Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, the defendant, Cody Wayne Hopkins, was charged with Attempted Enticement of a Minor Using the Internet, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The accusation revolved around an online conversation Hopkins had with a government agent posing as a 13-year-old girl. Despite knowing her age, Hopkins continued the conversation, making explicit sexual remarks, and arranging to meet her at a nearby high school. Upon arriving, Hopkins was arrested, and in a subsequent interview, admitted to knowing the girl was underage but claimed his intention was only to talk to her.During his trial, Hopkins claimed he was severely sleep-deprived during the interview, which led to confusion. However, the prosecution implied that he was lying about this assertion since it was not mentioned in the interview's transcript, which was redacted and given to the jury. Furthermore, the prosecution argued that Hopkins intended to entice a minor into engaging in illegal sexual activity based on his explicit text messages, despite Hopkins's claims of merely wanting to talk.The jury found Hopkins guilty, and he moved for a new trial citing prosecutorial misconduct. He argued that the prosecution had attacked his credibility based on untrue facts - that he had not mentioned sleep deprivation during the interview - and had repeatedly misstated the elements of the charged crime. However, the district court denied his motion for a new trial.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found no plain error in the prosecution’s conduct that would affect Hopkins' substantial rights, as the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming. The court also did not find any exceptional circumstances warranting reversal due to the prosecutor's alleged misstatement of the elements of the crime during the closing argument. Lastly, the court concluded that the cumulative effect of the alleged prosecutorial misconduct did not deny Hopkins a fair trial. View "United States v. Cody Hopkins" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Roads was convicted of transporting and accessing child pornography, and received a 324-month prison sentence. He appealed, alleging conflicts of interest among his defense counsel and the presiding judge. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit previously vacated Roads's sentence and ordered a lower court to determine whether a conflict of interest among Roads's defense counsel may have affected his substantial rights. After re-assignment of the case to a different judge and changes in counsel, Roads's motions for disclosure of information and recusal were denied. His motion to withdraw his guilty plea was also denied, and he was re-sentenced to the same term of imprisonment.On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, Roads argued that the district court erred in denying his motions and in applying a two-level obstruction enhancement during sentencing. He claimed that a reasonable person may question the impartiality of the court due to perceived personal relationships with federal officials or court employees who had been threatened by another individual, Justin Fletcher.However, the Appeals Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Roads's motions. It found that Roads had failed to provide any information suggesting the court could not be impartial. The court also found that Roads's reasons for recusal were based on inaccurate "facts" and mere speculation. The court denied Roads's motion to withdraw his guilty plea as he failed to show a fair and just reason for withdrawal. It concluded that the district court was correct in applying the obstruction enhancement, as Roads had attempted to destroy evidence. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding Roads's sentence. View "United States v. Roads" on Justia Law

Jonathan Weber Arrington, the defendant, was employed by Recon Roofing and Construction to handle their finances. He was found guilty of wire fraud, having embezzled a total of $315,835 from the company between August 2019 and March 2021. Arrington appealed his sentence and the related restitution order. He argued that the district court erred by assigning him the burden of proof regarding any offset to the restitution amount. The defendant also contended that the court didn't account for the value of payments he made towards the loss, and that the imposed sentence was unreasonably harsh.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the sentence but vacated the restitution order. The Appeals Court stated that the district court was correct in assigning Arrington the burden of proof for any offset to the amount of restitution. However, it was determined that the district court had erred in not reducing the restitution amount by the value of shares sold by the defendant back to the company. Therefore, the restitution amount was reduced by $50,000 to $265,835. The court found the prison sentence to be reasonable, considering the factors such as Arrington's position of trust within the company, the extent of the fraud, his attempt to cover it up, and his prior federal fraud conviction. View "United States v. Arrington" on Justia Law

