Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A jury in a Missouri state court found Petitioner guilty of statutory sodomy in the first degree, which a person commits if he "has deviate sexual intercourse with another person who is less than fourteen years old." Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, rejecting the argument that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was less than fourteen years old. When Petitioner turned to the federal courts for relief, a magistrate judge1 denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the Missouri Court of Appeals' decision was not objectively unreasonable, though it did grant Petitioner a certificate of appealability. He now challenges the magistrate judge's determination.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it agreed with the magistrate judge that the Missouri Court of Appeals' decision was not objectively unreasonable. Though a reasonable juror might harbor some possible doubt that the victim was fourteen or older, the court wrote it is dubious that every rational juror would be compelled to harbor a reasonable doubt or would necessarily not "reach a subjective state of near certitude" that Petitioner was guilty. But a more critical point is that, under AEDPA, the court does not think that the state court's decision was objectively unreasonable or "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement." View "Dale Bookwalter v. David Vandergriff" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury on multiple counts of possessing methamphetamine and firearms. Juneau appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motions to suppress evidence seized during searches of two residences in Columbia Heights and Coon Rapids, Minnesota.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the firearms were found in the garage near Defendant’s motorcycle, and, as the warrant explained, Defendant’s truck had been observed at the Coon Rapids residence. Thus, the officers had probable cause to believe the firearms belonged to Defendant. Because the firearms fit comfortably within the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. John Juneau" on Justia Law

On April 18, 2018, a jury convicted Defendant of three counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 1153 and 2241(c). The court imposed concurrent terms of imprisonment of 30 years on each count. Defendant appealed, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court on two issues and remanded for in-camera review on a single issue—that is, whether the refusal to allow defense counsel access to the victim’s mental health records was harmless in light of the victim’s testimony at trial that she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) after the alleged sexual assault by Defendant. The district court reviewed the records and concluded that not ordering the disclosure of the victim’s mental health records was harmless, finding she received a PTSD diagnosis for the first time after Defendant sexually assaulted her, and her trial testimony was truthful.   The Eighth Circuit, upon de novo review of the claimed constitutional violation, reversed, vacated the convictions, and remanded for a new trial. The court concluded that the district court’s refusal to require the production of K.P.’s mental health records and its limitations on cross-examination after the government opened the door about K.P.’s mental health diagnoses was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "United States v. Ira Alan Arias" on Justia Law

The United States indicted Defendant for illegal exportation of firearm parts from the United States to Mexico. Mexican authorities apprehended Defendant while he was living in Mexico. In conjunction with his arrest, Mexican authorities searched both his vehicle and his Mexican residence. They returned Defendant to the United States border, allowing him to cross the border into the United States, where he was arrested by United States authorities. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the searches. He also filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on an alleged violation of his due process rights premised on his treatment by Mexican authorities. The district court denied both motions. The district court imposed an upward variance and sentenced him to 144 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed the denial of his suppression and dismissal motions, as well as the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the record reflects Defendant made his Miranda waiver “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Further, Defendant’s that the district court clearly erred in concluding he self-surrendered is merely an additional attempt to show a joint venture. In this case, the district court explained that it was going above the Guidelines range in order to serve as a deterrent to people going to Mexico to assist cartels. The resulting sentence, while significantly above the Guidelines range, was well below the statutory maximum of 240 months and based on applicable Section 3553(a) factors. Defendant has not shown the sentence imposed was an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Andrew Pierson" on Justia Law

