Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's denial of their motion to remand and its dismissal on the merits of their claims against Wells Fargo and Kozeny. The court concluded that, because plaintiffs did not allege that Kozeny owed a tort duty enumerated in the deed of trust, no reasonable basis in fact and law supported plaintiffs' negligence claim against Kozeny; because there was no reasonable basis in fact and law for either of plaintiffs' negligence and breach of fiduciary claims, it follows that Kozeny was fraudulently joined and that the district court properly denied plaintiffs' motion to remand; the court modified the district court's dismissal of the claims against Kozeny to be without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and because Kozeny - the only nondiverse defendant - was dismissed, the district court properly retained federal diversity jurisdiction over plaintiffs' remaining claims against Wells Fargo. Because plaintiffs failed to state a claim of wrongful foreclosure, fraudulent misrepresentation, violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.020.1, negligence, or negligent misrepresentation, the district court properly granted Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss. View "Wivell, et al v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Bridgestone for violating the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA), 407.020.1 RSMo. Plaintiff alleged that a shop supply fee was for profit, not supplies. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff's Rule 56(d) motion because the affidavit supporting the motion provided only speculative hope of finding evidence to support her claim; the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Bridgestone summary judgment before ruling on her motion for class certification; the fee was not an unfair or deceptive practice under the MMPA where the undisputed evidence showed that the fee covered costs for a variety of shop supplies; and, in regards to a case for money had and received, the fee was not unjust where the undisputed evidence showed that the fee covered costs for a variety of shop supplies and clearly disclosed that it was intended partly for profit. Accordingly, the court affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in granting Bridgestone summary judgment. View "Toben v. Bridgestone Retail Operations" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a purported class action against Charter in Missouri state court, alleging that Charter violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.10 et seq., and breached its contract with the class members. Plaintiffs alleged that Charter had provided the class members with Internet modems that were incapable of operating at the speed that Charter had promised. Charter removed to federal court. The court concluded that Charter met its burden of showing that the amount in controversy exceeded the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005's (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), $5 million jurisdictional threshold. The court also concluded that, under Missouri law, plaintiffs failed to allege facts to support pecuniary loss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Grawitch, et al. v. Charter Communication" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed the district court's order granting Bank of America's motion for summary judgment on their counterclaims for rescission and statutory damages under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. The court concluded that the district court did not err in determining that defendants' right to rescission had expired and that their rescission claim was time-barred under section 1635 because defendants notified Bank of America of their intent to rescind but failed to file a lawsuit within the three-year period. The court concluded, however, that defendants have offered evidence that Bank of America failed to deliver the TILA disclosures and notices. Therefore, there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the failure to deliver the required documents. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Bank of America on defendants' counterclaim for rescission; vacated the grant of summary judgment to Bank of America on defendants' counterclaim for statutory damages; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bank of America v. Peterson, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Countrywide, alleging violation of the Missouri Second Mortgage Loan Act (MSMLA), 516.231 to 408.241 RSMo. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's dismissal of their claims as barred by the three-year statute of limitations of section 516.130(2). The court concluded that the MSMLA was subject to the three-year limitations period of section 516.130(2), not the six-year statute of limitations under section 516.420, pursuant to Rashaw v. United Consumers Credit Union. The court also concluded, under Missouri law, that the "entire damage" to plaintiffs was capable of ascertainment "in a single action" and the "continuing or repeated wrong" exception did not apply in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Washington, et al. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's order denying her objection to the garnishment of her disability payments. The court concluded that defendant's disability payments were "earnings" within the meaning of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 1673(a), and were subject to the Act's limitations on garnishment. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment holding otherwise. View "United States v. Ashcraft" on Justia Law

Mortgagors appealed the district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings to their lenders in a dispute regarding a home loan. At issue on appeal was whether mailing a notice of rescission within three years of consummating a loan was sufficient to "exercise" the right to rescind a loan transaction under 15 U.S.C. 1635(a) or, alternatively, whether a party seeking to rescind the transaction was required to file a lawsuit within the three-year statutory period. The court held that a party seeking to rescind a loan transaction must file suit within three years of consummating the loan. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on the pleadings in favor of the lenders. View "Jesinoski, et al. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit against CMH Homes, Vanderbilt and others in state court. The companies subsequently filed a petition in the district court alleging that plaintiffs' claims were subject to mandatory arbitration. The district court dismissed the petition. The companies argued that the district court erred by concluding that it lacked diversity jurisdiction. The court concluded that the district court correctly reasoned that Vaden undermined Advance America and required the court's departure from that precedent. Following the Vaden approach, the district court properly looked through the arbitration petition to the state court complaint to determine the amount in controversy. Nonetheless, the court remanded for the district court to calculate an amount in controversy and to determine on that basis whether it had jurisdiction over the putative class action under 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2). View "CMH Homes, Inc., et al. v. Goodner, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants alleging claims under, inter alia, the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), as amended by the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 1602 et seq. Defendants are persons and entities involved in the transactions related to the financing of an addition to a house on plaintiffs' property. The court recently joined the Ninth and Tenth Circuits in holding that notice was not sufficient to exercise the right of rescission. In this instance, the court concluded that the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs' notice was sufficient to exercise the right of rescission under section 1635 of TILA. Therefore, plaintiffs' right of rescission expired upon the sale of the property. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's finding that plaintiffs' notice was sufficient to exercise the TILA statutory right of rescission. The court affirmed, however, the district court's grant of summary judgment, the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims, and the dismissal of the Hartmans as parties to the case. View "Hartman, et al. v. Smith, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed putative class actions under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. 1693, alleging that Mutual First and First National violated the Act because defendants' ATM machines did not have "on machine" notice of a transaction fee. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff's claim of statutory damages was sufficiently related to his injury to confer standing where defendants did not provide him with the required "on machine" notice and then charged him a prohibited fee following an ATM transaction that he initiated and completed. Further, plaintiff's injury was fairly traceable to defendants' conduct where, if defendants had not violated the Act's notice requirement, plaintiff would not have been forced to choose between engaging in a transaction without the required notice and walking away. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Charvat v. Mutual First Fed. Credit Union" on Justia Law