Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit heard an appeal from a defendant who was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon and sentenced to 57 months in prison, with an order of restitution. The defendant, White Shield, had assaulted another woman with a metal bar in a fit of jealousy when she discovered the woman in the truck with her husband.She appealed the conviction on two grounds. First, she argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a mistrial after a witness mentioned three times that she was on probation. The court of appeals disagreed, stating that the trial court had broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for mistrial, and in this case, the reference to the defendant's probation status had minimal, if any, prejudicial effect. The court also noted that the trial court's instruction to the jury to disregard the reference to probation mitigated any potential prejudice.Second, White Shield contested the restitution amount, as there was a discrepancy between the oral sentence and the written judgment. The court agreed with this contention, clarifying that when there is a conflict between an oral sentence and written judgment, the oral sentence prevails.The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and the denial of the motion for mistrial but remanded the case back to the district court to amend the written judgment to align with the oral sentence regarding the restitution amount. View "United States v. Juanita White Shield" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. The district court determined an advisory sentencing guideline range of 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment and varied upward from the range to impose a term of 92 months’ imprisonment. Defendant argued on appeal that the district court plainly erred in calculating an advisory guideline range because his prior conviction for kidnapping in Arizona was not a conviction for a “crime of violence.”The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant contends that Marquez-Lobos is obviously wrong and that the Arizona kidnapping plainly does not qualify as a generic kidnapping. His theory is that the Arizona statute encompasses kidnappings that do not involve an unlawful deprivation of liberty as defined by most States. But he contends that kidnapping in Arizona is broader than the generic offense because the Arizona statute assertedly applies to the restraint of any person who is incapable of giving consent—even if the person is neither a minor nor incompetent. Defendant’s argument is premised on a decision of an intermediate state appellate court, State v. Bernal, 713 P.2d 811 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). The court explained that it is not convinced that Bernal establishes an obvious error by the district court. Further, the court wrote that Defendant has not produced evidence that most of the States would disagree with the alternative line of reasoning suggested in Bernal: he simply argues that the expanded set of victims identified in Bernal would exceed the set of victims identified in most state statutes and the Model Penal Code. View "United States v. Michael Goforth" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction for numerous drug offenses. The court held that the evidence against him was overwhelming, and he does not claim a reasonable probability that, but for the introduction of the challenged evidence, he would not have been found guilty.Defendant operated a website on which he once advertised 4- Fluoroamphetamine, a drug similar to the prescription medicine Adderall. Broussard received numerous orders for the Adderall analogue. But instead of shipping his customers the drug they ordered, he sent them fentanyl, a potent narcotic. As a result, eleven people died, and several others were seriously injured. Police investigated, and a grand jury indicted Defendant on numerous drug offenses. Broussard, representing himself, filed several motions in limine. One of his motions sought exclusion of all evidence “presented to invoke sentiment by expressing how the deaths or injuries of the alleged victims influenced personal experiences.” The jury found Defendant guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced Broussard to life in prison. He appealed, arguing that the district court erred in allowing the Government to introduce evidence about the victims’ lives.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the challenged evidence was arguably relevant to show that the victims were unlikely to have knowingly sought fentanyl or to have obtained it from some other source. It was also relevant to show that the victims were in good health, making it less likely that they died from some cause other than a fentanyl overdose. And taking into account the evidence’s arguable relevance, its introduction was not obviously unfairly prejudicial. Further, the court wrote that the evidence against him was overwhelming, and he does not claim a reasonable probability that, but for the introduction of the challenged evidence, he would not have been found guilty. View "United States v. Aaron Broussard" on Justia Law

Defendant le 120c(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), codified at 10 U.S.C. Section 920c(b) (2012). He later failed to register as a sex offender in Iowa and pleaded guilty to violating the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). On appeal, Defendant argued the “categorical approach” applies to his SORNA tier analysis.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that it held pursuant to the categorical approach, that his prior statute of conviction is “overbroad” in relation to SORNA’s Tier III listed comparator offenses. The court held for the first time, in line with a consensus of authority from other circuits, that the categorical approach applies to SORNA’s tier analysis. Further, the court agreed with Defendant that the application of the categorical approach resulted in his classification as a Tier I offender. The court explained that turning to the application of the categorical approach, the present case leaves no room for the United States’ suggested and generalized broadening of the analysis based on SORNA’s use of the term “comparable.”   Here, the offense of conviction is unambiguously broader in scope than the SORNA comparators. The offense of “forcible pandering” employs the defined term “prostitution,” which may be found based on “sexual contact.” “Sexual contact” includes over-the-clothes touching. Such contact falls outside the scope of SORNA’s Tier III comparator offenses as found in 18 U.S.C. Sections 2241 and 2242, both of which require a “sexual act” as defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 2246 and which does not include over-the-clothes touching. View "United States v. Michael Coulson" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). The district court sentenced Defendant to a 132-month term of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant argued that because he was arrested without probable cause when officers placed him in handcuffs during an investigative stop, the evidence seized from his backpack must be suppressed as the fruit of his unlawful arrest.