Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A grand jury indicted Defendants Magallon and Garcia Ortiz with conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing methamphetamine and at least 50 grams of actual methamphetamine. Garcia Ortiz was also indicted with possession with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of a mixture and substance containing methamphetamine. Garcia Ortiz conditionally pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge, and Magallon was convicted by a jury of the conspiracy charge.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Garcia Ortiz's motion to suppress evidence where officers had an objectively reasonable suspicion that the GMC Sierra's occupants were involved in criminal activity, namely drug distribution; reasonable suspicion clearly existed to justify the stop and remained present as further information unfolded during the stop; and the officers did not exceed the mission of the stop. Furthermore, the district court did not err in finding that Garcia Ortiz consented to the search of the Lexus. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of Garcia Ortiz's motion to suppress his post-Miranda statements. In this case, defendant voluntarily waived his rights against self-incrimination and to counsel. Finally, the court held that the district court did not err in denying Magallon's request for a willful blindness instruction, and the evidence was sufficient to support defendant his conspiracy conviction. View "United States v. Magallon" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for two counts of aiding and abetting a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction where the evidence showed he constructively possessed the Glock pistol in the Air Jordan bag and was in joint constructive possession of three other handguns. The court also held that there was no plain Rehaif error where defendant cannot show that the district court's failure to include a Rehaif instruction affected his substantial rights or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. Finally, the district court did not err by imposing a sentencing enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(1) for possessing three to seven firearms. View "United States v. Brooks-Davis" on Justia Law

Under a prisoner transfer arrangement, petitioner is serving a thirty-year sentence imposed in Arkansas state court in 1996. After petitioner was sentenced in Arkansas, the federal government prosecuted him for offenses committed before his incarceration, and a federal court in New Mexico sentenced him in September 1997 to a term of 595 months' imprisonment. The federal government briefly assigned petitioner to a federal prison, but then concluded that he should have been returned to Arkansas and transferred him back there in October 1997.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus based on petitioner's claim that time served since September 1997 on his Arkansas sentence should also be credited against his federal sentence. The court concluded that petitioner is not entitled to credit against his federal sentence where the district court did not clearly err in finding that Arkansas transferred custody to the United States pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum; the federal government's mistaken retention of custody does not constitute an assumption of primary jurisdiction where the State never intended to relinquish jurisdiction and the error was quickly rectified; and a detainer does not alter the custody status of a prisoner. Finally, the court held that the district court did not err in denying petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel. View "Wiseman v. Wachendorf" on Justia Law

Harris pleaded guilty to first-degree assault. In 2012, the Circuit Court of Scott County, Missouri imposed a 15-year sentence, ordering that it run concurrently with Harris’s recently-imposed 25-year federal sentence, imposed after he pleaded guilty to interference with commerce by threat or violence, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and being a convicted felon in possession of ammunition. His federal sentence, which was silent on whether it was to be served consecutively or concurrently, was later reduced to 183 months, in light of the Supreme Court’s Johnson decision.Harris is in state custody, receiving credit only against his state sentence. He will begin serving his federal sentence after he completes his state sentence and is transferred to the Bureau of Prisons. Despite the state court’s order, Harris will serve consecutive, not concurrent, sentences.Harris sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Harris alleged sufficient facts to apprise the court and the state of a distinct basis for his claim—that Plea Counsel advised that his 25-year federal sentence would “swallow” up any state sentence he would receive for pleading guilty to assault. On remand, the district court must determine whether Harris procedurally defaulted that claim. View "Harris v. Wallace" on Justia Law

Herrera's husband fraudulently used the identity of a lawful permanent U.S. resident (LPR) to become a citizen. Herrera obtained LPR status as the wife of a citizen and became a citizen. Herrera's four children are U.S. citizens. In 2011, Herrera was convicted of second-degree theft. The government discovered Herrera’s false statement. She pleaded guilty to naturalization fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1425(a). The district court revoked her citizenship and restored her to LPR status, 8 U.S.C. 1451(e).If an alien commits fraud or misrepresents a material fact to gain a benefit under the immigration laws, she may be deported, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i); 1227(a)(1)(A). Herrera sought a waiver available to aliens who committed immigration fraud but are the parent of a citizen and separately sought cancellation of removal as an LPR. DHS added a charge of removability for convictions of crimes involving moral turpitude based on Herrera's theft conviction, then withdrew the charge of removability for immigration fraud. The BIA affirmed that she was ineligible for a fraud waiver because she was no longer charged under the fraud provision and was ineligible for cancellation of removal because she had obtained her LPR status by fraud.The Eighth Circuit denied relief, rejecting Herrera’s argument that DHS could not withdraw the fraud charge because it had already been sustained by the IJ. The government is permitted to adjust the charges against an alien during the immigration court case. View "Gonzalez v. Rosen" on Justia Law

