Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant le 120c(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), codified at 10 U.S.C. Section 920c(b) (2012). He later failed to register as a sex offender in Iowa and pleaded guilty to violating the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). On appeal, Defendant argued the “categorical approach” applies to his SORNA tier analysis.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that it held pursuant to the categorical approach, that his prior statute of conviction is “overbroad” in relation to SORNA’s Tier III listed comparator offenses. The court held for the first time, in line with a consensus of authority from other circuits, that the categorical approach applies to SORNA’s tier analysis. Further, the court agreed with Defendant that the application of the categorical approach resulted in his classification as a Tier I offender. The court explained that turning to the application of the categorical approach, the present case leaves no room for the United States’ suggested and generalized broadening of the analysis based on SORNA’s use of the term “comparable.”   Here, the offense of conviction is unambiguously broader in scope than the SORNA comparators. The offense of “forcible pandering” employs the defined term “prostitution,” which may be found based on “sexual contact.” “Sexual contact” includes over-the-clothes touching. Such contact falls outside the scope of SORNA’s Tier III comparator offenses as found in 18 U.S.C. Sections 2241 and 2242, both of which require a “sexual act” as defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 2246 and which does not include over-the-clothes touching. View "United States v. Michael Coulson" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). The district court sentenced Defendant to a 132-month term of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant argued that because he was arrested without probable cause when officers placed him in handcuffs during an investigative stop, the evidence seized from his backpack must be suppressed as the fruit of his unlawful arrest.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here the officers had a legitimate concern that Defendant might try to run from the scene. When Detective Love asked for permission to search his suitcase, Defendant was calm and cooperative, giving the impression that it was “not a big deal.” However, as an additional officer started asking him questions, he showed physical signs of nervousness. Defendant already knew that the K-9 had alerted to his suitcase. Then, as Love was searching the suitcase, Defendant asked to go brush his teeth, which would have allowed him to leave the scene with his backpack, out of the officers’ sight. Given the change in Defendant’s demeanor over a short period of time, the perceived attempt to discard contraband outside the presence of the officers, and the other factors that aligned at least in part with drug-trafficking behavior, the officers had a legitimate concern that Defendant might try to flee. View "United States v. Daniel Bonilla" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found during a police search of a vehicle after concluding Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the reportedly stolen vehicle. Defendant appealed, arguing the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed under the alternative rationale that the search was reasonable under the automobile exception. The court explained that a reasonable officer would believe there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found in the vehicle at the time of the search. The court further wrote that because the vehicle was reported stolen, officers could search it for evidence of it being stolen. Additionally, the court noted that officers may consider the known criminal history of a suspect in conducting the probable cause analysis. Therefore, the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle and the district court was ultimately justified in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. The court wrote that It follows that it would not exclude the evidence obtained from the storage unit because the warrant to search the unit was based on probable cause from the evidence obtained during the valid search of the car. View "United States v. Bryce Vittetoe" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The presentence investigation report recommended a base offense level of 20 under USSG Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) because Defendant’s 2013 Missouri conviction for second-degree robbery is a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. Overruling Defendant’s objection, the district court adopted this recommendation, resulting in an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 63 to 78 months imprisonment. The court imposed a 72-month sentence followed by three years of supervised release. Defendant appealed the sentence, arguing the district court erred in determining that his prior conviction for Missouri second-degree robbery is a crime of violence under the Guidelines.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Guidelines define “crime of violence” to mean “any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” that either “(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” (the force clause), or “(2) is murder . . . robbery [etc.]” (the enumerated offenses clause). The court concluded that controlling Eighth Circuit precedent has established that a prior conviction for Missouri second-degree robbery under Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 569.030.1, the statute in effect when Defendant committed the offense, is a crime of violence under USSG Section 4B1.2(a)(1). View "United States v. Cody Rethford" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to Possession of a Firearm by a Felon in violation. The district court sentenced him to 100 months imprisonment. Bailey appealed the sentence, arguing the court erred by increasing his base offense level under USSG Section 2K2.1(a)(2), based on two prior Illinois convictions for Delivery or Manufacture of Cocaine in violation of 720 ILCS 570/206(b)(4); and by applying a four-level increase under Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because he used a firearm in connection with another felony offense, Intimidation with a Dangerous Weapon in violation of Iowa Code Section 708.6(2).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant contends he is entitled to this stand-your-ground exception, despite being a felon in possession, because his illegal activity was not germane to his use of force against the person who was shooting at him. The court explained that the Supreme Court disagreed. Thus, his “possession of the handgun was germane to the use of deadly force.” Further, the court wrote that here, the district court found that Defendant did not have “reason to believe that somebody was actually shooting at him or endangering his life.” Thus, even if Defendant had no duty to retreat, his use of force was not necessary to avoid injury or harm to himself (or to anyone else). View "United States v. Lamont Bailey" on Justia Law

