Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While Defendant was working at a convenience store in St. Louis, a suspected shoplifter appeared to steal a piece of candy. Defendant pointed a loaded pistol at the man and chased him from the store. The pistol ultimately discharged and killed the man. Defendant initially pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm while being unlawfully present in the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(5). The district court applied a homicide guideline cross reference pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(c)(1)(B). While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Rehaif v. United States. On remand, the district court again applied the second-degree murder guideline as the cross reference. Defendant now appeals his conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the record is more than sufficient to support the guilty verdict. Further, the court explained that the record adequately supports the guilty verdict and its implicit finding of subjective knowledge. Immigration authorities repeatedly informed Defendant that he lacked legal status. Moreover, the fact that he purposefully committed fraud in an effort to obtain legal status indicates an understanding that he lacked legal status. Further, the use of potentially deadly violence against another may demonstrate the malice necessary to support a second-degree murder conviction. Accordingly, whether Defendant purposefully shot the victim in the head, or accidentally shot the victim in the head while potentially fatally beating his head with a pistol, the district court permissibly concluded the mens rea rose above the baseline recklessness required for manslaughter and reached the level of malice required for murder. View "United States v. Taleb Jawher" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s son spent several months at a medium-security facility in St. Louis called “the Workhouse.” None of the guards saw Plaintiff’s son receive or take fentanyl, the drug that killed him. Inmates tried to help by rubbing ice on him once he lost consciousness. Upon arriving a few minutes later, three Officers radioed for medical assistance. In the meantime, rather than try to resuscitate Plaintiff’s son themselves, they stood by and watched as two inmates tried to help him. When trained medical personnel finally arrived four minutes later, it was too late: they were unable to revive Plaintiff’s son, who died from an overdose. Surveillance footage captured some, but not all, of these events. Plaintiff’s mother sued the City of St. Louis, the three responding officers, and two supervisors for their deliberate indifference. The district court denied summary judgment to the responding officers.   The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the district court misstated the burden and relied on allegations from an unverified complaint to deny summary judgment. The court wrote that the district court erred in how it dealt with the gaps in the video footage. Instead of relying on other evidence to fill in the missing details, the findings mirrored what the plaintiff’s unverified complaint said. The court wrote that unsworn allegations are no substitute for evidence at summary judgment. The court explained that the district court tilted the scales too far in the Plaintiff’s favor by raising the summary-judgment burden on the officers and allowing unsworn allegations to rebut evidence. View "Janice Washington v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possessing a firearm by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), after law enforcement discovered a gun on him during an investigatory stop. Defendant moved to suppress the firearm, claiming the officers’ mistaken belief that he was a wanted fugitive nine inches taller than him rendered the stop unreasonable. The district court denied his motion and sentenced him to a term of 37 months’ imprisonment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed explaining that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity independent of the mistaken identification justified the detention. The court explained that here, the Officers had sufficient evidence to establish reasonable suspicion justifying Defendant’s detention. First, the time of the encounter. It was 12:30 a.m. when the Officers began their surveillance, and they detained Defendant at approximately 1:50 a.m. Second, the encounter took place in a high-crime area. The Officers were aware of multiple reports of subjects in that neighborhood with firearms, and the apartment Defendant freely entered was associated with an armed and dangerous fugitive. Third, Defendant’s behavior when he became aware of law enforcement’s presence. View "United States v. Lorenzo Lemons, Sr." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged in a five-count indictment with attempted bank robbery involving assault with a dangerous weapon. The district court found Defendant guilty of the five offenses and sentenced him to 230 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing the evidence was insufficient to convict him of any offense; the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress involuntary custodial statements he made to an FBI agent; and the district court erred by failing to include the term “knowingly” in reciting the elements of the Count II, III, and IV offenses when explaining its decision during a post-trial hearing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court considers the evidence submitted at trial and makes findings of fact and conclusions of law in determining whether the government has proved the offenses charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the indictment charged that Defendant “knowingly” brandished and used a pistol during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count II), “knowingly” discharged and used a pistol during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count III), and “knowingly” discharged and used an AR-15 rifle during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count IV). The court explained that neither filed a post-trial motion challenging the court’s findings and conclusions even though stand-by counsel was granted a one-month extension of time to do so. The evidence that Defendant committed these three offenses “knowingly” was overwhelming. There was no error, plain or otherwise. View "United States v. Jacob Monteer" on Justia Law

