Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his case, arguing that his allegations of fact sufficiently stated a claim for, inter alia, breach of contract. Plaintiff's claim arose from a mortgage modification process he entered into with Chase under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). The court concluded that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract by alleging sufficient facts to show that the elements of a contract exist, that the conditions precedent were satisfied or waived, and that an exception to the statute of frauds applied. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, CEO of Roxio, Inc., filed suit against Best Buy and Napster for breach of contract. The contract dispute arose out of Best Buy's refusal to pay plaintiff a performance award under an Award Agreement. The district court considered only the pleadings and matters embraced therein. The court held that the district court's reliance upon the Award Agreement did not convert the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Accordingly, the court need not address plaintiff's subsequent argument that the district court erred by failing to defer the motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(d) to allow him to conduct meaningful discovery. Further, plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim was foreclosed by the language of the Award Agreement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Gorog v. Best Buy Co., Inc., et al." on Justia Law

BVS filed suit against CDW over a dispute regarding BVS's contract with CDW for a computer storage area network (SAN). The court agreed with the district court's finding that BVS's original purchase order constituted an offer and that CDW accepted that offer when it sent a purchase order to Arrow. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred when it ruled, as a matter of law, that the Invoice - sent after offer and acceptance had already created a contract - integrated the contract with respect to terms not included in either BVS's offer or CDW's acceptance. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "BVS, Inc. v. CDW Direct, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Midland, contending that the plain language of an annuity contract dictates that the term is zero or that, at minimum, Midland's proffered term is unreasonable. Completely absent from the annuity contract was any indication about the interest rate to be applied in the event that Midland was no longer offering new certificates of the annuity. The court concluded that the district court did not err in this case where Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 204 permitted the district court to supply a term for the missing value that is reasonable under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Midland. View "Murr v. Midland National Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

MHFS filed suit against the County, the Commission, and others for interfering with its business operations at the Baxter County Airport. The court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing MHFS's claims for breach of contract where MHFS did not allege any breach of contract distinct from the breach of the duty to act in good faith; Arkansas law does not recognize a "continuing tort" theory; even if the court were to assume such acts were intentional, MHFS failed to state a claim for intentional interference with its business relationship; the district court correctly dismissed MHFS's civil rights claims for denial of procedural due process where MHFS was not deprived of any property or liberty interest; the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend following its dismissal of the action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Mountain Home Flight Service v. Baxter County, et al." on Justia Law

Amana seeks reversal of the district court's grant of summary judgment to Excel where the district court concluded that Amana failed to establish that Excel breached a duty of care to Amana in a design-certification letter that it supplied to the firm that Amana hired to construct an anaerobic digester. The court concluded that Amana could not establish that it justifiably relied on any statements from Excel and its engineer concerning the digester outputs because no relevant representations exist on which to rely; Excel never reviewed the final design or substrate proposal and therefore made no representations as to the feasibility of that design; and the district court correctly concluded that Amana could not have justifiably relied on Excel's review of the initial GHD design as a basis for liability due to the failure of a materially different design and utilization. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Amana Society, Inc., et al. v. Excel Engineering, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit alleging that CUT violated the Missouri Uniform Code (Mo UCC) and Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA) by participating in a subprime motor vehicle lending program administered by now-bankrupt Centrix. The court concluded that plaintiffs' MO UCC claims were time-barred whether they were subject to the five-year statute of limitations in section 516.120(2) or the three-year statute of limitations in section 516.130(2); the court denied plaintiffs' motion to supplement the record and to take judicial notice of various Missouri legislative materials related to Mo. Rev. Stat. 516.420; the five year statute of limitations in section 516.120(2) applies in this case because plaintiffs' MMPA claims are actions based upon a liability created by a statute other than a penalty; even if section 516.120(5) applied to plaintiffs' MMPA claims, they are still time-barred because the causes of action accrued no later than March 2005 under either section 516.120(2) or 516.120(5). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment that the claims were time-barred. View "Huffman, et al. v. Credit Union of Texas" on Justia Law

After enXco did not obtain a permit by a date certain, thus failing to satisfy a condition precedent to a contract concerning the construction of a wind-energy project, NSP terminated the contract. enXco filed suit against NSP for breach of contract. On appeal, enXco challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment for NSP. Assuming, without deciding, that Minnesota courts would apply the doctrine of temporary impracticability to conditions precedent for use as a sword, the court concluded that the doctrine has no application on these facts. Therefore, the district court correctly declined to apply the doctrine of temporary impracticability. The court declined to apply the doctrine of disproportionate forfeiture and left the parties to their bargain. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "enXco Dev. Corp. v. Northern States Power Co." on Justia Law

FFCC filed suit against Lonza, alleging breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Lonza on the contract claim because the parties did not reach a meeting of the minds as to all terms and, therefore, there was no contract formed; the district court properly granted summary judgment on the promissory estoppel claim where nothing in the Letter of Intent or in the parties' conduct suggested that Lonza made a firm promise to purchase 1000 metric tons of Diethoxymethane in 2009; the court dismissed as moot FFCC's claim that the district court abused its discretion in denying FFCC's motion for a jury trial; dismissed FFCC's appeal as it pertains to the unsealing of the record for lack of appellate jurisdiction; and affirmed the district court's grant of attorney's fees. View "FutureFuel Chemical Co. v. Lonza" on Justia Law

This dispute arose between H&S, the lessor of drilling equipment, and Graham, the lessee, over the lease of drilling equipment for the construction of an underground water shaft. The court reversed the jury's verdict and judgment in favor of Graham and entered judgment in favor of H&S on Graham's claim for negligent misrepresentation as the claim was barred by the economic loss doctrine; the court had no basis to conclude that the doctrine of equitable estoppel barred H&S's breach of contract claim as a matter of law; because the district court refused to submit an estoppel instruction based exclusively on failure to disclose, any error in refusing the instruction could not be predicated on evidence of affirmative representations made by H&S; the district court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on Graham's proposed mitigation instruction; therefore, the court vacated the jury award in favor of H&S on its breach of contract claim; the court concluded that the doctrine of unclean hands does not bar H&S's recovery of the value of the auger; therefore, the court vacated the district court's award in favor of H&S for loss of the auger and remanded for a new trial on damages as to those claims; and the court noted that on remand, Graham's mitigation defense may reduce all, some, or none of H&S's damages. View "Graham Construction Services v. Hammer & Steel Inc." on Justia Law