Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition found after he shot a man in a convenience store in Davenport, Iowa. The victim recovered; both were separately prosecuted. Defendant appealed his 120-month sentence, arguing the district court erred by cross-referencing to the base offense level for attempted first-degree murder.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. First, the court explained that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Defendant’s swift but deliberate actions before the shooting demonstrate that he acted with the requisite premeditation. Next, the court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding “there is absolutely no evidence of self-defense.” Finally, even if the district court committed clear error in cross-referencing to the attempted first-degree murder guideline, the court would conclude the error was harmless. An incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines is harmless error when the district court “specifically identifies the contested issue and potentially erroneous ruling, sets forth an alternative holding supported by the law and the record in the case, and adequately explains its alternative holding.” Here, the district court’s careful and adequate explanation why the Section 3553(a) factors justified a 120-month sentence renders any guidelines cross-referencing error harmless. View "United States v. Jaterrius Greer" on Justia Law

Defendants (D1 and D2) were each convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) after the district court denied their motions to suppress. On appeal, Defendants challenged the district court's denial of their motions to suppress. D2 also challenged the court's withholding of the juror questionnaires that were completed during voir dire.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of D2's motion to suppress, finding that officers arrested him after he fled from them, at which point they had probable cause to arrest him for fleeing with intent to avoid arrest. However, the court remanded D2's case to the district court for the limited purpose of disclosing the completed questionnaires to defendant D2. Based on the record, the court could not conclude that the district court's questioning was adequate to determine if juror bias contributed to D2's conviction. View "United States v. Ronald Finley, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendants (D1 and D2) were each convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) after the district court denied their motions to suppress. On appeal, Defendants challenged the district court's denial of their motions to suppress.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of both Defendants' motions to suppress. Pertaining to D1, the court concluded that the district court did not err in finding that a reasonable police officer would have found that D1 was fleeing with the intent to avoid arrest. The interaction occurred during the day in a public area, and police officers were wearing tactical vests emblazoned "Police" and displayed badges. The officers also made repeated commands that were consistent with their intent to arrest him. View "United States v. Ronald Finley, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested pursuant to an absconder warrant for failing to report to his supervising parole officer. Law enforcement received a tip that Defendant was staying at a certain residence and arrested him in the vicinity of the residence. Law enforcement then executed a warrantless search of that nearby residence. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search. The district court granted the motion to suppress, finding that law enforcement did not have reasonable suspicion that Defendant lived at the residence. The government appealed the order granting the motion to suppress, arguing that law enforcement had probable cause or at least reasonable suspicion that Defendant resided at the place searched.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting Defendant’s motion to suppress because law enforcement needed probable cause that Defendant was residing at the home in order to execute the warrantless search. The court explained that the informant’s tip had far fewer indicia of reliability to support probable cause without corroboration. True, the CI had given reliable information at least once before, but the record contains no details as to the basis of the tip about Defendant. View "United States v. Justin Thabit" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of committing a carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury. Under a separate count, they were convicted of using and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, the carjacking. One defendant was also convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Defendants’ appealed and raise several issues.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that there was no error in the court’s challenged evidentiary rulings or jury instruction, and that sufficient evidence supported the carjacking convictions, but that the convictions for discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence must be reduced to convictions for simply using a firearm during the carjacking. Accordingly, the court vacated the convictions under Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and order them reduced to convictions under Section 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Because the firearms convictions affected the terms of imprisonment imposed, the court vacated the sentences on all counts and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Ranson Long Pumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of committing a carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury. Under a separate count, they were convicted of using and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, the carjacking. Defendants appealed certain evidentiary and jury instruction issues, and also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the discharging a firearm