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here the officers had a legitimate concern that Defendant might try to run from the scene. When Detective Love asked for permission to search his suitcase, Defendant was calm and cooperative, giving the impression that it was “not a big deal.” However, as an additional officer started asking him questions, he showed physical signs of nervousness. Defendant already knew that the K-9 had alerted to his suitcase. Then, as Love was searching the suitcase, Defendant asked to go brush his teeth, which would have allowed him to leave the scene with his backpack, out of the officers’ sight. Given the change in Defendant’s demeanor over a short period of time, the perceived attempt to discard contraband outside the presence of the officers, and the other factors that aligned at least in part with drug-trafficking behavior, the officers had a legitimate concern that Defendant might try to flee. View "United States v. Daniel Bonilla" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found during a police search of a vehicle after concluding Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the reportedly stolen vehicle. Defendant appealed, arguing the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed under the alternative rationale that the search was reasonable under the automobile exception. The court explained that a reasonable officer would believe there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found in the vehicle at the time of the search. The court further wrote that because the vehicle was reported stolen, officers could search it for evidence of it being stolen. Additionally, the court noted that officers may consider the known criminal history of a suspect in conducting the probable cause analysis. Therefore, the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle and the district court was ultimately justified in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. The court wrote that It follows that it would not exclude the evidence obtained from the storage unit because the warrant to search the unit was based on probable cause from the evidence obtained during the valid search of the car. View "United States v. Bryce Vittetoe" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The presentence investigation report recommended a base offense level of 20 under USSG Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) because Defendant’s 2013 Missouri conviction for second-degree robbery is a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. Overruling Defendant’s objection, the district court adopted this recommendation, resulting in an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 63 to 78 months imprisonment. The court imposed a 72-month sentence followed by three years of supervised release. Defendant appealed the sentence, arguing the district court erred in determining that his prior conviction for Missouri second-degree robbery is a crime of violence under the Guidelines.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Guidelines define “crime of violence” to mean “any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” that either “(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” (the force clause), or “(2) is murder . . . robbery [etc.]” (the enumerated offenses clause). The court concluded that controlling Eighth Circuit precedent has established that a prior conviction for Missouri second-degree robbery under Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 569.030.1, the statute in effect when Defendant committed the offense, is a crime of violence under USSG Section 4B1.2(a)(1). View "United States v. Cody Rethford" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to Possession of a Firearm by a Felon in violation. The district court sentenced him to 100 months imprisonment. Bailey appealed the sentence, arguing the court erred by increasing his base offense level under USSG Section 2K2.1(a)(2), based on two prior Illinois convictions for Delivery or Manufacture of Cocaine in violation of 720 ILCS 570/206(b)(4); and by applying a four-level increase under Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because he used a firearm in connection with another felony offense, Intimidation with a Dangerous Weapon in violation of Iowa Code Section 708.6(2).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant contends he is entitled to this stand-your-ground exception, despite being a felon in possession, because his illegal activity was not germane to his use of force against the person who was shooting at him. The court explained that the Supreme Court disagreed. Thus, his “possession of the handgun was germane to the use of deadly force.” Further, the court wrote that here, the district court found that Defendant did not have “reason to believe that somebody was actually shooting at him or endangering his life.” Thus, even if Defendant had no duty to retreat, his use of force was not necessary to avoid injury or harm to himself (or to anyone else). View "United States v. Lamont Bailey" on Justia Law

While Defendant was working at a convenience store in St. Louis, a suspected shoplifter appeared to steal a piece of candy. Defendant pointed a loaded pistol at the man and chased him from the store. The pistol ultimately discharged and killed the man. Defendant initially pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm while being unlawfully present in the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(5). The district court applied a homicide guideline cross reference pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(c)(1)(B). While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Rehaif v. United States. On remand, the district court again applied the second-degree murder guideline as the cross reference. Defendant now appeals his conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the record is more than sufficient to support the guilty verdict. Further, the court explained that the record adequately supports the guilty verdict and its implicit finding of subjective knowledge. Immigration authorities repeatedly informed Defendant that he lacked legal status. Moreover, the fact that he purposefully committed fraud in an effort to obtain legal status indicates an understanding that he lacked legal status. Further, the use of potentially deadly violence against another may demonstrate the malice necessary to support a second-degree murder conviction. Accordingly, whether Defendant purposefully shot the victim in the head, or accidentally shot the victim in the head while potentially fatally beating his head with a pistol, the district court permissibly concluded the mens rea rose above the baseline recklessness required for manslaughter and reached the level of malice required for murder. View "United States v. Taleb Jawher" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possessing a firearm by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), after law enforcement discovered a gun on him during an investigatory stop. Defendant moved to suppress the firearm, claiming the officers’ mistaken belief that he was a wanted fugitive nine inches taller than him rendered the stop unreasonable. The district court denied his motion and sentenced him to a term of 37 months’ imprisonment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed explaining that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity independent of the mistaken identification justified the detention. The court explained that here, the Officers had sufficient evidence to establish reasonable suspicion justifying Defendant’s detention. First, the time of the encounter. It was 12:30 a.m. when the Officers began their surveillance, and they detained Defendant at approximately 1:50 a.m. Second, the encounter took place in a high-crime area. The Officers were aware of multiple reports of subjects in that neighborhood with firearms, and the apartment Defendant freely entered was associated with an armed and dangerous fugitive. Third, Defendant’s behavior when he became aware of law enforcement’s presence. View "United States v. Lorenzo Lemons, Sr." on Justia Law