Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant entered a guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant's pre-sentence report indicated he had committed three violent felonies: a 2004 conviction for burglary; a 2006 conviction for battery; and a 2006 conviction for battery and possession of a firearm. Both 2006 offenses occurred on the same date. At sentencing, the district court found that Defendant was an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 180 months incarceration, the statutory maximum.Defendant appealed, arguing that because both 2006 convictions occurred on the same date, they should be considered a single predicate offense under the ACCA.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence. After considering (1) the time lapse between offenses, (2) the physical distance between their occurrence, and (3) their lack of overall substantive continuity, the court concluded that, for the purposes of the ACCA, the offenses were not committed on the "same occasion." View "United States v. Christopher Stowell" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). He appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, two additional evidentiary rulings, and the application of a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(3).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court first concluded that the officers had probable cause to arrest Richardson because the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest was sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that Defendant committed the offense of indecent exposure.   Further, the court concluded that the officers properly searched Defendant’s person and his car after he was arrested. The search of Defendant’s person was a proper search incident to arrest. The search of the CR-V was a proper probationary search because Defendant was subject to a probationary search condition and there was reasonable suspicion to believe that he possessed firearms based on the pistol magazine found in his pocket or that he violated the law by committing the offense of indecent exposure, both of which were prohibited by his probation conditions.   Moreover, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Government to introduce evidence about Defendant’s six prior convictions. Contrary to Defendant’s claim, the probative value of the evidence of his prior convictions was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Finally, the court explained it need not decide whether North Dakota robbery qualifies as a crime of violence because any alleged error was harmless. View "United States v. LaSamuel Richardson, III" on Justia Law

Defendant and the government reached a binding plea agreement whereby Defendant would plead guilty to transportation of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2423(a) and receive a below-guideline sentence of 150 months. At a change-of-plea hearing in March, the district court rejected the plea agreement. At the end of the second hearing, the district court accepted Defendant’s guilty plea. The district court imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.   Defendant appealed arguing that the district court participated in plea negotiations in violation of Rule 11(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring vacatur of his conviction and sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order.   The court explained that Defendant waived “all rights to appeal or collaterally attack . . . [his] conviction or sentence [and] all non-jurisdictional issues.” Because Defendant’s appeal requests vacatur of his conviction and sentence, it falls within the scope of the waiver. However, a violation of Rule 11(c)(1) is appealable unless the defendant specifically waives “an appeal challenging the voluntariness of his plea.” Here, Defendant did not waive his right to appeal, thus the court wrote that Defendant must show that the district court’s error affected his substantial rights. The court explained that although at least one factor favors Defendant, the particular facts and circumstances in the entire record here do not show that the Rule 11 violation affected Defendant’s substantial rights. View "United States v. Douglas Schneider" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexually abusing an incapacitated individual in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2242(2)(B). Defendant appealed, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress certain statements made to law enforcement and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the finding that the district court properly denied Defendant’s suppression motion. The court concluded that considering the Griffin factors together in light of the totality of the circumstances, Defendant was not in custody during his interviews with the Agents. Here, Defendant retained freedom of movement throughout the interviews: the agents did not handcuff him, the doors remained unlocked, and he entered and exited the front seat of the vehicle on his own. In addition, Defendant voluntarily acquiesced to both interviews. Furthermore, the agents did not employ strong-arm or deceptive tactics but simply were candid with Johnson about the evidence against him.   Moreover, the court held that the district court properly denied Defendant’s judgment of acquittal. The court explained that a defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal due to insufficient evidence only if “no reasonable jury could have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Further, only in extreme circumstances, such as when the witness testified to facts that are physically impossible, will a court disturb the factfinder’s decision to credit one witness’s testimony over another’s. The court wrote that no such extreme circumstances were present in Defendant’s case. View "United States v. Michael Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the order of the district court denying his motion for a reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1). On appeal, Defendant argued that the court improperly relied on the fact that he was subject to removal to Mexico and that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider relevant information.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion and affirmed. The court rejected Defendant’s first contention and explained that it mischaracterizes the district court’s order. Although the probation office cited the removal order as a reason to deny the motion, the court did not adopt that reasoning. Rather, the court explained that (1) Defendant “is no more safe in Mexico than he would be if he continued to be held” in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, and (2) Defendant “is potentially a very dangerous person.” These are permissible considerations under the statute.   Further, the court wrote that Defendant asserted that the district court mistakenly relied on concern that he would present a danger to the public if released, without considering evidence of his more recent good behavior. Defendant presented no prison records in support of his motion, although he did assert that he participated in recidivism reduction programming and “maintained excellent conduct” at his current facility. The court found that the district court permissibly concluded that Defendant’s previous violent conduct weighed against a reduction in sentence despite his assertion of good behavior while incarcerated. View "United States v. Jose Avalos Banderas" on Justia Law

