Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Herbert Green previously appealed the denial of his motion to suppress drugs and firearms discovered in his apartment during a law enforcement search outside the scope of the police’s warrant. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court to make factual findings necessary to determine whether the independent source doctrine supported denial of Green’s motion to suppress. After additional briefing and an evidentiary hearing, the district court found law enforcement would have requested and obtained a federal warrant to search the apartment notwithstanding the protective sweep. Based on this finding, the Eighth Circuit held that the independent source doctrine justified the district court’s denial of suppression. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was diagnosed with a reducible ventral hernia while detained awaiting trial at the Greene County Justice Center in Missouri. Although his hernia could be repaired through surgery, Plaintiff was unable to prepay the fee required by the outside surgeon and thus the hernia was not repaired during his detention.   Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the Greene County Sheriff’s Department and its contract healthcare service provider, Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc. (ACH), as well as several individuals employed by those entities (collectively, jail officials). Plaintiff claimed that the jail officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment. The court explained that to establish deliberate indifference Plaintiff was required to show (1) that he suffered from an objectively serious medical need and (2) that the jail officials had actual knowledge of that need but deliberately disregarded it. The court explained that Plaintiff submitted no medical or expert evidence that any delay in his hernia repair surgery created any excessive risk or harm. Plaintiff argued that his own claims of pain and suffering constitute the verifying medical evidence needed to show harm from the delay. Without corroborating evidence of symptoms, however, self-reported assertions of pain are insufficient to survive summary judgment.   Further, despite Plaintiff’s subjective reports of pain, objective observations did not indicate that he was in severe pain or forced to limit his activities. Thus, the court held that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that jail officials disregarded a known risk to his health. View "Michael Hancock v. Jim Arnott" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s approval of a settlement between Defendant Monsanto and Plaintiffs. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the notice to the class was sufficient or in concluding that payment to class members of 50% of the average weighted retail price of the items they purchased fully compensated the class members.    Plaintiffs filed suit pleading multiple claims arising out of the allegedly deceptive labeling of Roundup products manufactured by Monsanto. The parties agreed to a total Common Fund. They agreed that Monsanto would not object to Plaintiffs’ counsel seeking 25% of that amount as an attorney’s fee. Class members who filed claims were to receive 10% of the average retail price for the product(s) they bought, and any remaining funds after the costs of administration would be distributed cy pres. The parties executed a Second Corrected Class Action Settlement Agreement that made four changes to the initial agreement.   Appellant, a party injured by Roundup, made three objections to the settlement, all of which she renewed on appeal. First, she argued that the district court should have (1) required the parties to take additional steps to identify additional class members and (2) increased the pro-rata portion of the Common Fund up to 100% of the weighted average retail price. The court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that notice to the class was sufficient in light of the comprehensive notice plan and the estimated results from the claims administrator.Further, the court wrote that cy pres distribution of residual funds pursuant to the settlement agreement neither constitutes speech by any individual class member nor infringes on their First Amendment rights. View "Lisa Jones v. Anna St. John" on Justia Law

Following a traffic stop during which Plaintiff was cited for driving with an open liquor bottle in his car, he filed suit against the Des Moines Police Department officers involved in the stop Officers as well as the City of Des Moines Chief of Police, and the City of Des Moines (collectively “Defendants”), alleging claims under state and federal law for violation of his constitutional rights.   The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and denied Plaintiff’s request to certify questions to the Iowa Supreme Court and his motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the officers based on qualified immunity on his federal and state claims for an unreasonable seizure.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court wrote that because Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officers unreasonably prolonged the stop, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity to the officers on this claim.   Next, Plaintiff asserted that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the officers based on qualified immunity on his federal and state claims for racial profiling. The court affirmed holding that because Plaintiff failed to show that the officers were motivated in any part by Plaintiff’s race, the court need not conclusively resolve this issue to determine that Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact necessary. View "Courtney Saunders v. Kyle Thies" on Justia Law

On remand, the Supreme Court directed the Eighth Circuit to “to employ an inquiry that clearly attends to the facts and circumstances” of the incident between Plaintiffs’ son and the officers in considering whether the officers used unconstitutionally excessive force or, if they did, whether the Plaintiffs’ son’s right to be free of such force in these circumstances was clearly established at the time of his death.   The court affirmed the district court’s ruling and concluded that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because the right in question was not clearly established at the time of Plaintiffs’ son’s death and the City is not liable for a policy of deliberate indifference in the absence of a clearly established constitutional right.   The court explained that the Supreme Court has never addressed whether prone restraint generally, or a particular use of prone restraint, more specifically, is unconstitutional. And the Supreme Court has never answered the question of whether a right may be clearly established without a Supreme Court case specifically recognizing it. Thus, assuming, as the Supreme Court has, that a court of appeals decision may constitute clearly established law, the precedent in this area is insufficient to demonstrate that the facts, in this case, show a violation of a clearly established right of a detainee to be free from prone restraint while resisting.   Thus, the Plaintiffs’ son’s right to be free from prone restraint while engaged in ongoing resistance, even where officers applied force to various parts of his body, including his back, was not clearly established in 2015 when the incident occurred. View "Jody Lombardo v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to distributing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. Section 841. The district court imposed a bottom-of-Guidelines sentence of 87 months in prison. Defendant challenged his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court explained that “procedural error includes failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the Section 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009).   Where, as here, the defendant fails to object at sentencing, the court reviews for plain error. Plain error is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. The court wrote that contrary to Defendant’s argument, the court found that the safety valve applied. But safety valve eligibility does not guarantee Defendant a below-statutory minimum sentence; it just gives the court the opportunity to sentence below the minimum if it believes it is appropriate. Defendant argued that the court needed to specifically explain why it decided not to impose a below-minimum sentence— beyond the usual explanation for choosing a particular sentence. But he does not cite any cases from this circuit announcing such a rule, and the out-of-circuit cases he cites do not support his argument. Further, the court found that a within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable and the court’s Section 3553(a) analysis was proper. View "United States v. Jaamil Owens" on Justia Law

