Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant z pled guilty to a drug offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A). The district court applied a two-level sentence enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon in connection with a drug offense under U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(1), while declining safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. Section 5C1.2. The court sentenced him to the statutory minimum of 120 months in prison. Defendant appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Defendant argued that the enhancement should not apply because the firearms in the garage were locked in the safe. But the weapons in the shed, where at least two of the four controlled purchases occurred, were not in a safe—which independently supports the enhancement. Even without independent evidence, the locked garage safe might support the enhancement. Further, Defendant stresses he had legitimate purposes for possessing the firearms. But this does not affect the analysis. Thus, the court held that it is not clearly improbable that the weapons were connected to Defendant’s drug offense. The district court properly applied the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(1). Further, the court held that sufficient evidence supports the conclusion that Defendant possessed the weapons in connection with the offense. Thus, the district court did not clearly err in finding Defendant ineligible for safety-valve relief because enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(1) was proper. Moreover, the court explained that the district court did not commit plain error by following Eighth Circuit precedent and properly assigning the burden of proof for safety-valve relief to Defendant. View "United States v. Michael Voelz" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). At sentencing, over Defendant’s objection, the district court applied an increased base offense level of 24 under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(2), finding Defendant’s two prior convictions for aggravated assault under Iowa Code Section 708.2(3) and his prior conviction for aggravated domestic abuse assault under Iowa Code Section 708.2A(2)(c) qualify as convictions for crimes of violence. Defendant appealed, arguing the district court erred in making these determinations.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under Iowa Code Section 708.2(3), aggravated assault occurs when “[a] person . . . commits an assault, as defined in section 708.1, and uses or displays a dangerous weapon in connection with the assault.” In United States v. McGee, the Eighth Circuit held Section 708.2(3) qualifies as a crime of violence under the force clause because the “display” of a dangerous weapon requires at least the threatened use of physical force. In addition, the court wrote that it is unaware of any Iowa case in which a defendant was convicted under Section 708.2(3) without knowingly or intentionally displaying a dangerous weapon. Accordingly, there is no “realistic probability” the Iowa courts would apply Section 708.2(3) in a situation where the defendant did not knowingly or intentionally display a dangerous weapon. View "United States v. Kaleb Shannan" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of robbing two branches of Regions Bank and brandishing a firearm during one of the robberies. Following trial, Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, for a new trial. He argued that (1) the government’s evidence was insufficient to prove his identity as the bank robber; (2) the government’s evidence was insufficient to prove the Regions Bank branches’ FDIC status, and (3) the verdict was the product of jury coercion after the district court instructed the jury to continue deliberating once a jury poll revealed the initial verdict lacked unanimity. The district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court acknowledged that Defendant “offered numerous persuasive challenges to the credibility of this identification” but ultimately concluded “that the fingerprint evidence and other testimony, in this case, were sufficient to permit a conviction absent any eye-witness identification. The court explained that the evidence offered in the present case exceeds what was offered in Rusan and sufficiently proved the Regions Bank branches’ FDIC status. The government presented testimony and introduced exhibits proving that the deposits of Regions Bank were insured by the FDIC and that the policy was in effect at the time of the robberies. Specifically, the government admitted into evidence the certified and stamped copies of the FDIC certificates. Finally, the court found that the district court’s “inquiries were essentially neutral and not calculated to affect the juror’s judgment. Thus, the court found no error of law or fact in this determination. View "United States v. Briran Blake" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of the People’s Republic of China and a long-time resident of the United States, conditionally pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit economic espionage. He appealed the conviction and sentence. The principal issue is whether the district court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained by a warrantless seizure and forensic search of Defendant’s digital devices as he was leaving Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport, with Shanghai, China, his final destination.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it agreed with the district court’s conclusion that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct non-routine forensic searches of Defendant’s electronic devices and acted reasonably in doing so. The court also concluded that Defendant waived his appeal of the $150,000 fine the district court imposed as part of his sentence. The court explained that no Circuit has held that the government must obtain a warrant to conduct a routine border search of electronic devices. Further, the court held that the officers and agents had background information, much of it corroborated, that provided a basis for assessing Defendant’s actions in May and June 2017. Their experience and training in international economic espionage and theft of trade secrets gave them reasonable suspicion for an extended border search that included a forensic search of electronic devices. Ultimately, the court held that the search was not constitutionally unreasonable. View "United States v. Haitao Xiang" on Justia Law

