Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, William Howard Proto, Jr., appealed his conviction on drug trafficking and firearms charges. Proto's appeal was based on the contention that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior arrest and conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which prohibits the use of a defendant’s prior act to prove his character in order to show that on a particular occasion he acted in accordance with the character. However, the rule permits such evidence for proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.The case originated from two incidents in 2021 where Proto was found in possession of drugs, firearms, and a large amount of cash. Proto's prior conviction in 2016 was for a similar offense, where he was found in possession of a firearm and methamphetamine.The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 404(b) evidence. The Court reasoned that the evidence of Proto's prior conviction was relevant to a material issue at trial, was similar in kind and not overly remote in time to the crime charged, was supported by sufficient evidence, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The Court also noted that the trial court gave a limiting instruction to the jury on the proper use of the evidence, and dismissed Proto's argument that such instructions are ineffective, citing Supreme Court precedent. The Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "United States v. Proto" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower court's decision to deny defendant Ki-Jana Kolajuan Ivey's motion to suppress evidence retrieved from his cell phone. Ivey, a convicted felon, was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm following a traffic stop in which officers discovered a gun under his seat. Officers also obtained a warrant to search Ivey's phone, finding photos and videos of him with other firearms. Ivey argued that the search of his phone was not supported by probable cause and that the warrant was too general, violating the Fourth Amendment. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the warrant was supported by probable cause given the circumstances of the traffic stop, Ivey's possession of the phone, and his prior social media activity displaying firearms. Additionally, the court concluded that the warrant was sufficiently particular, as it specified the phone to be searched and the information to be seized. The court noted that the presence of unrelated information on Ivey's phone did not transform the warrant into an impermissible general warrant. View "United States v. Ivey" on Justia Law

In this case, James Bennett was convicted for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and sentenced to 300 months in prison. Bennett appealed, challenging both his conviction and sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the initial judgement.Evidence showed that Bennett was involved in a methamphetamine trafficking conspiracy with Khrista Erdman. They would travel out-of-state to acquire large amounts of methamphetamine, which Bennett would then distribute, a fact supported by text messages, location data, and testimony from another co-conspirator, Kenneth Crook. Moreover, a significant amount of methamphetamine was found in Bennett's backpack.Bennett argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, but the court found that the combination of co-conspirator testimony, seized drugs, and corroborating data was enough to support the verdict.Bennett also contended that the district court erred by not instructing the jury on multiple conspiracies, as he had been involved in smaller distributions before joining Erdman and Cook for larger-scale trafficking. The court found no prejudice from the absence of such an instruction, particularly given that Bennett was able to argue the point of multiple conspiracies during the trial.Regarding his sentence, Bennett claimed that the court wrongly denied him a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. However, the court stated that he consistently maintained that he was not guilty of the charged conspiracy, which negated his claim for a reduction.Lastly, Bennett objected to the calculation of drug quantity for his sentence. The court, however, found that the drug quantity seized from Bennett was enough to support the court's finding. Even though the jury found him guilty of conspiring to distribute less than 50 grams of methamphetamine, the sentencing court was able to attribute a larger drug quantity based on a preponderance of the evidence. The court also found the 300-month sentence to be reasonable, given the severity of the offense and Bennett's criminal history. View "United States v. Bennett" on Justia Law

The case involves Alexzander Michael Carneal, who pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of child pornography and was ordered to pay restitution to twenty-one identified victims. Carneal appealed the restitution order, arguing that the government's request for restitution was untimely and breached his plea agreement, which stated that the government may seek mandatory restitution within 60 days of discovering new losses. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, disagreed with Carneal's interpretation of the plea agreement. The court held that the government's request for restitution was not untimely, as it did not involve "new" or "further" losses that were discovered after the plea agreement, but rather the original losses identified before the sentencing. The court further held that the plea agreement was not breached, and that Carneal's waiver of his right to appeal any restitution order associated with his sentence was valid and enforceable. As such, the court dismissed Carneal's appeal of the restitution order. View "United States v. Carneal" on Justia Law

Glen Robert Anderson pleaded guilty to two counts of production and attempted production of child pornography, one count of enticement of a minor, and one count of interstate communication with intent to extort. The district court sentenced him to 20 years in prison and 12 years of supervised release, which is above the statutory minimum sentence of 15 years. Anderson appealed, contending that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in the sentencing. The court had carefully assessed the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and had explained its reasoning for choosing a sentence above the statutory minimum. The court had considered the nature and seriousness of Anderson's crimes as aggravating factors, while also taking into account mitigating factors such as Anderson's history of abuse and mental health issues. The court had not relied solely on the advisory Guidelines, which recommended a life sentence, but had used them as a starting point and then varied downward based on the specific circumstances of the case. Thus, Anderson's sentence was not deemed substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In this case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the defendant, Mickael Oliver, was convicted of six firearms-related felonies following a jury trial and was sentenced to 204 months of imprisonment. The crimes committed by Oliver involved a series of firearm transactions in Kansas City, Missouri, during which Oliver sold various firearms to a paid confidential informant. The transactions escalated to an attempted sale that turned violent when Oliver pointed a gun at the informant and kept both the money and the firearms. Oliver was subsequently charged and convicted of possessing a stolen firearm, unlawfully possessing a firearm as a drug user, dealing in firearms without a federal license, robbery of United States property through the use of a deadly weapon, using and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime, and selling a firearm to a convicted felon.On appeal, Oliver challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions, specifically, the counts that he robbed U.S. property and brandished a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime. The court, reviewing de novo, found that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. They determined that a reasonable jury could find that Oliver intended to commit a robbery, as he kept both the money and the firearms after threatening the informant with a gun. Furthermore, the court found that the evidence showed Oliver brandished a firearm during the crime, as he pointed a gun at the informant's head.As for the other charges, the court found that Oliver did not provide convincing argument or citation to authority to challenge them. Regardless, the court noted that the evidence of Oliver's guilt on those charges was impressive, with Oliver having stipulated at trial that he sold and possessed firearms without a federal license while illegally using a controlled substance, conceded that he sold firearms to a convicted felon, and possessed recently stolen firearms.The court concluded that Oliver's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence were without merit and affirmed his convictions. View "United States v. Oliver" on Justia Law

