Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Continental sold its food and beverage metal can and can-end technology to Crown via a stock purchase agreement (SPA) in March 1990. The parties disputed the extent of each other's resultant liabilities, as defined by the indemnity provision in the SPA in concurrent binding arbitration and judicial proceedings. Continental subsequently appealed the grant of summary judgment and the district court's denial of its motion to reconsider or alter or amend its judgment. The court found that Continental failed to meet its burden of proving it was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the meaning of the indemnity provision. Therefore, the district court correctly determined that Continental was precluded from further litigating the provision's meaning, properly granted summary judgment in favor of Crown, and did not abuse its discretion in denying Continental's motion to reconsider.

This declaratory judgment action was brought by Secura, an insurer for Horizon, a subcontractor on a troubled construction project. Horizon's two other insurers, State Auto and Federated later joined. Their dispute with Weitz arose out of a construction project in which Weitz was the general contractor for Metropolitan. After Weitz and Metropolitan brought breach of contract claims against each other, both filed third party complaints against Horizon for defective plumbing. Horizon's insurers defended and settled all claims against it and reimbursed Weitz for its defense of claims against Horizon. Weitz then contended that since it was an "additional insured" on Horizon's policies, the insurers should pay for attorney fees and costs it incurred in defending against Metropolitan's entire counterclaim. The insurers filed this action seeking a final judgment that they not be required to pay the attorney fees and costs. Applying Missouri law, the court rejected Weitz's argument that Metropolitan's counterclaim asserted potentially covered losses under the policies. Therefore, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the insurers because Metropolitan's counterclaim did not state an "occurrence" giving rise to a possibility of coverage under the policies.

MoBev appealed the district court's order denying its motion for partial summary judgment and granting Shelton's motion for summary judgment on MoBev's claims for violation of Missouri franchise law. Because the plain language of the Missouri franchise statue at issue unambiguously required that the general definition of "franchise" applied to liquor supplier-wholesaler relationships and the relationship between MoBev and Shelton did not satisfy this definition, the court affirmed the judgment.

Best Buy sued various commercial landlords and the landlords' property manager, DDRC, alleging that DDRC impermissibly charged Best Buy for insurance-related costs under various lease agreements. The court held that the district court did not err in deciding that the landlords breached their various lease agreements by charging Best Buy for the First Dollar Program in an attempt to meet its insurance obligations under the leases. Based on the unambiguous language of the leases, the court found the landlords' interpretation of the leases to be unreasonable. Because the landlords breached the leases, the court found that the district court did not err in determining that the landlords breached their contracts with Best Buy. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment to Best Buy on its breach of contract claims for 2005-2009. Because the court found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Best Buy, the court need not address the applicable pre-judgment interest rate until after the resolution of Best Buy's breach of contract claims for the 1999-2004 lease years. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Best Buy's remaining fraud claims with prejudice. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings.

Insureds, Minnesota residents, filed class action complaints against their automobile insurers alleging violations of a Minnesota statute, Minn. Stat. 65B.285, requiring insurers to provide a discount for cars which have antitheft devices and breach of contract claims based on the failure to apply the statutory discount. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the insureds' amended complaints, rejecting their attempts here, particularly in the absence of any indication that Minnesota's administrative remedies were inadequate, to circumvent Minnesota's administrative remedies in order to create a private right of action.

Lakeside appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Producers on Lakeside's state-law claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment involving payment for the feed and care of the hogs at issue. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Producers on Lakeside's fraudulent misrepresentation claim where Lakeside was unable to establish that Producers made any false representations; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the fraudulent nondisclosure claim where Producers was under no legal obligation to disclose information to Lakeside; held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Lakeside's expert testimony where such testimony was not needed to inform the district court on the legal issues; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Producers on the issue of negligent misrepresentation where Producers was not in the business or profession of supplying information or guidance to Lakeside but rather the two conducted themselves at arm's length; and held that it was not unjust to allow Producers to retain the benefit of these particular happenings when a shortfall existed, as it was not inequitable to allow a contracting party the right to fulfillment of contractual obligations, which in this case included the payment of fees contemplated by the Hog Program.

Appellants, Robert A. Sears and Korley B. Sears, appealed from the June 8th, 2011 order of the bankruptcy court overruling their objections to claims that were filed by the Sears Family Members in the bankruptcy case of the debtor and disallowing Claim No. 26 of Korley. The court held that the bankruptcy court correctly disallowed Claim No. 26 where Korley's proof of claim provided no legal basis for liability by the debtor. The court also agreed with the bankruptcy court's determination that Robert and Korely failed to overcome the presumptive validity of the proofs of claim filed by the Sears Family Members. The court finally held that there was no need for the bankruptcy court to allow Robert and Korley more time to develop the record or a hearing with testimony and cross-examination of witnesses, before it ruled on the claim objections.

Camelot brought this action against its tenant, AMC Showplace Theatres, seeking a declaration that section 3.4 of their lease was an option to renew if the parties agree on new, negotiated terms rather than an option to extend on the terms contained in their existing lease. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment and the district court granted Camelot's motion. The court affirmed and held that the terms of the option period were not readily ascertainable and that section 3.4 was an option to renew that required new, negotiated terms.

Appellant guaranteed CWA obligations under an Aircraft Management Agreement (AMA) between CWA and BP. BP sued CWA and appellant for breach of contract. The district court denied appellant's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to BP on its claims that appellant was liable under the guaranty for CWA's breach of the AMA. Appellant appealed. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding CWA waived any conceivable right to rescind it might have had; BP's consideration for the AMA was sufficient; CWA's performance was not excused; and the district court did not err in holding appellant liable for the paint and refurbishment costs. Because genuine disputes remained as to whether the AMA and Priester agreement were substantially similar and whether BP otherwise took reasonable steps to avoid unnecessary damages, the court reversed the district court's judgment. The court expressed no opinion as to whether appellant had waived his present-value argument.

Plaintiff, producer of ready-mix concrete, commenced this action to vacate an arbitrator's order to provide plaintiff's employee with a second Functional Capacity Evaluation (FCE) under the company's return-to-work policy and to assign the employee work as a ready-mix truck driver, restoring his seniority if he passed the FCE. The district court granted summary judgment for the union and enforced the award. The court held that the district court properly rejected plaintiff's petition to vacate the award where the arbitrator's decision drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement's management rights provision as construed by the parties. The court also held that plaintiff's contention that the award was contrary to federal law was without merit.