Police observed Defendant leaving a hotel room just after they had secured a search warrant for the room. Within minutes, they detained and arrested him. They found methamphetamine on his person and more in the room. After the district court refused to suppress the drugs found on his person, a jury convicted Defendant of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the officers believed that Defendant’s hotel room contained firearms, had seen him giving a hard stare and clutching his waistband, and suspected him of “engaging in drug trafficking, which very often is accompanied by dangerous weapons.” Drawing guns before approaching Defendant was reasonable. Nor did officers err by deploying a taser because, by then, Defendant’s acts had provided probable cause for an arrest. Further, the court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant and used reasonable force to detain him. When Defendant’s acts created probable cause for an arrest, they used appropriate force to arrest him. Their acts did not violate the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. William Stevenson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a substance containing methamphetamine, possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, and obstruction of justice. On appeal, Defendant challenged several district court decisions that span from indictment through sentencing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because both the stop and the search of the Pontiac were supported by probable cause, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s suppression motion. Moreover, Defendant offered nothing to suggest the government violated that order by making use of the suppressed documents or information gleaned from them at trial. Accordingly, the court discerned no abuse of discretion in the remedy crafted by the district court. The court explained that under the facts of this case, Defendant has failed to show that Section 1503(a) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.   Further, the court explained that the government also presented evidence that Defendant had knowledge of the firearm. The gun was recovered from inside a red drawstring bag in the Pontiac, and surveillance footage showed Defendant leaving a Walmart carrying the same distinctive red bag one hour before the Pontiac was stopped. Finally, the government presented evidence that Defendant, on occasion, traded methamphetamine for guns. Under these facts, a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Milk knowingly possessed the firearm as charged. View "United States v. Wicahpe Milk" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1344(2), and theft of government funds.  The district court sentenced Defendant to 96 months imprisonment on each count to run concurrently. On appeal, Defendant challenged her sentence, arguing that the district court erred in denying her acceptance of responsibility, erroneously admitted and considered certain tax information, and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court’s factual findings are supported by the record. First, Defendant stipulated sending falsified letters in support of herself to the probation officer and the government. Specifically, Defendant stipulated to writing one letter purportedly from her pastor and three letters purportedly from medical providers and signing each letter without their authorization or knowledge. Fraudulent conduct is inconsistent with accepting responsibility for bank fraud. Second, the evidence at sentencing showed that Defendant lied to the probation officer about the source of the funds that she used to pay restitution. Thus, the court held that the district court did not err in admitting and considering Defendant’s 2018, 2019, and 2020 tax filings. Moreover, the court held that Defendant’s 96-month sentence is substantively reasonable. The district court stated that it had considered all of the Section 3553(a) factors and offered a lengthy explanation for why it was imposing an upward variance under those factors. View "United States v. Kelli Hogue" on Justia Law

Defendant assaulted a 77-year-old St. Louis taxi driver, stole his taxi, and drove it to Chicago. He pleaded guilty to transporting a stolen vehicle and now appeals his 42-month sentence, an upward variance from his advisory guidelines sentencing range of 15 to 21 months imprisonment. Defendant argued the sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court did not properly account for Defendant’s mental health issues and gave too much weight to the fact that the offense occurred on the first day he was released on parole following a 2015 Illinois second-degree murder conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by varying upward based in part on Defendant’s Illinois murder conviction and the fact that he committed this offense on his first day of parole. The court explained that the record does not support Defendant’s further argument that the district court placed too little weight on the mitigating impact of his serious, untreated mental health issues. The court expressed sympathy for Defendant’s mental health condition, criticized the failure to provide him mental health treatment while incarcerated in Illinois, and noted that the federal Bureau of Prisons has resources to provide mental health treatment in its facilities. But the court concluded that the circumstances and timing of Defendant’s vicious assault on E.G. demonstrated that he poses a significant danger to the community and that a sentence close to time served would not sufficiently protect the public. View "United States v. David Twine" on Justia Law

After an officer initiated a traffic stop of Defendant and recovered approximately six pounds of methamphetamine from the vehicle Defendant was driving, he was charged with one count of possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. After the district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea. Prior to sentencing, Defendant filed two pro se motions to withdraw his guilty plea, which the district court denied. The district court sentenced Defendant to 168 months imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. Defendant appealed the denials of his motion to suppress and his motions to withdraw his guilty plea.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that considering the factors together, the unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated in this case by the discovery of Defendant’s expired license and lack of insurance. Thus, despite the unlawful stop of Defendant, the “deterrence benefits” of excluding the evidence do not “outweigh its substantial societal costs,” and the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion. Further, the court held that given Defendant’s grounds for withdrawal of his guilty plea are contradicted by the record, the court found no error in the district court’s decision to decline an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the motions. Finally, the court found no error that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. View "United States v. Felix Forjan" on Justia Law

While driving under the influence of alcohol one night in Indian country, Defendant crossed the centerline and crashed into another car, killing two people and seriously injuring two others. Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of involuntary manslaughter, and the district court sentenced him to two consecutive 84-month prison terms. He challenged the sentence on appeal. Defendant maintained on appeal that the district court failed to provide an adequate explanation for its decision to depart upward on the ground that his criminal-history category underrepresented his likelihood of reoffending.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that even if the district court's explanation of Section 4A1.3(a)(1) departure was plainly insufficient, Defendant has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have received a more favorable sentence absent the court's error. The district court expressly anchored its chosen sentence to the maximum punishment set by Congress, not to the Guidelines. The record shows that the sentence chosen, much like the one the government recommended, was a product of an evaluation of the Section 3553(a) criteria, in particular, the nature and circumstances of the offense and Defendant’s criminal history. Further, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Moses Runs Against" on Justia Law