Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of attempted Hobbs Act robbery and three firearm charges, including possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). Defendant argued that there is insufficient evidence to support his attempted Hobbs Act robbery conviction and that his Section 924(c) conviction should be vacated in light of United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022). He also challenged his sentence’s substantive reasonableness.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed his attempted Hobbs Act robbery conviction but vacated his Section 924(c) conviction under Taylor. The court also vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that here Defendant repeatedly surveilled L.B.’s home. He donned a disguise and scripted his false entry. He had a rifle and planned to neutralize, if necessary, those he found inside. But he preferred to wield a handgun and told his fake accomplice he wouldn’t rob the house without one. Just before the trade, he was arrested. All told, the district court did not clearly err by finding the circumstances showed Defendant was about to complete all the acts he believed necessary to complete the Hobbs Act robbery but for the police’s intervention. The court explained that after Defendant’s trial, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Taylor and held that “attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy the elements clause” of Section 924(c). This means that Defendant’s attempted Hobbs Act robbery conviction no longer qualifies as a predicate crime of violence for his Section 924(c) conviction. Thus the court vacated his Section 924(c) conviction in accordance with Taylor. View "United States v. Rufus Dennis" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity. The charge arose from Defendant’s response to an online advertisement and his dialogue with an undercover detective who posed as a fourteen-year-old girl. At trial, the district court declined Defendant’s request to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment, and Defendant appealed that decision.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the requested instruction. The court explained that the evidence here shows that the government presented Defendant with an opportunity to entice an arguably sexually precocious minor whose appearance was arguably more mature than average. Defendant responded to an advertisement, and broached the topic of unlawful sexual activity with a fourteen-year-old girl. The detective posing as a minor carried on a lengthy dialogue with Defendant, but did not employ the tactics most likely to warrant an entrapment instruction: pressure, assurances that a person is not doing anything wrong, persuasion, fraudulent representations, threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises of reward, or pleas based on need, sympathy, or friendship. Without more, there was not sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the government impermissibly induced Defendant to commit the offense. View "United States v. Darren Lasley" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Africa who became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2012, pleaded guilty to aggravated identity theft predicated on wire fraud. In the plea agreement, Petitioner admitted that she “aided and abetted” her mother in the mother’s scheme of “defrauding” the State of California of $475,350.28.The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") charged Petitioner as removable, characterizing her conviction as a conviction for an offense involving “fraud or deceit” with a loss to the victim exceeding $10,000, thus qualifying as an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). In so holding, the BIA determined that the elements of the identity theft offense included a reference in the alternative to several qualifying felony offenses, and required as an element that the identity theft be committed “during and in relation to” one of the other qualifying felonies.Petitioner appealed, arguing her conviction did not qualify under the categorical approach as an offense involving fraud or deceit. She also sought relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). An immigration judge rejected Petitioner's arguments, as did the BIA. Petitioner appealed.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the BIA appeals did not err in concluding that Petitioner's conviction was a qualifying aggravated felony based on her express admission that she had aided and abetted a scheme to defraud a victim of more than $475,000. Further, the Eighth Circuit found that the BIA did not apply the wrong legal standard in finding Petitioner ineligible for withholding of removal and did not err in denying CAT relief. View "Chantelle Robbertse v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of first-degree murder and use of a firearm during a crime of violence that caused death. The district court sentenced Defendant to serve two concurrent life terms of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, asserting the district court committed four errors during trial: (1) when it allowed the government to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) of Defendant’s jealous behavior toward two other men; (2) when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal, finding the government had presented sufficient evidence of premeditation; (3) when it sua sponte failed to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense; and (4) when it denied Defendant’s request to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that evidence of the manner of killing also gives rise to a reasonable inference of premeditation. Although Defendant provided three different versions of what happened, in one accounting before the jury, Defendant told law enforcement that he aimed and fired at the victim, who was indisputably shot in the back of the head at a distance of at least three feet away. Further, Defendant retrieved that gun from his bedroom closet and shot the victim in the head as she tried to escape. Defendant’s actions after the shooting also point towards premeditation. Because there is ample evidence that supports the jury’s finding that the killing was premeditated, Defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim fails. View "United States v. Casey Crow Ghost" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to 30 months of imprisonment after McKenzie pled guilty to failure