Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

I.M. and J.R. (collectively, “Appellants”) were convicted by a jury of charges alleged in a ten-count superseding indictment for offenses committed as part of a large drug conspiracy. The district court sentenced them to 360 and 336 months in prison, respectively. On appeal, I.M. challenged both the denial of his motion for severance and his sentence; J.R. challenged the denial of his motion for recusal, the denial of his motions to suppress wiretap and video surveillance recordings and his convictions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court first explained I.M. has given the court no reason to conclude that this was not an adequate safeguard in his case or that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to sever. Thus, the denial of I.M.’s severance motion was not an abuse of discretion. Further, the district court’s statement that I.M.’s “criminal history consists of violent acts and possession of firearms” did not mischaracterize his criminal history. Thus, the district court did not commit procedural error.   Moreover, the court held J.R. has failed to point to any facts establishing that the district judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The district judge’s issuance of some of the warrants, in this case, does not, of itself, require recusal. Any other challenges to the wiretap recordings are also waived because J.R. has failed to meaningfully explain why his motion to suppress should have been granted. View "United States v. Isaac May" on Justia Law

Claimant claimed $34,918 found in his car during a traffic stop. When he failed to fully respond to the government’s special interrogatories, the district court sanctioned him by striking his claim and entering a default judgment forfeiting the money to the government. Claimant appealed, arguing that the district court relied on an incorrect interpretation of Rule G(8).   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that an individual cannot “fail to comply” with an unknowable obligation. A party fails to comply with discovery obligations after a court order defines those obligations. Thus, Rule G(8) authorizes striking a claim for “failing to comply with” Rule G(6) only if the claimant has reason to know of and violates Rule G(6) special interrogatory obligations. The court wrote that it cannot conclude that Claimant knew or should have known that Rule G(6) obligated him to provide more information than he had provided. Claimant articulated a facially reasonable belief that the bank records and check receipts he supplied “firmly established” his relationship to the cash by “showing where the money comes from, [and] where the money was transferred and sent.” He claimed that additional documents requested by the government exceeded the scope of Rule G(6). Nothing in the record indicates that Hester had actual or constructive knowledge of additional obligations—the district court neither found that he should have known he was violating the Rule nor issued an order compelling him to respond to interrogatories. View "United States v. Christopher Hester" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a sentence of ninety-six months’ imprisonment imposed by the district court after Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. Defendant argued that the district court committed procedural error by miscalculating his base offense level under the sentencing guidelines.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it has held that second-degree robbery under this Missouri statute is a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act because the offense requires “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. Because Defendant’s prior conviction for second-degree robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under USSG Section 4B1.2(a)(1), the district court did not err in determining a base offense level of 20 under USSG Section 2K2.1(a)(4). Accordingly, the court held that there was no procedural error. View "United States v. George Gordon" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of being an armed career criminal in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e). The district court sentenced him to 262 months in prison. Defendant appealed, challenging: (1) the admission of evidence (field tests and a photograph); (2) the sufficiency of the evidence; and (3) the sentence (an adjustment and an enhancement).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the evidence was not inadmissible simply because it was prejudicial. Further, the court explained that the jury saw the pistol and photographs of it. An ATF agent, testifying as an expert, testified that it met the federal definition of a firearm. The pistol and the testimony are sufficient to prove that the pistol was a firearm. Accordingly, the court held that the evidence sufficiently proved that Defendant’s .45-caliber pistol was a firearm under 18 U.S.C. Sections 921(a)(3) and 922(g). Finally, the district court found that Defendant was a drug dealer—not merely a drug user—due to the packaging of the drugs, the evidence found in the search and police investigations, and his own testimony that he intended to distribute drugs. As such, the district court did not err in applying the sentencing enhancement. View "United States v. Gregory McCoy" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. He argued that evidence should have been excluded from trial due to an unlawful search and seizure, that he had a constitutional right under the Second Amendment to possess a firearm as a convicted felon, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that none of the contentions has merit and therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court found that the officer’s action was permissible under the Fourth Amendment on at least two bases: as an investigative search based on reasonable suspicion of crime and danger and as a search for evidence-based on probable cause under exigent circumstances. Further, the court held that the longstanding prohibition on the possession of firearms by felons is constitutional, and the district court properly denied the motion to dismiss. Moreover, the court wrote that there was ample evidence to support the jury’s finding that Defendant knowingly possessed the firearm. Finally, the court explained that a rational jury could have found that the firearm was placed strategically in a location where it was hidden from view but readily accessible to one who was seated in a wheelchair and carrying drugs in his undergarment. View "United States v. Sylvester Cunningham" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of distributing a controlled substance near a protected location, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced Defendant to 380 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred in instructing the jury and challenges the reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant specifically requested separating the protected location element—Proposed Instruction No. 15—from the remainder of the elements of Count 1—Proposed Instruction No. 12. Defendant then filed objections to certain instructions but failed to object to either Instruction No. 12 or 15 prior to trial. He further failed to do so at trial or in his post-trial motion. Defendant “cannot complain that the district court gave him exactly what his lawyer asked.” Further, the court wrote that Evans controls here. Henderson’s interpretation of the career offender enhancement was “neither unexpected nor indefensible” and “had a rational basis.” The district court did not err in applying this enhancement. The court also explained that “when a district court varies downward and sentences below a presumptively reasonable Guidelines range, it is nearly inconceivable that the court abused its discretion in not varying downward still further.” Here, Defendant offered no convincing reasoning to rebut this presumption. View "United States v. Patrick Webb, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant received a 108-month sentence for possessing a firearm as a felon. He challenged the base-offense-level calculation, a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense, and the overall length of the sentence. At issue on appeal is whether the crime of assault while displaying a dangerous weapon is a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.2(a).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that each of the three ways of committing assault in Iowa requires intent. Thus, contrary to Defendant’s contention, the holding in Borden v. United States is of no help to Defendant. Further, beyond the base offense level, Defendant believes that he did not deserve a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony offense.” The court held that there is Defendant’s guilty plea, which necessarily required him to admit that he possessed the gun. Second, there was a video of him wielding what appeared to be the same gun just days earlier, which shows that he had “authority” and “control” over it. Third, no one disputes that the gun’s location under the front passenger seat placed it within arm’s reach of him. On these facts, the court could not say the district court’s finding that he was “armed” was erroneous. Finally, Defendant challenged the substantive reasonableness of his 108-month prison sentence. The court held that given the 12-month downward variance he received, “it is nearly inconceivable” that the district court “abused its discretion in not varying downward even further.” View "United States v. Catrell Green" on Justia Law

