Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and heroin. The district court sentenced him to 180 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing the court erred in applying a two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement and that his sentence is unreasonable.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court described specific portions of the testimony that either Defendant “struggled to explain” or were simply “fanciful” and noted that Defendant’s testimony under oath directly contradicted his earlier statements to law enforcement made immediately after his arrest. The court wrote that the district court properly addressed each element of perjury, and the court’s findings are sufficient to support an obstruction-of-justice enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence.   Further, the court wrote that the district court may “assign relatively greater weight to the nature and circumstances of the offense than to the mitigating personal characteristics of the defendant,” and the record demonstrates that the court properly considered Section 3553(a) factors. Under these circumstances, Defendant’s sentence was not unreasonable. View "United States v. Joel Garcia" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of two child pornography-related offenses. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court’s admission of social media evidence at trial, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the court’s application of a 5-level enhancement at sentencing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed his convictions but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that taken together, this circumstantial evidence provided a sufficient basis for the district court to permit the jury to decide whether the MeWe account belonged to Defendant. Further Defendant asserted that the district court erred in applying an enhancement under USSG Section 4B1.5(b)(1) because he was not convicted of a “covered sex crime.” With the 5-level enhancement, Defendant’s advisory Guidelines range was 262 to 327 months of imprisonment; without it, the range would be 180 to 188 months. Under these circumstances, Defendant has shown “a reasonable probability that but for the error he would have received a more favorable sentence.” View "United States v. Vincent Perez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied for and was denied disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). Plaintiff appealed the decision to the District of Minnesota, arguing in part that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) who oversaw the case lacked authority because SSA Acting Commissioner Nancy Berryhill was not properly serving as Acting Commissioner when she ratified the ALJ’s appointment. The district court agreed.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court found that Berryhill was properly serving as Acting Commissioner when she ratified the appointment. Plaintiff argued the district court’s decision can be affirmed because Berryhill was never directed to serve by the president. In essence, he argued the 2016 succession memo became null and void when administrations changed in 2017. The court concluded that this argument fails. The general rule is that presidential orders without specific time limitations carry over from administration to administration. Plaintiff provides no authority indicating succession orders are any different from other presidential orders. The text of the FVRA likewise does not change the default position that presidential orders, including succession memos under the FVRA, carry over from one administration to the next. View "Brian Dahle v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

D.B., a juvenile and an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree burglary pursuant to a plea agreement. The district court sentenced him to 12 months of official detention followed by a three-year term of juvenile delinquent supervision. D.B. appeals, arguing that his federal juvenile delinquency proceedings should have been dismissed because he was not afforded a speedy trial as required by the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), and that his sentence is unreasonable.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained it need not resolve whether D.B.’s speedy trial rights under the FJDA were violated because D.B. waived his right to appeal that issue as part of his plea agreement. Further, D.B. does not assert that his sentence is unlawful or that his counsel was ineffective. His sentence likewise did not violate the terms of his plea agreement. Although the district court declined to adopt the parties’ joint recommendation for a sentence of probation, the agreement cautioned that this recommendation was not binding on the district court. And that warning was expressly reiterated to D.B. during his change-of-plea hearing. Accordingly, the court concluded that the sentence imposed by the district court here was not plainly unreasonable. View "United States v. D. B." on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance and possession of a firearm. He reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress drugs and a gun seized from his rental vehicle after a traffic stop and incriminating statements he made later that day. On appeal, Defendant argued the district court erred because police officers did not have an objectively reasonable basis to believe he committed a traffic violation and then unconstitutionally expanded the stop while a drug dog sniffed the exterior of the vehicle.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, given the undisputed facts regarding the length of the stop, particularly its short duration, and the reasons given for the time it took to almost complete the purpose of the stop before the narcotics dog alerted to the rear of the driver’s side, the district court did not err in concluding that the Sergeant did not unlawfully prolong the stop before the dog alert gave the officers probable cause to arrest Defendant and search the vehicle. Further, the court held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation before Defendant made incriminating statements after being given Miranda warnings. Thus, the district court properly rejected his argument that the statements should be suppressed as fruit of a poisonous tree. View "United States v. James Rutledge" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of two counts of felon-in-possession and one count of possessing an unregistered firearm. Defendant brought three challenges. First, he argues that Standing Order 19-03 and Standing Order 16-043 denied him his constitutional right to prepare for trial. Second, he claims the district court erred in declining to give his requested jury instruction on duress and coercion. Finally, he challenges the evidentiary sufficiency of his conviction.   