Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Charles H. Lester, Jr. was sentenced to 188 months' imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine. After serving a portion of his supervised release term, the United States Probation Office filed a report recommending the early termination of Lester's supervision, citing his low risk of recidivism and compliance with the conditions of his supervision. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied this request, asserting that it did not have the authority to terminate Lester's supervised release early due to the requirement in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) that a five-year term of supervised release be imposed, which the court interpreted as precluding early termination under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district court's interpretation. The appellate court held that the language of § 841(b)(1)(A) requires the imposition of a five-year term of supervised release, but does not impact a district court's ability to later terminate an individual's supervised release after the individual has served at least one year, as provided in § 3583(e)(1). Thus, the district court retained discretion to consider whether Lester's supervised release could be terminated early under § 3583(e)(1). Consequently, the appellate court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Lester" on Justia Law

A defendant, John Radermacher, was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine by a jury in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. Radermacher appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, arguing two main points: firstly, that the district court erred in admitting evidence of his prior drug conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and secondly, that the court wrongly denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal due to insufficient evidence.In reviewing the first argument, the Appeals Court noted that while evidence of past crimes is generally not admissible to prove a person's character, it can be admitted for other purposes, such as proving motive, intent, or knowledge. In this case, Radermacher's prior conviction was relevant to his knowledge of the drug conspiracy and his intent to join it. The court also noted that the prior conviction was sufficiently similar in kind to the crime charged, and although there was a considerable gap of time between the two offenses, most of that time Radermacher was incarcerated. Therefore, the court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.As for the second argument, the Appeals Court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence that led to Radermacher's conviction. In order to establish guilt for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, three elements must be present: the existence of a conspiracy, the defendant's knowledge of the conspiracy, and the defendant's intentional joining of it. The court determined that there was enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find Radermacher guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the Appeals Court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Radermacher" on Justia Law

In this case heard before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the defendant Ricky Timothy Williams was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Williams appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court erred by giving a supplemental instruction to the jury that he believed went beyond the scope of the jury's question and was duplicative of instructions already given.The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, stating that the district court has the discretion to respond to a jury's request for a supplemental instruction. The Court of Appeals found that the instructions given by the district court, when taken as a whole, fairly and adequately instructed the jurors on the applicable law. They also found that the supplemental instruction was not unnecessarily duplicative, and that district courts are not prohibited from giving duplicative instructions where reinstruction will assist the jury.The Court of Appeals also noted that the jury's note to the court made clear that they were confused about the meaning of a phrase from the final instruction. The district court clarified this confusion by providing a supplemental instruction using language from the final instructions already given, and the Court of Appeals found this to be within the district court's discretion. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

The case concerns the defendant, Roylee Richardson, who was convicted by a jury for witness tampering and possessing a firearm as a felon. After his arrest for attacking his then-girlfriend and shooting at her would-be rescuer, Richardson made several recorded jailhouse calls attempting to persuade her to recant her testimony or refuse to testify. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that there was sufficient evidence to support Richardson's conviction on both counts of witness tampering.The court explained that witness tampering involves two elements: knowingly intimidating, threatening, or corruptly persuading another person, and intending to influence, delay, or prevent another's testimony in an official proceeding. The court found that Richardson's actions met these elements. In the calls, he attempted to corruptly persuade his ex-girlfriend to lie or refuse to testify, and he feared the impact her testimony would have on his case, demonstrating his intent to influence her testimony.Furthermore, the court addressed Richardson's argument about the admission of his multiple prior felony convictions. The court noted that one element of a felon-in-possession charge requires the possessor to have a prior felony conviction. Richardson refused to formally admit his prior felony convictions, thereby necessitating the government to prove this element. The court found that the government appropriately presented evidence of his multiple prior felony convictions to establish that Richardson was a felon and was aware of his status as a felon at the time. The court concluded there was no abuse of discretion in the government's introduction of multiple prior convictions and three mug shots as evidence. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit, the defendant, Kaycee Heard, appealed his 180-month sentence for involvement in a drug-trafficking conspiracy that transported oxycodone and fentanyl pills from Michigan to North Dakota for distribution. Heard pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, and his sentence exceeded his Guidelines range of 135 to 168 months. Heard's appeal centered around three key claims: the district court miscalculated his criminal history score, wrongly applied a Guidelines enhancement for his role in the conspiracy, and issued an unreasonable sentence.The Court of Appeals rejected all three of Heard's claims. First, the court found that the district court was correct to assess a criminal history point for a two-year probation term Heard served under Michigan’s Holmes Youthful Trainee Act. Despite Heard's argument that this sentence should not have counted towards his criminal history score as no conviction was entered and the underlying charges were dismissed, the Appeals Court ruled that Heard's admission of guilt by pleading guilty meant the probation term was correctly counted as a "prior sentence".Second, the Appeals Court upheld the district court's application of a three-level enhancement for Heard's role in the conspiracy, finding that Heard had exhibited sufficient managerial or supervisory authority to warrant this enhancement. The court pointed to evidence that Heard had recruited co-conspirators, used a co-conspirator’s apartment as a stash house, directed a co-conspirator to travel to get pills for distribution, and received proceeds from the pills’ sale.Finally, the court found Heard's sentence to be both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district court had varied up from the Guidelines range based on Heard's conduct in pretrial detention, including his participation in a prison riot and assaults on two inmates. The Appeals Court found no clear error in the district court's determination that Heard had participated in the riot, and concluded that the 180-month sentence was within the realm of reasonableness given Heard's drug trafficking and pretrial detention misconduct. The court also rejected Heard's claim that his sentence created unwarranted disparities with his co-conspirators, stating that the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities refers to national disparities, not differences among co-conspirators. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Heard" on Justia Law

