Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant shot a man in the chest and led police on a high-speed chase through a residential neighborhood before his eventual capture. When arrested, he possessed a pistol, ammunition, and bags containing methamphetamine and fentanyl. One of the bags appeared to have been opened using teeth, and officers observed Walker becoming lethargic and losing consciousness. Officers administered two doses of Naloxone to revive him before transporting him to a hospital. Defendant eventually pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a previously convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g). The district court determined Defendant was an armed career criminal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e), and also determined his extensive and violent criminal history merited an above-Guidelines-range sentence. The district court ultimately varied from a guideline range of 188–235 months and imposed a sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the sentence imposed in this case and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that the district court’s failure to specifically address the standard conditions of supervised release and the third special condition, which relates to the two special conditions that were orally pronounced, was a matter of mere oversight. As such, the court vacated that portion of the judgment and commitment order imposing the standard conditions of supervised release and the third special condition and remand to the district court for a resentencing, limited to the standard conditions and third special condition. View "United States v. Bradley Walker" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, facilitating prostitution, and distributing methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA”) to a person under twenty-one. Most relevant for this appeal, the government relied on evidence related to the trafficking of A.E., who, at the time, was a college student and under twenty-one. According to the indictment, Defendant trafficked A.E. between approximately February 2 and March 14, 2020. Defendant argued he is entitled to a new trial on two of the three counts because the district court made evidentiary errors and the government deprived him of a fair trial.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there was no plain error. While Defendant relies on United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1992), for the proposition that a prosecutor may not urge the jury to convict so as to protect community values or deter other criminal conduct, this is not what occurred here. Rather, the government referenced Defendant’s victims, tracking the evidence presented at trial. And although the government stated someone should end Defendant’s behavior by telling him “no” and “enough is enough,” the context was recounting the evidence presented at trial. Indeed, the government concluded by urging the jury to rely on the evidence. The district court did not plainly err by failing to sua sponte correct the government’s closing argument. View "United States v. Darrius Redd" on Justia Law

A jury found Sherman and Smith guilty of conspiracy to commit witness tampering resulting in death. The jury also found Smith guilty of witness tampering, resulting in death, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking crime.  The district court denied Defendants’ motions for judgment of acquittal on those counts and sentenced both men to life imprisonment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. First, the court considered whether the district court erred in denying Sherman’s repeated requests to be tried separately from Smith. The court explained that it was convinced that the district court’s repeated limiting instructions sufficiently cured whatever risk of prejudice existed. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to sever.   Further, the court explained that Sherman and Smith argue that the Government failed to establish a nexus between their conduct and an official proceeding. However, the court held that sufficient evidence demonstrates a nexus between the murder and the upcoming revocation hearing, as well as a potential future federal prosecution for distributing drugs.   Moreover, Smith claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and the related firearms charge. The court explained that because Smith’s challenge to his conviction on the firearms offense rests entirely on his argument that the evidence was not sufficient to prove a drug-distribution conspiracy, the court found the evidence sufficient to prove Smith’s guilt on the firearms offense as well. View "United States v. Samuel Sherman" on Justia Law

Defendant sexually abused C.M. and E.A.H. in his mother’s basement on separate occasions. L.M., the legal guardian of C.M. and E.A.H. and sister of Defendant’s mother, often brought the two children to the house for visits. At trial, the jury heard testimony from C.M., E.A.H., L.M., and a forensic examiner. The Government introduced evidence of Defendant’s prior conviction of abusive sexual contact of a person incapable of consent. Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied, and was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child and one count of witness tampering. The district court sentenced him to life in prison for each sexual abuse count and 20 years for witness tampering, running concurrently. On appeal, Defendant alleged insufficient evidence to support the verdict, improper joinder of charges, improper introduction of evidence of his prior conviction, and procedural and substantive sentencing errors.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant argued that because the sexual abuses of C.M. and E.A.H. involved different methods of penetration, victims of different ages, and different occurrences, the charges were improperly joined. However, the court explained that the victims do not have to be the same age. Further, the court wrote that joinder was proper because the offenses were of a similar character. “In applying the same or similar character standard, we have found joinder of offenses to be proper when the two counts refer to the same type of offenses occurring over a relatively short period of time, and the evidence as to each count overlaps.” View "United States v. Jerome Goodhouse, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted Hobbs Act robbery and three firearm charges, including possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). Defendant argued that there is insufficient evidence to support his attempted Hobbs Act robbery conviction and that his Section 924(c) conviction should be vacated in light of United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022). He also challenged his sentence’s substantive reasonableness.