Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant believes that the statute criminalizing reentry into this country after removal violates his equal-protection rights. See 8 U.S.C. Section 1326(a), (b). He did not raise this issue before the district court. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and denied the pending motion for judicial notice.   The court explained that even constitutional arguments can be forfeited. Forfeiture occurs when a party has an argument available but fails to assert it in time. The court wrote that failure to raise an equal-protection challenge before the district court is a classic example of forfeiture. During the six months before he pleaded guilty, Defendant filed more than a dozen motions raising all sorts of issues, but not one of them questioned the constitutionality of the illegal-reentry statute or mentioned equal protection. Had he done so, the district court would have had an opportunity to potentially correct or avoid the alleged] mistake in the first place.   The court explained that under these circumstances, Defendant’s constitutional argument receives, at most, plain-error review. Here, to succeed, Defendant’ had to show, among other things, that there was a clear or obvious error under current law. In this case, there is one district court case on his side, see Carillo-Lopez, 555 F. Supp. 3d at 1001, but at most it shows that the issue is subject to reasonable dispute. The court explained that picking one side of a reasonable dispute cannot be clearly or obviously wrong. View "United States v. Salvador Nunez-Hernandez" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced him to 70 months imprisonment followed by 3 years supervised release. Defendant appealed asserting that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized by law enforcement officers during the search of a vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger, as well as evidence obtained under subsequently secured search warrants.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that as a general matter, mere passengers, such as Defendant, who have no ownership rights in a vehicle lack standing to challenge a search of the vehicle. However, Defendant contends that he has standing to challenge the search because it was the direct result of his illegal seizure by officers. In this case, however, the officer had probable cause to detain the vehicle and Defendant, a passenger, based upon traffic violations alone, because any traffic violation, however minor, provides probable cause for a traffic stop.Defendant also contended that the affidavits in support of the search warrants for his DNA and the two cell phones did not allege facts sufficient to establish probable cause for the issuance of the warrants. The district court found the affidavits constitutionally adequate but alternatively concluded that suppression was inappropriate in any event because the officers acted in good faith in executing the search warrants. Thus, the court affirmed the district court based on this alternate reasoning. View "United States v. Mar'yo Lindsey" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed after a jury convicted him of abusive sexual contact of a minor. Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to establish the offense occurred in Indian Country, that the district court erred by admitting uncharged conduct as propensity evidence, and that the use of acquitted conduct to increase his sentence violated his constitutional rights.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained Major Crimes Act gives the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over certain crimes committed by an Indian within Indian Country, including abusive sexual contact. Here, the deputy superintendent of the trust for the BIA’s Yankton Agency with nearly 32 years of experience, testified that the tract was part of the Yankton Sioux Reservation in 2006. Accordingly, the court held that it would not disturb the conviction because the deputy’s testimony provided a reasonable basis for the jury to find the offense occurred in Indian Country. Further, the court wrote that in affording great weight to the district court’s balancing, it found no abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence under Rules 413 and 414. View "United States v. Frank Sanchez" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and was sentenced to 360 months in prison. He appealed, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence, as well as his request for leave to file a second suppression motion out of time. He also argued that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the relevant search was legal, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s leave to file a second, untimely suppression motion. The court explained that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was armed and dangerous, and he never exceeded the lawful scope of his Terry frisk of Defendant’s truck. Accordingly, the district court was correct to deny Defendant’s first suppression motion.   Further, even if the district court had erred, any error would have been harmless. The evidence from Defendant’s second traffic stop related to Counts 3–5 of the second superseding indictment—counts that were dropped as part of Defendant’s plea deal. So the evidence didn’t affect Defendant’s conviction. And since the exclusionary rule doesn’t apply at sentencing, United States v. Tauil-Hernandez, 88 F.3d 576, 581 (8th Cir. 1996), the district court was free to consider this evidence when imposing Defendant’s 360-month sentence. View "United States v. Randy Dabney" on Justia Law

The district court had strong views about what charges fit Defendant’s crimes. It rejected both her plea agreement and a motion by the government to dismiss four of the five counts in the indictment. The Eighth Circuit held that the latter ruling went too far, and reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the government’s motion.   The court explained that here, the district court merely “disagreed with the prosecutor’s assessment of what penalty the defendant ought to face.” Rather than addressing whether the prosecutor acted in bad faith, the court just listed the reasons it thought Defendant was getting off too easy: she was “very dangerous” and “by far the most culpable”; the victim suffered life-threatening injuries; and a “conviction for robbery alone strip[ped] the [c]ourt of any ability to sentence [her] to a just punishment.” These may be important factors to consider at sentencing, but they are not reasons to interfere with the government’s charging decisions, no matter how much the court may disagree with them. View "United States v. Tiffany Bernard" on Justia Law