Cortez Ingram pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. Both parties recommended an 87-month sentence, but the district court for the Eastern District of Missouri imposed a 123-month sentence and three years of supervised release. Ingram appealed, arguing that the court was bound by the plea agreement to sentence him to 87 months and that the court erred in departing upward to impose an above-guidelines sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the district court was not bound by the plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(A). The plea agreement was nonbinding on the court and was not converted to a binding agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). Therefore, the court did not err in declining to accept the parties' sentencing recommendation.Ingram also argued that the district court erred in departing upward to impose an above-guidelines sentence. The court of appeals found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in departing upward under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.21 based on Ingram's possession of cocaine and a loaded firearm during his arrest in 2022 (the uncharged conduct). The district court was not prohibited from considering this conduct in sentencing Ingram.Finally, Ingram believed he should have had access to the probation officer's sealed sentencing recommendation. The court of appeals found that under local rules and administrative order in the Eastern District of Missouri, the probation officer's sentencing recommendation was not to be disclosed. Therefore, the court did not err in failing to disclose the sentencing recommendation to Ingram.The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Ingram" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to increase the monthly restitution payment of Ronald Totaro, who was convicted in 2001 of sixty-one counts of various crimes including mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and racketeering. The court ruled that the increase from $200 to $1,000 was justified by Totaro's financial circumstances, his willful failure to comply with the initial restitution order, and the fact that he still owed nearly $2 million to his victims. Totaro had argued that the increase was too substantial and that his early release and receipt of Social Security payments did not constitute a "material change" in his financial situation. The Court of Appeals disagreed, citing the substantial assets shared by Totaro and his wife, which included their home, a $45,000 vehicle, and over $80,000 in savings. The court also noted Totaro's pattern of trying to evade his obligations and consequences for his behavior. View "United States v. Totaro" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Raymond Lee March appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his home during a police search. March had pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a prohibited person, but retained his right to appeal the suppression issue. The police had executed a search warrant at March's home based on information that March's nephew, Edwin Goodwin, was storing firearms at March's home. During the search, the police seized two firearms and some marijuana.March argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause for the search warrant, which was based on the discovery of two marijuana stems in his trash and the information about Goodwin's firearms. The district court had ruled that the search warrant was supported by probable cause, and alternatively, even if probable cause was lacking, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied.The Court of Appeals did not address the existence of probable cause, but agreed with the district court that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule was sufficient to resolve the appeal. The court held that even if the affidavit for the warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause, the evidence should not be suppressed because the officer had obtained the search warrant from a judge in good faith and had reasonably relied on the judge's determination of probable cause. The court found that the information in the affidavit justified reasonable reliance on the judge's determination of probable cause. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment and denied March's motion to suppress the evidence. View "United States v. March" on Justia Law

The defendant, Henry Watkins Jr., was stopped while driving by a police officer due to a mismatched license plate. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer smelled marijuana and eventually found cocaine, ecstasy, and a loaded 9-millimeter handgun in the vehicle. Watkins was the sole occupant at the time. He was subsequently indicted and convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Watkins appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that there were errors in his sentencing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found sufficient evidence for the conviction, as Watkins was the only person in the vehicle and made movements consistent with hiding the gun. Therefore, the court affirmed Watkins's conviction. However, the court found procedural errors in Watkins's sentencing, as the district court presumed the Guidelines range to be reasonable and adopted a sentence without considering the factors in § 3553(a). The court vacated Watkins's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Watkins" on Justia Law

In this appeal before the United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit, the defendant, Linda Riaski, who was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, appealed the denial of her request for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware. The case involves a search warrant that was issued based on an affidavit prepared by Deputy Sheriff Jerry Brisky, who relied on information provided by a confidential informant (CI). The CI claimed to have observed Riaski packaging methamphetamine for distribution and to have seen Riaski with a black 9 millimeter handgun. The search of Riaski's residence resulted in the discovery of methamphetamine and firearms.Riaski's appeal was based on the argument that the district court erred in denying her request for a Franks hearing to challenge the validity of the search warrant. She claimed that the affidavit supporting the search warrant was misleading because it omitted information about the CI’s credibility, her criminal history, her drug use, the financial arrangement between her and Deputy Brisky, and certain facts alleged in Riaski’s own affidavit.The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Riaski failed to make a substantial preliminary showing that Deputy Brisky intentionally or recklessly omitted facts with the intent to mislead the issuing judge, and that the affidavit, even if supplemented by the omitted information, could still support a finding of probable cause. The court reasoned that the omitted information about the CI's criminal history and drug use would not have altered the probable cause determination, as the affidavit had already provided a basis for the CI’s reliability, disclosing that she previously had provided accurate information and had made controlled purchases under Brisky’s supervision. The court also found that the omission of the details and existence of the agreement between Brisky and the CI did not render the affidavit misleading. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Riaski" on Justia Law