Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit evaluated a decision by the Western District Court of Missouri, which had denied Robin M. Sims's motion for compassionate release from prison under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). In 2015, Sims was convicted of drug trafficking and firearm offenses and was sentenced to 360 months in prison. In 2022, he filed a motion for compassionate release, citing changes to the Armed Career Criminal Act since his sentencing and his medical conditions as extraordinary and compelling reasons for a reduction in sentence. The district court denied the motion, stating that Sims's arguments did not constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction.The Court of Appeals found that the district court had misunderstood Sims's arguments and the government's position. Instead of arguing for compassionate release due to an increased risk of contracting COVID-19, Sims had argued that he had contracted COVID-19 in custody, was experiencing ongoing medical complications, and was receiving inadequate medical care. The government had conceded that Sims had established "extraordinary and compelling" reasons under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), but the district court mistakenly stated that the government had opposed Sims's motion on the basis that he had failed to do so.The Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the district court, instructing it to consider the full scope of Sims's argument in support of "extraordinary and compelling" reasons, and if such reasons were found, to consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in light of these reasons. The court emphasized the need for an individualized inquiry in motions for compassionate release. View "United States v. Sims" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence of Christopher M. Holmes who was resentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment under the First Step Act for his involvement in a narcotics-distribution ring. Holmes appealed his sentence, alleging that the district court committed procedural error and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. Holmes claimed that the district court erred in attributing to him a drug quantity of 50-150 kilograms of cocaine rather than five or more kilograms as established by the jury’s verdict, and assigning three criminal-history points for an unconstitutional Illinois weapons conviction. The court of appeals held that even if there was an error in the district court's calculation of the Guidelines range, it was harmless because the district court stated that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of how it ruled on the objections. Holmes also argued that the district court failed to adequately explain its sentence and consider his arguments for a downward variance. The court of appeals found that the district court did not err in explaining the sentence and considered the relevant factors in sentencing. Lastly, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the relevant factors and thus, the sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Holmes" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas's decision to sentence Jordan Cutler to 180 months in prison for distributing child pornography, a sentence that exceeded the Guidelines range of 108 to 135 months. Cutler appealed, arguing that the district court made a procedural error in calculating the Guidelines range and asserting that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. Cutler claimed that the district court erred in assessing one criminal history point under the Sentencing Guidelines for a set of uncounseled misdemeanors from 2010.The appellate court rejected this argument, explaining that Cutler's uncounseled misdemeanors were not voided by his lack of counsel, as the fines associated with these misdemeanors were constitutionally valid and could be used to enhance his punishment. The court clarified that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for misdemeanor defendants only applies where the defendant receives a prison sentence, not when the defendant is merely fined.In terms of the substantive reasonableness of Cutler's sentence, the appellate court again affirmed the district court's decision. The court explained that although the Guidelines captured certain aspects of Cutler's offense, they did not reflect the "heinous" nature of his crimes, including threats to kidnap, rape, torture, and kill young girls. Cutler also argued that the district court improperly considered its reputation and public perception when determining his sentence. However, the appellate court disagreed, noting that the district court was considering the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense.Therefore, the appellate court found no procedural or substantive error in Cutler's sentencing and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Cutler" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower court decision that the defendant, Felipe Lorthridge, could be involuntarily medicated to restore his competency to stand trial. Lorthridge was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, a crime carrying a maximum sentence of ten years. After being diagnosed with schizophrenia and found incompetent to stand trial, the government moved to medicate him involuntarily to restore his competency, as allowed under Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). The court found that bringing an individual accused of a serious crime to trial is an important governmental interest and that the involuntary medication of Lorthridge would significantly further that interest. The court also found that the medication was necessary to further that interest and was medically appropriate. Lorthridge appealed the decision, challenging the lower court's conclusions on the first, second, and fourth elements of the Sell test. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no clear error in its judgement. View "United States v. Lorthridge" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit heard an appeal from a defendant who was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon and sentenced to 57 months in prison, with an order of restitution. The defendant, White Shield, had assaulted another woman with a metal bar in a fit of jealousy when she discovered the woman in the truck with her husband.She appealed the conviction on two grounds. First, she argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a mistrial after a witness mentioned three times that she was on probation. The court of appeals disagreed, stating that the trial court had broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for mistrial, and in this case, the reference to the defendant's probation status had minimal, if any, prejudicial effect. The court also noted that the trial court's instruction to the jury to disregard the reference to probation mitigated any potential prejudice.Second, White Shield contested the restitution amount, as there was a discrepancy between the oral sentence and the written judgment. The court agreed with this contention, clarifying that when there is a conflict between an oral sentence and written judgment, the oral sentence prevails.The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and the denial of the motion for mistrial but remanded the case back to the district court to amend the written judgment to align with the oral sentence regarding the restitution amount. View "United States v. Juanita White Shield" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. The district court determined an advisory sentencing guideline range of 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment and varied upward from the