Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A confidential informant told police that Defendant was importing heroin from Chicago and selling it at an apartment. A detective applied for a search warrant for Defendant’s apartment to seize evidence of drug distribution. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence arguing that the warrant application incorrectly stated he was listed on the utility bills—one of the seven facts the detective used in his affidavit for a search warrant.Defendant argues that the good-faith exception does not apply because the affidavit in support of the warrant was so lacking in “indicia of probable cause to search for evidence of drug trafficking” at Defendant’s apartment that the existence of probable cause was entirely unreasonable. The court disagreed, reasoning that the detective had had an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause, and the affidavit contained sufficient indicia of probable cause, thus the good-faith exception applies. There is no evidence the detective acted in bad faith, and the issuing judge found that the affidavit provided a substantial basis to find probable cause to search for evidence. Further, information known to the detective reinforces the objective reasonableness of his belief in probable cause.Defendant counters that there was not a sufficient nexus between his drug trafficking and this apartment. However, the good-faith exception applies even if there is no direct nexus between a defendant’s continuous course of drug trafficking and his residence. As a result, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling. View "United States v. Roy Norey" on Justia Law

Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained after police stopped Defendant upon suspicion of criminal activity. He later pled guilty and appealed the district court’s denial of his first motion to suppress, arguing that officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a Terry stop without reasonable suspicion and by arresting him without probable cause.The court found that the officer and a particularized and objective basis for suspecting Defendant of wrongdoing, which provided the officer with reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. The court reasoned that the officer stopped Defendant at the direction of a detective who was investigating Defendant for drug-related crimes and as a person of interest in a homicide investigation. Defendant argues his past convictions and his involvement in a suspected drug deal two months earlier were “stale” and thus could not provide reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity. However, the court found that the argument is unpersuasive because it fails to take into consideration the totality of the circumstances. Thus, the district court correctly held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant.Defendant further argues that the Terry stop became an arrest when the officers drew their weapons and handcuffed Defendant. Defendant claims this purported arrest was unlawful because the officers lacked probable cause. The court found that the officers’ protective actions here did not turn the stop into an arrest. View "United States v. Andre Johnson" on Justia Law

Prison corrections officers suspected that Defendant’s family had given him contraband. A strip search did not reveal contraband, but surveillance footage showed Defendant taking bundles out of his shoes and giving them to another inmate. Defendant was charged with three counts of possessing a prohibited object in prison.Defendant claims that excluding his sole witness, a Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) employee, violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to put on a complete defense. Defendant argues that the witness would testify as to his decision not to discipline Defendant. The court held that under Rule 403, the testimony is inadmissible. Whatever probative value the testimony might have is substantially outweighed by the danger that the testimony would be unfairly prejudicial.Defendant argues that the government did not lay the necessary foundation because there was no testimony that the shoes presented at trial were in the same condition as the day of the offense. The court found Defendant didn’t present evidence to rebut the presumption that evidence is presumed unchanged unless there is “a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with.”The court found that the jury instruction was proper because an inmate need not know specifically what prohibited item he has, so long as he knows that he possesses a prohibited object. Finally, Defendant’s evidentiary insufficiency argument fails because a reasonable jury could weigh this evidence and infer that he knew the items were prohibited. Thus, the court affirmed Defendant's convictions. View "United States v. Isiah Dozier" on Justia Law

Plaintiff arrived at Becker County Jail in Minnesota with a number of physical ailments, two weeks later he was taken to the hospital and subsequently diagnosed with acute myeloid leukemia. Plaintiff filed an action against Becker County Jail (“BCJ”) and its personnel, claiming deliberate indifference to his medical needs, failure to provide adequate training to corrections officers, and negligence. The district court held that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleging Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and claims under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).On appeal, the court reasoned that qualified immunity “shields government officials from liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” The court found no violation of the Eighth or the Fourteenth Amendments because the undisputed facts do not provide sufficient proof that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs nor do they show intentional denial or delay in access to medical care. The court reasoned that Plaintiff gave mixed signals as to the severity of his pain. Because medical professionals failed to grasp the seriousness of his condition, prison staff without medical training could not have been expected to do so. Further, because the individual Defendants are entitled to official immunity, Becker County is entitled to the same immunity. View "Kyle Rusness v. Becker County, Minnesota" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleges that while he was detained at a detention center, officers subjected him to severe racial harassment, including the use of racial epithets, multiple times per day. He filed several internal grievances, but each was rejected. Plaintiff alleges the grievances were rejected because of his race. Plaintiff challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants. He also argues that the court should have construed his pleadings to include claims for retaliation and violations of the Minnesota Human Rights Act.Plaintiff argues that his summary judgment evidence and other evidence available in the record was sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact. Plaintiff identifies three “buckets” of relevant evidence: (1) his counter-affidavits; (2) the internal grievance forms filed with the adult detention center; and (3) other non-summary judgment evidence available in the record.The court found that the evidence does not raise a genuine dispute that either officer was personally involved in racial harassment or discrimination at the detention center. Plaintiff's statement fails to identify any direct or circumstantial evidence that would demonstrate the denial was racially motivated. Further, Plaintiff failed to obtain sworn testimony or documentary evidence asserting specific facts to help prove his claim. The court held that Plaintiff’s summary judgment evidence is insufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact that Defendants were personally involved in racial discrimination or harassment. Thus, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that either officer’s conduct violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights, and both are entitled to qualified immunity View "Wilbert Glover v. Matt Bostrom" on Justia Law

