Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) and (b)(1), after law enforcement discovered 28 grams of methamphetamine following an inventory search of a vehicle Defendant had been driving. Defendant moved to suppress the methamphetamine. After the district court denied Defendant’s motion, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when officers conduct an inventory search according to standardized police procedures, the reasonableness requirement is generally met. This is true even when officers are afforded discretion to release a vehicle to a registered, insured driver instead of towing it, provided this discretion “is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” The court wrote that even if it assumes that the officer had an investigatory motive, it still holds that the inventory search was reasonable. Finally, the court explained that SCSD’s inventory-search policy requires officers to open all containers within the vehicle, whether open or closed, to inventory them for valuable items. The officer followed this policy in opening the binoculars case to determine whether there were any items of value inside. Such a policy is “unquestionably permissible.” View "United States v. Scott Nielsen" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. His conditional plea preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the ammunition recovered from his person and the firearms recovered from his vehicle. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress these preserved issues. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the high-risk felony stop protocol transformed an investigative stop pursuant to reasonable suspicion, or Terry stop, into a de facto arrest without probable cause; (2) the search of his person “exceeded the permissible scope and intensity” of a valid Terry stop; and (3) the search of the vehicle exceeded the scope of the protective sweep doctrine.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. In evaluating the relevant factors, the court explained that it was reasonable to believe that the persons they identified and approached might be armed and had recently unlawfully discharged a firearm. Thus, both factors justified a greater show of force in performing the Terry stop. Here, the officers had at least a reasonable suspicion that at least one of the suspects was armed or that a firearm was in the vehicle. The officers’ actions warranted placing Defendant in a separate secure location. Therefore, applying the court’s precedent to the instant facts, the court concluded that the officers’ methods were permissible and did not transform the Terry stop into an arrest. View "United States v. Victor Childers" on Justia Law

Defendant shot and killed her husband when she found him cheating. She pled guilty to second-degree murder in Indian country. A year later, Defendant moved to vacate her Section 924(c) conviction, believing that intervening Supreme Court cases rendered it unlawful. Specifically, she argued that federal second-degree murder could not be considered a “crime of violence” under Section 924(c)(3)(A). The district court dismissed her motion. She appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that murder is the ultimate violent crime—irreversible and incomparable “in terms of moral depravity.” Malice aforethought, murder’s defining characteristic, encapsulates the crime’s violent nature. The court wrote that here, Defendant unlawfully killed her husband with malice aforethought. That was murder—a crime of violence. Accordingly, the court held that Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction need not be vacated. View "Tiffany Janis v. United States of America" on Justia Law

Defendant was found with 890 fentanyl pills after Arkansas state troopers pulled him over. He admitted that the pills were his, that he had traveled to Arkansas from Texas to sell them, and that he had successfully done so before. He later pleaded guilty to possessing a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. On appeal, Defendant contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the court impermissibly varied upward based on a policy disagreement with the guidelines’ treatment of fentanyl.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a district court may vary from the guidelines based on its own policy disagreements with those guidelines. A variance need not be based on the court’s “individualized determination that [the guidelines] yield an excessive sentence in a particular case.” Moreover, the court tied its general policy disagreement to the specific aggravating circumstances of Defendant’s case: the quantity of fentanyl involved, the concealment of the pills as oxycodone, and the past drug sales for which Cortez was not charged. The court carefully weighed these against the mitigating factors and ultimately concluded that they warranted an above-guidelines sentence. The court found no abuse of discretion in that determination. View "United States v. Cesar Cortez" on Justia Law

A jury in a Missouri state court found Petitioner guilty of statutory sodomy in the first degree, which a person commits if he "has deviate sexual intercourse with another person who is less than fourteen years old." Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, rejecting the argument that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was less than fourteen years old. When Petitioner turned to the federal courts for relief, a magistrate judge1 denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the Missouri Court of Appeals' decision was not objectively unreasonable, though it did grant Petitioner a certificate of appealability. He now challenges the magistrate judge's determination.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it agreed with the magistrate judge that the Missouri Court of Appeals' decision was not objectively unreasonable. Though a reasonable juror might harbor some possible doubt that the victim was fourteen or older, the court wrote it is dubious that every rational juror would be compelled to harbor a reasonable doubt or would necessarily not "reach a subjective state of near certitude" that Petitioner was guilty. But a more critical point is that, under AEDPA, the court does not think that the state court's decision was objectively unreasonable or "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement." View "Dale Bookwalter v. David Vandergriff" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury on multiple counts of possessing methamphetamine and firearms. Juneau appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motions to suppress evidence seized during searches of two residences in Columbia Heights and Coon Rapids, Minnesota.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the firearms were found in the garage near Defendant’s motorcycle, and, as the warrant explained, Defendant’s truck had been observed at the Coon Rapids residence. Thus, the officers had probable cause to believe the firearms belonged to Defendant. Because the firearms fit comfortably within the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. John Juneau" on Justia Law

