Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jermaine Steven Daye pleaded guilty to arson, having set a fire in the hallway of an occupied apartment building. The presentence investigation report recommended classifying Daye as a career offender due to two previous convictions for Domestic Abuse Assault, Enhanced (DAAE) under Iowa Code § 708.2A(3)(b). However, Daye objected to this classification, arguing that the DAAE convictions were not "crimes of violence" within the meaning of the sentencing guidelines. The district court agreed, finding that DAAE is not categorically a crime of violence and thus Daye was not a career offender. Daye was sentenced to 84 months' imprisonment, an upward variance from the advisory sentencing guidelines range of 60 to 63 months. The Government appealed, claiming Daye is a career offender.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered whether DAAE has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person, defining a crime of violence. The Government argued that DAAE is divisible and thus could be considered a crime of violence. However, the court found the Government's argument insufficient and waived it, thus applying the categorical approach to DAAE. According to this approach, the court looks at the abstract requirements for a conviction rather than the defendant's actual conduct and determines if a conviction necessarily had a physical force element for the crime to qualify as a crime of violence under the force clause.The court noted that under Iowa law, DAAE is an enhanced assault statute that imposes increased penalties for conduct that violates Iowa's simple assault statute and which is committed against someone within a domestic relationship. The court concluded that a defendant could be found guilty of DAAE by committing three simple misdemeanor domestic abuse assaults, which the Government conceded were not crimes of violence. Thus, the court determined there was a non-fanciful, non-theoretical manner by which a person could be convicted of DAAE without so much as the threatened use of physical force. The court therefore affirmed the district court's decision, holding that DAAE is not categorically a crime of violence and that Daye was not a career offender. View "United States v. Daye" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of Thomas Brewer's motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Brewer, who had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, sought to challenge the legality of his 10-year prison sentence for the latter charge. He argued that voluntary manslaughter did not qualify as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c). However, the appellate court rejected this argument. It held that voluntary manslaughter does constitute a crime of violence as it involves a higher level of mens rea or mental state (depraved heart recklessness or general intent to kill) than ordinary recklessness, which the Supreme Court in Borden v. United States deemed insufficient to meet the use-of-force criteria for a crime of violence. The court also relied on its prior decision in McCoy v. United States which held that voluntary manslaughter is a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). The court concluded that Borden did not supersede McCoy as it did not address whether an offense committed with depraved heart or extreme recklessness has as an element the use of force against the person of another. The court also rejected Brewer's reliance on United States v. Lung’aho, which held that arson is not a crime of violence, noting that second-degree murder, if committed with a mental state of depraved heart or extreme recklessness, requires “more risk and culpability” than arson. View "Brewer v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1996, Duane D. Worthington was charged with several crimes related to a robbery he committed in Iowa. The government sought enhanced penalties due to his past convictions for robbery and attempted robbery, which they argued constituted “serious violent felonies” under federal law. Worthington pled guilty to all four counts and received a sentence of 425 months in prison. Years later, the Supreme Court ruled that increasing a statutory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)’s residual clause violated the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause. Following this ruling, Worthington sought to challenge his sentence, arguing that his past convictions no longer qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA. The district court vacated his sentence and ordered a resentencing hearing. The court determined that Worthington was a "career offender" under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) and imposed a new sentence of 420 months. Worthington appealed, arguing that the district court erred in calculating his advisory sentencing range. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the district court was bound by the appellate court's prior decision that denied Worthington authorization to challenge his career offender status. Therefore, the district court did not err by refusing to recalculate Worthington’s advisory sentencing range under the newer version of the Guidelines. View "United States v. Worthington" on Justia Law

This case concerns the appeal of Gordon Grabau's sentence for receiving child pornography, with the appellant arguing that the district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement because he knowingly distributed child pornography. The United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, maintaining that Grabau, who was a field technician for a technology company and held a bachelor's degree in computer science, demonstrated superior knowledge about how software works. This knowledge, in conjunction with his use of the peer-to-peer file-sharing program BitTorrent and his possession of a large collection of child pornography, was deemed by the court as sufficient evidence that Grabau knowingly distributed child pornography. Therefore, the application of the two-level enhancement was found to be appropriate. View "United States v. Grabau" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant, Daryl Stephen Jones, III, who appealed his sentencing after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, which is a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). Jones had absconded from a residential reentry facility where he was serving a previous sentence for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. He was arrested six months later in Des Moines, Iowa, with a loaded handgun and extra ammunition. The district court sentenced Jones to 84 months’ imprisonment with 3 years of supervised release, to be served consecutively to any term of imprisonment or supervised release imposed for the then-pending escape charge in the District of Kansas.In his appeal, Jones claimed procedural error and argued that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, affirmed the sentence. The court found no clear error in the district court's application of a four-level sentencing enhancement for Jones' possession of a firearm in connection with the escape felony, as well as its calculation of two criminal-history points for Jones' 2013 controlled substance possession offense. The court also determined that because the district court was aware of its authority to depart downward based on the alleged overrepresentation of Jones' criminal history and there was no allegation of an unconstitutional motive, its decision not to depart was unreviewable. