Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was arrested and charged with firearm and drug charges after an officer claimed to see a bag of drugs in Defendant's car that was in plain view. In a motion to suppress, the officer testified inconsistently with the radio call. However, the district court found the officer credible and denied Defendant's motion. On appeal, Defendant claimed that the district court should not have credited the officer's testimony.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, finding that the district court was entitled to credit the police officer's testimony over Defendant's. In finding that the drugs were in plain view, the district court implicitly credited the officer's testimony over his radio call. While the two statements were at odds, the court’s credibility determination did not amount to clear error. View "United States v. Lamont White" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was removed from a political rally and arrested for violating a St. Louis, Missouri ordinance that prohibits disturbing the peace. After Plaintiff was acquitted of that charge in state court, he brought claims against, as pertinent to this appeal, three St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department officers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, and Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed holding that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to mistakenly believe, under the totality of the circumstances that Plaintiff was engaged in acts or conduct inciting violence or intended to provoke others to violence. The court explained that two of the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest and then initiate prosecution against Plaintiff meaning that it was not clearly established that doing so would violate Plaintiff’s right to be free from unlawful seizure, malicious prosecution, or First Amendment retaliation. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to those officers. Further, the court wrote that the district court properly granted qualified immunity to the remaining officer because it was not clearly established that initiating prosecution against Plaintiff would violate his Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution or his corresponding right under Missouri law. View "Rodney Brown v. Matthew T. Boettigheimer" on Justia Law

This is the third appeal to the Eighth Circuit involving litigation arising from police response to protest activity in St. Louis on September 17, 2017. In this case, as in the others, Plaintiffs allege that St. Louis police officers boxed civilians into a downtown intersection in a maneuver characterized as a “kettle.” Some persons caught in this kettle allegedly were beaten, pepper sprayed, handcuffed with zip-ties, and arrested. The Eighth Circuit has issued two decisions in cases brought by different plaintiffs against the same six police officers.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying the officers’ motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims alleging use of excessive force and conspiracy to deprive civil rights. The court affirmed the order with respect to the claims alleging unlawful arrest.   The court explained that the case-at-hand arises in the same procedural posture and includes the same relevant factual allegations as Baude v. Leyshock, 23 F.4th 1065 (8th Cir. 2022), and Baude precludes a grant of qualified immunity on the arrest claims in this case as well. Thus, the court concluded that the allegations, in this case, are insufficient to establish a plausible claim that the defendant officers violated any Plaintiffs clearly established right against the use of excessive force. View "Alicia Street v. Gerald Leyshock" on Justia Law

Appellants are four Minnesota state employees who sued unions that represented their local bargaining units. The employees sought monetary relief based on the amount of so-called “fair-share” fees that were deducted from employee paychecks for the benefit of the unions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the unions.  On appeal, the employees argue that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the unions on each of the claims for retrospective relief.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the unions’ reliance on Section 179A.06 was objectively reasonable. It is an open question whether subjective intent is relevant to the defense, but the employees did not present a submissible case that the unions collected fair-share fees in subjective bad faith in any event. Therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for the unions on these claims.   The unions prevailed on motions for summary judgment. The rules of civil procedure provide those costs “should be allowed to the prevailing party,” unless the court or a federal statute or rule directs otherwise. Further, the employees point to no authority that requires a district court to reduce an award of costs because a defendant opted to forgo a motion to dismiss and to file a dispositive motion only after developing a factual record. A defendant may choose how best to defend a lawsuit, and if the case is resolved in favor of the defense on a motion for summary judgment, then the defendant is presumptively entitled to costs. View "Linda Hoekman v. Education Minnesota" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). He appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, two additional evidentiary rulings, and the application of a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(3).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court first concluded that the officers had probable cause to arrest Richardson because the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest was sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that Defendant committed the offense of indecent exposure.   Further, the court concluded that the officers properly searched Defendant’s person and his car after he was arrested. The search of Defendant’s person was a proper search incident to arrest. The search of the CR-V was a proper probationary search because Defendant was subject to a probationary search condition and there was reasonable suspicion to believe that he possessed firearms based on the pistol magazine found in his pocket or that he violated the law by committing the offense of indecent exposure, both of which were prohibited by his probation conditions.   Moreover, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Government to introduce evidence about Defendant’s six prior convictions. Contrary to Defendant’s claim, the probative value of the evidence of his prior convictions was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Finally, the court explained it need not decide whether North Dakota robbery qualifies as a crime of violence because any alleged error was harmless. View "United States v. LaSamuel Richardson, III" on Justia Law