to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). Defendant appealed, arguing the district court incorrectly applied U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(b) by failing to account for the time he had served in Florida for a related state offense.Agreeing with Defendant, the Eighth Circuit reversed Defendant's sentence, finding that the district court did not reduce the sentence after finding the time served in Florida was for relevant conduct. Thus, the Eighth Circuit vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded for clarification. View "United States v. Alfonso McKenzie" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. He argued the district court should have suppressed the gun and shell casing found in his apartment. He challenged the steps the officers took from the moment they entered his apartment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a suspect who has just illegally used a gun is on a different Fourth Amendment footing than someone who merely possesses one. Moreover, the court wrote that first, when the officers asked Defendant whether they could “look” around “to make sure there’s nobody else in the apartment,” he replied, “[y]es ma’am. You can do whatever you want.” Based on that reply, he consented to at least a protective sweep of the apartment. Second, after Defendant blurted out that there had been suspicious activity outside, it was reasonable for the officers to believe that Defendant had provided consent to look there. Third, consent extended to the retrieval of the gun itself after Defendant confessed to “firing the shot” and admitted that the gun was in a kitchen cabinet. View "United States v. Cornell Williams" on Justia Law

Petitioner initially entered the United States on a traveler’s visa, but he later became a permanent resident after marrying a United States citizen. Then, roughly a decade later, he and his accomplices robbed a delivery van belonging to “an ATM vendor.” Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery and spent five years in prison. Once immigration officials found out about the conviction, they started removal proceedings. As relevant here, the government argued he was removable because Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence. The immigration judge and the Board agreed and refused to waive inadmissibility.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Hobbs Act robbery requires proof of an “unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person . . . of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force.” Thus, Petitioner is removable for having committed a “crime of violence.” Moreover, the court wrote that the decision in Taylor “does not change our position” that a completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence. View "Garfield Green v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District of South Dakota challenging the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court’s exercise of jurisdiction in a custody matter involving his minor daughter, C.S.N. Petitioner claimed that the Tribal Court’s refusal to recognize and enforce North Dakota state court orders awarding him custody of C.S.N. violated the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. Section 1738A. The district court granted summary judgment to the Tribal Court after concluding that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes. Petitioner appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes. As a result, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court is not obligated under that statute to enforce the North Dakota court orders awarding custody of C.S.N. to Petitioner. The district court properly granted summary judgment to the Tribal Court. The court further explained that its conclusion that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes is further supported by the fact that when Congress intends for tribes to be subject to statutory full-faith-and-credit requirements, it expressly says so. View "Aarin Nygaard v. Tricia Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant and co-Defendant were convicted in district court on charges arising out of the kidnapping of Defendant’s minor grandchildren. Defendant appealed her conviction for aiding and abetting kidnapping, and co-Defendant appealed his conviction for being a prohibited person in possession of firearms. Defendant appealed, asserting (1) the district court erred in refusing to admit the full recording of her interview with law enforcement; (2) the district court erred in instructing the jury and preparing the jury verdict form; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. Co-Defendant appealed, asserting the district court erred when it (1) declined to grant his motion to withdraw his plea; and (2) committed procedural error.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that co-Defendant has not offered a fair and just reason for withdrawing his plea. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Moreover, the court wrote that the children’s mother testified that she did not give consent to co-Defendant to take the children and that Defendant told her that co-Defendant was going to take the children because the mother did not love them, did not deserve to be their mother, and was not going to be able to see them ever again. The court found that the record contains more than sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Defendant guilty of aiding and abetting kidnapping. View "United States v. Nora Guevara Triana" on Justia Law

Defendants pleaded guilty to federal controlled substance offenses, and all three appealed their sentences.   The Fourth Circuit vacated each defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that Texas case law indicates that a defendant can be convicted of “offering to sell a controlled substance” under Section 481.112(a) without having the intent to distribute or dispense drugs. An offer-to-sell conviction is thus categorically broader than an attempt to commit a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines. The court explained that the government bears the burden of proving “the facts necessary to establish a sentencing enhancement” by a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, the court concluded that, once Defendant objected to the factual recitation in the PSR, the government failed to meet its burden as to both the obstruction-of-justice and the violent-threat enhancements. View "United States v. Jaime Campos" on Justia Law