Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Bank filed suit against the Hanna Parties for breach of contract after the Hanna Parties failed to pay the balance due on a loan when it matured. The Hanna Parties counterclaimed, alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, deceptive trade practices, and breach of contract by the Bank, and demanding reformation or rescission. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank as to the counterclaims. A jury concluded that the Hanna Parties did not breach the contract and the district court denied the Bank's post-verdict motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. Both parties appealed. The court concluded that the case was properly submitted to a jury, and the Bank is precluded from seeking a judgment as a matter of law, but that the jury's verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, so the court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the Bank's breach-of-contract claims. The court agreed with the district court that the Hanna Parties' counterclaims failed as a matter of law and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Bank as to those claims.View "Bank of America v. JB Hanna, et al." on Justia Law

G&K filed suit against Bill's for breach of contract and sought liquidated damages. Bill's counterclaimed, asserting common-law clams and a violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark. Code 4-88-113. A jury found in favor of G&K on the common-law counterclaims but returned a verdict for Bill's on its deceptive trade practices counterclaim, awarding Bill's damages. The district court subsequently awarded G&K attorney's fees and denied Bill's motion for attorney's fees. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $82,766.50 in attorney's fees to G&K where the district court expressly considered G&K's degree of success and reduced its requested award based on time devoted to unsuccessful causes of action; the district court did not abuse its discretion by implicitly finding that the hourly rates claimed by G&K's Little Rock-based attorneys were reasonable; the documentation was sufficient to support the district court's conclusion where the record includes invoices that detail the amount of time spent on this litigation and the activities on which that time was spent; although the district court did not expressly mention all eight of the Chrisco factors, the district court did address several and provided enough explanation for the court to conclude that there was no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court rejected Bill's challenge to the award of attorney's fees to G&K. In light of comments from the Arkansas courts and the absence of mandatory language in section 4-88-113(f), the court agreed with the district court that Bill's was not automatically entitled to an award of fees when it prevailed on a claim under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. However, the court found little explanation for the district court's ruling and remanded for the district court to consider whether Bill's should be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee under section 4-88-113(f). The Act establishes an independent basis for awarding fees and does not restrict awards to a party that prevails in whatever larger litigation involves a claim under the Act. A party who prevails on a cause of action to recover actual damages under the Act is eligible for an award of attorney's fees, even when another party is the prevailing party in the overall action for purposes of Ark. Code Sec. 16-22-308.View "G&K Services Co., Inc. v. Bill's Super Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Sammy Hagar after he published an autobiography in which he alleged that plaintiff had extorted him by claiming she was pregnant with his child. The district court granted summary judgment for Hagar on all of plaintiff's claims. Applying Iowa law, the court concluded that the district court erred by granting summary judgment on the libel per se claim where Hagar's statements are defamatory as a matter of law, plaintiff has shown the existence of a fact issue regarding whether the challenged statements were "of and concerning" her, and the evidence was sufficient to submit the question of substantial truth to the jury. The court also concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the false light invasion of privacy claim where questions of fact exist as to whether the challenged statements were sufficiently publicized. The court agreed with the district court's ruling that, with respect to evidence of emotional distress, plaintiff put forth conclusory statements; the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the breach-of-contract claim where a jury must decide the ultimate issue of breach; and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because Hagar's statement's did not deprive plaintiff of the benefits under a negotiated agreement between the parties.View "Doe v. Hagar" on Justia Law

Asarco filed suit against UP alleging breach of contract and seeking contribution regarding a dispute about environmental liability for a lead refinery and smelter which polluted Omaha, Nebraska. The district court granted UP's motion to dismiss, ruling that UP did not breach the agreement and consent decree that protected UP from Asarco's claims. Despite receiving notice of UP's settlement, Asarco did not object before the district court issued the consent decree. Asarco waited until after entry of the consent decree and brought this collateral case. The court concluded that the district court correctly recognized that all of Asarco's claims were prohibited contribution claims even though some were disguised as breach of contract claims. In light of the consent decree, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675, protected UP against any contribution claim related to the site. Further, the district court correctly concluded that UP neither waived CERCLA's contribution protection nor breached the tolling agreement by invoking that protection. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "ASARCO v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Cargotec appealed the district court's conclusion that Cargotec's contract with NMC did not contain arbitration and indemnification provisions. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that whether the arbitration clause became part of the parties' agreement remains a question "presumptively committed to judicial determination." On the merits, the court concluded that the district court erred in failing to order a trial to resolve material factual disputes concerning whether the parties agreed to arbitration and indemnification. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to hold a non-jury trial, making findings of fact, and apply the appropriate U.C.C. provisions in light of those facts. View "Nebraska Machinery Co. v. Cargotec Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Mid-Continent, alleging that Mid-Continent breached the insurance contract by denying coverage to plaintiff in an underlying lawsuit arising from a subcontractor's faulty workmanship during construction of a home. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claim because faulty workmanship on the home was not an "occurrence" within the meaning of the policy under Essex Ins. Co. v. Holder. The district court did not err by denying plaintiff leave to amend because plaintiff seeks to extend coverage to subcontractor negligence through a claim of estoppel. Under Arkansas law, the doctrine of waiver of estoppel cannot be given the effect of enlarging or extending the coverage as defined in the contract. View "J-McDaniel Construction Co v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., et al." on Justia Law

Grandoe filed suit against Gander Mountain after Gander Mountain reneged on its oral commitment to purchase $3.05 million worth of winter gloves from Grandoe. After the jury awarded judgment in favor of Grandoe, Gander Mountain moved for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, claiming that two written documents rendered the oral agreement void. Grandoe filed an unopposed motion for prejudgment interest. The court concluded that the district court did not commit reversible error in declining to rule on the legal effect of the Vendor Buying Agreement because any error on the district court's part was invited by Gander Mountain; the district court did not err in concluding that the Resource Allowance Contract did not render evidence of the oral agreement inadmissible; a reasonable jury could have found that the parties orally agreed to the sale of $3.05 million worth of gloves and that no written contract voided that oral agreement; and the district court did not clearly err in awarding Grandoe prejudgment interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Gander Mountain's motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, and affirmed its grant of prejudgment interest to Grandoe. View "The Grandoe Corp. v. Gander Mountain Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his case, arguing that his allegations of fact sufficiently stated a claim for, inter alia, breach of contract. Plaintiff's claim arose from a mortgage modification process he entered into with Chase under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). The court concluded that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract by alleging sufficient facts to show that the elements of a contract exist, that the conditions precedent were satisfied or waived, and that an exception to the statute of frauds applied. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, CEO of Roxio, Inc., filed suit against Best Buy and Napster for breach of contract. The contract dispute arose out of Best Buy's refusal to pay plaintiff a performance award under an Award Agreement. The district court considered only the pleadings and matters embraced therein. The court held that the district court's reliance upon the Award Agreement did not convert the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Accordingly, the court need not address plaintiff's subsequent argument that the district court erred by failing to defer the motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(d) to allow him to conduct meaningful discovery. Further, plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim was foreclosed by the language of the Award Agreement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Gorog v. Best Buy Co., Inc., et al." on Justia Law

BVS filed suit against CDW over a dispute regarding BVS's contract with CDW for a computer storage area network (SAN). The court agreed with the district court's finding that BVS's original purchase order constituted an offer and that CDW accepted that offer when it sent a purchase order to Arrow. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred when it ruled, as a matter of law, that the Invoice - sent after offer and acceptance had already created a contract - integrated the contract with respect to terms not included in either BVS's offer or CDW's acceptance. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "BVS, Inc. v. CDW Direct, LLC" on Justia Law