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed his attempted Hobbs Act robbery conviction but vacated his Section 924(c) conviction under Taylor. The court also vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that here Defendant repeatedly surveilled L.B.’s home. He donned a disguise and scripted his false entry. He had a rifle and planned to neutralize, if necessary, those he found inside. But he preferred to wield a handgun and told his fake accomplice he wouldn’t rob the house without one. Just before the trade, he was arrested. All told, the district court did not clearly err by finding the circumstances showed Defendant was about to complete all the acts he believed necessary to complete the Hobbs Act robbery but for the police’s intervention. The court explained that after Defendant’s trial, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Taylor and held that “attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy the elements clause” of Section 924(c). This means that Defendant’s attempted Hobbs Act robbery conviction no longer qualifies as a predicate crime of violence for his Section 924(c) conviction. Thus the court vacated his Section 924(c) conviction in accordance with Taylor. View "United States v. Rufus Dennis" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity. The charge arose from Defendant’s response to an online advertisement and his dialogue with an undercover detective who posed as a fourteen-year-old girl. At trial, the district court declined Defendant’s request to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment, and Defendant appealed that decision.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the requested instruction. The court explained that the evidence here shows that the government presented Defendant with an opportunity to entice an arguably sexually precocious minor whose appearance was arguably more mature than average. Defendant responded to an advertisement, and broached the topic of unlawful sexual activity with a fourteen-year-old girl. The detective posing as a minor carried on a lengthy dialogue with Defendant, but did not employ the tactics most likely to warrant an entrapment instruction: pressure, assurances that a person is not doing anything wrong, persuasion, fraudulent representations, threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises of reward, or pleas based on need, sympathy, or friendship. Without more, there was not sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the government impermissibly induced Defendant to commit the offense. View "United States v. Darren Lasley" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Africa who became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2012, pleaded guilty to aggravated identity theft predicated on wire fraud. In the plea agreement, Petitioner admitted that she “aided and abetted” her mother in the mother’s scheme of “defrauding” the State of California of $475,350.28.The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") charged Petitioner as removable, characterizing her conviction as a conviction for an offense involving “fraud or deceit” with a loss to the victim exceeding $10,000, thus qualifying as an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). In so holding, the BIA determined that the elements of the identity theft offense included a reference in the alternative to several qualifying felony offenses, and required as an element that the identity theft be committed “during and in relation to” one of the other qualifying felonies.Petitioner appealed, arguing her conviction did not qualify under the categorical approach as an offense involving fraud or deceit. She also sought relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). An immigration judge rejected Petitioner's arguments, as did the BIA. Petitioner appealed.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the BIA appeals did not err in concluding that Petitioner's conviction was a qualifying aggravated felony based on her express admission that she had aided and abetted a scheme to defraud a victim of more than $475,000. Further, the Eighth Circuit found that the BIA did not apply the wrong legal standard in finding Petitioner ineligible for withholding of removal and did not err in denying CAT relief. View "Chantelle Robbertse v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of first-degree murder and use of a firearm during a crime of violence that caused death. The district court sentenced Defendant to serve two concurrent life terms of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, asserting the district court committed four errors during trial: (1) when it allowed the government to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) of Defendant’s jealous behavior toward two other men; (2) when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal, finding the government had presented sufficient evidence of premeditation; (3) when it sua sponte failed to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense; and (4) when it denied Defendant’s request to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that evidence of the manner of killing also gives rise to a reasonable inference of premeditation. Although Defendant provided three different versions of what happened, in one accounting before the jury, Defendant told law enforcement that he aimed and fired at the victim, who was indisputably shot in the back of the head at a distance of at least three feet away. Further, Defendant retrieved that gun from his bedroom closet and shot the victim in the head as she tried to escape. Defendant’s actions after the shooting also point towards premeditation. Because there is ample evidence that supports the jury’s finding that the killing was premeditated, Defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim fails. View "United States v. Casey Crow Ghost" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to 30 months of imprisonment after McKenzie pled guilty to failure to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). Defendant appealed, arguing the district court incorrectly applied U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(b) by failing to account for the time he had served in Florida for a related state offense.Agreeing with Defendant, the Eighth Circuit reversed Defendant's sentence, finding that the district court did not reduce the sentence after finding the time served in Florida was for relevant conduct. Thus, the Eighth Circuit vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded for clarification. View "United States v. Alfonso McKenzie" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. He argued the district court should have suppressed the gun and shell casing found in his apartment. He challenged the steps the officers took from the moment they entered his apartment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a suspect who has just illegally used a gun is on a different Fourth Amendment footing than someone who merely possesses one. Moreover, the court wrote that first, when the officers asked Defendant whether they could “look” around “to make sure there’s nobody else in the apartment,” he replied, “[y]es ma’am. You can do whatever you want.” Based on that reply, he consented to at least a protective sweep of the apartment. Second, after Defendant blurted out that there had been suspicious activity outside, it was reasonable for the officers to believe that Defendant had provided consent to look there. Third, consent extended to the retrieval of the gun itself after Defendant confessed to “firing the shot” and admitted that the gun was in a kitchen cabinet. View "United States v. Cornell Williams" on Justia Law