Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to a firearms offense. The district court imposed a sentence of thirty-two months’ imprisonment. Defendant argued that the district court committed procedural error in calculating his base offense level.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the guidelines define “crime of violence” as “any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Commentary to the guidelines provides that “crime of violence” includes the crimes of aiding and abetting or conspiring to commit such an offense. Defendant contends that carjacking does not categorically involve the use of threatened force because the “intimidation” element in the statute does not require a communicated threat of force. The Eighth Circuit has explained, however, that “bank robbery by intimidation requires proof that the victim ‘reasonably could infer a threat of bodily harm’ from the robber’s acts.” Defendant also argued that his conspiracy to commit carjacking offense does not qualify as a crime of violence because conspiracy offenses do not require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. His argument is foreclosed by the commentary to USSG Section 4B1.2 and the court’s precedent. View "United States v. Melvin Shields" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court sentenced him to 110 months in prison. He appealed his sentence. Defendant argued the district court erred in determining he had a “controlled substance offense” under U.S.S.G. Sections 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) and 4B1.2(b).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is no equal protection violation “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis” for the application of United States v. Henderson. Because Henderson was neither unexpected nor indefensible, its interpretation of the guidelines had a rational basis. The district court did not plainly err in not sua sponte finding that applying Henderson violated Defendant’s equal protection rights. Moreover, the court wrote that the district court considered Section 3553(a) factors and thoroughly explained its decision. It did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Christopher Evans" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. He appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Defendant argued that his unconstitutional arrest stemmed from the Brown County Sheriff’s Office’s reckless conduct, i.e., its failure to establish any procedure to handle recalled warrants. Defendant contends that the office should have implemented a review system, suggesting that “[a] simple, routine process of a weekly review would have caught the error.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that it was employee negligence—not reckless disregard of constitutional requirements—that resulted in the failure to remove Defendant’s recalled warrant from the file and the computer system. The sheriff’s office manager and her co-worker’s negligent conduct “was not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion” of the evidence garnered after Defendant’s arrests. Thus, the court wrote in light of its conclusion that the exclusionary rule does not apply, it need not consider the government’s alternate ground for admission of the evidence, i.e., that Defendant’s resistance to his illegal arrest furnished grounds for a second, legitimate arrest. View "United States v. Elmer Zahn" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of several child pornography-related offenses. He appealed the district court’s denial of his pretrial suppression motion, the application of a sentencing enhancement, and the grouping of his counts at sentencing.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even if Defendant showed cause, he wasn’t prejudiced, which is required for good cause. The Government offered significant evidence at trial that supported Defendant’s conviction, including his incriminating admissions that he received and produced child pornography and explicit content recovered from his and the minor victim’s phones. While the motel room evidence was incriminating in the sense that it worked against Defendant, “[t]he desire to suppress” such evidence is “not by [itself] sufficient to establish good cause to justify relief from a waiver of a defense, objection, or request under Rule 12.” Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant leave to make an untimely pretrial motion.In calculating his sentence, Defendant says that the district court erred when it declined to group three counts together because those counts involved substantially the same harm. But the court explained that even if it grouped Defendant’s offenses the way he suggests, he would still receive a life sentence because his combined offense level would exceed 43, so any error was harmless. View "United States v. Travis Mayer" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and the district court imposed a sentence of 71 months of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, asserting that the government violated the terms of the plea agreement, rendering her appeal waiver invalid and that the district court procedurally erred when determining her advisory Guidelines range. Defendant suggests that the United States impermissibly objected to her receiving an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment “based on” her “pre-plea conduct.”   The Eighth Circuit enforced the waiver and dismissed Defendant’s appeal. The court explained that it is true that the government cannot object to an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment based on a defendant’s pre-plea conduct if it initially agreed at the time the plea was entered that the defendant “qualified for” that adjustment. But here, the government took no position in the plea agreement on whether an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment was warranted. And in any event, the government’s objection at sentencing was based on Defendant’s post-plea conduct, not any conduct that pre-dated the plea agreement. In the waiver, Defendant expressly gave up “any and all rights to appeal . . . [her] sentence,” which includes her appeal of the district court’s denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment. And she does not contend that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary or that enforcing it “would result in a miscarriage of justice.” View "United States v. Lacee Tuttle" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence of 1,680 months imprisonment for seven counts of child-exploitation and child pornography offenses. Specifically, he challenged the jury selection, the jury instructions, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the reasonableness of the district court’s sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained here the magistrate judge conducted extensive voir dire, and the parties had ample opportunity to examine the jurors. Throughout the process, the magistrate judge took care to rehabilitate wavering jurors by focusing them on what they were being asked to do as jurors—listen to the evidence and fairly and impartially judge the facts. Ultimately, the magistrate judge accepted Juror 3’s responses as indicating that he would be able to put aside his visceral reactions and impartially consider the evidence. On this record, that finding was not a “manifest error,” and the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove Juror 3.   