, the magistrate judge accepted Juror 3’s responses as indicating that he would be able to put aside his visceral reactions and impartially consider the evidence. On this record, that finding was not a “manifest error,” and the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove Juror 3.   Further, the court explained that the district court carefully considered the 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) factors and sentenced Defendant within the guidelines range, the calculation of which Defendant does not challenge. The district court noted Defendant’s “extremely dangerous” conduct in pulling a loaded handgun from his waistband and pointing it at a law-enforcement officer’s head when he was arrested. The court then emphasized that Defendant’s offense conduct was “particularly disturbing.” It also found by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant had sexually abused his ex-girlfriend’s daughter. It did not err in considering this conduct, even though Nosley was acquitted of it in state court. View "United States v. Nathan Nosley" on Justia Law

The United States Air Force required all service members to be vaccinated against COVID-19, subject to certain exemptions. In this case, thirty-six members of the Air Force, Air Force Reserve, or Air National Guard sued the Secretary of Defense and others, alleging that the government’s denial of their requests for religious exemptions violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Airmen sought a nationwide preliminary injunction prohibiting the Air Force from taking steps to discharge any of the Airmen and from denying travel, training, or other career opportunities to them. The district court denied the motion and later dismissed much of the case, although one aspect of the complaint remains pending in the district court. The Airmen appealed the order denying the request for preliminary injunctive relief.
The Eighth Circuit, in light of intervening developments that have granted the Airmen all of the relief requested, dismissed the appeal. The court explained that none of the Airmen is subject to a COVID-19 vaccination requirement, and no adverse action may be taken against the Airmen for refusing to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. A statutory change that discontinues a challenged practice usually makes an appeal moot. View "Tanner Roth v. Lloyd Austin, III" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Defendant to 75 months imprisonment. The government appealed the district court’s decision not to enhance Defendant’s sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e)(1). The government argues on appeal that the definition of MDMA at Minnesota Rules, part 6800.4210, is identical to the federal definition of MDMA. They argue that the district court should have deferred to the expert agency’s interpretation of the term “isomers,” which is contained in the Rule, rather than allowing the statute to expand the definition.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court found that the version of the Minnesota statute applicable to Defendant’s 2011 felony drug convictions prohibiting isomers of methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) was overbroad. The court explained for the enhancement to apply, the court would have to read “isomers” in Minnesota Rules, part 6800.4210, item C, as excluding certain isomers, namely, those excluded in the federal regulations. However, if the court read “isomers” as being limited to optical, positional, and geometric isomers, it would render superfluous the language of Minn. R. 6800.4210, “whether optical, positional, or geometric.” A common sense reading of the statute suggests that Minn. R. 6800.4210 limits some isomers, while Minn. Stat. Section 152.02, subd. 2(3) (2009) limits all isomers. Therefore, Defendant does not have the requisite three ACCA convictions for enhanced sentencing. View "United States v. Lorenzo Heard, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to the charge that he was an unlawful user of a controlled substance in possession of a firearm. He was charged with this offense on December 15, 2020, and arrested on December 17. A warrant search of his residence on December 20 found marijuana, cannabis flowers, cocaine, digital scales, drug packaging, stockpiles of magazines and ammunition, and a handgun. Defendant pleaded guilty to the Section 922(g)(3) offense in October 2021. The government agreed not to file charges related to the December arrest and warrant search (the “December 2020 search”), and to request a within-guidelines-range sentence. In calculating the advisory guidelines range, the PSR increased the offense level because Defendant used drugs and the Glock handgun in connection with his Section 922(g) offense. The district court overruled Defendant’s objections to the enhancements, adopted the PSR in full, and imposed a 72-month sentence. Defendant appealed the sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that even without evidence of Defendant’s activities at the residence in the intervening period, during which he was tried and convicted of state drug offenses, the court concluded this evidence is consistent with the findings of relevant conduct in Anderson (“a career of drug dealing”), and in Lawrence (“continuous pattern of drug activity”). Thus, the district court did not commit error, much less “clear or obvious” plain error, when it failed to find that Defendant’s conduct revealed by the December 2020 arrest and search, as set forth in the PSR and in Special Agent’s testimony, was not relevant conduct under Section 1B1.3 of the Guidelines. View "United States v. Gregorio Soto, Jr." on Justia Law

After a three-day trial, a jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm and, in a separate count, of being a felon in possession of ammunition, following a shooting in north Minneapolis. The district court imposed concurrent 115-month sentences on each count. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of the interstate commerce element of the firearm offense, insufficient evidence of possession of ammunition and that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The government’s appeal brief noted that the two counts are multiplicitous and should have been merged for sentencing purposes.   The Eighth Circuit agreed the firearm and ammunition convictions are multiplicitous as submitted to the jury. Therefore, one must be vacated to eliminate plain error prejudice, the two $100 special assessments. The court otherwise affirmed. The court reasoned in these circumstances, it was plain error not to merge the two counts for sentencing purposes, and the appropriate remedy is to remand with directions to vacate one of the multiplicitous convictions. The court left to the district court which of the two counts to vacate. The court wrote it does not require full resentencing or a new trial. View "United States v. Johnnie Haynes" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s1 denial of his pro se motion to terminate supervision or modify conditions of supervised release. Defendant argued that the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 and his Fifth Amendment due process rights when it denied Defendant’s motion in a sealed document without the procedural protections of appointed counsel, a hearing, and the opportunity to review and challenge the U.S. Probation Office’s recommendation. Additionally, he challenged the terms of his supervised release as overbroad and unconstitutional.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not violate Rule 32.1(c)(1) by failing to provide Defendant with counsel and a hearing before it denied his motion to terminate supervision or modify the conditions of his supervised release. By its plain language, Rule 32.1(c)(1) applies only if a district court “modif[ies] the conditions of . . . supervised release.” Here, the district court refused to modify Defendant’s conditions of supervised release. Under Rule 32.1’s plain language, neither a hearing nor counsel was required before the court denied Defendant’s motion. Further, because Defendant suffered no prejudice from the information contained in the Supervision Summary, no due-process violation occurred. View "United States v. James Norris, Jr." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress and his request for a Franks hearing. The court explained that because Defendant was not unlawfully questioned, his contention that he could not have knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights because of the allegedly unlawful questioning necessarily fails. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and his request for a Franks hearing. Defendant asserted that the district court correctly held that “law enforcement’s two warrantless K9 sniffs of the curtilage of his home were violations of the Fourth Amendment.” Defendant also argued that the district court erred, however, in ultimately denying his motion to suppress based on its application of the Leon good faith exception.    The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the two dog sniffs occurred in September 2019; at that time, we “had neither expressly overruled Scott nor explained how Jardines applies to apartment doors in a common hallway.” The applicable standard is an objective—not subjective—one. Applying this standard, the district court correctly denied Defendant’s suppression motion. The court agreed with the government that Defendant’s challenges to the search warrant affidavit’s omission of certain details about the two dog sniff amount to “an attempt to relitigate the merits of the curtilage issue.”   Further, the court held that the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statements given while he was in custody. As the district court correctly explained, “Police asked Defendant a series of simple questions to confirm his identity and ensure officer safety. They were not seeking to elicit incriminating responses from Defendant. He was read his Miranda rights prior to his further questioning in the bathroom and upon the continued questioning at the police station.” His contention that he could not have knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights because of the allegedly unlawful questioning necessarily fails. View "United States v. Donell Hines" on Justia Law