Ellison, remodeling Stephen’s house, noticed a USB drive on the toilet tank. Ellison had researched hidden recording devices following a break-in and recognized it as a hidden camera. Ellison took the USB home but did not view its contents. The next morning, Ellison returned to Stephen’s home and discovered a young boy asleep. Stephen, a youth basketball coach, arrived with another boy. Returning home, Ellison viewed the USB’s contents, finding multiple videos depicting children secretly recorded in various stages of undress. Ellison delivered the USB to the Monticello Police. The Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation took possession of the USB, obtained a warrant, and viewed its contents. A warranted search of Stephen’s homes uncovered more secret recording devices and a hard drive containing approximately 400 visual depictions of nude minor boys, including images of Stephen molesting unconscious victims. Indicted for sexually exploiting a child, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), possessing child pornography, section 2252(a)(4)(B), and transporting child pornography, section 2252(a)(1), Stephen unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion and Stephen’s 2,160-month sentence. The Fourth Amendment does not apply to private-citizen searches unless that private citizen acted as a government agent. Ellison was acting out of civic duty; even if Ellison intended to assist law enforcement, it would not be enough to establish he was a government agent. The police chief had probable cause to take the USB from Ellison. View "United States v. Stephen" on Justia Law

Dat was born in a Kenyan refugee camp in 1993. Admitted to the U.S. around 1994, he became a lawful permanent resident. Dat pled guilty to robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, and was sentenced to 78 months' imprisonment. Dat’s robbery conviction is a deportable offense, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Dat moved to vacate his guilty plea, claiming that his attorney, Allen, assured him that his immigration status would not be affected by his plea. Allen testified that she repeatedly told Dat the charges were “deportable offenses,” that she never told him, his mother, or his fiancée that he would not be deported. that she encouraged Dat to hire an immigration attorney, and that they reviewed the Plea Petition, which says that non-citizens would be permanently removed from the U.S. if found guilty of most felony offenses. The Plea Agreement refers to immigration consequences. Dat and Allen also reviewed the PSR, which stated that immigration proceedings would commence after his release from custody.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, finding that Dat was not denied effective assistance of counsel. It was objectively reasonable for Allen to tell Dat that he “could” face immigration ramifications that “could” result in deportation. An alien with a deportable conviction may still seek “relief from removal. These “immigration law complexities” should caution any defense attorney not to advise a defendant considering a guilty plea that the result of a post-conviction, contested removal proceeding is certain. View "Dat v. United States" on Justia Law

Police stopped Anguiano for expired license plates. The car contained a fake DEA badge and cash. At the hotel where Anguiano was staying, Baez’s wife, Gavino, admitted the officers. Baez was sitting next to Chevrolet keys and a methamphetamine pipe. Gavino consented to a search. In a backpack, officers found a Chevrolet Equinox owner’s manual. A locked armoire appeared to be under video surveillance. A canine unit alerted at the armoire and at an Equinox that responded to the Chevrolet keys. With a warrant, officers searched the hotel suite and the Equinox. The armoire held methamphetamine and a gun. The Equinox contained methamphetamine, another firearm, and a safe with ammunition and receipts in Baez’s name. The other conspirators pled guilty.The court denied Baez’s motions to suppress the evidence and his incriminating statements. Baez, claiming that he was infiltrating the conspiracy to assist law enforcement, sought to introduce evidence regarding his mental health and a potential informant with whom he was acquainted. Baez moved to compel the government to disclose information about the informant. The court excluded the evidence, partially granted his Brady motion, and declined to instruct the jury that it would “negate[] the specific intent required” if Baez intended to “assist ongoing federal investigations.” The court departed from the guidelines range of 360 months’ to life imprisonment, sentencing Baez to 168 months’ imprisonment.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding the denial of his suppression motions, the failure to instruct the jury on an “innocent-intent” defense, the exclusion of the evidence related to that defense, the partial denial of his Brady motion, and the reasonableness of his sentence. View "United States v. Baez" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment for possession of controlled substances with the intent to distribute, and a consecutive term of 30 months imprisonment for violating the terms of a previously imposed term of supervised release.The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence, holding that the district court did not procedurally err by finding that a consecutive term was mandatory under the Sentencing Guidelines. Rather, the record reflects that the district court treated the Guidelines as merely advisory and exercised its discretion in ordering consecutive sentences. In this case, the district court calculated the Guidelines range for defendant's new offense as 168 to 210 months imprisonment and noted the parties' plea agreement (and the agreed-to range of 144 to 216-months imprisonment). View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 where petitioner was convicted in 2012, after trial by general court-martial, of rape committed in 1998. At the time of petitioner's conviction and direct appeals, there was no statute of limitations for prosecution of rape under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). In 2018, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held for the first time that a five-year statute of limitations applied to rape in United States v. Mangahas, 77 M.J. 220, 222-24 (C.A.A.F. 2018). However, in United States v. Briggs, 2020 WL 7250099, at 2 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2020), the Supreme Court held that there is not a statute of limitations under the UCMJ for rapes committed between 1986 and 2006. Therefore, the court held that petitioner's conviction was not untimely. View "Hill v. Rivera" on Justia Law