While Defendant was working at a convenience store in St. Louis, a suspected shoplifter appeared to steal a piece of candy. Defendant pointed a loaded pistol at the man and chased him from the store. The pistol ultimately discharged and killed the man. Defendant initially pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm while being unlawfully present in the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(5). The district court applied a homicide guideline cross reference pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(c)(1)(B). While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Rehaif v. United States. On remand, the district court again applied the second-degree murder guideline as the cross reference. Defendant now appeals his conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the record is more than sufficient to support the guilty verdict. Further, the court explained that the record adequately supports the guilty verdict and its implicit finding of subjective knowledge. Immigration authorities repeatedly informed Defendant that he lacked legal status. Moreover, the fact that he purposefully committed fraud in an effort to obtain legal status indicates an understanding that he lacked legal status. Further, the use of potentially deadly violence against another may demonstrate the malice necessary to support a second-degree murder conviction. Accordingly, whether Defendant purposefully shot the victim in the head, or accidentally shot the victim in the head while potentially fatally beating his head with a pistol, the district court permissibly concluded the mens rea rose above the baseline recklessness required for manslaughter and reached the level of malice required for murder. View "United States v. Taleb Jawher" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possessing a firearm by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), after law enforcement discovered a gun on him during an investigatory stop. Defendant moved to suppress the firearm, claiming the officers’ mistaken belief that he was a wanted fugitive nine inches taller than him rendered the stop unreasonable. The district court denied his motion and sentenced him to a term of 37 months’ imprisonment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed explaining that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity independent of the mistaken identification justified the detention. The court explained that here, the Officers had sufficient evidence to establish reasonable suspicion justifying Defendant’s detention. First, the time of the encounter. It was 12:30 a.m. when the Officers began their surveillance, and they detained Defendant at approximately 1:50 a.m. Second, the encounter took place in a high-crime area. The Officers were aware of multiple reports of subjects in that neighborhood with firearms, and the apartment Defendant freely entered was associated with an armed and dangerous fugitive. Third, Defendant’s behavior when he became aware of law enforcement’s presence. View "United States v. Lorenzo Lemons, Sr." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged in a five-count indictment with attempted bank robbery involving assault with a dangerous weapon. The district court found Defendant guilty of the five offenses and sentenced him to 230 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing the evidence was insufficient to convict him of any offense; the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress involuntary custodial statements he made to an FBI agent; and the district court erred by failing to include the term “knowingly” in reciting the elements of the Count II, III, and IV offenses when explaining its decision during a post-trial hearing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court considers the evidence submitted at trial and makes findings of fact and conclusions of law in determining whether the government has proved the offenses charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the indictment charged that Defendant “knowingly” brandished and used a pistol during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count II), “knowingly” discharged and used a pistol during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count III), and “knowingly” discharged and used an AR-15 rifle during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count IV). The court explained that neither filed a post-trial motion challenging the court’s findings and conclusions even though stand-by counsel was granted a one-month extension of time to do so. The evidence that Defendant committed these three offenses “knowingly” was overwhelming. There was no error, plain or otherwise. View "United States v. Jacob Monteer" on Justia Law

Defendant, a native and resident of Iowa, was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of possessing child pornography. He was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment and 240 months supervised release. In January 2022, the district court revoked supervised release after Defendant admitted to viewing pornography on computers at public libraries in Des Moines, which violated conditions of his supervised release and Iowa Sex Offender Registry requirements. The court imposed a revocation sentence of 14 months imprisonment followed by 19 years of supervised release. The district court revoked supervised release and imposed a revocation sentence of 24 months imprisonment followed by 19 years supervised release. Defendant appealed, arguing the revocation sentence is substantively unreasonable.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court expressly acknowledged Defendant’s need for sex offender treatment and agreed to recommend that Defendant be confined in a BOP facility that has treatment programming. The court considered the relevant 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) sentencing factors and carefully explained its decision to give greater weight to protecting the community from a high-risk offender with a long criminal history that included hands-on sexual abuse of young children than to the possibility that the needed treatment would be less available or less effective in prison. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Nicholas Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant used fake deeds to gain possession of three houses. On appeal, Defendant challenged the loss calculation but began by disputing the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his identity theft convictions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Defendant argued that the government said too much in the closing argument. According to Defendant, two of the prosecutor’s statements qualify. The court explained that the prosecutor’s comment was a fleeting reference that immediately followed an accurate statement of the government’s burden—proof beyond a reasonable doubt— and the district court repeatedly instructed the jury that the burden was on the government.   However, the court explained that while Defendant’s convictions stand, his 41-month sentence cannot. For identity theft and other property crimes, the recommended sentencing range depends in part on the amount of the “actual” or “intended” losses from the crime. Defendant ended up with a total offense level of 22 and a range of 41 to 51 months in prison. The court explained that on remand, the district court must adopt “a reasonable estimate of the” fair market value at the time of the transfer, either by using a measure that reflects the value at that point or by accounting for Defendant’s post-fraud improvements and market changes during the intervening period. View "United States v. Arondo Harris" on Justia Law