Defendant received a 63-month sentence for possessing a firearm as a felon. The question for us is whether a prior conviction for “intentionally” causing “bodily injury,” Iowa Code Section 708.4(2), qualifies as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.2(a).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that committing willful injury in Iowa requires an unjustified “act” that is “intended to cause serious injury.” The fact that the statute requires an intent to cause harm to another person necessarily means that anyone who violates it has used “physical force against the person of another.” View "United States v. Christopher Cungtion, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant faced 13 federal charges. Included among them are three counts of arson: “maliciously damaging or destroying]” by “fire or an explosive,” a “vehicle . . . owned or possessed by . . . an institution or organization receiving” federal funding. The arson charges are also the driving force behind three counts of possessing a “destructive device” in connection with a “crime of violence.” Under the government’s theory, the Molotov cocktails were destructive devices, and the three counts of arson were crimes of violence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing three destructive device counts against Defendant. The court held that arson is not a “crime of violence.” The court explained that the differences between recklessness, malice, and knowledge come down to a sliding scale of probabilities. From “substantial and unjustified” (recklessness), to a “likelihood” (malice), to “practical certainty” (knowledge), each requires more risk and culpability than the last. In many cases, there may be “little difference” between these mental states. But little does not mean none. The court explained that consciously creating a “likelihood” of harm to property does not satisfy the force clause, despite the high risk involved. In short, the arson counts cannot support the charges for using a “destructive device” in connection with a “crime of violence.” View "United States v. Mujera Lung'aho" on Justia Law

Petitioner shot and killed her husband when she found him cheating. She pled guilty to second-degree murder in Indian country. She also pled guilty to discharging a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence. A year later, Petitioner moved to vacate her Section 924(c) conviction, believing that intervening Supreme Court cases rendered it unlawful. Specifically, she argued that federal second-degree murder could not be considered a “crime of violence” under Section 924(c)(3)(A). The district court dismissed her motion. She appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that federal l murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an “unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.” The statute lists the killings that qualify as first-degree murder.3 “Any other murder is murder in the second degree.” Second-degree murder thus has two elements: (1) unlawful killing of a human being; with (2) malice aforethought. Petitioner argued that killing a person “with malice aforethought” can be done without “using force against the person or property of another.” The court reasoned that the history and definition of “malice aforethought” demonstrate that federal second-degree murder satisfies Section 924(c)’s force clause. The phrase “malice aforethought” necessarily denotes the oppositional conduct that the force clause requires. Second-degree murder is thus a crime of violence. View "Tiffany Janis v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to receipt of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1). The district court sentenced Defendant to 142 months of imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. As two of the conditions of supervised release, the district court prohibited Defendant from possessing or using a “computer,” as the term is defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 1030(e)(1), and from possessing or viewing visual depictions of sexually explicit conduct. On appeal, Defendant challenged both special conditions.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the special condition on computers and affirmed in all other respects. The court explained that the district court discussed how, in its experience, people who have Defendant’s addiction initially search for adult pornography, which eventually “leads back to” searching for child pornography. Defendant’s internet search history; and the connection between using the Internet and accessing pornography. In addition, the presentence report detailed how some videos tied to Defendant depicted adult pornography. Under these circumstances, we conclude the district court did not plainly err. However, the court concluded that the district court’s findings do not adequately tie the special condition on computers to statutory purposes. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion, and therefore the court vacated the special condition discussing computers. View "United States v. Joshua Powell" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of ammunition as a felon. The district court sentenced him to 296 months and one day of imprisonment.  Defendant argued that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury forbids the district court to determine whether he committed three prior felonies on different occasion   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that the district court sufficiently considered the statutory factors and made an individualized assessment based on the facts presented. In varying upward, the district court considered Defendant’s extensive criminal history and concluded that his criminal history category understated the likelihood of recidivism and the seriousness of his criminal history. Defendant’s criminal history scored 24 points under the guidelines, well above the 13 points required for placement in the highest criminal history category. Giving deference to the district court as required by Gall, the court concluded that the one-level variance and the overall sentence is not unreasonable in light of Section 3553(a). View "United States v. Deonte Ellison" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of distributing a controlled substance, resulting in the death of R.L. The district court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, (2) the district court erred in allowing the government to introduce evidence of Defendant’s prior drug arrests and convictions pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and (3) the district court’s use of Defendant’s prior drug possession conviction to enhance his sentence is unconstitutional because it punishes Defendant more harshly than a drug distributor.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and drawing all reasonable inference in its favor, it held that the evidence supports the jury’s finding that Defendant distributed the drugs to R.L. Further, the court concluded that the record includes sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found that fentanyl was the but-for cause of R.L.’s death. Finally, the court held that the First Step Act did modify Section 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B). But it did not alter the language of Section 841(b)(1)(C), the crime under which Defendant was convicted. View "United States v. Gerald Cardwell, Jr." on Justia Law