Defendant, a native and resident of Iowa, was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of possessing child pornography. He was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment and 240 months supervised release. In January 2022, the district court revoked supervised release after Defendant admitted to viewing pornography on computers at public libraries in Des Moines, which violated conditions of his supervised release and Iowa Sex Offender Registry requirements. The court imposed a revocation sentence of 14 months imprisonment followed by 19 years of supervised release. The district court revoked supervised release and imposed a revocation sentence of 24 months imprisonment followed by 19 years supervised release. Defendant appealed, arguing the revocation sentence is substantively unreasonable.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court expressly acknowledged Defendant’s need for sex offender treatment and agreed to recommend that Defendant be confined in a BOP facility that has treatment programming. The court considered the relevant 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) sentencing factors and carefully explained its decision to give greater weight to protecting the community from a high-risk offender with a long criminal history that included hands-on sexual abuse of young children than to the possibility that the needed treatment would be less available or less effective in prison. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Nicholas Jackson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 after he was pepper-sprayed and tackled by a Des Moines Police Officer while photographing a protest. Plaintiff, who was covering the protest as a journalist, claimed that the officer and other city officials violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted the city officials’ motion for summary judgment after concluding that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment on the unlawful seizure and excessive force claims but affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment dismissing the retaliation claim. The court explained that viewing the totality of the circumstances in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there are genuine issues of material fact on whether there was an excessive use of force. To begin, they arrested Plaintiff for failure to disperse—a misdemeanor. Second, while the officer focuses on the fact there had been “hours of criminal activity occurring” and that he was “under constant threat of harm from active rioters,” he cannot point to any facts suggesting an immediate threat to his safety or the safety of others. Further, the court wrote that numerous cases show that the identified general constitutional rule applies with obvious clarity to the conduct in question. View "Mark Nieters v. Brandon Holtan" on Justia Law

Defendant used fake deeds to gain possession of three houses. On appeal, Defendant challenged the loss calculation but began by disputing the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his identity theft convictions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Defendant argued that the government said too much in the closing argument. According to Defendant, two of the prosecutor’s statements qualify. The court explained that the prosecutor’s comment was a fleeting reference that immediately followed an accurate statement of the government’s burden—proof beyond a reasonable doubt— and the district court repeatedly instructed the jury that the burden was on the government.   However, the court explained that while Defendant’s convictions stand, his 41-month sentence cannot. For identity theft and other property crimes, the recommended sentencing range depends in part on the amount of the “actual” or “intended” losses from the crime. Defendant ended up with a total offense level of 22 and a range of 41 to 51 months in prison. The court explained that on remand, the district court must adopt “a reasonable estimate of the” fair market value at the time of the transfer, either by using a measure that reflects the value at that point or by accounting for Defendant’s post-fraud improvements and market changes during the intervening period. View "United States v. Arondo Harris" on Justia Law

After Defendant violated the conditions of his supervised release, the district court sentenced him to 24 months in prison even though the Sentencing Guidelines recommended 5–11 months. He maintains that the district court failed to explain the sentence adequately and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when explaining a sentence, a court need only set forth enough to satisfy us that it considered the parties' arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its legal decision-making authority. The district court provided ample reason for imposing an upward variance, including the fact that Defendant stayed at the sober-living house only briefly, previously received leniency, frequently violated court orders, and absconded for months on end. The court explained that the court isn't required to discuss or recite each statutory sentencing consideration before imposing a sentence; when, as here, the court mentions some of them, we presume it is aware of them all. View "United States v. Lamar Bertucci" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant and co-Defendant of conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of mixtures and substances containing a detectable amount of fentanyl, as well as individual counts of possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of fentanyl. Co-Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Both defendants appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying their request for a jury instruction on multiple conspiracies. Co-defendant contends that the district court erred by ordering him to be handcuffed and shackled throughout the trial and by admitting into evidence portions of a post-arrest interview. Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his possession with intent to distribute conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the lack of any substantial prejudice stemming from the absence of a multiple-conspiracies instruction and the presence of sufficient single-conspiracy supporting evidence leads the court to conclude that no reversible error occurred with respect to the drug quantity finding. Further, the court wrote that given co-Defendant’s noncompliant behavior in jail and during transport, the district court acted well within its discretion by ordering that co-Defendant be shackled and handcuffed during trial and by taking appropriate precautions to minimize any prejudice to co-Defendant. View "United States v. Kevin Green" on Justia Law

Parolees sued the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC), claiming that its parole revocation system violated the Due Process Clause. Recognizing the system’s flaws, MDOC rewrote its policies and consented to summary judgment. Later, MDOC moved to dismiss for failure to join a required party—the Missouri Public Defender Commission (Commission). The district court denied MDOC’s motion and held a hearing to determine whether MDOC’s revised policies satisfied due process. Finding additional problems, the district court issued a remedy order instructing MDOC to make changes.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court explained that the state must hold a revocation hearing “within a reasonable time after the parolee is taken into custody.” The court wrote that MDOC has a policy requiring a revocation hearing within 30 days, but it does not always follow that policy. The district court ordered MDOC to follow its 30-day policy. The court wrote that because it has held that longer delays may be reasonable in some cases, the remedy is not tailored to the violation and was an abuse of discretion. View "Stephanie Gasca v. Anne Precythe" on Justia Law