Arkansas Act 710 prohibits state entities from contracting with private companies unless the contract includes a certification that the company “is not currently engaged in, and agrees for the duration of the contract not to engage in, a boycott of Israel.” Ark. Code Ann. Section 25-1-503(a)(1).  Arkansas Times, a newspaper, contracts with University of Arkansas-Pulaski Technical College sued for a preliminary injunction, arguing that the certification violates the First Amendment in two ways.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court reasoned that the First Amendment protections don’t just prevent outright prohibitions on speech; they also prohibit the government from imposing unconstitutional conditions that chill or deter speech. At issue, here, is whether “boycotting Israel” only covers unexpressive commercial conduct, or whether it also prohibits protected expressive conduct. Arkansas Times points to N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), which held that expressive conduct accompanying a boycott is protected by the First Amendment.  The State argues that Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47 (2006) controls. There, the Supreme Court held that First Amendment protection does not extend to non-expressive conduct intended to convey a political message.   The court wrote that it believes the Arkansas Supreme Court would read Act 710 as prohibiting purely commercial, non-expressive conduct. It does not ban Arkansas Times from publicly criticizing Israel, or even protesting the statute itself. It only prohibits economic decisions that discriminate against Israel. Because those commercial decisions are invisible to observers unless explained, they are not inherently expressive and do not implicate the First Amendment. View "Arkansas Times LP v. Mark Waldrip" on Justia Law

Following a series of trial delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a jury convicted Defendant of two counts of interstate communication of a threat, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c). The district court sentenced him to a term of 60 months in prison.   Defendant appealed arguing that the government did not have sufficient evidence to prove he made “true threats” because his statements were ambiguous and/or political hyperbole. Further, he argued that; the jury instructions were erroneous; the indictment failed to state an essential element of his offense; and he was denied a right to a speedy trial.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court first held that a jury could have reasonably concluded that his messages constituted a true threat of present or future violence and that he intended to communicate a threat. Thus, because the statements were objectively threatening, and neither ambiguous nor political hyperbole. The evidence is sufficient to satisfy the elements required for convictions under Section 875(c).  Further, there was no reversible error, because when taken as a whole, the instructions sufficiently articulated the elements for the charges and the matters were fairly and adequately submitted to the jury.   Next, Defendant has not shown prejudice caused by the delay. While he points to a longer period of detention, repossession of his vehicle, increased pretrial anxiety, and an in-custody assault, none of these circumstances demonstrate he was deprived of an opportunity to properly defend himself at trial. Finally, Defendant’s constitutional claim fails because he has not shown that a nine-month delay was presumptively prejudicial. View "United States v. Cody Leveke" on Justia Law

The government alleges that Medicare overpaid Plaintiff and his medical practice approximately $5.31 million. While the third level of administrative review, a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), was pending, Medicare began to recover the overpaid funds by withholding new reimbursements. Plaintiff argued that recovery prior to an ALJ hearing and decision violates procedural due process. He moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Medicare from recovering payments prior to the ALJ decision. The district court denied the preliminary injunction and Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction finding that Plaintiff has not satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunction. Further, he has not shown that he is likely to prevail on the merits of his procedural due process claim nor that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm. The court explained that if an audit shows that a provider has been overpaid, Medicare may seek to recover the overpaid funds. Moreover, if a Medicare contractor determines a provider has been overpaid, the provider may challenge that decision through administrative and judicial review.   Here, Plaintiff’s interest in avoiding erroneous recoupment outweighs the government’s interest in prompt repayment. However, there is no evidence in the record that any delay in recovery against Plaintiff will cause long-term harm to Medicare or prevent Medicare from providing services to other beneficiaries. Further, Plaintiff’s claims of irreparable harm are undercut by his apparent failure to try to ease the burdens of recoupment. View "Gurpreet Padda v. Xavier Becerra" on Justia Law

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz declared a state of “peacetime emergency” and began issuing executive orders (EOs) intended to combat the spread of the virus. The EOs limited which types of businesses could continue operations and, later, specified the capacities at which those businesses could operate. Plaintiffs, three Minnesota businesses and their respective owners, suffered financial losses during the COVID-19 pandemic while these EOs were in effect. Plaintiffs brought an Equal Protection Clause claim against Governor Walz and Minnesota’s Attorney General, in their official capacities and a Takings Clause claim against Governor Walz in his individual capacity, which the district court dismissed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The court found that in 2020, the law was not clearly established such that Governor Walz would have understood that his issuance of the challenged EOs violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to just compensation for a government taking. The court explained that Plaintiffs have not offered anything that supports their hypothesis that Governor Walz will, first, declare a second peacetime emergency and, then, will issue additional EOs—specifically, EOs like 20-74 that, in their view, treat them differently than other, similarly situated businesses and impede them from conducting their businesses as they wish. The court further wrote that it need not parse through whether or not a taking occurred, however, because even assuming that a taking did occur, whatever its type, Plaintiffs have offered nothing to support their contention that, in 2020, the law was clearly established such that Governor Walz would have understood that his EOs constituted a taking. View "Glow In One Mini Golf, LLC v. Tim Walz" on Justia Law