Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant’s mother called local dispatch and said an officer needed to come by because her son was “acting up.” A Bureau of Indian Affairs Officer was dispatched to the home, learning on the way that Defendant had an active tribal arrest warrant. Defendant’s mother invited Defendant into the living room and told Defendant to join them. The officer told Defendant he was “going to have to take you because you got that warrant.” Defendant fled to the garage, pursued by the officer, where Defendant knocked the officer down and escaped. Defendant was charged with forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, or interfering with a federal officer and inflicting bodily injury. The jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of forcible assault of a federal officer involving physical contact. The district court sentenced Defendant to 44 months’ imprisonment. He appealed, raising numerous evidentiary issues and challenging the assessment of a two-level sentencing increase.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, the amicable conversation -- dominated by Defendant-- occurred in his mother’s home, a non-custodial atmosphere. The officer testified he did not know what the warrant was based on. Defendant fled only after the officer later told him he would be arrested, confirming that Defendant initially believed or at least hoped that he could avoid immediate arrest. Further, the court explained that even if Defendant was in custody, follow-up questions to clarify ambiguity do not amount to “interrogation” unless “their point is to enhance the defendant’s guilt.” The court concluded the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Jade LaRoche" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of distributing morphine within 1,000 feet of a school. He was sentenced to 262 months imprisonment followed by 6 years of supervised release. Defendant began supervised release in September 2021. He was arrested and charged in Iowa state court with Domestic Abuse Assault for pushing his fiancée into a wall while inebriated. His fiancee requested a no-contact order, The United States Probation Office filed a petition to revoke supervised release that day. Probation filed an amended petition to revoke supervised release. He now appealed the revocation sentence, arguing the district court erred in imposing an overly broad no-contact order restricting communication between Defendant and his fiancée. At the end of the hearing, the court stated it would modify Special Condition 8. The court directed Probation to prepare and circulate revised language to counsel for both parties and stated, “If the parties object when it’s finally written out, please let me know, and we’ll try to arrive at appropriate wording.” Defendant made no objection to the final wording of Special Condition 8, either before or after Judgment was entered.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained Defendant, with a long history of alcohol abuse, admitted he assaulted his fiancee while he was literally falling down drunk. By limiting contact, Special Condition 8 seeks to protect the victim from further harm. Fiancee had requested a no-contact order from the state court, subject to a specific exception the district court incorporated in Special Condition 8. View "United States v. Paul Swehla" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child under the age of 12 and one count of abusive sexual contact. He appeals, challenging two evidentiary rulings at trial and the restitution order.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions but remanded to the district court for further proceedings to resolve the parties’ disputes about the amount, if any, of restitution owing. The court wrote that the government argued that restitution for lost wages was mandatory under 18 U.S.C. Section 2248 and that the amount was supported by documentation submitted in advance of sentencing. The district court did not hold a hearing. Instead, it entered an order that stated that it had “reviewed the presentence report concerning restitution” and the parties’ briefs and found that “the government’s requested restitution is authorized by law and is unrebutted by any evidence.” The court explained that the burden lies with the government to “demonstrate[e] the amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense.” Without any findings from the district court to resolve Defendant’s objections, the court wrote that it was unable to review whether the government met its burden of establishing restitution by a preponderance of the evidence. View "United States v. Warren Mackey" on Justia Law

Parents Defending Education, an association of parents, brought this action to challenge a policy adopted by the Linn Mar Community School District in Iowa. The disputed policy is entitled “Administrative Regulations Regarding Transgender and Students Nonconforming to Gender Role Stereotypes.” The policy sets forth regulations for the District that “address the needs of transgender students, gender-expansive students, nonbinary, gender nonconforming students, and students questioning their gender to ensure a safe, affirming, and healthy school environment where every student can learn effectively.” The parents who seek to participate in this case are anonymous; the pleadings identify them by a letter of the alphabet. The district court determined that Parents Defending failed to establish Article III standing because the organization did not show injury, causation, or redressability on its claims.   The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal in part as moot and reversed on one claim. The court concluded that at least Parent G has alleged an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing. Parent G asserts that her son wants to “state his belief that biological sex is immutable.” Because of the policy, however, Parent G states that her son remains silent in school “when gender identity topics arise” to avoid violating the policy. This student’s proposed activity “concerns political speech” and is “arguably affected with a constitutional interest.” Thus, Parent G has standing to bring a claim challenging the policy based on the First Amendment. Therefore, Parents Defending has standing as an association to pursue the claim on behalf of a member. View "Parents Defending Education v. LinnMar Community School Dist., et al" on Justia Law

MyPillow, Inc. and Chief Executive Officer Michael Lindell (collectively, “Lindell”) appealed the district court’s denial of their motions for a preliminary injunction and for the return of property—Lindell’s cell phone that was seized by federal agents on September 13, 2022. The basis of Lindell’s action arises from an ongoing federal investigation into the individuals responsible for publishing forensic images of election software used in the 2020 election in Mesa County, Colorado. He argued on appeal that the federal investigation violates his First Amendment rights of freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of the press, and the right to petition for the redress of grievances. He also contended the search warrant for his phone violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against general warrants.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Lindell’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court reversed the district court’s decision not to exercise equitable jurisdiction over Lindell’s motion for the return of property as it relates to the continued retention of the cell phone itself and all its data. The court explained that it is unable to determine from the record whether the government can reasonably justify its continued refusal to return Lindell’s cell phone, which at this point was seized nearly a year ago, or the data on it, which is entirely unrelated to the offenses the government is investigating. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to hold a prompt hearing and balance the government’s interest in retaining Lindell’s cell phone and all its data against Lindell’s right to get the property back. View "Michael Lindell v. United States" on Justia Law

After Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, the district court designated him an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 180 months in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that his predicate offenses were not committed on different occasions, a requirement for the armed career criminal sentencing enhancement. Alternatively, Defendant argued that the Sixth Amendment required a jury to find that he committed his predicate offenses on different occasions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Defendant’s PSR shows a 2004 burglary conviction and two 2006 battery convictions. According to charging documents, the battery offenses involved different victims and occurred on different days, one on or about March 8 and the other on or about March 11. Defendant argued that the 2006 convictions were committed on the same occasion because he was arrested and convicted on the same dates for both offenses. The court explained that the multi-day gap separating the battery offenses strongly supports a finding that Defendant committed them on different occasions. Accordingly, the court held that all things considered, the district court did not err when it concluded that Defendant committed his prior offenses on different occasions. View "United States v. Christopher Stowell" on Justia Law

Creighton Preparatory School expelled Plaintiff after he made lewd remarks about a teacher. Plaintiff sued Creighton under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 on the theory that the school had discriminated against him by failing to perform an “adequate and impartial investigation.” The district court granted Creighton’s motion to dismiss. It first dismissed the Title IX claim because Plaintiff had failed to “allege [that] his sex played any part in the disciplinary process at all.” Then, with the federal question gone, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff does not allege that Creighton faced external pressure to punish male students, much less gave in by expelling him. The court reasoned that without an allegation of that kind, the complaint fails to plausibly allege the sort of “causal connection between the flawed outcome and gender bias” required to make an erroneous outcome theory work.Further, the court wrote that treating men and women differently can support an inference of sex discrimination, but it requires identifying a similarly situated member of the opposite sex who has been “treated more favorably.” For Plaintiff, he had to find “a female accused of sexual harassment” who received better treatment. There are no female students at Creighton, an all-boys school, let alone any who have faced sexual-misconduct allegations. The court explained that to the extent that Plaintiff argues that believing them over him raises an inference of discrimination, there is nothing alleged that the school did so because of his sex. View "Elijah Wells v. Creighton Preparatory School" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was hired as a Law Enforcement Officer by the Sisseton, South Dakota, Police Department. Plaintiff and the City signed a Sisseton Police Department Employment Contract (the “Contract”) requiring Plaintiff to reimburse the City for the cost of her training if she left the Department before completing 36 months of employment. In January 2022, Defendant, the City’s Chief of Police, informed Plaintiff that the Police Commission had lost confidence in her, and Defendant asked Plaintiff to resign, which she did. Plaintiff filed this 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action, asserting, along with other claims, that the City and numerous individual defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights. The district court granted Defendants’ motion. Plaintiff appealed only the dismissal of her due process claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court the Supreme Court of South Dakota would rule that the Contract did not change an at-will employment relationship. The court explained that for Plaintiff’s claim against the City to survive a motion to dismiss, her complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” The court agreed with the district court that the Complaint “failed to allege any unconstitutional policy or custom that enabled” Defendants to deprive Plaintiff of her alleged federal due process rights. Counsel for Plaintiff could only respond that the Complaint plausibly alleged the practice of violating the three-year term in the City’s employee reimbursement contracts. That practice was not alleged in the Complaint and, in any event, is nothing more than a “facially lawful municipal action.” View "Samantha LaCoe v. City of Sisseton" on Justia Law

The University of Iowa expelled graduate student John Doe after investigating two accusations of sexual misconduct brought against him by different complainants. The Iowa Board of Regents affirmed the decision. Doe sued the University and University officials, claiming, in part, discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. Section 1681(a), and procedural due process violations, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court granted qualified immunity to the University officials, dismissed the procedural due process claims against them, and granted the University summary judgment on the remaining claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it is not convinced that institutional efforts to prevent sexual misconduct on campus, including educational programs that challenge students to evaluate the impact of gender norms on rape culture, amount to evidence of external pressure on the University that supports an inference of bias. The court held that Doe failed to provide “sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that [the University] disciplined him on the basis of sex.” Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Doe’s Title IX claim. Further, the court explained that the University provided adequate notice of the charges. Therefore, the court wrote that because Doe failed to show the University officials’ conduct violated his federal rights, it affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Doe’s claims against the University officials. View "John Doe v. University of Iowa" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on three counts of drug possession with intent to distribute. On the morning of the trial, he decided to plead guilty to two of them in exchange for dismissal of the third. The district court performed the usual change-of-plea colloquy. Defendant said that his mind was “crystal clear” and that he was not on any medications or drugs. Yet some of his responses showed hesitation. He said he had little time to go over the plea agreement with his lawyer and felt rushed. On top of that, he regretted not taking an earlier plea offer made while his mother’s recent death weighed heavily on him. Still, the court found Defendant competent to proceed with his proposed plea and confirmed that he was satisfied with his attorney. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at sentencing when it allowed his lawyer to withdraw, neglected to appoint another one, and failed to warn Defendant about the risks of proceeding on his own.   The Eighth Circuit dismissed his appeal, finding that Defendant waived his right to challenge these issues. The court explained that recognizing the validity of appeal waivers provides defendants with an important bargaining chip. The court wrote that applying the miscarriage-of-justice exception here would weaken that presumption of validity and reduce Defendant's bargaining power. As such, the court found that in this case, there is a valid appeal waiver and no showing that a miscarriage of justice would result from its enforcement. View "United States v. Rashaun Williams" on Justia Law