Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant of sexual abuse and aggravated sexual abuse of one child and abusive sexual contact and aggravated sexual abuse (two counts) of another child. The district court sentenced him to 32 years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing the court erred in admitting expert testimony about statistical studies of victims of child sexual abuse. Defendant argued the expert’s testimony improperly bolstered and vouched for the victims, rendering the trial fundamentally unfair   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the expert did not offer any information or opinion specific to this case. She repeatedly acknowledged she was not testifying whether sexual abuse occurred or whether the two victims were telling the truth. She testified only generally about child sexual abuse and victim statistics, based on her general knowledge of studies and her experience with hundreds of children she had interviewed. Further, the jury was specifically instructed that it must decide the case based on the evidence presented. The jury is presumed to follow all instructions. Thus, the district court did not commit error that was plain by allowing the expert’s testimony. View "United States v. Bennett Belt" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine with two prior serious drug felonies. The district court sentenced him to 324 months in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in admitting Rule 404(b) testimony from a man who was not involved in the charged conspiracy but began selling meth with Defendant three months after the conspiracy ended.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the government failed to give the notice required under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(3). But under a plain error standard of review, the error did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. The evidence of his participation in the conspiracy was robust. And, as he concedes, many witnesses had already testified about his drug connections to California.   Further, Defendant argued the testimony, particularly about him exchanging guns for drugs, was unduly prejudicial because it “changed a non-violent, alleged conspiracy into a hyper-violent one.” However, the court held that the evidence, particularly with the court’s limiting instruction, was not unduly prejudicial. Moreover, four cooperating witnesses and co-conspirators testified that Defendant brought and shipped meth into Nebraska for redistribution. Their testimony was further corroborated by a package (intercepted by law enforcement) with about five pounds of meth; Postal Service records of packages sent; records of wire transfers sent to California; phone records; and records of drug sales kept by a cooperating witness. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. View "United States v. Enrique Abarca" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine or 5 grams or more of actual, pure methamphetamine, two counts of distribution of heroin, and one count of distribution of heroin and methamphetamine. On appeal, he challenged the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based on the introduction of a stipulation as to his codefendant’s prior conviction, its refusal to give his requested jury instructions, and the sufficiency of the evidence on the conspiracy count. He also challenged the district court’s calculation of his advisory sentencing guidelines range.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the stipulation to be introduced or in rejecting Defendant’s proposed jury instructions, and there was sufficient evidence to convict him of conspiracy to distribute. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial. Further, the court wrote that the district court did not clearly err in calculating the drug quantity involved in Defendant’s offense. The district court’s quantity determination was largely based on a customer’s and a confidential informant’s testimony. The district court found these witnesses to be credible, and the court found no reason to overturn that finding. View "United States v. Charleton Maxwell" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for a firearm offense after he was pulled over and during the traffic stop, the officer conducted a pat down search, finding a firearm. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, subject to his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. The court explained that the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop. Here, there was a color discrepancy between the vehicle's actual color and the color listed on the vehicle registration. The officer also testified that, in his recent experience, several vehicles with mismatched colors came back as stolen. Thus, this gave the officer reasonable suspicion that the vehicle View "United States v. Joshua Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a guilty plea to two counts of distributing a controlled substance. The district court concluded that defendant qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G Sec. 4B1.1. Defendant appealed on this issue.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. A defendant qualifies for the enhancement if his present offense and at least two past offenses are felony convictions for a “crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” Here, the PSR identified three predicate offenses qualifying defendant for the enhancement: a 1994 attempted murder, a 1994 aggravated vehicular hijacking, and a 2018 possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver.Defendant claimed that his attempted murder and vehicular hijacking offenses do not qualify as predicate offenses because 1.) neither resulted in him serving prison time within the past 15 years and 2.) neither is a crime of violence. The court rejected both arguments, affirming defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Eric Coleman" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. On appeal, Defendant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the district court erred in admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior bad acts; (3) the district court failed to credit Defendant for acceptance of responsibility; and (4) the sentence was substantively unreasonable.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that a reasonable jury could have relied on the evidence to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was a knowing participant in the conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Therefore, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction. Further, the court reasoned that because the testimony was relevant to a material issue in the trial and had a non-propensity purpose, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting it. Additionally, Defendant cannot simultaneously argue that she accepted responsibility but also had no knowledge or involvement in the conspiracy. Thus, the district court did not err in denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Further, the court explained that because Defendant’s sentence was below her Guidelines range and justified by “precisely the kind of defendant-specific determinations that are within the special competence of sentencing courts,” the court cannot say the district court abused its discretion. View "United States v. Juana Aguilar" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendants guilty of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. In a consolidated appeal, the three raise numerous challenges to the admission of wiretap evidence, the jury instructions, the sufficiency of the evidence, and their sentences.