On April 18, 2018, a jury convicted Defendant of three counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 1153 and 2241(c). The court imposed concurrent terms of imprisonment of 30 years on each count. Defendant appealed, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court on two issues and remanded for in-camera review on a single issue—that is, whether the refusal to allow defense counsel access to the victim’s mental health records was harmless in light of the victim’s testimony at trial that she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) after the alleged sexual assault by Defendant. The district court reviewed the records and concluded that not ordering the disclosure of the victim’s mental health records was harmless, finding she received a PTSD diagnosis for the first time after Defendant sexually assaulted her, and her trial testimony was truthful.   The Eighth Circuit, upon de novo review of the claimed constitutional violation, reversed, vacated the convictions, and remanded for a new trial. The court concluded that the district court’s refusal to require the production of K.P.’s mental health records and its limitations on cross-examination after the government opened the door about K.P.’s mental health diagnoses was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "United States v. Ira Alan Arias" on Justia Law

The United States indicted Defendant for illegal exportation of firearm parts from the United States to Mexico. Mexican authorities apprehended Defendant while he was living in Mexico. In conjunction with his arrest, Mexican authorities searched both his vehicle and his Mexican residence. They returned Defendant to the United States border, allowing him to cross the border into the United States, where he was arrested by United States authorities. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the searches. He also filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on an alleged violation of his due process rights premised on his treatment by Mexican authorities. The district court denied both motions. The district court imposed an upward variance and sentenced him to 144 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed the denial of his suppression and dismissal motions, as well as the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the record reflects Defendant made his Miranda waiver “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Further, Defendant’s that the district court clearly erred in concluding he self-surrendered is merely an additional attempt to show a joint venture. In this case, the district court explained that it was going above the Guidelines range in order to serve as a deterrent to people going to Mexico to assist cartels. The resulting sentence, while significantly above the Guidelines range, was well below the statutory maximum of 240 months and based on applicable Section 3553(a) factors. Defendant has not shown the sentence imposed was an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Andrew Pierson" on Justia Law

Defendant received a 63-month sentence for possessing a firearm as a felon. The question for us is whether a prior conviction for “intentionally” causing “bodily injury,” Iowa Code Section 708.4(2), qualifies as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.2(a).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that committing willful injury in Iowa requires an unjustified “act” that is “intended to cause serious injury.” The fact that the statute requires an intent to cause harm to another person necessarily means that anyone who violates it has used “physical force against the person of another.” View "United States v. Christopher Cungtion, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant faced 13 federal charges. Included among them are three counts of arson: “maliciously damaging or destroying]” by “fire or an explosive,” a “vehicle . . . owned or possessed by . . . an institution or organization receiving” federal funding. The arson charges are also the driving force behind three counts of possessing a “destructive device” in connection with a “crime of violence.” Under the government’s theory, the Molotov cocktails were destructive devices, and the three counts of arson were crimes of violence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing three destructive device counts against Defendant. The court held that arson is not a “crime of violence.” The court explained that the differences between recklessness, malice, and knowledge come down to a sliding scale of probabilities. From “substantial and unjustified” (recklessness), to a “likelihood” (malice), to “practical certainty” (knowledge), each requires more risk and culpability than the last. In many cases, there may be “little difference” between these mental states. But little does not mean none. The court explained that consciously creating a “likelihood” of harm to property does not satisfy the force clause, despite the high risk involved. In short, the arson counts cannot support the charges for using a “destructive device” in connection with a “crime of violence.” View "United States v. Mujera Lung'aho" on Justia Law