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that Jones' sentence was substantively reasonable, noting that a sentence within the Guidelines range is accorded a presumption of substantive reasonableness on appeal. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentences of Theodore Browne and Karley Ann Smith, both of whom had pled guilty to conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. Browne claimed that the district court erred in determining that he transported 10 pounds of meth, which influenced his base offense level. However, the Appeals Court ruled that the district court's approximation of the drug quantity, based on witness testimonies, was not clearly erroneous. Browne also argued that the district court wrongly applied a 4-level role enhancement, contending that there was insufficient evidence to show he was an "organizer or leader" of the conspiracy. The Appeals Court disagreed, ruling that the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous based on witness testimonies. Smith argued that the district court abused its discretion by considering late-filed evidence in the government’s sentencing memorandum, which resulted in the imposition of an obstruction enhancement and the denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. The Appeals Court ruled that Smith had sufficient time to review and respond to the challenged exhibits, and that the district court did not err in finding obstruction of justice and rejecting the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. View "United States v. Browne" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, defendants Antione Deandre Maxwell and Chavee E’Laun Harden were convicted of conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery. Maxwell was additionally convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions, and Harden additionally argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, in denying his request for an implicit bias instruction, and in calculating his sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.The court affirmed the convictions due to overwhelming evidence of the defendants' involvement in the robbery, including their presence at the scene of the crime, their possession of stolen goods and firearms, and their actions before and after the robbery. The court also held that the district court correctly denied Harden's motion to suppress evidence, finding that the officers' entry into his home without a warrant was justified due to the exigent circumstances surrounding the presence of unattended children and the likely presence of an armed robbery suspect. The court also rejected Harden's request for an implicit bias instruction, stating that it was within the district court's discretion to decide how best to address the risk of racial bias. Finally, the court found no error in the district court’s calculation of Harden’s sentencing range, considering his role in the robbery, his perjury during trial, and his attempts to influence a witness to lie for him. View "United States v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

In this case, Michael Grady and Oscar Dillon, III were convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin, attempted obstruction of justice, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. They were sentenced to 226 and 187 months’ imprisonment, respectively, and each to 5 years of supervised release. The defendants appealed their convictions, arguing various issues including that their indictments should have been dismissed on Speedy Trial Act grounds, that there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions, and that the court erred in denying their motions to substitute counsel of their choice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the convictions. First, the court found no violation of the Speedy Trial Act, as the delays in the case were justified due to its complexity. Second, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the defendants' convictions for drug conspiracy, money laundering conspiracy, and attempted obstruction of justice. Finally, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants’ motions to substitute counsel of their choice. Specifically, the court found that the potential conflict of interest was unwaivable due to the attorney's previous representation of a key government witness in the case. Therefore, the court affirmed the convictions and sentences of the defendants. View "United States v. Grady" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Chad Betts's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a traffic stop. Betts, a felon, was found in possession of a firearm and ammunition after a drug dog alerted to his vehicle during a traffic stop. He appealed the district court's decision, arguing that reasonable suspicion did not exist to extend the traffic stop.The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop based on a combination of factors: Betts’s quick speaking, profuse sweating, and rapid, shallow breathing; his possession of a torch-style lighter, which the officer knew was often used to heat drugs like methamphetamine; Betts’s unusual travel plans and his history of drug-related offenses. These factors, viewed as a whole, justified the officer's suspicion that Betts was in possession of illegal drugs by the time the officer left Betts seated in the patrol car and walked back to Betts’s vehicle to question the passenger. As a result, the court concluded that the extended stop was justified, and the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress the evidence obtained during this stop. View "United States v. Betts" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit examined an appeal by John Lee Ralston, who was charged with being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm after a search of his residence. The search was conducted under a warrant that was primarily issued based on criminal activity suspected of another person, Colton Varty, who was believed to be residing on the same piece of property but in a different residence. Ralston argued the warrant did not establish probable cause that evidence would be located inside his house.The district court had denied Ralston’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his residence, ruling that even though the warrant lacked probable cause, the officers acted in good faith, relying on the Leon good-faith exception. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed and reversed the district court's decision.The Court of Appeals held that the Leon good-faith exception did not apply in this case. The court found that the affidavit supporting the warrant was so lacking in evidence connecting Ralston and his residence to the suspected criminal activity of Varty that no reasonable officer would have relied upon a warrant that was issued based on it. The Court of Appeals concluded that without evidence that Varty had access to Ralston’s residence or facts pointing to a fair probability that Ralston’s residence contained stolen property or was being used to fence stolen property, the Leon good-faith exception could not apply. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court with directions to vacate Ralston’s guilty plea and grant his motion to suppress. View "United States v. Ralston" on Justia Law