range to impose a term of 92 months’ imprisonment. Defendant argued on appeal that the district court plainly erred in calculating an advisory guideline range because his prior conviction for kidnapping in Arizona was not a conviction for a “crime of violence.”The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant contends that Marquez-Lobos is obviously wrong and that the Arizona kidnapping plainly does not qualify as a generic kidnapping. His theory is that the Arizona statute encompasses kidnappings that do not involve an unlawful deprivation of liberty as defined by most States. But he contends that kidnapping in Arizona is broader than the generic offense because the Arizona statute assertedly applies to the restraint of any person who is incapable of giving consent—even if the person is neither a minor nor incompetent. Defendant’s argument is premised on a decision of an intermediate state appellate court, State v. Bernal, 713 P.2d 811 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). The court explained that it is not convinced that Bernal establishes an obvious error by the district court. Further, the court wrote that Defendant has not produced evidence that most of the States would disagree with the alternative line of reasoning suggested in Bernal: he simply argues that the expanded set of victims identified in Bernal would exceed the set of victims identified in most state statutes and the Model Penal Code. View "United States v. Michael Goforth" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction for numerous drug offenses. The court held that the evidence against him was overwhelming, and he does not claim a reasonable probability that, but for the introduction of the challenged evidence, he would not have been found guilty.Defendant operated a website on which he once advertised 4- Fluoroamphetamine, a drug similar to the prescription medicine Adderall. Broussard received numerous orders for the Adderall analogue. But instead of shipping his customers the drug they ordered, he sent them fentanyl, a potent narcotic. As a result, eleven people died, and several others were seriously injured. Police investigated, and a grand jury indicted Defendant on numerous drug offenses. Broussard, representing himself, filed several motions in limine. One of his motions sought exclusion of all evidence “presented to invoke sentiment by expressing how the deaths or injuries of the alleged victims influenced personal experiences.” The jury found Defendant guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced Broussard to life in prison. He appealed, arguing that the district court erred in allowing the Government to introduce evidence about the victims’ lives.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the challenged evidence was arguably relevant to show that the victims were unlikely to have knowingly sought fentanyl or to have obtained it from some other source. It was also relevant to show that the victims were in good health, making it less likely that they died from some cause other than a fentanyl overdose. And taking into account the evidence’s arguable relevance, its introduction was not obviously unfairly prejudicial. Further, the court wrote that the evidence against him was overwhelming, and he does not claim a reasonable probability that, but for the introduction of the challenged evidence, he would not have been found guilty. View "United States v. Aaron Broussard" on Justia Law

Defendant le 120c(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), codified at 10 U.S.C. Section 920c(b) (2012). He later failed to register as a sex offender in Iowa and pleaded guilty to violating the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). On appeal, Defendant argued the “categorical approach” applies to his SORNA tier analysis.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that it held pursuant to the categorical approach, that his prior statute of conviction is “overbroad” in relation to SORNA’s Tier III listed comparator offenses. The court held for the first time, in line with a consensus of authority from other circuits, that the categorical approach applies to SORNA’s tier analysis. Further, the court agreed with Defendant that the application of the categorical approach resulted in his classification as a Tier I offender. The court explained that turning to the application of the categorical approach, the present case leaves no room for the United States’ suggested and generalized broadening of the analysis based on SORNA’s use of the term “comparable.”   Here, the offense of conviction is unambiguously broader in scope than the SORNA comparators. The offense of “forcible pandering” employs the defined term “prostitution,” which may be found based on “sexual contact.” “Sexual contact” includes over-the-clothes touching. Such contact falls outside the scope of SORNA’s Tier III comparator offenses as found in 18 U.S.C. Sections 2241 and 2242, both of which require a “sexual act” as defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 2246 and which does not include over-the-clothes touching. View "United States v. Michael Coulson" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). The district court sentenced Defendant to a 132-month term of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant argued that because he was arrested without probable cause when officers placed him in handcuffs during an investigative stop, the evidence seized from his backpack must be suppressed as the fruit of his unlawful arrest.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here the officers had a legitimate concern that Defendant might try to run from the scene. When Detective Love asked for permission to search his suitcase, Defendant was calm and cooperative, giving the impression that it was “not a big deal.” However, as an additional officer started asking him questions, he showed physical signs of nervousness. Defendant already knew that the K-9 had alerted to his suitcase. Then, as Love was searching the suitcase, Defendant asked to go brush his teeth, which would have allowed him to leave the scene with his backpack, out of the officers’ sight. Given the change in Defendant’s demeanor over a short period of time, the perceived attempt to discard contraband outside the presence of the officers, and the other factors that aligned at least in part with drug-trafficking behavior, the officers had a legitimate concern that Defendant might try to flee. View "United States v. Daniel Bonilla" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found during a police search of a vehicle after concluding Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the reportedly stolen vehicle. Defendant appealed, arguing the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed under the alternative rationale that the search was reasonable under the automobile exception. The court explained that a reasonable officer would believe there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found in the vehicle at the time of the search. The court further wrote that because the vehicle was reported stolen, officers could search it for evidence of it being stolen. Additionally, the court noted that officers may consider the known criminal history of a suspect in conducting the probable cause analysis. Therefore, the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle and the district court was ultimately justified in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. The court wrote that It follows that it would not exclude the evidence obtained from the storage unit because the warrant to search the unit was based on probable cause from the evidence obtained during the valid search of the car. View "United States v. Bryce Vittetoe" on Justia Law