conviction.The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions for carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury, finding no error in the district court's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions. However, the court concluded that Defendant's discharging a firearm conviction must be reduced to using a firearm. The court explained that the carjacking offense was complete at the moment of the taking, so the fact that the firearm was used after that point could not be used to support the discharging a firearm offenses. View "United States v. Ranson Long Pumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. According to the presentence report, Defendant was subject to the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence because he had two prior convictions for violent felonies and one prior conviction for a serious drug offense. Defendant objected, arguing that his 2003 conviction for the sale of cocaine under Missouri Revised Statute Section 195.211 (2000) does not qualify as a serious drug offense under the ACCA because that Missouri statute criminalized conduct that does not violate federal law. The district court sustained Defendant’s objection. The government appealed the district court’s ruling.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant’s prior Missouri conviction involved cocaine. The court compared the definition of cocaine under Missouri law at the time of Defendant’s Missouri conviction with the definition of cocaine under federal law at the time of Defendant’s instant federal offense. The Missouri schedule did not define isomer. The federal definition, however, criminalizes only optical and geometric isomers—but not positional isomers. Given the unambiguous breadth of Missouri’s definition of cocaine, the court agreed with the district court that Defendant’s prior Missouri conviction for the sale of cocaine was not a predicate offense for purposes of the ACCA. View "United States v. Anthony Myers" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to transporting a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity after Defendant pleaded guilty to transporting a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity. He filed a motion in limine asking the district court to instruct the jury that Section 2423(a) required the Government to prove that (1) he knew R.M. was underage and (2) he intended the unlawful nature of the sexual activity. The district court denied the motion.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial. The court explained that Section 2423(a) “does not signal an exception to the rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse.” Therefore, a Section 2423(a) conviction predicated on intent to engage in unlawful sexual activity does not require proof of the defendant’s intent or knowledge that such activity is unlawful. Thus, the court held that the district court correctly held that the Government did not need to prove that Defendant specifically intended R.M. to engage in sexual activity that was unlawful as such. It was required to prove only (1) that he intended R.M. to engage in sexual activity and (2) that the sexual activity was unlawful. View "United States v. Luis Moreira Bravo" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the supervised release revocation sentence the district court imposed when it found, after a hearing, that he had committed three Grade C violations -- a new law violation, failure to comply with a search condition, and marijuana use.  On appeal, Defendant argued that, because he tested positive on April 1, it was a “near certainty” that he would test positive again on April 4. Therefore, for the district court to order eight months imprisonment on May 4 after ordering residential reentry on April 1 is “simply unreasonable.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it has repeatedly upheld revocation sentences that varied upward from the advisory guidelines range because the defendant was a “recidivist violator of supervised release conditions.” Here, the district court imposed a within-range sentence of eight months, a sentence that is accorded a presumption of substantive reasonableness. Thus, on the record, the district court did not abuse its substantial revocation sentencing discretion. View "United States v. Johnny Harris" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s orders directing state officials to transport or facilitate testing for purposes of Petitioner’s clemency case. Because argument would not be helpful or assist us in analyzing this issue of statutory interpretation, the court denied Petitioner’s request for oral argument. Petitioner was sentenced to death in 2001 for killing two Sheriff’s Deputies. Petitione, relying on the same authority, filed an ex parte sealed motion in preparation for his clemency case—this time requesting that the court authorize a doctor to conduct bone-lead level testing on Petitioner, either in a private room in the prison or at another secure location of the prison’s choosing. The next day the district court granted the ex parte motion for bone-lead level testing. The district court entered an ex parte sealed order directing the Warden and Missouri Department of Corrections to transport Petitioner to the hospital on October 24, 2022, at 6:00 a.m. for medical testing. The State moved the district court to vacate and stay its orders, but before the district court ruled on the motions.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s orders directing state officials to transport or facilitate testing for purposes of Petitioner’s clemency case. The court held that because argument would not be helpful or assist us in analyzing this issue of statutory interpretation, Petitioner’s request for oral argument is denied. The court explained that Section 3599’s authorization for funding neither confers nor implies an additional grant of jurisdiction to order state officials to act to facilitate an inmate’s clemency application. View "Michael Tisius v. David Vandergriff" on Justia Law