Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Contracts
Smith, et al. v. David H. Arrington Oil & Gas, Inc.; Foster, Jr., et al. v. Arrington Oil & Gas, Inc.; Hall, et al. v. Arrington Oil & Gas, Inc.
In this consolidated appeal, three sets of landowners asserted claims against Arrington for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment relating to Arrington's failure to pay cash bonuses under oil and gas leases. The district court granted summary judgment to the landowners on the breach of contract claims and thereafter dismissed the landowners' other claims with prejudice on the landowners' motions. The court rejected the landowners' assertion that the lease agreements could be construed without considering the language of the bank drafts; the drafts' no-liability clause did not prevent enforcement of the lease agreements; Arrington entered into a binding contract with each respective landowner despite the drafts' no-liability clause; the lease approval language of the drafts was satisfied by Arrington's acceptance of the lease agreements in exchange for the signed bank drafts and as such, did not bar enforcement of the contracts; Arrington's admitted renunciation of the lease agreement for reasons unrelated to title precluded its defense to the enforceability of its contracts; Arrington's admission that it decided to dishonor all lease agreements in Phillips County for unrelated business reasons entitled the landowners to summary judgment; there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Arrington disapproved of the landowner's titles in good faith. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the breach of contract claims.
Bjornestad v. Progressive Northern Ins.
Plaintiff brought suit against her insurer, asserting claims of breach of contract and bad faith. After a jury awarded plaintiff the full amount of her underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage, but denied her bad faith claim, the district court found the insurer's refusal to pay was "vexatious or without reasonable cause" and awarded plaintiff attorney's fees pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 58-12-3. The insurer appealed arguing that the jury's rejection of plaintiff's bad faith claims should preclude an award of fees under the statute. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the district court did not err when it determined it could consider whether plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees on her successful contract claim, notwithstanding the defense verdict on the bad faith claim. The court also held that the district court did not err in finding the insurer's refusal to pay was vexatious or without reasonable cause.
Tripp, et al. v. Western Nat’l Mutual Ins.
Plaintiff brought suit against her insurer, asserting claims of breach of contract and bad faith. After a jury awarded plaintiff the full amount of her underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage, but denied her bad faith claim, the district court found that the insurer's refusal to pay was "vexatious or without reasonable cause" and awarded plaintiff attorney's fees pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 58-12-3. The insurer appealed arguing that the jury's rejection of plaintiff's bad faith claim should preclude an award of fees under the statute. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the district court did not err when it determined the statutory fee award did not hinge on the outcome of the bad faith claim and the district court did not err in finding the insurer's refusal to pay was vexatious or without reasonable cause.
Community Finance Group, Inc., et al. v. Republic of Kenya, et al.
Plaintiffs brought suit against defendants for breach of duty, improper taking in violation of international law, conversion, conspiracy to commit a tort, aiding and abetting an improper taking and fraudulent scheme, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). The court held that, because the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602 et seq., applied to all defendants and no exception to sovereign immunity existed in this case, the judgment was affirmed.
The Weitz Co. v. MacKenzie House, et al.
The Weitz Company sued MacKenzie House and MH Metropolitan for breach of construction contract. Arrowhead and Concorde were third-party defendants. MH Metropolitan counterclaimed for breach of the same contract, seeking liquidated damages and the cost to complete the project. Arrowhead also counterclaimed. The jury returned a verdict for MH Metropolitan, Arrowhead, and Concorde on Weitz's claim. The district court denied post-judgment motions and Weitz appealed. The court held that there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict; the district court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the evidence of other projects; the district court correctly decided that the issue of liquidated damages and completion costs were issues of fact that were properly submitted to the jury; there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the district court to deny judgment as a matter of law for Weitz's breach-of-contract claims against Arrowhead; the district court did no err in refusing to enter a default judgment against Concorde when it failed to appear at trial, or in the alternative, refusing to grant Weitz judgment as a matter of law on its claims against Concorde; and because the district court properly found against Weitz on all issues, there was no reason to consider the issue of vicarious liability.
Penford Corp., et al. v. Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co., et al.
Plaintiff brought suit seeking declaratory judgment and asserted claims for breach of contract and bad faith when its insurers asserted that certain sublimits in plaintiff's policy capped reimbursement for damages caused by flood and that those sublimits applied to both property damage and business interruption losses. Plaintiff claimed that the sublimits only applied to property damage. The court concluded that there was no factual dispute regarding whether an insurance brokerage employee shared the same understanding as the underwriters and whether that understanding bound plaintiff. Consequently, the interpretation of the contract did not depend "on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the extrinsic evidence," and thus the district court did not err when it granted insurers' judgment as a matter of law on the declaratory judgment and breach of contract claims.
Thatcher v. Hanover Ins. Group, Inc., et al.
Plaintiff filed a putative class action in Arkansas state court against defendants, asserting causes of action for unjust enrichment, fraud, constructive fraud, and breach of contract. After defendants removed the case to federal district court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), plaintiff sought permission to voluntarily dismiss his case without prejudice so that he could refile an amended complaint in state court that would avoid federal jurisdiction. The district court granted plaintiff's voluntary motion to dismiss without prejudice. Defendants appealed, arguing that the district court should have considered whether the motion to voluntarily dismiss was an improper forum-shopping measure. The court agreed and reversed the court's dismissal, remanding for consideration of the issue.
Crest Construction II, et al. v. Doe, et al.
Plaintiffs brought this action against several defendants alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 28 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., and raising several state law causes of action. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the RICO claim and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The district court denied plaintiffs' subsequent motions to reconsider and to amend their complaint. Plaintiffs appealed. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs failed to plead the RICO elements of an enterprise, a pattern of racketeering activity, and at least two predicate acts committed by each defendant. The court found no error in the district court's denial of the motion to amend and could not say that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the state law claims.
Kreisler & Kreisler, LLC v. National City Bank, et al.
Plaintiff brought a class action against the Bank, alleging that the Bank breached its contract by charging interest in excess of the rate specified in the promissory note. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the Bank's motion to dismiss where the district court correctly concluded that the relevant provisions were clear, did not conflict with one another, and adequately disclosed the interest to be charged.
United States v. Vespa Beverages, et al.
Defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting and the falsification of a document. See No. 10-117 issued this date in defendant's criminal prosecution. With defendant's direct appeal pending, the government learned that he would be paid to settle unrelated civil litigation. The government moved the district court for, inter alia, a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining defendant and his attorney or agents from spending, dispersing, investing or otherwise placing the settlement amount beyond the reach of the United States while the issue was resolved. The court held that a sentencing court had jurisdiction to enforce its restitution order and could use the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a), when necessary and appropriate, to prevent the restitution debtor from frustrating collection of the restitution debt. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining defendant and his agents from transferring liquid assets and in declining to dissolve the injunction until the amount to be applied to his restitution debt had been paid. As the court had vacated the restitution order in the criminal case, the payment order in this case was also vacated for further proceedings.