After a jury trial before the district court, Defendant was convicted of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he knowingly possessed a firearm.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the government presented sufficient evidence to prove that Defendant knowingly possessed the firearm in question. The court explained the government presented security camera footage showing a man retrieving a firearm from Apartment H6, running down the exterior staircase of the H building with the firearm and taking a firing stance, returning to Apartment H6 and depositing the firearm, and running to Apartment P4. Security camera footage showed that Defendant was the only person, besides the resident of the apartment, who entered Apartment P4 between the time of the shooting and the time officers were posted outside of the apartment, and it is inconsequential whether Defendant left Apartment P4 before the shooting. Thus, based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could have found that Defendant knowingly possessed the firearm found in Apartment H6 on August 30th. View "United States v. Earl McKee" on Justia Law

Defendant drove drunk through the White Earth Indian Reservation. Local residents tried to stop him, but he struck and pinned one of them, N.V., under his car. A jury convicted Defendant of assault with a dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The district court varied upward from the Guidelines and sentenced Defendant to 80 months on each count, to run consecutively.   Defendant appealed, arguing that: (1) he was too drunk to have the specific intent to assault N.V.; (2) he ran over N.V. in self-defense; (3) his convictions violate the Double Jeopardy clause; and (4) his sentence was substantively unreasonable. Because those arguments are meritless.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that there was enough evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Defendant intended to assault N.V. The jury’s verdict was supported by evidence that: Defendant aimed his car at local residents; he attempted to jump the curb three times; he stomped on N.V.’s head after hitting him with his car, and police described his responses afterward as logical. Further, the court wrote that the jury had significant evidence that Defedenadnt was not acting in self-defense. Moreover, the court explained that Defendant’s Double Jeopardy clause argument is foreclosed by both Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent. Finally, the court saw no abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentence. View "United States v. Kevin Doerr" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, asserting that his 2000 Illinois state conviction could not qualify as a prior felony drug offense under 21 U.S.C. Section 851. The district court denied Appellant the requested post-conviction relief because of his untimely filing, but it granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether Appellant’s Section 2255 motion is time-barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).The Eighth Circuit affirmed finding that Appellant failed to demonstrate the diligence required for equitable tolling. The court concluded that Appellant’s Section 2255 motion is time-barred and equitable tolling is not appropriate because Appellant failed to allege facts showing that circumstances beyond his control at the prison prevented him from timely seeking relief. The court explained it need not address whether the motion is procedurally defaulted. The court also rejected Appellant’s argument that finding his motion time-barred under Section 2255(f) poses a problem under the Suspension Clause. View "Clifton Odie v. United States" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections  841(a)(1) and 846. He appealed the district court’s denials of his motion to suppress evidence, his motion to strike a juror for cause, and his motion to admit a portion of a video recording.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions. Defendant argued that the seizure and detention of the lockboxes was unreasonable under United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). But “Place had nothing to do with the automobile exception and is inapposite.” See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 578 (noting that the Supreme Court has consistently “explained that automobile searches differ from other searches” and has denied the applicability of cases that “do not concern automobiles or the automobile exception” to cases involving the automobile exception). Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. Further, the court wrote there was no abuse of discretion because the juror stated that she could remain fair and would listen to the detective’s testimony before deciding if she believed it. Finally, Defendant claimed that the “partial recording and the Government’s characterization of it . . . gave a misleading and unfair understanding of the meaning of Defendant’s statement to the jury.” But he offers no explanation of how the recording was misleading. View "United States v. Shaun Farrington" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine in 2006. While on bail awaiting sentencing, Defendant and his brother were involved in a bar fight, during which Defendant shot and killed one man and assaulted another. Defendant was charged with murder, assault, and armed criminal action in state court.The following year Defendant was sentenced on the federal drug charges. The district court calculated a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category II, resulting in a Sentencing Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months of imprisonment. The government moved for an upward departure under USSG Secs. 4A1.3 and 5K2.0(a)(2). The district court heard evidence about the bar fight, including a video of the altercation and testimony from a police detective, and granted the motion. The court sentenced Defendant to 480 months of imprisonment, the then-applicable statutory maximum. Defendant was subsequently acquitted of the charges related to the bar fight.In 2013, Defendant moved for a sentencing reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec 3582(c). The district court granted the motion, but only reduced Defendant's sentence to 240 months. The court denied Defendant's subsequent sentencing reduction under Section 404 of the First Step Act. Defendant appealed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's s motion, finding that the district court conducted a complete review of Defendant's motion and provided a reasonable basis for its decision. View "United States v. Anthony Sisco" on Justia Law