Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of robbery affecting interstate commerce, conspiracy to commit robbery affecting interstate commerce, and using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence resulting in murder. Basically, the Government’s theory was that a drug dealer was robbed and killed, and his body was tossed into a burn pit behind Defendant’s house. The district court denied Defendant’s motions for acquittal and a new trial.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that sufficient evidence supported the findings that the robbery involved methamphetamine and drug proceeds. The evidence at trial showed that the victim was a drug dealer who sold methamphetamine and had no source of legitimate income. The court explained that while Defendant highlights some facts, he suggests pointing the opposite way; the court wrote it was not convinced. The district court didn’t err in denying acquittal. Further, Defendant’s concerns speak to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. The evidence was admissible because it advanced the Government’s theory of the case—that the victim was killed during a robbery, and his body was destroyed in a backyard burn pit. It also wasn’t unfairly prejudicial, considering the evidence suggesting that the victim was murdered. View "United States v. Matthew Robbins" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court ultimately sentenced Defendant to 87 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court’s calculation of the advisory sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines”). Specifically, Defendant argued the district court erroneously decided Defendant’s past conviction for aggravated vehicular hijacking in violation of 720 Illinois Compiled Statutes Section 5/18-4(a)(3) was a crime of violence. Thus it should not enhance his offense level under Section 2K2.1 of the Guidelines.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the issue is whether, under the pre-2012 version of the Illinois statute, Defendant could have been convicted for reckless vehicular hijacking. The court concluded that the answer was no. The court wrote that there is neither a precedential case nor a realistic situation in which vehicular hijacking would not be considered a crime of violence as it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Therefore, the court held Defendant’s vehicular hijacking conviction constitutes a crime of violence under the force clause. View "United States v. Ricky Pulley" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a prohibited person. He argued that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his home.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that there was no error in admitting the evidence. The court explained that officers may seize an effect without a warrant under the “plain view doctrine” if they are lawfully present in a place to view the object, the incriminating character of the object is immediately apparent, and the officers have a lawful right of access to the object. Here, once the officers were lawfully present in Defendant’s house based on his stepfather’s apparent authority to consent, the officers permissibly seized the Molotov cocktails as objects in plain view in the bathroom and kitchen.   Defendant suggests that even if the police officers were lawfully present in his home and the incriminating character of the explosive devices was immediately apparent, the officers were required to obtain a warrant before making a seizure. But “where the elements of the plain view doctrine are met, the fact that the officers could have left and obtained a warrant does not invalidate the justification for seizing the property.” Accordingly, the district court did not err when it concluded that the officers lawfully seized the items from Defendant’s bathroom and kitchen. View "United States v. Melchizedek Hayes" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) and (b)(1), after law enforcement found more than 1,500 grams of methamphetamine concealed in a vest on his person. He filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his detention and frisk were not supported by reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion. Defendant entered a conditional plea, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. On appeal, Defendant conceded that his first two encounters with the Drug Enforcement Administration Task Force Officer (TFO) were consensual and that his third encounter involving both TFOs began consensually. He argued only that his detention and subsequent frisk during this third encounter were neither consensual nor supported by reasonable suspicion, and, thus, the evidence obtained thereafter must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that initially, it is questionable whether the TFOs would have even been justified in conducting a pat down, as the facts do not lend much credence to the claim that Jimenez may have been “armed and presently dangerous.” The court explained that even if it were to assume that the TFOs would have been justified in conducting a pat down of Defendant based on his efforts to keep his blanket on his person and his potential involvement in drug trafficking, the TFOs far exceeded the scope of these permissible bounds when they immediately leaped to the substantially more intrusive action of forcibly removing his blanket. View "United States v. Sergio Jimenez" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for conspiracy to commit wire fraud; wire fraud and aiding and abetting wire fraud and money laundering; and money laundering and aiding and abetting money laundering.  On appeal, Defendants claimed the district court erred when it admitted a redacted plea agreement that Ridings signed but which did not ultimately result in a guilty plea. By the terms of the plea agreement, one Defendant waived his rights under Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. That Defendant also appealed his sentence, asserting that the district court imposed a sentence above the Sentencing Guidelines range based on his religious beliefs in violation of the First Amendment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there was an overwhelming quantum of evidence received at trial that was consistent with Defendant’s statement, rendering admission of the factual statement, even if it was error, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, the court explained that here, the district court specifically stated that its sentence was not based on Defendant’s faith, but rather, the district court considered that Defendant used faith to manipulate people who were susceptible to such manipulation and lull people into a false sense of security. The court explained that it has upheld sentences where the district court took into account a defendant’s abuse of a religious connection. Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering Defendant’s abuse of others’ faith, nor is the sentence it imposed substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Phillip Ridings" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. On appeal, Defendant argued judgment of acquittal or a new trial and in calculating the drug quantity for purposes of sentencing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the magistrate judge, after hearing testimony from the officer, concluded that his conduct in drafting the affidavit amounted to negligence. But to prevail here, Defendant “must show more than negligence or an innocent mistake.” And the court agreed with the district court that the officer did not act recklessly in his efforts to obtain a search warrant, despite the time pressure. The record does not indicate that the officer entertained serious doubts about or had obvious reasons to question the accuracy of his statements. Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to suppression under Franks. Further, the court held that the information included in the warrant affidavit, the officers’ good-faith reliance on the search warrant for Defendant’s home, was objectively reasonable. Moreover, the court wrote that there was no abuse of discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial because there was no reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the Gentry evidence been produced. Finally, the court saw no clear error in the district court’s drug quantity calculation. View "United States v. Melroy Johnson, Sr." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for committing mail and wire fraud against his spouse and National Life Insurance. He moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to state an offense, which the district court1 denied. Welker appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the indictment included allegations about Defendant’s intentional concealment of material information from and misrepresentations to R.W., supporting that he had the “intent to defraud” her. And it alleged that he used the mail and wire in furtherance of his scheme. These allegations were sufficient to apprise Defendant of the nature of the accusations against him and to enable the district court to determine that the facts stated were adequate in law to support a conviction. Further, the court wrote that Defendant provided no support for the proposition that an indictment must sufficiently allege a violation of state law to sufficiently state a federal mail or wire fraud offense. Ultimately, the court held that the indictment charging Defendant is not “so defective” that it fails to charge him for mail and wire fraud under federal law. View "United States v. Michael Welker" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon. At sentencing, the district court determined a base offense level of 24 after concluding that Defendant had sustained two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence. The court sentenced Defendant to 96 months imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court committed procedural error when it calculated his base offense level and failed to follow the procedures of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3).
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence but remanded for correction of the court’s statement of reasons. The court explained that the district court was not required to resolve every disputed issue and to amend the presentence report accordingly. But Rule 32 does impose a duty either to resolve disputes or to determine that a ruling is unnecessary and then to append a copy of the court’s determinations to the report. Defendant requested, and the government does not resist, a remand for the district court to amend its statement of reasons to reflect that it did not resolve Defendant’s objection to the presentence report regarding gang affiliation. Accordingly, the court agreed that the remedy is warranted. View "United States v. Christopher Conrad" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by law enforcement while speeding in a construction zone. The driver admitted there was marijuana in the car. During the search, the driver tossed a bag to Defendant. The bag contained methamphetamine. Ultimately, the trooper seized both cell phones from the driver and Defendant.Although the phone found in the center console was a “burner” phone without any identifying subscriber information on it, it contained evidence tying Defendant to the phone, including: (1) messages identifying the sender as Defendant; (2) a photograph of Defendant's bank card; and (3) text messages between a sender using the phone and Defendant's sister. At trial, prosecutors planned to call the trooper to authenticate the phone. The district court allowed the trooper's testimony over objection.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that direct evidence that the phone belonged to Defendant is not required and circumstantial evidence may be relied on to support authenticity. View "United States v. Jerry Wise" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued police officers under Sec. 1983 after the officers made warrantless entry into their apartment. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs and Defendants appealed.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed. While warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, there is an exception when officers act with probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and an objectively reasonable basis to believe that exigent circumstances exist.Here, the officers were dispatched to the scene in response to a report of domestic violence. The report received by the officers explained that the 911 call came from a neighbor who thought “abuse” was occurring and heard a “verbal argument,” “someone being thrown around,” and “yelling and screaming” in the upstairs apartment. The neighbor stated that a woman, her boyfriend, and a child lived in the apartment. This created anm exigency, justifying warrantless entry. View "Benedda Cotten v. Ryan Miller" on Justia Law