Officers conducted a traffic stop of a car in which the defendant was the passenger. The officers stated they were concerned the defendant was carrying something, so they handcuffed him. Defendant denied carrying anything but told officers they could check, at which point they found a stun gun and a lighter.A federal grand jury indicted the defendant on three counts, and he moved to suppress the evidence officers discovered during the search. He then pled guilty to the charges. Defendant presented mitigation evidence and asked the district court to impose the minimum sentence; however, they sentenced him to 211 months of imprisonment.Defendant argued that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion, the officers placed him under de factor arrest without probable cause, and the district court gave too much weight to aggravating factors when sentencing him. First, the circuit court concluded that the totality of the circumstances justified the officer’s search. Next, the circuit court found that the officers’ reasonable belief that the defendant was carrying weapons allowed them to handcuff him without resulting in a de facto arrest. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by the sentencing defendant at the bottom of the guidelines range.. View "United States v. Tanner Halverson-Weese" on Justia Law

Under Michigan abortion law, a minor may bypass the parental-consent requirement by obtaining a court order granting the right to self-consent (for mature minors) or judicial consent (for “best interests” minors). When the plaintiff sought to apply for judicial bypass, the defendant hadn’t heard of the process and told the plaintiff to come back later. Plaintiff sued the defendant in her individual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendant’s refusal to allow her to apply for a judicial bypass without parental notification violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion when the defendant moved for summary judgment, invoking quasi-judicial and qualified immunity.Before the Eighth Circuit, the defendant claimed she acted at the direction of the Associate Circuit Judge (“Judge”). The Judge testified that he did not recall telling the defendant not to accept the application without parental consent. The circuit court concluded there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the Judge’s practice of giving pre-filing directions. Further, the is a clearly established right to apply for a judicial bypass. Thus the circuit court declined to address the defendant’s other arguments regarding qualified immunity. View "Jane Doe v. Michelle Chapman" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to murdering his cousin and her husband. At sentencing, the defendant was represented by two attorneys with experience handling capital cases. The jury returned a sentence of death for each murder, finding seven aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant then petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus under Section 2254, raising twenty-eight claims, including a claim that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of his adjustment to incarceration.The Eighth Circuit reviewed whether a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is substantial under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). Martinez requires a defendant to show that his underlying claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel has “some merit.” The circuit court agreed with the defendant that the district court erred by treating the substantiality standard as different from the certificate-of-appealability standard. However, the court concluded that the error was harmless because the defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim was insubstantial even under the correct standard. The circuit court found that no reasonable jurist could believe that or find it debatable whether either prong of the defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim is met. Thus, the defendant cannot show cause for his failure to raise the claim in state postconviction proceedings. View "Brian Dorsey v. David Vandergriff" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleges he was unlawfully assaulted, pepper-sprayed, detained in an unlawful mass arrest, and ultimately incarcerated. He sued the City of St. Louis and multiple police officers for First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations, conspiracy to deprive him of civil rights, and supplemental state law claims. One officer moved to dismiss the 1983 claims, arguing plaintiff’s amended complaint failed to state a claim and he is entitled to qualified immunity. The only allegations relating to the defendant’s involvement are that he was working on September 17 and took custody of the plaintiff’s bicycle lying in the street at the time of his arrest. These allegations do not establish a causal link between the plaintiff and the specific wrongs the defendants as a whole allegedly committed. Further, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because the amended complaint did not contain specific and plausible allegations linking the defendant to overt acts alleged as part of the conspiracy of all the defendants. The assertion that he agreed to participate in those acts does not state a plausible claim.Finally, the circuit court held that the district court erred in denying the other defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine was not clearly established. View "Michael Faulk v. Gerald Leyshock" on Justia Law

Minnesota Governor Walz (“Walz”) signed an executive order mandating a statewide residential eviction moratorium. Heights Apartments, LLC (“Heights”), a property owner of residential units, challenged the executive orders, raising First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims under Section 1983.The court found that the plaintiffs met the two-prong test to determine whether a state has impermissibly interfered with a contract. However, the court held that Heights has failed to allege a cognizable Petition Clause claim because the only potential remedy is damages; Heights has not pleaded damages that are somehow unique to its Petition Clause claim.Heights alleged it was deprived of its expected return on investment in the form of rental income. These alleged damages are sufficient to plausibly give rise to a Fifth Amendment takings claim. Finally, Heights has alleged violations of various rights that trigger protections under other constitution amendments; however, it has failed to plausibly plead a substantive due process violation. Thus, Heights has plausibly argued constitutional claims under the Contract Clause and Takings Clause. The court reversed the dismissal of those two claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Heights Apartments, LLC v. Tim Walz" on Justia Law