Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment against Jax, the exclusive manufacturer and distributor of a game he invented. Plaintiff alleged that Jax breached their contract by granting unauthorized sublicenses and failing to apprise him of unauthorized sales and Jax's response to them. The court held that, even if plaintiff did not waive Jax's breach with his own breach, any factual disputes were not outcome determinative because Jax's breach was neither damaging nor material. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment. Further, the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. View "Reuter v. Jax Ltd., Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a commercial lease dispute governed by Minnesota law. Annex filed suit against TNS seeking unpaid rent and penalties owed under a lease for July, August, September, and October 2011. The district court held that TNS's July 7th letter together with its earlier email were sufficient to terminate the holdover lease effective August 31, 2011. Therefore, the district court entered judgment for the rent owing for July and August, but not for September and October. Annex appealed, arguing that the July 7th letter was not the notice of termination required by Minn. Stat. 504B.135 as construed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, and therefore TNS continued to be bound by the terms of the unterminated lease. The court disagreed with the district court's reading of Minnesota precedents, concluding that Annex was entitled to the relief requested in this lawsuit for four months' rent. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Annex Properties, LLC v. TNS Research Int'l" on Justia Law

Olympus appealed the district court's dismissal of its complaint for failure to state a claim. Olympus argued that the district court erred in determining that its contract with Benfield clearly and unambiguously provided that Benfield did not owe Olympus an annual fee after Benfield was notified of Olympus's decision to replace Benfield with another reinsurance broker. The court agreed with the district court's sound reasoning that the proper reading of the contract was to define "Subject Business" as the placement and servicing of all of Olympus's reinsurance contracts and therefore, this part of the contract was not ambiguous. The court also agreed with the district court, which determined that "intent not to renew" encompassed both termination and replacement and therefore, no ambiguity existed as to that matter. When Guy Carpenter informed Benfield that it would be taking over as Olympus's reinsurance broker, this activated the forfeiture provision of the contract and released Benfield from the obligation to pay the Annual Fee to Olympus, regardless of whether it was viewed as termination, replacement, or intent not to renew. Because the court found the contract to be clear and unambiguous, Olympus's claims for equitable relief must be rejected. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Olympus Ins. Co. v. AON Benfield, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Bayside installed hurricane-resistant windows manufactured by Viracon and supplied by EFCO. Shortly after installation, cracking and delamination occurred in some of the windows. Bayside filed suit against Viracon and EFCO nine years after it noticed the defect. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Viracon and EFCO, concluding that Minnesota's two-year statute of limitations applied to Bayside's breach of warranty claims and therefore, these claims were time-barred. View "Bayside Holdings, Ltd., et al v. Viracon, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

After Nada Payich's death, her son, Ivan Payich, sued Sorensen for negligent care of Nada, among other claims. Sorensen subsequently appealed the district court's denial of its application to compel arbitration in the suit filed by Ivan, the Special Administrator for the Estate of Nada Payich. On appeal, Sorensen argued that Nada was a third-party beneficiary of an Arbitration Agreement between Sorensen and Ivan and that the Estate was therefore compelled to arbitrate its claims. The court affirmed the judgment because it found no clear error in the district court's determination that Sorensen failed to prove it executed a valid contract with Ivan. View "GGNSC Omaha Oak Grove, LLC v. Payich" on Justia Law

Dittmer appealed the district court's dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) of their two lawsuits against a failed bank, the FDIC as the bank's receiver, and the successor representative to the Estate of John Peters. Barkley is a Missouri general partnership with two equal partners, John Peters and Joe Dittmer. In the first of two eventual lawsuits arising out of a 2006 loan transaction to Barkley, Dittmer, representing Joe Dittmer's half interest in Barkley, sued Premier Bank, seeking declaratory judgment that the loan should be declared void as to Dittmer and sought to enjoin the bank from selling encumbered property. The suit was filed in Missouri state court, and the primary basis for Dittmer's complaint was that Peters did not have authority from his partner, Joe Dittmer, to mortgage Barkley property for this transaction. The second suit included the same claims as the first case but included various Dittmer successors as plaintiffs, and both the FDIC and the personal representative were added as defendants. The court found that under 12 U.S.C. 1821(j), the district court correctly dismissed Dittmer's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief; given the language of the Missouri Uniform Partnership Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 358.090(1), the amended partnership agreement, and the power of attorney documents, the district court correctly dismissed the claim in the second suit against the FDIC; and the court agreed with the district court that the doctrine of res judicata required dismissal of the second suit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dittmer Properties v. FDIC, et al" on Justia Law

BancorpSouth (the bank) sued HLC and McKee (collectively, Hazelwood), alleging breach of contract against HLC, breach of guaranty against McKee, and asserting a security interest in some of HLC's property. Hazelwood raised lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper venue and choice of forum, and a state law contract defense. MPT intervened, claiming priority over real property tax refunds owed to HLC and attached by the bank. The court held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(1); the forum selection clauses at issue were permissive and did not prohibit the bank from bringing the suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri; the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the bank on its breach of contract claim against HLC, or the breach of guaranty claim against McKee; Hazelwood failed factually to contest the bank's damages assessment before the district court, and was not entitled to relief on appeal; and the court declined MPT's invitation to disregard state law and craft an "equitable" solution designed to protect a party who failed to take reasonable steps to protect itself and assumed a known risk. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "BancorpSouth Bank v. Hazelwood Logistics Center, et al" on Justia Law

American Family appealed the district court's order denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial and awarding defendant attorney's fees pursuant to section 91A.8 of the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law (IWPCL). The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant's Rule 15(b)(2) motion to amend the pleadings to add the IWPCL claim because the claim was tried with American Family's implied consent and the amendment did not result in prejudice to American Family. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to defendant under the IWPCL. Any error in giving jury Instruction 13A was harmless in light of the subsequently given Instruction No. 14. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hollander" on Justia Law

Heubel and Raymond appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Universal on Heubal's claim for coverage under a Universal insurance policy. The district court held that Heubel's breach of a cooperation clause in the Universal policy absolved Universal of the duty to defend or provide coverage for a products liability lawsuit against Heubel. Because no reservation of rights or conflict of interest entitled Heubel to select its own counsel while continuing to enjoy the coverage benefits of the Universal policy, Heubel breached the policy by refusing to allow Universal to control the defense. Because nothing in the Universal policy or the Raymond indemnification program precluded a third-party indemnification claim by Universal against Raymond in the Harris suit, Universal suffered substantial prejudice from Heubel's refusal to allow Universal to control the defense. As a result, Universal was justified in denying coverage based on Heubel's breach of the cooperation clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Heubel Materials Handling Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Hallmark sued its former employee, defendant, for a breach of the parties' separation agreement and won a jury verdict of $860,000 on its breach of contract claim. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in delivering an adverse inference instruction to the jury and the award on Hallmark's breach of contract claim was excessive. In light of the overwhelming evidence of bad faith and prejudice before the district court, the court concluded that its failure to issue explicit findings before delivering the otherwise warranted adverse inference instruction was harmless error which did not prejudice defendant. By awarding Hallmark more than its $735,000 severance payment, the jury award placed Hallmark in a better position than it would find itself had defendant not breached the agreement. Accordingly, the jury's award of the $125,000 payment was improper and the court vacated and remanded for the district court to reduce the fee award appropriately. View "Hallmark Cards v. Murley" on Justia Law