The case revolved around Darron Mayo, who was appealing the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a hidden camera placed by police officers across his apartment door. The evidence from this camera was used to obtain a search warrant for Mayo's apartment, where police found drugs, paraphernalia, cash, a loaded pistol, and an iPhone containing incriminating photographs and videos.Mayo argued that the footage from the hidden camera violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that the search warrant was deficient after removing evidence obtained from the camera. He also contended that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, affirmed the decision of the District Court, ruling that the probable cause affidavit remained sufficient even when the evidence from the hidden camera was omitted.The court cited four sets of related facts supporting this conclusion. First, various drugs, a scale, and stolen handguns were found in a car associated with Mayo. Second, Mayo's fingerprints were found on a handgun magazine, and a video linked him to the vehicle. Third, during a traffic stop, Mayo gave a false name, marijuana was found in the car, and he made incriminating phone calls recorded by a police dash camera. Fourth, utilities in Mayo's name connected him to the apartment in question. These facts indicated a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in his apartment. Therefore, the court held that the hidden camera footage was not necessary to establish probable cause. View "United States v. Mayo" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed two cases where the district courts did not impose a $5,000 special assessment fee mandated by the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act on defendants Jason Wesely and Jesus Diaz-Figueroa. The Act stipulates that non-indigent individuals convicted of sexual exploitation of a child must pay this fee, but both defendants were deemed indigent.The Court of Appeals assessed the financial situations of both defendants. In Wesely's case, the court upheld the original decision, concluding that the district court did not err in recognizing Wesely's indigence. At the time of sentencing, Wesely had minimal assets and was facing uncertain future income, largely due to prison time and potential suspension of his military disability benefits.In contrast, the appellate court reversed and remanded the district court's decision regarding Diaz-Figueroa. At the time of sentencing, Diaz-Figueroa had a net worth of approximately $120,000, even when accounting for court-ordered restitution. Given his positive net worth, the Court of Appeals concluded that the district court's finding of Diaz-Figueroa's indigence was clearly erroneous. Thus, the court concluded that Diaz-Figueroa was not indigent and should have been required to pay the $5,000 special assessment. View "United States v. Wesely" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the defendant Nolan Ryan Morin, who had pleaded guilty to a false-statements charge, a class D felony, faced the revocation of his supervised release multiple times. After his initial violation of supervised release, he was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. After two more violations, his supervised release was revoked and he was sentenced to 18 months' and then 24 months' imprisonment, respectively.Morin appealed his most recent 24-month revocation term of imprisonment, arguing that the "all or part" clause in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), which governs the revocation of supervised release, requires a sentencing court to credit previous revocation terms of imprisonment up to a maximum of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the underlying offense. In Morin's case, he claimed that the total length of all revocation imprisonment he may serve based on his false-statements conviction was capped at 3 years, and as he had already served 30 months on his first two revocations, the district court was only authorized to impose a maximum of 6 months on the present revocation.The Eighth Circuit disagreed with Morin's interpretation. The court held that the "all or part" clause imposed a per-revocation limit and did not require the court to consider or aggregate prior revocation terms of imprisonment. Moreover, the court opined that the clause expanded the sentencing court's authority by removing the limitation that a prison term imposed could never be longer than the term of the revoked supervised release. Thus, the court affirmed the 24-month term of revocation imprisonment Morin received as it was authorized by statute. View "United States v. Morin" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Loing Yar, a native and citizen of South Sudan who entered the United States as a refugee, appealed an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that denied his claim under the Convention Against Torture for deferral of his removal to South Sudan. Yar was convicted of distributing methamphetamine in the United States, which is considered an aggravated felony, leading to the initiation of removal proceedings against him. Yar sought relief from removal, claiming he would be likely tortured if he was returned to South Sudan due to his membership in the minority Nuer tribe and his relationship to his father, an advocate for South Sudanese independence who died under suspicious circumstances.An immigration judge initially granted deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, but the BIA vacated this decision, concluding that the potential harm identified by the immigration judge did not rise to the level of torture, as defined by the law. The BIA further asserted that the likelihood of detention or imprisonment alone does not amount to torture, and the indeterminate "chance" of future upheaval or ethnic cleansing did not meet the legal standard of "more likely than not" under the regulations implementing the Convention.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied Yar's petition for review, affirming the BIA's decision. The court found no error in the BIA's legal conclusion that Yar failed to establish a likelihood of torture upon return to South Sudan. The court agreed with the BIA's interpretation of the Convention Against Torture, emphasizing that the definition of torture is a legal issue and whether a predicted factual outcome meets the definition of "torture" is a question of law. View "Yar v. Garland" on Justia Law

Thomas Springs was convicted by an Arkansas jury for the capital murder of his wife, Christina, and sentenced to death. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct review by the Arkansas Supreme Court. Later, Springs filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing, among other points, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present his son Matthew’s testimony during the trial's penalty phase.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's denial of Springs' § 2254 petition. The court noted that Springs needed to show both that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. However, the court found that even if Matthew had testified, Springs failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different given the extensive evidence against him and the nature of his crime. The court also declined to expand the certificate of appealability to include Springs's challenge to his competency to stand trial and participate in the appellate process. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment and denied Springs’s request to expand the certificate of appealability. View "Springs v. Payne" on Justia Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Defendant Ledra Craig appealed his conviction for various counts related to the distribution of fentanyl. On August 2, 2020, Craig sold fentanyl to two men, R.P. and N.B., at a casino in Missouri. R.P. and N.B. were later found unconscious and R.P. ultimately died. Craig was then arrested and made a statement to officers after waiving his Miranda rights, which was later used as evidence during his trial.Craig raised three main points of contention in his appeal. First, he argued that text messages between him and an unidentified co-conspirator, "Glenn," were wrongly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). The court disagreed, stating that the texts, which discussed drug deals, were made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy. Second, Craig claimed that the court improperly denied him the right to present a complete defense by restricting his ability to question an officer about the circumstances surrounding his inculpatory statement. The court also rejected this argument, noting that Craig had been able to conduct a thorough cross-examination of the officer. Finally, Craig contended that evidence of his prior drug conviction was erroneously admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) as it was irrelevant to the current case and served as improper propensity evidence. The court disagreed, stating that the prior conviction was relevant to his intent to engage in the charged conspiracy to distribute drugs. Based on these reasons, the court affirmed Craig's conviction. View "United States v. Craig" on Justia Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the court considered an appeal by Whitehorse Ducharme, who had pleaded guilty to abusive sexual contact with a child and was sentenced to life in prison. Ducharme challenged his sentence on two grounds. First, he asserted that the district court failed to consider the offense level used to calculate his recommended sentencing range. Second, he argued that the court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.The Court of Appeals rejected both arguments. Regarding the first, the court noted that the district court had indeed meticulously calculated Ducharme's offense level, and the assertion that it failed to consider the applicable offense level was untenable. Ducharme's actual issue appeared to be with the court's reliance on the § 3553(a) considerations to impose a sentence above what the Guidelines recommended. The appellate court pointed out that once courts have correctly calculated the Guidelines range, they may find a sentence outside that range "appropriate irrespective of the Guidelines range."On the second point, Ducharme argued that a life sentence was substantively unreasonable because the court did not weigh the § 3553(a) sentencing considerations properly. He highlighted his limited criminal history and the fact that a life sentence far exceeded his Guidelines range. However, the court noted that its review of the substantive reasonableness of a sentence is narrow and deferential. The district court had considered the relevant sentencing criteria and given several convincing reasons for the sentence it chose, leading the Court of Appeals to conclude that it did not commit "a clear error of judgment" in varying upward to a life sentence.Thus, the court affirmed the life sentence given to Ducharme. View "United States v. Ducharme" on Justia Law