Valentino Bagola, serving a life sentence for two counts of first-degree murder, was required to pay $9,000 in restitution through monthly installment payments during his incarceration. When Bagola received funds as part of a federal COVID-related stimulus payment, the government filed a motion to release these funds to apply towards his restitution obligations. Bagola objected, arguing that the funds were not garnishable. However, the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota ruled in favor of the government, ordering the turnover of $924.60 from Bagola's trust account towards his restitution obligations. The court concluded that the funds were not exempt under 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1) and there was a valid lien against these funds. Bagola appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the district court did not err in determining that the stimulus funds constituted "substantial resources" under § 3664(n). Bagola’s contention that applying stimulus funds to restitution was improper and threatened prison security by negatively impacting inmate morale was raised for the first time on appeal and did not meet the plain error standard for review. The court also found that the amount of the funds, over $900, could be considered substantial relative to Bagola's usual monthly installment amounts. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, ruling that the stimulus payment funds were subject to turnover towards Bagola's restitution obligations. View "United States v. Bagola" on Justia Law

Jermaine Steven Daye pleaded guilty to arson, having set a fire in the hallway of an occupied apartment building. The presentence investigation report recommended classifying Daye as a career offender due to two previous convictions for Domestic Abuse Assault, Enhanced (DAAE) under Iowa Code § 708.2A(3)(b). However, Daye objected to this classification, arguing that the DAAE convictions were not "crimes of violence" within the meaning of the sentencing guidelines. The district court agreed, finding that DAAE is not categorically a crime of violence and thus Daye was not a career offender. Daye was sentenced to 84 months' imprisonment, an upward variance from the advisory sentencing guidelines range of 60 to 63 months. The Government appealed, claiming Daye is a career offender.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered whether DAAE has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person, defining a crime of violence. The Government argued that DAAE is divisible and thus could be considered a crime of violence. However, the court found the Government's argument insufficient and waived it, thus applying the categorical approach to DAAE. According to this approach, the court looks at the abstract requirements for a conviction rather than the defendant's actual conduct and determines if a conviction necessarily had a physical force element for the crime to qualify as a crime of violence under the force clause.The court noted that under Iowa law, DAAE is an enhanced assault statute that imposes increased penalties for conduct that violates Iowa's simple assault statute and which is committed against someone within a domestic relationship. The court concluded that a defendant could be found guilty of DAAE by committing three simple misdemeanor domestic abuse assaults, which the Government conceded were not crimes of violence. Thus, the court determined there was a non-fanciful, non-theoretical manner by which a person could be convicted of DAAE without so much as the threatened use of physical force. The court therefore affirmed the district court's decision, holding that DAAE is not categorically a crime of violence and that Daye was not a career offender. View "United States v. Daye" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of Thomas Brewer's motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Brewer, who had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, sought to challenge the legality of his 10-year prison sentence for the latter charge. He argued that voluntary manslaughter did not qualify as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c). However, the appellate court rejected this argument. It held that voluntary manslaughter does constitute a crime of violence as it involves a higher level of mens rea or mental state (depraved heart recklessness or general intent to kill) than ordinary recklessness, which the Supreme Court in Borden v. United States deemed insufficient to meet the use-of-force criteria for a crime of violence. The court also relied on its prior decision in McCoy v. United States which held that voluntary manslaughter is a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). The court concluded that Borden did not supersede McCoy as it did not address whether an offense committed with depraved heart or extreme recklessness has as an element the use of force against the person of another. The court also rejected Brewer's reliance on United States v. Lung’aho, which held that arson is not a crime of violence, noting that second-degree murder, if committed with a mental state of depraved heart or extreme recklessness, requires “more risk and culpability” than arson. View "Brewer v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1996, Duane D. Worthington was charged with several crimes related to a robbery he committed in Iowa. The government sought enhanced penalties due to his past convictions for robbery and attempted robbery, which they argued constituted “serious violent felonies” under federal law. Worthington pled guilty to all four counts and received a sentence of 425 months in prison. Years later, the Supreme Court ruled that increasing a statutory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)’s residual clause violated the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause. Following this ruling, Worthington sought to challenge his sentence, arguing that his past convictions no longer qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA. The district court vacated his sentence and ordered a resentencing hearing. The court determined that Worthington was a "career offender" under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) and imposed a new sentence of 420 months. Worthington appealed, arguing that the district court erred in calculating his advisory sentencing range. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the district court was bound by the appellate court's prior decision that denied Worthington authorization to challenge his career offender status. Therefore, the district court did not err by refusing to recalculate Worthington’s advisory sentencing range under the newer version of the Guidelines. View "United States v. Worthington" on Justia Law