Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was filming a protest when Officer Olsten pepper sprayed the crowd. She sued Officer Olsten, Commissioner Hayden, and the City of St. Louis for violating her First Amendment rights, among other things. The district court granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her First Amendment claim against Officer Olsten and her municipal liability claim against the City. She also argued that her state law causes of action should be “reinstated.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that De Mian’s actions motivated Officer Olsten to spray in her direction. So the lack of a causal connection is “so free from doubt as to justify taking this question from the jury.” Plaintiff argued that she is a well-known reporter and is readily identifiable because she is in a wheelchair. But this fact, without more, is insufficient for a jury to infer that Officer Olsten knew or recognized her. She also speculates that Officer Olsten may have been retaliating against her for filming. But “there is no evidence Officer Olsten observed her filming or deployed pepper spray in retaliation for her doing so.” View "Heather De Mian v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The presentence investigation report recommended a base offense level of 20 under USSG Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) because Defendant’s 2013 Missouri conviction for second-degree robbery is a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. Overruling Defendant’s objection, the district court adopted this recommendation, resulting in an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 63 to 78 months imprisonment. The court imposed a 72-month sentence followed by three years of supervised release. Defendant appealed the sentence, arguing the district court erred in determining that his prior conviction for Missouri second-degree robbery is a crime of violence under the Guidelines.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Guidelines define “crime of violence” to mean “any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” that either “(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” (the force clause), or “(2) is murder . . . robbery [etc.]” (the enumerated offenses clause). The court concluded that controlling Eighth Circuit precedent has established that a prior conviction for Missouri second-degree robbery under Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 569.030.1, the statute in effect when Defendant committed the offense, is a crime of violence under USSG Section 4B1.2(a)(1). View "United States v. Cody Rethford" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to Possession of a Firearm by a Felon in violation. The district court sentenced him to 100 months imprisonment. Bailey appealed the sentence, arguing the court erred by increasing his base offense level under USSG Section 2K2.1(a)(2), based on two prior Illinois convictions for Delivery or Manufacture of Cocaine in violation of 720 ILCS 570/206(b)(4); and by applying a four-level increase under Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because he used a firearm in connection with another felony offense, Intimidation with a Dangerous Weapon in violation of Iowa Code Section 708.6(2).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant contends he is entitled to this stand-your-ground exception, despite being a felon in possession, because his illegal activity was not germane to his use of force against the person who was shooting at him. The court explained that the Supreme Court disagreed. Thus, his “possession of the handgun was germane to the use of deadly force.” Further, the court wrote that here, the district court found that Defendant did not have “reason to believe that somebody was actually shooting at him or endangering his life.” Thus, even if Defendant had no duty to retreat, his use of force was not necessary to avoid injury or harm to himself (or to anyone else). View "United States v. Lamont Bailey" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a protest of the Dakota Access Pipeline at the Backwater Bridge in Morton County, North Dakota. Police officers deployed water, tear gas, rubber bullets, and bean bags to disperse a crowd. Plaintiffs participated in the protest, and they were allegedly injured by the officers’ use of force. The protestors sued Morton County, the City of Mandan, Stutsman County, the law enforcement chiefs for those municipalities, and one hundred unnamed officers. The district court* granted summary judgment for Defendants.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it was not clearly established in November 2016 that the officers’ use of force to disperse protestors violated a constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the need for training and supervision on dispersal of protestors was not so obvious that it can be characterized as deliberate indifference to the protestors’ rights to be free from unreasonable seizures. Further, the court explained that as with the municipalities, there is insufficient evidence here of deliberate indifference by supervisors where the alleged constitutional right was not clearly established. View "Vanessa Dundon v. Kyle Kirchmeier" on Justia Law

Facing a tight deadline from the Ninth Circuit, the Environmental Protection Agency banned the use of chlorpyrifos on food crops. Two environmental groups petitioned the EPA in 2007 to have all tolerances revoked. In denying the petition, the EPA concluded that their objections were “not supported by valid, complete, and reliable evidence.”   The Eighth Circuit granted the petitions, finding that the EPA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. The court explained that in this case, the EPA believed it lacked discretion or at least acted that way. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion had already narrowed its options down to two: revoke the tolerances or modify them. With little time to act, the agency ruled out the second option, leaving only revocation by default. In doing so, however, it misread the statute and misunderstood the “scope of its discretion”. Therefore, the court set aside the decision as arbitrary and capricious. Further, the court explained that a partial ban was a real alternative for the EPA. It could have canceled some registrations and retained others that satisfied the statutory safety margin. View "RRVSG Assoc. v. Michael Regan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the Arkansas Division of Corrections (ADC), alleging its policies violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). After a bench trial, the district court dismissed the complaint. It found that their religious beliefs were not sincerely held; that even if they were sincerely held, the policies did not substantially burden those beliefs; and that even if there was a substantial burden, the policies were the least restrictive means to further ADC’s compelling interests. Plaintiffs appealed.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. The court explained that the district court found that ADC lacks the staff and space for separate Jumu’ah services. But Plaintiffs proposed alternatives, including utilizing other available spaces, partitioning the same space, and scheduling two Jumu’ah services in the same space at different times. The district court neither addressed these proposed alternatives to determine whether they were available or would effectively address ADC’s compelling security interests nor addressed whether the prison’s reasons for refusing to offer an accommodation were persuasive in light of the evidence that other prisons are able to do so. Correctly applying the governing law to Plaintiffs’ challenge requires that the court do so. Further, the court wrote that the district court also found that ADC’s religious headdress policy did not substantially burden Plaintiffs’ beliefs because ADC informally allows them to wear kufis in violation of the policy. But even if ADC does not enforce it consistently, the policy expressly prohibits Plaintiffs from wearing their kufis except during religious services. View "Gregory Holt v. Dexter Payne" on Justia Law