Further, the court explained that the district court carefully considered the 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) factors and sentenced Defendant within the guidelines range, the calculation of which Defendant does not challenge. The district court noted Defendant’s “extremely dangerous” conduct in pulling a loaded handgun from his waistband and pointing it at a law-enforcement officer’s head when he was arrested. The court then emphasized that Defendant’s offense conduct was “particularly disturbing.” It also found by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant had sexually abused his ex-girlfriend’s daughter. It did not err in considering this conduct, even though Nosley was acquitted of it in state court. View "United States v. Nathan Nosley" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Defendant to 75 months imprisonment. The government appealed the district court’s decision not to enhance Defendant’s sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e)(1). The government argues on appeal that the definition of MDMA at Minnesota Rules, part 6800.4210, is identical to the federal definition of MDMA. They argue that the district court should have deferred to the expert agency’s interpretation of the term “isomers,” which is contained in the Rule, rather than allowing the statute to expand the definition.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court found that the version of the Minnesota statute applicable to Defendant’s 2011 felony drug convictions prohibiting isomers of methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) was overbroad. The court explained for the enhancement to apply, the court would have to read “isomers” in Minnesota Rules, part 6800.4210, item C, as excluding certain isomers, namely, those excluded in the federal regulations. However, if the court read “isomers” as being limited to optical, positional, and geometric isomers, it would render superfluous the language of Minn. R. 6800.4210, “whether optical, positional, or geometric.” A common sense reading of the statute suggests that Minn. R. 6800.4210 limits some isomers, while Minn. Stat. Section 152.02, subd. 2(3) (2009) limits all isomers. Therefore, Defendant does not have the requisite three ACCA convictions for enhanced sentencing. View "United States v. Lorenzo Heard, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pled guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition. The district court sentenced Defendant to 48 months of imprisonment. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The parties agree there are two issues on appeal, whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to (1) conduct a Terry stop on Defendant and (2) command Defendant to stand for a frisk.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that because Defendant only challenged the district court’s legal conclusions, there is no basis to disturb the district court’s findings of fact. The court further reasoned that Defendant’s answers to the officer’s questions about why he was at the salvage lot at 3:00 a.m. were odd because he was waiting at the salvage lot in the middle of the night so he could inquire about a stolen car in the morning and Defendant had not reported it stolen. Under a totality of the circumstances analysis, these facts were sufficient to provide the officer with reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop.   Further, while Defendant argued the bulge in his pockets was insufficient to justify the frisk, under the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for the officer to fear for his safety. Therefore, the court concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the attempted frisk. View "United States v. Victor Stokes" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of offenses involving interstate transportation of stolen property and witness tampering. The district court sentenced him to a total of 108 months imprisonment, along with a term of supervised release and restitution. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions and that the district court erred when imposing the sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Defendant’s co-conspirator gave detailed testimony about the scheme that was neither incredible nor insubstantial on its face. His testimony was corroborated by other evidence, including security camera videos, GPS data, and seized evidence of burglaries. The court, therefore, concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions for conspiracy and for aiding and abetting the interstate transportation of stolen property. Further, the court found that Defendant’s criminal history and offense conduct, including his commission of witness tampering while on pretrial release, adequately justified the sentence imposed. View "United States v. Bryan Kirkendoll, II" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, one count of health care fraud, and one count of obtaining controlled substances by fraud. Defendant caused multiple persons, including her daughter and significant other, to inflict serious bodily injury on themselves. In some instances, she inflicted the injuries herself by using a rock to smash their hands. Defendant secured their injuries to enable them to obtain pain medication for her use. Their injuries and the lack of prompt, proper treatment ultimately resulted in amputated fingers.   The district court sentenced Defendant to 144 months in prison, a 36-month upward variance. She appeals, challenging the substantive reasonableness of her sentence. She argues that it resulted from “an unreasonable weighing decision in that it was unjustified by the record and explanation.” Defendant also argued that the district court’s articulated reasons did not warrant an upward variance because the calculated Guidelines range sufficiently accounted for them.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that despite One Defendant’s assertions to the contrary, the district court expressly accounted for her upbringing, prior abuse, and addiction. It stated, “we can’t overlook the reality that she’s had a very difficult journey in life herself, and then struggling with the addiction issues,” but that “it’s not offered as an excuse for the behavior.” The district court also noted that the seriousness of the crime warranted commensurate consequences, “especially when there’s physical injury to five different victims in the setting of these facts.” View "United States v. Frenchone One Horn" on Justia Law