Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a lower court's decision that an Iowa law violated the First Amendment. The law prohibited accessing an agricultural production facility under false pretenses or making a false statement or misrepresentation as part of a job application at such a facility, with the intent to cause physical or economic harm or other injury to the facility. Various organizations challenged this law, arguing it was unconstitutional as it was "viewpoint-based", targeting speakers with negative views of agricultural production facilities. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa agreed and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, enjoining officials from enforcing the law. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit disagreed, finding that the law was constitutional as it restricted intentionally false speech carried out to cause a legally recognized harm. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the judgment, vacated the injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

The case involves Brandon Peterson, an inmate at Washington County Jail (WCJ), who filed a lawsuit alleging violations of his constitutional rights by various jail officials. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, reviewing the case, had to decide on numerous instances of alleged excessive force, failure to intervene, and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, as well as constitutional and state law claims.The court found that on several occasions of alleged excessive force, the officers' actions were justified given Peterson's disruptive and threatening behavior. Consequently, the court granted qualified immunity to the officers involved in these incidents. In the case of the failure to intervene claims, the court decided that without an underlying constitutional violation, there can be no liability for failure to intervene, resulting in the officers being granted qualified immunity for these claims as well.On the issue of deliberate indifference to Peterson's mental health condition, the court found that the prison officials had made efforts to address his condition and had not acted with deliberate disregard for his health. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to the officials involved.Regarding Peterson's claim of being subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, the court remanded the case to the district court for it to address this issue. The court also remanded the case to the district court to decide on the state law and Monell claims. As such, the Appeals Court reversed in part, dismissed in part, and vacated in part the district court's decision, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion. View "Peterson v. Heinen" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Chad Betts's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a traffic stop. Betts, a felon, was found in possession of a firearm and ammunition after a drug dog alerted to his vehicle during a traffic stop. He appealed the district court's decision, arguing that reasonable suspicion did not exist to extend the traffic stop.The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop based on a combination of factors: Betts’s quick speaking, profuse sweating, and rapid, shallow breathing; his possession of a torch-style lighter, which the officer knew was often used to heat drugs like methamphetamine; Betts’s unusual travel plans and his history of drug-related offenses. These factors, viewed as a whole, justified the officer's suspicion that Betts was in possession of illegal drugs by the time the officer left Betts seated in the patrol car and walked back to Betts’s vehicle to question the passenger. As a result, the court concluded that the extended stop was justified, and the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress the evidence obtained during this stop. View "United States v. Betts" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit heard an appeal from Jacob Bermel, who had pleaded guilty to two child pornography offenses following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence that was found on a camera he had hidden in his daughter's bathroom. Bermel argued that the warrantless seizure and subsequent search of the camera and its memory card violated his Fourth Amendment rights. However, the district court found that the seizure was justified by exigent circumstances and that the search was lawful due to the daughter's consent.On appeal, Bermel made three arguments: (1) minor children cannot consent to a search of their parents' property, (2) even if minors can consent, his daughter lacked such authority, and (3) the district court erred in finding that his daughter had consented to the search of the camera and memory card.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It rejected Bermel's first argument, stating that there is no legal precedent for a per se rule that minors cannot consent to a search of their parents' property. The court also found that the daughter had apparent authority to consent to the search given her joint access and control over the camera and its memory card. Finally, the court determined that the daughter had indeed consented to the search of the camera and its memory card. The court noted that lack of verbal response did not negate consent and the scope of her consent reasonably extended to the camera's memory card. View "United States v. Bermel" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Darren J. Ackerman’s motion to suppress evidence of firearms discovered in his basement. The police had entered his home on the information that Ackerman had tried to choke his girlfriend, was possibly on drugs, and might be holding their infant daughter hostage. They found him at the bottom of the basement stairs, holding his daughter, and upon arresting and handcuffing him, they performed a protective sweep of the basement, during which they found firearms in a room adjoining the area of his arrest.Ackerman argued that the search was not a valid protective sweep as the rooms searched did not adjoin the place of his arrest. The court, however, determined that the arrest occurred at the bottom of the stairs, where Ackerman first submitted to the officers' authority. The court concluded that the room where the firearms were found immediately adjoined the area at the bottom of the stairs, and thus, the protective sweep complied with the Fourth Amendment.The court followed the "protective sweep" exception to the Fourth Amendment, which allows officers to conduct a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others. The court used the two-prong test from the Supreme Court case Maryland v. Buie to determine the constitutionality of the protective sweep. The first prong allows officers to look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from where an attack could be launched, and the second prong allows officers to search areas where they believe a danger may be present based on articulable facts. View "United States v. Ackerman" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas's decision to sentence Jordan Cutler to 180 months in prison for distributing child pornography, a sentence that exceeded the Guidelines range of 108 to 135 months. Cutler appealed, arguing that the district court made a procedural error in calculating the Guidelines range and asserting that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. Cutler claimed that the district court erred in assessing one criminal history point under the Sentencing Guidelines for a set of uncounseled misdemeanors from 2010.The appellate court rejected this argument, explaining that Cutler's uncounseled misdemeanors were not voided by his lack of counsel, as the fines associated with these misdemeanors were constitutionally valid and could be used to enhance his punishment. The court clarified that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for