A handgun was found in Defendant’s jacket pocket while he was being treated in a hospital emergency room for a gunshot wound. After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Conley conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. He appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant argued on appeal that because the Hennepin County Medical Center (HCMC) protection officers’ restraint of him in the stabilization room amounted to an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, evidence of the handgun found in his jacket pocket must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that under the balancing test, “the greater the intrusion on a citizen, the greater the justification required for that intrusion to be reasonable.” Noninvestigatory seizures are reasonable if they are “based on specific articulable facts” and the “governmental interest” in effectuating the seizure in question “outweighs the individual’s interest in being free from arbitrary government interference.” The court explained that here the HCMC protection officers’ seizure of Defendant in the stabilization room was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Further, Defendant voluntarily brought himself to HCMC’s emergency room to seek treatment for a gunshot wound that medical staff considered potentially life-threatening. Given those circumstances, Defendant should have reasonably expected the sort of intrusions that are inherent to the provision of emergency medical care, including the removal of one’s clothes to facilitate treatment and—if compelled by the need to maintain a safe environment—even temporary physical restraint. View "United States v. Dywan Conley" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of three counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor. On appeal, Defendant challenged the jury instructions, an evidentiary ruling, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that there was no reversible error and therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court first wrote that Defendant is not entitled to relief unless he can show that the error affected his substantial rights. To meet that prong of the plain-error analysis, Defendant must show a reasonable probability that the erroneous instruction affected the verdict. The court saw no reasonable probability that the jury would have found Defendant not guilty of touching C.W.’s genitalia if the instruction had excluded the extraneous terms. Further, Defendant contended the jury could have mistaken C.W.’s sexualized behavior for his own. Here, the district court reasonably declined to exclude the evidence under Rule 403. C.W.’s testimony about age-inappropriate sexual behavior was not presented in the abstract; she connected it directly to Defendant by explaining that she learned the behavior from him. Viewed in that context, the testimony was prejudicial to Defendant but not unfairly so. C.W.’s testimony, if believed, gave the jury reason to conclude that Defendant had sexually abused her. Finally, the court wrote that no physical evidence was required: “A victim’s testimony alone can be sufficient to support a guilty verdict.” View "United States v. Garrett Waters" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Defendant, a former sheriff’s deputy, on six counts: attempting to induce a minor to produce child pornography, enticement of a minor, and transferring and attempting to transfer obscenity to a person under the age of 16. Defendant pleaded guilty to a superseding information charging him with the conduct underlying Counts 3 and 4 under a single count. In exchange, the government agreed to dismiss the original indictment. The parties also agreed to recommend a sentence of 120 months imprisonment. At sentencing, the district court sustained Defendant’s objection to a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2G1.3(b)(3)(A). Defendant challenged his sentence’s length.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court emphasized that the Guidelines did not adequately account for the seriousness of Defendant’s offense and the need to send an accurate message to the community. Given the clarity of the district court’s rationale for its variance, any procedural error in the upward departure was harmless. Accordingly, even if the district court erred procedurally in its departure analysis, any error is harmless considering the court’s rationale for its alternative variance. The court wrote that Defendant has shown no likelihood that his sentence would be more favorable should he be resentenced based on the alleged error. View "United States v. Francis Kistler" on Justia Law