Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for 14 counts of aiding and abetting wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, and six counts of aiding and abetting securities fraud. Defendant's convictions stemmed from his involvement in a market manipulation scheme.The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that defendant's conduct was fraudulent and manipulative within the meaning of the statutes in question; the evidence was sufficient to show nondisclosure or active concealment of a material fact where a jury could easily find that a reasonable investor would have found material the fact that a corporate insider had, through a nominee, purchased more than half of the freely tradeable stock and was directing that nominee and others to trade the stock at pre-arranged prices for the purpose of triggering tens of millions of dollars in bonus payments that would likely cripple the corporation; the district court did not abuse its discretion or plainly err in admitting lay opinion testimony; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution in the amount of $15,135,361. View "United States v. Gilbertson" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in denying the motion without a hearing, because defendant did not identify any evidentiary support for his allegations and thus they were insufficient to warrant a new trial. In this case, there is no reason to believe that new evidence related to a prior shooting would change the jury's verdict. View "United States v. Glinn" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a sentence reduction, holding that the district court erred in relying on a drug-quantity figure that did not match what was attributed to defendant at sentencing. In this case, defendant seeks to take advantage of Amendment 782, which retroactively lowered the base offense levels for most drug-quantity offenses. The district court assumed that the correct drug amount was 136.08 kilograms and denied the motion. However, the district court had already rejected this figure earlier at defendant's original sentencing. Therefore, the amount the district court used was at odds with its previous factual finding and the remedy for this error is remand for reconsideration. View "United States v. Rendon" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence and defendant's sentence for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. In regard to the motion to suppress, the court held that the district court did not clearly err in its factual findings; the district court did not commit legal error by finding that the initial encounter between the detectives and defendant was consensual; a reasonable officer would believe that defendant had consented to the search of his luggage at a bus stop despite the existing language barrier based on defendant's responsiveness to questions and affirmative response when asked if his bag could be searched; the search of defendant's cell phone was also consensual; and the district court did not clearly err in concluding that defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and voluntary.In regard to defendant's sentence, the court held that defendant's within-Guidelines sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court gave due consideration when weighing all the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, and the court found no abuse of discretion. View "United States v. DaCruz-Mendes" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and defendant's conviction for one count of arson related to a fire at a trailer home.In regard to the motion to suppress, the court held that defendant was not in custody for the purposes of Miranda protections during a polygraph examination and subsequent interview. In this case, defendant came voluntarily to the justice center to take the test; he was read and signed the authorization form, which reiterated that he could refuse to take the test, decline to answer questions, end the test at any time, and have an attorney present; and defendant's movement was not restrained. Because defendant was not in custody, he was not entitled to Miranda protections of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. To the extent defendant asserts that his incriminating statements were involuntarily made, primarily due to his low cognitive functioning, the court agreed with the district court that defendant voluntarily provided the statements after the polygraph examination. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction where defendant's incriminating statements, combined with the testimony of other witnesses, provided a sufficient basis for a jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. View "United States v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment after defendant pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The court upheld the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the district court did not err in finding there was probable cause where the affidavit was based on two highly detailed tips that were corroborated by police investigation. Furthermore, defendant has not made a substantial preliminary showing that the affiant's description of him as a tenant was false or based on a material omission or lack of investigation, and defendant has not shown that the alleged false statement or omission was necessary to the finding of probable cause. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's request for a Franks hearing. View "United States v. Knutson" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's 180 month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of violating the Hobbs Act by robbery, and one count of discharging a firearm during the commission of the robbery. The court held that the district court did not clearly err by imposing a three level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2B3.1(b)(3) for a bystander's injury, which fell between bodily injury and serious bodily injury; the court found no reported decision holding that Application Note 4 precludes a USSG 2B3.1(b)(3) enhancement; and defendant's below-guidelines Hobbs Act sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors and did not abuse its substantial sentencing discretion. View "United States v. Mays" on Justia Law

After arriving in North Dakota, Myers supplied Volz and Kramer with heroin. After their third purchase, they smoked the heroin and lost consciousness. Kramer was unable to awaken Volz. Paramedics were unable to revive Volz, who was pronounced dead. Myers was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), 846; distribution of a controlled substance and controlled substance analog resulting in death, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), 18 U.S.C. 2; and distribution of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), 18 U.S.C. 2. Applying a two-level enhancement for possessing a firearm while distributing a controlled substance, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1), and a four-level enhancement for knowingly misrepresenting or knowingly marketing as another substance a mixture or substance containing fentanyl or a fentanyl analog, section 2D1.1(b)(13), the court calculated a sentencing guidelines recommendation of life imprisonment.The Eighth Circuit affirmed Myers' 360-month sentence, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and an argument that the court improperly admitted a coconspirator’s statement. Any error in applying the sentencing enhancements was harmless. The court declined to consider arguments that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to strike a juror and for failing to timely alert the court to alleged contact between Volz’s family members and jurors, stating that the arguments were best left for collateral review. View "United States v. Myers" on Justia Law

Ivers filed a lawsuit against a life insurance company. Judge Wright granted the company summary judgment on all but one claim. Ivers mailed Judge Wright a packet of court-related materials on which Ivers had written statements such as “I want my fucking money ” and “I am becoming a very dangerous person!!!” Before a scheduled bench trial, Ivers sent another letter. Ivers’s communications were forwarded to the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). Ivers had previously threatened a state court judge and had been convicted of stalking; he was on probation. Deputy Hattervig spoke with Ivers, who lacked remorse. The USMS provided increased security at the trial. After judgment was entered in favor of the company, Ivers sent letters asserting that Judge Wright was biased and called the Chief Judge’s chambers, describing himself as a “walking bomb.” In interviews with USMS deputies, Ivers refused to retract his statements, remained visibly angry, and confirmed that he remained a “ticking time bomb.”The EIghth CIrcuit affirmed Ivers’ convictions for threatening to murder a federal judge, 18 U.S.C. 115(a)(1)(B), and interstate transmission of a threat to injure the person of another, 18 U.S.C. 875(c), and his 18-month sentence. The court rejected arguments that Ivers' statements were privileged, that there was insufficient evidence suggesting that he made a true threat of harm, that the court erred in instructing the jury, and that cumulative errors deprived him of a fair trial. View "United States v. Ivers" on Justia Law

Red Cloud’s son, D.K.E., was born on August 20, 2014. Red Cloud was 20 years old; D.K.E.’s mother, J.K.E., was 15. On October 11, the baby was found not breathing. The autopsy reported the cause of death as emaciation/dehydration. Red Cloud pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, 18 U.S.C. 1111(a) and 1153. The PSR calculated a Guidelines range of 210-262 months’ incarceration. Neither party objected.The Eighth Circuit affirmed his sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release as not substantively unreasonable. The district court analyzed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors to justify the extent of the variance. The court properly considered an expert’s forensic interview of Red Cloud, indicating he has significant cognitive impairments that affected his ability to properly care for a newborn child and concluded that, on these facts, the need for additional deterrence was not “significant.” The district court noted that Red Cloud needed “support and help” going forward—not solely punishment for his role in the death of D.K.E. The court also noted Red Cloud had a history with substance abuse and imposed the term of supervised release in part so he could receive the resources to address his chemical dependency issues. The court expressly sought to balance the seriousness of the offense with Red Cloud’s specific personal history, characteristics, and limitations. View "United States v. Red Cloud" on Justia Law