Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two dog owners sued a police officer and the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners after the officer shot a dog during an encounter at a residence. The dog owners alleged that the officer violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by unreasonably “seizing” the dog. They also asserted that the Board’s policies and customs caused the officer to commit the alleged violation. The district court granted summary judgment for the officer and the Board.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that given the behavior of the dog, and the failure of the owner to control the animal at the doorway, a reasonable officer could have perceived the dog as an imminent threat. Thus, the officer’s s firing of a first shot was reasonable. The court further wrote that the circumstances in LeMay are readily distinguishable from the officer’s doorway encounter with a growling dog who suddenly rushed at him and then turned in the direction of his fellow officer. View "Brandee Buschmann v. Kansas City Police Department" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. The district court sentenced him to sixty months’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed the court’s evidentiary rulings at trial and the determination of his sentence. The parties dispute whether Defendant’s term of imprisonment for the state assault offense was “anticipated.” Defendant says the state sentence was anticipated because the state assault charge was pending in state court. The government counters that any state sentence was speculative and not “anticipated” because Defendant had not been convicted of any state offense.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that there is no reversible error and therefore affirmed the judgment. The court concluded that there is no plain error warranting relief because it is not obvious under current law that Defendant’s state term of imprisonment was “anticipated.” Section 5G1.3(c) does not define “anticipated,” and Defendant cites no authority from the Eighth Circuit. The court explained that given the absence of a definition in the guidelines, and the limited authority on the issue, the court wrote, it is at least subject to reasonable dispute whether the filing of a state charge, by itself, makes a future state sentence “anticipated” within the meaning of Section 5G1.3(c). Further, the court concluded that the district court made an individualized assessment based on the facts presented and acted within the wide latitude available to a sentencing judge who weighs the relevant factors. View "United States v. Montgomery Lebeau" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for two counts of assaulting a federal officer and one count of using a firearm to further a crime of violence. The first assault count was based on Defendant’s altercation with Officer Johnson, the second on Defendant’s pointing his rifle at Troopers Shipley and Wakefield and Sheriff Medley. The third count, using a firearm to further a crime of violence, was based on the second assault count. At trial, Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for all counts. The district court denied both motions. Defendant was convicted of all three counts, and the district court denied his subsequent motion for reconsideration of the denial of his judgment of acquittal. He appealed his convictions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Officer Johnson testified that when he went to the house the first time, it was in the back of his mind to look for possible firearms violations. His concern about the possible access to weapons is the reason he did not let Defendant go back inside the house. Thus, the jury could have concluded that Officer Johnson was fulfilling the mission of the ATF to enforce federal firearms statutes when he went to the home. To be sure, he was also conducting a state investigation, but an officer can be “engaged in the performance of official [federal] duties” while simultaneously fulfilling state duties. Further, the court wrote that there is sufficient evidence that Troopers Shipley and Wakefield and Sheriff Medley were assisting Officer Johnson “in the performance of official duties” when they were assaulted. View "United States v. Zerak Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The district court sentenced him as a career offender to 168 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed, claiming the district court committed three reversible errors: (1) designating him as a career offender; (2) applying a two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon; and (3) applying a two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment in the course of fleeing from law enforcement.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the dangerous weapon enhancement is applicable if the firearm is found during “relevant conduct,” as defined in U.S.S.G. Section 1B1.3(a)(2) and is not limited to the offense of conviction. both instances involved drug trafficking-related conduct, with the only difference being the seizure of a distributable quantity of methamphetamine in March, while there was no seizure of drugs but evidence of drug trafficking at the time of Defendant’s arrest in May. Specifically, the district court noted the discovery of two scales, one with methamphetamine residue, a pipe with residue, baggies, and two firearms. Notably, Defendant was out on bond for the March possession offense when he was observed at a known drug house, and his companion acknowledged that she and Defendant had met with a known drug trafficker. On this record, the district court did not clearly err in finding the events surrounding the May arrest and seizure of evidence were relevant conduct under the Guidelines because they were part of Defendant’s course of conduct—his ongoing drug trafficking activities—during these three months. View "United States v. Remberto Rivera" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of four charges related to sex trafficking. Defendant raised several challenges to his convictions. Defendant first argues that the government violated his due process right to the disclosure of exculpatory or impeachment material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), by failing to disclose one of the victim’s (J.R.) juvenile court records.