While Defendant was working at a convenience store in St. Louis, a suspected shoplifter appeared to steal a piece of candy. Defendant pointed a loaded pistol at the man and chased him from the store. The pistol ultimately discharged and killed the man. Defendant initially pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm while being unlawfully present in the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(5). The district court applied a homicide guideline cross reference pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(c)(1)(B). While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Rehaif v. United States. On remand, the district court again applied the second-degree murder guideline as the cross reference. Defendant now appeals his conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the record is more than sufficient to support the guilty verdict. Further, the court explained that the record adequately supports the guilty verdict and its implicit finding of subjective knowledge. Immigration authorities repeatedly informed Defendant that he lacked legal status. Moreover, the fact that he purposefully committed fraud in an effort to obtain legal status indicates an understanding that he lacked legal status. Further, the use of potentially deadly violence against another may demonstrate the malice necessary to support a second-degree murder conviction. Accordingly, whether Defendant purposefully shot the victim in the head, or accidentally shot the victim in the head while potentially fatally beating his head with a pistol, the district court permissibly concluded the mens rea rose above the baseline recklessness required for manslaughter and reached the level of malice required for murder. View "United States v. Taleb Jawher" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s son spent several months at a medium-security facility in St. Louis called “the Workhouse.” None of the guards saw Plaintiff’s son receive or take fentanyl, the drug that killed him. Inmates tried to help by rubbing ice on him once he lost consciousness. Upon arriving a few minutes later, three Officers radioed for medical assistance. In the meantime, rather than try to resuscitate Plaintiff’s son themselves, they stood by and watched as two inmates tried to help him. When trained medical personnel finally arrived four minutes later, it was too late: they were unable to revive Plaintiff’s son, who died from an overdose. Surveillance footage captured some, but not all, of these events. Plaintiff’s mother sued the City of St. Louis, the three responding officers, and two supervisors for their deliberate indifference. The district court denied summary judgment to the responding officers.   The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the district court misstated the burden and relied on allegations from an unverified complaint to deny summary judgment. The court wrote that the district court erred in how it dealt with the gaps in the video footage. Instead of relying on other evidence to fill in the missing details, the findings mirrored what the plaintiff’s unverified complaint said. The court wrote that unsworn allegations are no substitute for evidence at summary judgment. The court explained that the district court tilted the scales too far in the Plaintiff’s favor by raising the summary-judgment burden on the officers and allowing unsworn allegations to rebut evidence. View "Janice Washington v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possessing a firearm by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), after law enforcement discovered a gun on him during an investigatory stop. Defendant moved to suppress the firearm, claiming the officers’ mistaken belief that he was a wanted fugitive nine inches taller than him rendered the stop unreasonable. The district court denied his motion and sentenced him to a term of 37 months’ imprisonment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed explaining that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity independent of the mistaken identification justified the detention. The court explained that here, the Officers had sufficient evidence to establish reasonable suspicion justifying Defendant’s detention. First, the time of the encounter. It was 12:30 a.m. when the Officers began their surveillance, and they detained Defendant at approximately 1:50 a.m. Second, the encounter took place in a high-crime area. The Officers were aware of multiple reports of subjects in that neighborhood with firearms, and the apartment Defendant freely entered was associated with an armed and dangerous fugitive. Third, Defendant’s behavior when he became aware of law enforcement’s presence. View "United States v. Lorenzo Lemons, Sr." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged in a five-count indictment with attempted bank robbery involving assault with a dangerous weapon. The district court found Defendant guilty of the five offenses and sentenced him to 230 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing the evidence was insufficient to convict him of any offense; the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress involuntary custodial statements he made to an FBI agent; and the district court erred by failing to include the term “knowingly” in reciting the elements of the Count II, III, and IV offenses when explaining its decision during a post-trial hearing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court considers the evidence submitted at trial and makes findings of fact and conclusions of law in determining whether the government has proved the offenses charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the indictment charged that Defendant “knowingly” brandished and used a pistol during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count II), “knowingly” discharged and used a pistol during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count III), and “knowingly” discharged and used an AR-15 rifle during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count IV). The court explained that neither filed a post-trial motion challenging the court’s findings and conclusions even though stand-by counsel was granted a one-month extension of time to do so. The evidence that Defendant committed these three offenses “knowingly” was overwhelming. There was no error, plain or otherwise. View "United States v. Jacob Monteer" on Justia Law