Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Camelot brought this action against its tenant, AMC Showplace Theatres, seeking a declaration that section 3.4 of their lease was an option to renew if the parties agree on new, negotiated terms rather than an option to extend on the terms contained in their existing lease. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment and the district court granted Camelot's motion. The court affirmed and held that the terms of the option period were not readily ascertainable and that section 3.4 was an option to renew that required new, negotiated terms.

Appellant guaranteed CWA obligations under an Aircraft Management Agreement (AMA) between CWA and BP. BP sued CWA and appellant for breach of contract. The district court denied appellant's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to BP on its claims that appellant was liable under the guaranty for CWA's breach of the AMA. Appellant appealed. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding CWA waived any conceivable right to rescind it might have had; BP's consideration for the AMA was sufficient; CWA's performance was not excused; and the district court did not err in holding appellant liable for the paint and refurbishment costs. Because genuine disputes remained as to whether the AMA and Priester agreement were substantially similar and whether BP otherwise took reasonable steps to avoid unnecessary damages, the court reversed the district court's judgment. The court expressed no opinion as to whether appellant had waived his present-value argument.

Plaintiff, producer of ready-mix concrete, commenced this action to vacate an arbitrator's order to provide plaintiff's employee with a second Functional Capacity Evaluation (FCE) under the company's return-to-work policy and to assign the employee work as a ready-mix truck driver, restoring his seniority if he passed the FCE. The district court granted summary judgment for the union and enforced the award. The court held that the district court properly rejected plaintiff's petition to vacate the award where the arbitrator's decision drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement's management rights provision as construed by the parties. The court also held that plaintiff's contention that the award was contrary to federal law was without merit.

In this consolidated appeal, three sets of landowners asserted claims against Arrington for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment relating to Arrington's failure to pay cash bonuses under oil and gas leases. The district court granted summary judgment to the landowners on the breach of contract claims and thereafter dismissed the landowners' other claims with prejudice on the landowners' motions. The court rejected the landowners' assertion that the lease agreements could be construed without considering the language of the bank drafts; the drafts' no-liability clause did not prevent enforcement of the lease agreements; Arrington entered into a binding contract with each respective landowner despite the drafts' no-liability clause; the lease approval language of the drafts was satisfied by Arrington's acceptance of the lease agreements in exchange for the signed bank drafts and as such, did not bar enforcement of the contracts; Arrington's admitted renunciation of the lease agreement for reasons unrelated to title precluded its defense to the enforceability of its contracts; Arrington's admission that it decided to dishonor all lease agreements in Phillips County for unrelated business reasons entitled the landowners to summary judgment; there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Arrington disapproved of the landowner's titles in good faith. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the breach of contract claims.

Plaintiff brought suit against her insurer, asserting claims of breach of contract and bad faith. After a jury awarded plaintiff the full amount of her underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage, but denied her bad faith claim, the district court found the insurer's refusal to pay was "vexatious or without reasonable cause" and awarded plaintiff attorney's fees pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 58-12-3. The insurer appealed arguing that the jury's rejection of plaintiff's bad faith claims should preclude an award of fees under the statute. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the district court did not err when it determined it could consider whether plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees on her successful contract claim, notwithstanding the defense verdict on the bad faith claim. The court also held that the district court did not err in finding the insurer's refusal to pay was vexatious or without reasonable cause.

Plaintiff brought suit against her insurer, asserting claims of breach of contract and bad faith. After a jury awarded plaintiff the full amount of her underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage, but denied her bad faith claim, the district court found that the insurer's refusal to pay was "vexatious or without reasonable cause" and awarded plaintiff attorney's fees pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 58-12-3. The insurer appealed arguing that the jury's rejection of plaintiff's bad faith claim should preclude an award of fees under the statute. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the district court did not err when it determined the statutory fee award did not hinge on the outcome of the bad faith claim and the district court did not err in finding the insurer's refusal to pay was vexatious or without reasonable cause.

Plaintiffs brought suit against defendants for breach of duty, improper taking in violation of international law, conversion, conspiracy to commit a tort, aiding and abetting an improper taking and fraudulent scheme, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). The court held that, because the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602 et seq., applied to all defendants and no exception to sovereign immunity existed in this case, the judgment was affirmed.

The Weitz Company sued MacKenzie House and MH Metropolitan for breach of construction contract. Arrowhead and Concorde were third-party defendants. MH Metropolitan counterclaimed for breach of the same contract, seeking liquidated damages and the cost to complete the project. Arrowhead also counterclaimed. The jury returned a verdict for MH Metropolitan, Arrowhead, and Concorde on Weitz's claim. The district court denied post-judgment motions and Weitz appealed. The court held that there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict; the district court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the evidence of other projects; the district court correctly decided that the issue of liquidated damages and completion costs were issues of fact that were properly submitted to the jury; there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the district court to deny judgment as a matter of law for Weitz's breach-of-contract claims against Arrowhead; the district court did no err in refusing to enter a default judgment against Concorde when it failed to appear at trial, or in the alternative, refusing to grant Weitz judgment as a matter of law on its claims against Concorde; and because the district court properly found against Weitz on all issues, there was no reason to consider the issue of vicarious liability.

Plaintiff brought suit seeking declaratory judgment and asserted claims for breach of contract and bad faith when its insurers asserted that certain sublimits in plaintiff's policy capped reimbursement for damages caused by flood and that those sublimits applied to both property damage and business interruption losses. Plaintiff claimed that the sublimits only applied to property damage. The court concluded that there was no factual dispute regarding whether an insurance brokerage employee shared the same understanding as the underwriters and whether that understanding bound plaintiff. Consequently, the interpretation of the contract did not depend "on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the extrinsic evidence," and thus the district court did not err when it granted insurers' judgment as a matter of law on the declaratory judgment and breach of contract claims.

Plaintiff filed a putative class action in Arkansas state court against defendants, asserting causes of action for unjust enrichment, fraud, constructive fraud, and breach of contract. After defendants removed the case to federal district court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), plaintiff sought permission to voluntarily dismiss his case without prejudice so that he could refile an amended complaint in state court that would avoid federal jurisdiction. The district court granted plaintiff's voluntary motion to dismiss without prejudice. Defendants appealed, arguing that the district court should have considered whether the motion to voluntarily dismiss was an improper forum-shopping measure. The court agreed and reversed the court's dismissal, remanding for consideration of the issue.