After two separate arrests Defendant was charged with nine conspiracy- and drug-related counts in a 19-count second superseding indictment. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence recovered during these stops. At sentencing, the district court varied downward from the United States Sentencing Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment and sentenced Defendant to 180 months imprisonment and 5 years supervised release. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction on three of the nine counts, and the district court gave an erroneous jury instruction. The government cross-appealed Defendant’s sentence, arguing that the district court procedurally erred when it relied on clearly erroneous facts.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence.  Amongst other claims, Defendant argued that the March 12 stop and accompanying pat-down and inventory searches, as well as the November 1 stop, was unconstitutional and that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence recovered pursuant to these illegal stops and searches. The court explained that the detective did not exceed the allowable scope of the pat-down search when he reached into Defendant’s pocket. “Because the ‘sole justification for such a search is the protection of the officer and others, its scope must be confined to a search reasonably designed to discover concealed weapons.”   Further, the court found that the district court did not commit plain error by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury as to some unspecified “heightened showing” required to prove constructive possession. View "United States v. Eric Williams" on Justia Law

The district court sentenced Defendant to 264 months’ imprisonment for drug trafficking conspiracy. Defendant asserted on appeal that the district court erred by admitting certain evidence at trial and that the court imposed an unreasonable sentence.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that there was no reversible error, and therefore affirmed the judgment. Defendant first challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. He sought to exclude a statement about employment that he made to a detective during the search of his residence in 2019. The court wrote that employment is a standard element of a booking inquiry because a judicial officer is required by statute to consider “employment” in deciding whether to release or detain a defendant pending trial. Employment status is not so central to a drug investigation that it must be excised from the routine biographical information that is collected in the course of arrest and booking.   Further, Defendant claimed that the disputed evidence concerned “other acts” of the defendant and should have been excluded as inadmissible character evidence. The court concluded that the district court properly deemed the evidence probative of the charged conspiracy. The evidence tended to show that Defendant and the co-conspirator acted to protect the “turf” of their drug trafficking organization and to “warn” potential competitors. That sort of activity is relevant to the crime charged.   Finally, in sentencing Defendant, the district court varied downward by eight years from the bottom of the advisory range, and the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to vary downward even further. View "United States v. Terrell Jason Armstrong" on Justia Law

After the district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, Redman pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Defendant appealed, arguing that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him and that evidence recovered after the seizure should have been suppressed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The court explained, during a Terry stop, an officer may “take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop,” including frisking a person for weapons if the officer has “articulable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous.”   Here, the parties agree that Defendant was not seized until the officer physically grabbed his jacket. The court concluded that the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Defendant at that time. The officer was investigating an early-morning report of shots fired near 1:00 a.m. in a high-crime area. That he had been told that the call may have pertained to fireworks did not alone end his investigation, however. The officer knew that, among other facts, Defendant was one of only two people present in the dark parking lot that was the alleged location of the shots fired. Given these circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion that Defendant may have been involved in a shots fired incident, which justified his decision to seize Defendant and to perform a limited search to determine if Defendant was armed. View "United States v. Anthony Redman" on Justia Law

Defendant is an inmate serving a sentence in federal custody after he was convicted in 2007 for unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. After a hearing, the district court ordered Defendant committed to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment of a mental disease or defect at the Federal Medical Center in Springfield, Missouri. Defendant filed a notice of appeal on his own without counsel, and the clerk of this court appointed the federal public defender to represent Defendant on appeal. Counsel filed a motion to withdraw from representing Defendant and a separate motion to file counsel’s motion to withdraw under seal.   The Eighth Circuit denied the motion to file under seal as overbroad. The court explained that a proper motion to seal should be narrowly drawn and accompanied by a proposed redacted filing for the public docket. Here, counsel’s present motion seeks to seal the entire motion to withdraw without any proffered justification. Further, counsel failed to state any cited authority or developed an argument as to why a court’s decision to commit a person against his will for mental health treatment should be made and reviewed in secret.   However, the court granted the the motion to withdraw and will not require a brief of the sort described in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The court wrote that on review of the motion and the record, the court is satisfied that counsel’s ethical obligation to refrain from prosecuting a frivolous appeal justifies his motion to withdraw. View "United States v. David Garner" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of distributing at least fifty grams of methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. Section 841. At sentencing, the district court denied Defendant’s request to be sentenced according to the sentencing guidelines without regard to the statutory minimum penalty of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(b). Defendant relied on 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(f), which allows a court to sentence offenders who meet certain criteria below the otherwise applicable statutory minimum term of imprisonment. Defendant disputed the district court’s ruling, but the Eighth Circuit concluded that he does not qualify for sentencing under Section 3553(f), and therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court.   The court considered whether Congress meant to introduce a new concept of a “prior offense” that accrues criminal history point. The statute requires an evaluation of whether a defendant has a particular prior offense “as determined under the sentencing guidelines.” The court wrote there is no separate determination under the guidelines that would assign criminal history points to a defendant’s prior offense.   Here, it is undisputed that Defendant has a criminal history that meets the criteria in subsections (A) and (B). He has more than four criminal history points and a prior three-point offense. Those circumstances make him ineligible for sentencing under Section 3553(f). That Defendant does not also have a prior two-point violent offense that would meet the condition in subsection (C) is immaterial. View "United States v. Mark Pulsifer" on Justia Law