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. In regards to Defendant’s argument that the district court erred in admitting the wiretap evidence, the court found that the district court did not clearly err in determining that the Government satisfied the necessity requirement. The court reasoned that the affidavits explained in great detail how these conventional methods had failed—and would have likely continued to fail—to reveal the full extent of the organization’s drug-trafficking activities and membership because, among other reasons, Defendant and his associates utilized various and frequently changing residences and vehicles. Further, the orders authorizing the wiretaps expressly required minimization, providing that interception “must immediately terminate when it is determined that the conversation is unrelated to communications subject to interception.”   Moreover, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give the multiple-conspiracies jury instruction. Here, the Government’s evidence at trial overwhelmingly pointed to a single conspiracy with a singular purpose—selling methamphetamine and cocaine—a steady core membership—Defendants, and others—operating primarily in the same territory—Burlington—over several years. Witnesses consistently described a single organization in which Defendant would recruit and oversee multiple underlings. Although one of the defendants may have joined the conspiracy later than other members, and membership in the organization may have fluctuated somewhat over the years, this is not necessarily evidence of separate conspiracies. View "United States v. Breon Armstrong" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C Section 922(g)(1) pursuant to a written plea agreement. He later moved to withdraw his guilty plea when the probation office determined that he had three or more prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense,” which qualified him for a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). At sentencing, the district court denied Defendant’s motion, reasoning that the plea agreement expressly stated that Defendant may be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA and that this would not be grounds for withdrawal of his plea. The district court then concluded that Defendant’s prior convictions indeed qualified him for a 15-year sentence under the ACCA and sentenced him accordingly. Defendant argued that the district court erred by not allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea and by finding that his criminal history included three ACCA predicate offenses.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court consulted the indictment to which Defendant pleaded guilty. The court explained that the language makes clear that Defendant pleaded guilty to the Section 571.030.1(9) offense of shooting at other persons from a motor vehicle. The final step, then, is to determine whether this offense has a physical-force element. The court concluded that it does because there is no “non-fanciful, non-theoretical manner” to knowingly shoot at other persons from a motor vehicle “without so much as the threatened use of physical force.” View "United States v. Clarence Harris" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The district court denied his motion for a new trial in a thirty-page Order and sentenced Defendant as an armed career criminal to 360 months imprisonment. The court also revoked Defendant’s supervised release and imposed a consecutive fifty-four-month sentence. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the firearm offenses; the district court committed evidentiary errors and improperly instructed the jury; the government committed Brady violations; his trial counsel was ineffective; and the district court erred in sentencing him as an armed career criminal and abused its discretion in revoking supervised release.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction but, based on an intervening armed-career-criminal decision, remanded for resentencing.  The court explained that at oral argument, without conceding the merits of these issues, government counsel conceded that United States v. Perez, 46 F.4th 691 (8th Cir. 2022), would require a different outcome and, therefore, the court should remand for further proceedings on whether Defendant was properly sentenced under the ACCA. The court agreed that is the proper course of action. As the district court may decide that the Iowa convictions are no longer proper ACCA predicate offenses, an issue the court did not decide, that would moot the question of whether the Georgia conviction is a qualifying ACCA predicate, absent a second appeal. View "United States v. Kenny Smart" on Justia Law

Following a six-week trial in 1998, a federal jury convicted Defendant of twelve crimes he committed as part of the 6-0 Tres Crips, including the five murders (Counts 51-55) and conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine (Count 2). Under the mandatory sentencing guidelines then in effect, the district court imposed statutory maximum life imprisonment sentences on those counts. Defendant sought Section 2255 relief under Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, which made relief under Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 available to eligible defendants sentenced prior to 2010. Invoking the concurrent sentence doctrine, the district court denied First Step Act relief. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion by employing the concurrent sentence doctrine to avoid resentencing Defendant.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that in reviewing the district court’s use of the concurrent sentence doctrine for an abuse of discretion, the district court applied the doctrine consistent with controlling Eighth Circuit decisions. The court explained that when, as here, the district court ruling on a First Step Act motion initially sentenced the defendant and later granted a sentence reduction, the court’s “plain statement” that it declined to exercise its discretion to grant a further reduction “closes the matter.” The district court properly treated the concurrent sentence doctrine as “a species of harmless-error review.” As it applied the proper analysis in invoking the doctrine, and its analysis is consistent with our First Step Act precedents, there was no abuse of its broad First Step Act discretion. View "United States v. Robert Jefferson" on Justia Law