Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against Bank of America, alleging that Bank of America failed to provide necessary disclosures in violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. The district court agreed with defendants that the loan at issue was a residential mortgage transaction to which section 1635(a) did not apply. Therefore, the notice of rescission plaintiffs sent to Bank of America in February 2011 could not cancel the loan or provide a basis for wrongful foreclosure and quiet title actions. The district court determined that even if defendants had been required to provide disclosures under the TILA, any claim for damages would have been barred by its one-year statute of limitations. The court concluded that, based on the plain language of the statute, a residential mortgage transaction is not entitled to the right of rescission under section 1635(a). The court rejected plaintiffs' remaining claims and affirmed the judgment. View "Dunn v. Bank of America N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Rodenburg, a debt collection law firm, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692d-f. The court concluded that Rodenburg reasonably believed that plaintiff had not provided a complete response to his prior communication with defendant and thus section 1692(b)(3) permitted a call back. The court agreed with the district court that it was objectively reasonable for Rodenburg to believe that plaintiff, as the parent, had or could obtain location information about his daughter, Alexis, permitting a follow-up call to learn if he had acquired or was now willing to provide “correct or complete location information.” The court also agreed with the district court that there is no material factual dispute as to the section 1692d(5) claim because Rodenburg’s conduct did not rise to the level of harassment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kuntz v. Rodenburg LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against PRA, a debt collector, and its attorneys, Gamache, under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. The district court granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The court concluded that nothing inherent in the process of charging off a debt precludes a claim for statutory interest, and Missouri’s prejudgment interest statute does not expressly preclude statutory prejudgment interest following a waiver of contractual interest. Therefore, defendants' demands for such interest were not actionable misrepresentations or unfair or unconscionable collection methods under sections 1692e or 1692f. Because the court held that the original creditors’ acts of charging off the debts did not effectuate waivers of statutory interest, the assignments of the debt to PRA did not “create” the entitlement to statutory prejudgment interest. The court concluded that the assignments merely transferred any entitlement to such interest that otherwise existed. The court further concluded that any demand requirement that exists as a precondition to the accrual of statutory prejudgment interest was satisfied by the original creditors’ demands upon plaintiff. The court held that there exists no de minimis exception to FDCPA liability based upon low dollar amounts; and debt collectors’ false representations about the availability of remedies or amounts owed under state law, like representations of fact, are to be viewed through the unsophisticated-consumer standard and may be actionable pursuant to the FDCPA. Applying these holdings to the present case, the court concluded that plaintiff has articulated viable section 1692e and 1692f(1) claims by alleging false statements and collection attempts regarding the availability of compound interest. Accordingly, the court reversed as to these claims, rejected plaintiff's remaining claims, and affirmed in all other respects. View "Haney v. Portfolio Recovery Assoc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that 21 Budget rental car businesses willfully violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), 15 U.S.C. 1681c(g)(1), by issuing receipts that contained more than five digits of customers’ credit card numbers. The parties subsequently mediated and agreed on a proposed settlement. The settlement provided that each class member would receive a certificate worth $10 off any car rental or $30 off a rental over $150, with no holiday blackout days. Applying the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1712(a)-(c), the district court awarded $23,137.46 in attorneys’ fees and costs, and a $1,000 class representative incentive fee. Plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded that the district court erred by following the In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig. mandatory approach in applying section 1712(a)-(c) without explicitly stating that the award was based on an exercise of the district court’s discretion to determine a reasonable attorney’s fee. But plaintiffs do not argue the award was a breach of the district court’s discretion, and if the court remanded, it would be for an explicit exercise of that discretion, applying the principles of section 1712(a)-(c). The court determined that any award greater than $17,438.45 would be unreasonable in light of class counsel’s limited success in obtaining value for the class. Accordingly, the court concluded that any error was harmless and affirmed the judgment. View "Galloway v. The Kansas City Landsmen, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and purportedly on behalf of others similarly situated, filed suit against GameStop for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, money had and received, and violation of Minnesota’s Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), Minn. Stat. 325F.68, et seq. Plaintiff alleged that GameStop's disclosure of personally identifiable information (PII) to a third party (Facebook) violated an express agreement not to do so. The district court granted GameStop's motion to dismiss based on plaintiff's lack of standing. The court concluded that plaintiff provided sufficient facts alleging that he is party to a binding contract with GameStop, and GameStop does not dispute this contractual relationship; GameStop has violated that policy; and plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of GameStop's breach. The court also concluded that plaintiff has standing to bring his breach-of-contract claim and to bring his other claims. The court concluded, however, that the privacy policy unambiguously does not include those pieces of information among the protected PII. Therefore, the protection plaintiff argues GameStop failed to provide was not among the protections for which he bargained by agreeing to the terms of service, and GameStop thus could not have breached its contract with plaintiff. Plaintiff's Minnesota CFA claims fail for similar reasons. Finally, plaintiff has not alleged a claim for unjust enrichment or the related claim of money had and received. View "Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Midland under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e, alleging that Midland violated the FDCPA by filing a proof of claim on a time-barred debt. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court declined to extend the FDCPA to time-barred proofs of claim, concluding that an accurate and complete proof of claim on a time-barred debt is not false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable under the FDCPA. The court explained that the bankruptcy code provides for a claims resolution process and these protections against harassment and deception satisfy the relevant concerns of the FDCPA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Nelson v. Midland Credit Mgmt." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants Barton, Weiss, and CACi, raising claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692d-f, alleging misrepresentations along with certain claims for interest and costs. The court concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply in this case where plaintiff seeks relief from neither a Missouri judgment nor an Illinois garnishment order. Rather, plaintiff alleges statutory violations seeking statutory penalties based on Barton’s actions in the process of obtaining the judgment and order. The court further concluded that, because equitable tolling does not apply, all of plaintiff’s FDCPA claims directed towards conduct that preceded the Illinois proceedings are time barred. Because Barton's use of the Illinois courts did not amount to an action "against the consumer," those actions were not subject to the FDCPA's venue restriction. The court affirmed as to these claims. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of claims that allege independent FDCPA violations in the Illinois proceedings related to the identity of Barton’s client and the amounts of interests and costs asserted; the court declined at the pleading stage of this case to apply state-law preclusion principles to these remaining claims due to the absence of briefing and the parties’ failure to clearly identify the state law applied by the Illinois court; and because federal claims remain, the court reversed the discretionary dismissal of the state law claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hageman v. Barton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, the law firm representing plaintiff's landlord in a suit for unpaid rent, alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e. Plaintiff claimed that the law firm had violated the act by swearing to an affidavit without personal knowledge of the facts. The court concluded that, absent an allegation that he actually did not owe rent, plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the defendant's practice misled the state court in any meaningful way. In this case, plaintiff's complaint only indicates that a trial was had in which the state court received evidence before rendering a judgment on the underlying rent issue. Because plaintiff has not alleged a plausible violation of the FDCPA and his class claims were properly dismissed, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Janson v. Katharyn B. Davis, LLC" on Justia Law

In April 2014, two consumers filed a class action against BF Labs, asserting “deceptive and unconscionable business practices” in marketing and selling Bitcoin mining machines. Five months later, the Federal Trade Commission sued BF for unfair and deceptive acts, 15 U.S.C. 45(a). The court stayed pending suits and imposed a receivership. The stay was subsequently lifted. The two consumers were denied leave to intervene in the FTC action. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the interests of the consumers’ proposed class are subsumed within the public interest because the FTC, on behalf of consumers, sought relief for the same “deceptive and unconscionable business practices” alleged by the consumers. The consumers have not made the necessary “strong showing of inadequate representation.” View "Alexander v. Fed. Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

Messerli law firm obtained a default judgment for its client, Capital One against Scheffler, a former debt collector. Having learned of Scheffler’s reputation as “the most litigious debtor” in Minnesota, Messerli instructed its employees not to contact Scheffler. Scheffler claims he nonetheless sent a cease-and-desist letter to Messerli, which says it received no letter. Messerli attempted to enforce the judgment by serving Scheffler with a garnishment summons. Scheffler returned an exemption Form, claiming that all of the money the bank had frozen was protected, but giving no reason why it was protected. He asserted that the source of the money was “[his] butt,” that he was entitled to death benefits, and “I told you that you were wasting your time.” Scheffler’s attorney sent a letter asking Messerli to honor the claimed cease-and-desist request and asserting that Scheffler was “judgment proof.” Scheffler, acting pro se, sued Messerli under the Fair Debt Collection Practices and Fair Credit Reporting Acts and state laws. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal. Even if there were a cease letter, Messerli’s communications did not violate it. A creditor may communicate with a debtor after receiving a cease letter “to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke specified remedies,” 15 U.S.C. 1692c(c)(2), which is what the garnishment letter was. Messerli was also permitted to request Scheffler’s credit report, 15 U.S.C. 1681b(a)(3). View "Scheffler v. Messerli & Kramer P.A." on Justia Law