Defendant and the government reached a binding plea agreement whereby Defendant would plead guilty to transportation of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2423(a) and receive a below-guideline sentence of 150 months. At a change-of-plea hearing in March, the district court rejected the plea agreement. At the end of the second hearing, the district court accepted Defendant’s guilty plea. The district court imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.   Defendant appealed arguing that the district court participated in plea negotiations in violation of Rule 11(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring vacatur of his conviction and sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order.   The court explained that Defendant waived “all rights to appeal or collaterally attack . . . [his] conviction or sentence [and] all non-jurisdictional issues.” Because Defendant’s appeal requests vacatur of his conviction and sentence, it falls within the scope of the waiver. However, a violation of Rule 11(c)(1) is appealable unless the defendant specifically waives “an appeal challenging the voluntariness of his plea.” Here, Defendant did not waive his right to appeal, thus the court wrote that Defendant must show that the district court’s error affected his substantial rights. The court explained that although at least one factor favors Defendant, the particular facts and circumstances in the entire record here do not show that the Rule 11 violation affected Defendant’s substantial rights. View "United States v. Douglas Schneider" on Justia Law

Missouri challenged the Secretary of the Treasury’s implementation of the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA), Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4. Missouri argues that the Secretary’s “erroneously broad interpretation” of a provision in ARPA—the “Offset Restriction”—is unconstitutional. The district court dismissed the case, finding that Missouri lacked standing and that Missouri’s claims were not ripe for adjudication.   On appeal, Missouri identifies five specific ways it has been injured: (1) the broad interpretation of the Offset Restriction punishes Missouri for exercising its constitutional right to set taxes; (2) the Secretary’s “embrace of the broad interpretation” has harmed Missouri’s interest in the offer Congress provided to the State; (3) Treasury’s regulations make ARPA’s requirement more onerous, leading to greater compliance costs; (4) under the broad interpretation, there is an increased chance Missouri will lose ARPA funds; and (5) under the pre-enforcement test, Missouri has alleged an intention to engage in conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by statute, with a credible threat of enforcement hanging over it.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that Missouri has not alleged an injury in fact. The court explained that Missouri has only alleged a “conjectural or hypothetical” injury, not one that is actual or imminent. It has also not alleged a future injury that is “certainly impending” or even likely to occur. Instead, Missouri asked the court to declare, in the abstract, what a statute does not mean. It asked the court to enjoin a hypothetical interpretation of the Offset Restriction that the Secretary has explicitly disclaimed, without alleging any concrete, imminent injury from the Secretary’s actual interpretation. View "State of Missouri v. Janet Yellen" on Justia Law

After two separate arrests Defendant was charged with nine conspiracy- and drug-related counts in a 19-count second superseding indictment. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence recovered during these stops. At sentencing, the district court varied downward from the United States Sentencing Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment and sentenced Defendant to 180 months imprisonment and 5 years supervised release. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction on three of the nine counts, and the district court gave an erroneous jury instruction. The government cross-appealed Defendant’s sentence, arguing that the district court procedurally erred when it relied on clearly erroneous facts.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence.  Amongst other claims, Defendant argued that the March 12 stop and accompanying pat-down and inventory searches, as well as the November 1 stop, was unconstitutional and that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence recovered pursuant to these illegal stops and searches. The court explained that the detective did not exceed the allowable scope of the pat-down search when he reached into Defendant’s pocket. “Because the ‘sole justification for such a search is the protection of the officer and others, its scope must be confined to a search reasonably designed to discover concealed weapons.”   Further, the court found that the district court did not commit plain error by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury as to some unspecified “heightened showing” required to prove constructive possession. View "United States v. Eric Williams" on Justia Law

After the district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, Redman pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Defendant appealed, arguing that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him and that evidence recovered after the seizure should have been suppressed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The court explained, during a Terry stop, an officer may “take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop,” including frisking a person for weapons if the officer has “articulable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous.”   Here, the parties agree that Defendant was not seized until the officer physically grabbed his jacket. The court concluded that the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Defendant at that time. The officer was investigating an early-morning report of shots fired near 1:00 a.m. in a high-crime area. That he had been told that the call may have pertained to fireworks did not alone end his investigation, however. The officer knew that, among other facts, Defendant was one of only two people present in the dark parking lot that was the alleged location of the shots fired. Given these circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion that Defendant may have been involved in a shots fired incident, which justified his decision to seize Defendant and to perform a limited search to determine if Defendant was armed. View "United States v. Anthony Redman" on Justia Law

Appellant, a black male who was 60 years old at the time his employment was terminated, brought race, sex, and age discrimination claims under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) and a retaliation claim under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act ("MWA") after the Minnesota Guardian ad Litem Board (“GALB”) terminated his employment following internal and external investigations into allegations of his misconduct. The district court granted GALB’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellant failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation and, even if he had done so, he failed to demonstrate GALB’s reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual.   Appellant appealed and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellant failed to point to any direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation; thus, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies. The court concluded that GALB has demonstrated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for terminating Appellant in March 2018: the internal and external investigations into Appellant’s alleged misconduct uncovered evidence that Appellant had engaged in gross misconduct. As such, because Appellant failed to show that GALB’s reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to GALB on his race, sex, and age discrimination claims and his retaliation claim. View "Gregory King v. MN Guardian ad Litem Board" on Justia Law