misdemeanor defendants only applies where the defendant receives a prison sentence, not when the defendant is merely fined.In terms of the substantive reasonableness of Cutler's sentence, the appellate court again affirmed the district court's decision. The court explained that although the Guidelines captured certain aspects of Cutler's offense, they did not reflect the "heinous" nature of his crimes, including threats to kidnap, rape, torture, and kill young girls. Cutler also argued that the district court improperly considered its reputation and public perception when determining his sentence. However, the appellate court disagreed, noting that the district court was considering the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense.Therefore, the appellate court found no procedural or substantive error in Cutler's sentencing and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Cutler" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the Independence-Alliance Party of Minnesota, a minor political party, challenged a Minnesota statute that required voters to swear an oath before signing a minor-party nominating petition. The party argued that this requirement violated the First Amendment as it deterred voters from signing nominating petitions, thus, burdening the expressive associational rights of minor political parties, their members, and their candidates.The court, applying the Anderson-Burdick framework, held that the burden imposed by the oath requirement was insubstantial at most and did not warrant strict scrutiny. The court reasoned that the oath only required potential signatories to express their present intent not to vote at the primary election for the office for which the nominating petition is made, and did not preclude them from changing their intentions in the future. The court also reasoned that voters were expected to understand the law, and therefore, understand the oath's actual meaning. It also noted that the party's complaint did not plausibly allege that the oath requirement prevented signatories from signing nominating petitions with any meaningful frequency.The court held that any insubstantial burden imposed by the oath requirement was justified by legitimate state interests, such as protecting the democratic voting process by requiring a preliminary showing of support for a candidate, preventing the distortion of the electoral process, promoting election integrity and reliability, and discouraging party raiding. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Independence-Alliance Party's complaint. View "Independence-Alliance Party of Minn. v. Simon" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. The district court determined an advisory sentencing guideline range of 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment and varied upward from the range to impose a term of 92 months’ imprisonment. Defendant argued on appeal that the district court plainly erred in calculating an advisory guideline range because his prior conviction for kidnapping in Arizona was not a conviction for a “crime of violence.”The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant contends that Marquez-Lobos is obviously wrong and that the Arizona kidnapping plainly does not qualify as a generic kidnapping. His theory is that the Arizona statute encompasses kidnappings that do not involve an unlawful deprivation of liberty as defined by most States. But he contends that kidnapping in Arizona is broader than the generic offense because the Arizona statute assertedly applies to the restraint of any person who is incapable of giving consent—even if the person is neither a minor nor incompetent. Defendant’s argument is premised on a decision of an intermediate state appellate court, State v. Bernal, 713 P.2d 811 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). The court explained that it is not convinced that Bernal establishes an obvious error by the district court. Further, the court wrote that Defendant has not produced evidence that most of the States would disagree with the alternative line of reasoning suggested in Bernal: he simply argues that the expanded set of victims identified in Bernal would exceed the set of victims identified in most state statutes and the Model Penal Code. View "United States v. Michael Goforth" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction for numerous drug offenses. The court held that the evidence against him was overwhelming, and he does not claim a reasonable probability that, but for the introduction of the challenged evidence, he would not have been found guilty.Defendant operated a website on which he once advertised 4- Fluoroamphetamine, a drug similar to the prescription medicine Adderall. Broussard received numerous orders for the Adderall analogue. But instead of shipping his customers the drug they ordered, he sent them fentanyl, a potent narcotic. As a result, eleven people died, and several others were seriously injured. Police investigated, and a grand jury indicted Defendant on numerous drug offenses. Broussard, representing himself, filed several motions in limine. One of his motions sought exclusion of all evidence “presented to invoke sentiment by expressing how the deaths or injuries of the alleged victims influenced personal experiences.” The jury found Defendant guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced Broussard to life in prison. He appealed, arguing that the district court erred in allowing the Government to introduce evidence about the victims’ lives.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the challenged evidence was arguably relevant to show that the victims were unlikely to have knowingly sought fentanyl or to have obtained it from some other source. It was also relevant to show that the victims were in good health, making it less likely that they died from some cause other than a fentanyl overdose. And taking into account the evidence’s arguable relevance, its introduction was not obviously unfairly prejudicial. Further, the court wrote that the evidence against him was overwhelming, and he does not claim a reasonable probability that, but for the introduction of the challenged evidence, he would not have been found guilty. View "United States v. Aaron Broussard" on Justia Law

At Northwest Missouri State University, they must notify an administrator before distributing “non-University publications.” Plaintiff Richard Hershey earns money promoting a vegan lifestyle on college campuses. In September 2015, he visited Northwest Missouri State with a stack of written materials. A student called campus police to report a “suspicious male” who was “attempting to pass something out to . . . students.” About a year later, Northwest Missouri State updated its policy. Nearly five years after he visited, Hershey sued multiple Northwest Missouri State officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to declare the old and new policies unconstitutionally overbroad and to enjoin their enforcement. The district court, for its part, treated the two policies as materially indistinguishable from one another. The main problem, at least in the district court’s eyes, was that neither required “a decision on the proposed speech within a reasonable period of time,” which could have the effect of silencing speakers indefinitely. So it awarded Hershey most of the relief he requested.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the entry of judgment in Defendants’ favor. The court explained that the procedural safeguards that must accompany prior restraints do not apply to content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. No matter the First Amendment theory, Hershey has not shown that the advance-notice requirement has “a substantial number” of unconstitutional applications. It is neither content-based nor an impermissible prior restraint on speech, meaning it can remain in place. View "Richard Hershey v. Dr. John Jasinski" on Justia Law