The Eighth Circuit. The court held that because Defendant did not show the absence of legal alternatives to firearm possession, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury on coercion/duress. Further, the court reasoned that Defendant’s own statements support the verdict. Although he was one of many passengers in the car that held the gun, he told officers that he “wouldn’t charge the other passengers with the gun” and joked that he might have held the other passengers hostage with a “12-gauge.” Officers testified that Defendant had never been told that a gun was found in the car, much less that it was a 12-guage. Police found the sawed-off shotgun under the passenger seat where Defendant sat. The gun’s stock was positioned toward him, bullets at his feet. Defendant’s knowledge that the car held a 12-gauge shotgun, the gun’s position, and his proximity to it support an inference that he knowingly possessed the gun. View "United States v. Eric Ladeaux" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of sexual abuse and aggravated sexual abuse of one child and abusive sexual contact and aggravated sexual abuse (two counts) of another child. The district court sentenced him to 32 years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing the court erred in admitting expert testimony about statistical studies of victims of child sexual abuse. Defendant argued the expert’s testimony improperly bolstered and vouched for the victims, rendering the trial fundamentally unfair   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the expert did not offer any information or opinion specific to this case. She repeatedly acknowledged she was not testifying whether sexual abuse occurred or whether the two victims were telling the truth. She testified only generally about child sexual abuse and victim statistics, based on her general knowledge of studies and her experience with hundreds of children she had interviewed. Further, the jury was specifically instructed that it must decide the case based on the evidence presented. The jury is presumed to follow all instructions. Thus, the district court did not commit error that was plain by allowing the expert’s testimony. View "United States v. Bennett Belt" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Minnesota prisoner, sued several officials of the Minnesota Department of Corrections, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights by failing to protect him from an attack by a fellow inmate. The district court granted summary judgment for the officials. Defendant appealed the dismissal of his Eighth Amendment claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court that the evidence is insufficient to show that any of the defendant officials subjectively concluded that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm and then failed to respond reasonably to it. The unrebutted evidence is that the two voting officials on the incompatibility committee considered incident reports and other relevant information but decided that the situation did not rise to the level of incompatibility—that is, they concluded that the evidence did not indicate a risk of serious bodily injury to an offender. This means that the officials did not draw the subjective inference that there existed a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. The officials predicted incorrectly, but they were not deliberately indifferent for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment. View "David Hodges v. Minnesota Dept. Corrections" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine with two prior serious drug felonies. The district court sentenced him to 324 months in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in admitting Rule 404(b) testimony from a man who was not involved in the charged conspiracy but began selling meth with Defendant three months after the conspiracy ended.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the government failed to give the notice required under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(3). But under a plain error standard of review, the error did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. The evidence of his participation in the conspiracy was robust. And, as he concedes, many witnesses had already testified about his drug connections to California.   Further, Defendant argued the testimony, particularly about him exchanging guns for drugs, was unduly prejudicial because it “changed a non-violent, alleged conspiracy into a hyper-violent one.” However, the court held that the evidence, particularly with the court’s limiting instruction, was not unduly prejudicial. Moreover, four cooperating witnesses and co-conspirators testified that Defendant brought and shipped meth into Nebraska for redistribution. Their testimony was further corroborated by a package (intercepted by law enforcement) with about five pounds of meth; Postal Service records of packages sent; records of wire transfers sent to California; phone records; and records of drug sales kept by a cooperating witness. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. View "United States v. Enrique Abarca" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine or 5 grams or more of actual, pure methamphetamine, two counts of distribution of heroin, and one count of distribution of heroin and methamphetamine. On appeal, he challenged the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based on the introduction of a stipulation as to his codefendant’s prior conviction, its refusal to give his requested jury instructions, and the sufficiency of the evidence on the conspiracy count. He also challenged the district court’s calculation of his advisory sentencing guidelines range.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the stipulation to be introduced or in rejecting Defendant’s proposed jury instructions, and there was sufficient evidence to convict him of conspiracy to distribute. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial. Further, the court wrote that the district court did not clearly err in calculating the drug quantity involved in Defendant’s offense. The district court’s quantity determination was largely based on a customer’s and a confidential informant’s testimony. The district court found these witnesses to be credible, and the court found no reason to overturn that finding. View "United States v. Charleton Maxwell" on Justia Law