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to establish a violation of the Brady/Giglio rule, Defendant must demonstrate that the government suppressed evidence that was favorable to him and material to the outcome of the trial. See United States v. Garrett, 898 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 2018). There was no violation here because Defendant learned of the records during the trial and had an opportunity to use them in cross-examining the witness. United States v. Almendares, 397 F.3d 653, 664 (8th Cir. 2005). The court explained that  If Defendant needed more time to make use of the information, then he could have moved to continue the trial or sought other relief, but he did not do so. Moreover, the court explained that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order a new trial. The allegation that the federal agent communicated with J.R. about impeachment material was speculative and controverted by the agent. In any event, whether J.R. lived with her foster parents for one week or two months was immaterial to the charged offenses. View "United States v. Jesse Cody" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. The district court determined that Defendant had three prior convictions for a “violent felony” and sentenced him to the statutory minimum sentence of 180 months imprisonment. Defendant asserted error during the trial and at sentencing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court did not err, however, in concluding that Defendant’s witness’s statements lacked the “sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness” required by the rule. The court wrote that the statements were not supported by corroborating circumstances indicating their trustworthiness, and there were sound reasons to doubt his credibility. Accordingly, the court held that the court properly declined to admit the evidence under Rule 807. Further, the court explained that the district court properly determined that the disputed gang evidence was intrinsic to the crime charged and thus not governed by Rule 404(b).   Moreover, the court wrote that the district court also properly declined to exclude the gang evidence under Rule 403 after concluding that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. Evidence of Defendant’s gang membership was relevant to a disputed issue; its primary effect was not to prejudice Defendant unfairly by showing association with unsavory characters. Additionally, Defendant argued that the assault was an “act of juvenile delinquency” under Section 924(e) because he committed the offense as a juvenile. The record shows, however, that Defendant was convicted of third-degree assault in Minnesota state court as an adult. View "United States v. Darnell Dunn" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, Defendant learned that the detective who testified at his suppression hearing had been indicted for crimes related to an on-duty shooting. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea based on this discovery. Defendant argued that the Government’s failure to disclose the information about the detective at the suppression stage rendered his plea involuntary and, separately, constituted a fair and just reason for withdrawal.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Supreme Court precedent forecloses Defendant’s involuntariness argument. Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Defendant lacked a fair and just reason for withdrawal. Further, the court explained that the information Defendant discovered about the detective would have, as the district court suggested, only marginally improved Defendant’s chances of winning his suppression motion. The material was only indirectly related to his case, amounting to weak propensity evidence that the detective, as in prior situations, violated Defendant’s  rights here. View "United States v. Juan Colbert" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals arise from a multi-defendant criminal case involving the Lowriders street gang in Davenport, Iowa. All five Appellants pleaded guilty to a charge of racketeering conspiracy and other charges related to their activities with the Lowriders. The district court sentenced them to various terms of imprisonment. The appeals concern only the sentences imposed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgments for four appellants and vacated the sentence of one appellant and remanded his case for resentencing. Regarding the vacated sentence, the court explained that the evidence is insufficient to support the district court’s finding that Appellant aided and abetted attempted first-degree murder. The court explained that he was a backseat passenger in the vehicle from which shots were fired. The government contends that Appellant aided and abetted attempted first-degree murder because he “got in a car with a gun and went looking for Latin Kings.” But a defendant’s presence at the scene of a crime or association with persons engaged in illegal activity is not sufficient to establish that he aided and abetted the crime. Rather, the defendant must affirmatively act in a manner “which at least encourages the perpetrator.” There is insufficient evidence here that Appellant’s act of riding in the back seat of a vehicle to the scene of the crime facilitated the offense. View "United States v. Austin Nichols" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged his conviction for receiving child pornography. Defendant asserts that the district court’s decision to stop him from asking about the employee’s prior sex-offense conviction deprived him of his right to present a complete defense.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments “guarantee criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” The court wrote that the district court, for its part, tried to strike a balance too. It recognized that Duggar should have an opportunity “to create reasonable doubt” by “calling” the former employee to testify and asking whether he was “present on the car lot” when the downloads occurred. But he could not impeach him with a prior sex crime or introduce “speculative” testimony. Here, the district court had “unquestionably constitutional” discretion to exclude the conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.   Further, Defendant wanted his incriminating statements during the search at the car dealership suppressed on the ground that the agents violated his right to counsel, which he tried to invoke by mentioning a lawyer and then attempting to call one. The court explained that viewed through Griffin’s lens, we conclude that a reasonable person in Defendant's position would not have thought “his freedom of movement” was “restricted.” View "United States v. Joshua Duggar" on Justia Law

Defendant is one of four former Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) officers involved in the death of George Floyd. Defendant was convicted of two counts of deprivation of rights under color of law resulting in bodily injury and death. He appealed the district court’s denial of his motions for acquittal and a mistrial. On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him and that prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of his right to a fair trial.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant specifically argued that no reasonable jury could have found that he had the requisite mens rea to commit the crimes. The court wrote that to prove Defendant acted willfully, the Government produced evidence that Defendant knew from his training that (1) Chauvin’s use of force on Floyd was unreasonable and (2) he had a duty to intervene in another officer’s use of unreasonable force. The court concluded that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, there was sufficient evidence that Defendant acted willfully on this charge.   In regards to Defendant’s second charge: his deliberate indifference to Floyd’s serious medical needs, the court held that it agreed with the district court that the evidence on this count is “not overwhelming,” but nonetheless, a reasonable jury could find that Defendant acted willfully. Ultimately, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Defendant acted willfully on both Section 242 counts and that any prosecutorial conduct did not deprive Defendant of his right to a fair trial. View "United States v. Tou Thao" on Justia Law