Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants were convicted of committing a carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury. Under a separate count, they were convicted of using and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, the carjacking. One defendant was also convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Defendants’ appealed and raise several issues.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that there was no error in the court’s challenged evidentiary rulings or jury instruction, and that sufficient evidence supported the carjacking convictions, but that the convictions for discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence must be reduced to convictions for simply using a firearm during the carjacking. Accordingly, the court vacated the convictions under Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and order them reduced to convictions under Section 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Because the firearms convictions affected the terms of imprisonment imposed, the court vacated the sentences on all counts and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Ranson Long Pumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of committing a carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury. Under a separate count, they were convicted of using and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, the carjacking. Defendants appealed certain evidentiary and jury instruction issues, and also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the discharging a firearm conviction.The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions for carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury, finding no error in the district court's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions. However, the court concluded that Defendant's discharging a firearm conviction must be reduced to using a firearm. The court explained that the carjacking offense was complete at the moment of the taking, so the fact that the firearm was used after that point could not be used to support the discharging a firearm offenses. View "United States v. Ranson Long Pumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. According to the presentence report, Defendant was subject to the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence because he had two prior convictions for violent felonies and one prior conviction for a serious drug offense. Defendant objected, arguing that his 2003 conviction for the sale of cocaine under Missouri Revised Statute Section 195.211 (2000) does not qualify as a serious drug offense under the ACCA because that Missouri statute criminalized conduct that does not violate federal law. The district court sustained Defendant’s objection. The government appealed the district court’s ruling.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant’s prior Missouri conviction involved cocaine. The court compared the definition of cocaine under Missouri law at the time of Defendant’s Missouri conviction with the definition of cocaine under federal law at the time of Defendant’s instant federal offense. The Missouri schedule did not define isomer. The federal definition, however, criminalizes only optical and geometric isomers—but not positional isomers. Given the unambiguous breadth of Missouri’s definition of cocaine, the court agreed with the district court that Defendant’s prior Missouri conviction for the sale of cocaine was not a predicate offense for purposes of the ACCA. View "United States v. Anthony Myers" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to transporting a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity after Defendant pleaded guilty to transporting a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity. He filed a motion in limine asking the district court to instruct the jury that Section 2423(a) required the Government to prove that (1) he knew R.M. was underage and (2) he intended the unlawful nature of the sexual activity. The district court denied the motion.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial. The court explained that Section 2423(a) “does not signal an exception to the rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse.” Therefore, a Section 2423(a) conviction predicated on intent to engage in unlawful sexual activity does not require proof of the defendant’s intent or knowledge that such activity is unlawful. Thus, the court held that the district court correctly held that the Government did not need to prove that Defendant specifically intended R.M. to engage in sexual activity that was unlawful as such. It was required to prove only (1) that he intended R.M. to engage in sexual activity and (2) that the sexual activity was unlawful. View "United States v. Luis Moreira Bravo" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the supervised release revocation sentence the district court imposed when it found, after a hearing, that he had committed three Grade C violations -- a new law violation, failure to comply with a search condition, and marijuana use.  On appeal, Defendant argued that, because he tested positive on April 1, it was a “near certainty” that he would test positive again on April 4. Therefore, for the district court to order eight months imprisonment on May 4 after ordering residential reentry on April 1 is “simply unreasonable.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it has repeatedly upheld revocation sentences that varied upward from the advisory guidelines range because the defendant was a “recidivist violator of supervised release conditions.” Here, the district court imposed a within-range sentence of eight months, a sentence that is accorded a presumption of substantive reasonableness. Thus, on the record, the district court did not abuse its substantial revocation sentencing discretion. View "United States v. Johnny Harris" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s orders directing state officials to transport or facilitate testing for purposes of Petitioner’s clemency case. Because argument would not be helpful or assist us in analyzing this issue of statutory interpretation, the court denied Petitioner’s request for oral argument. Petitioner was sentenced to death in 2001 for killing two Sheriff’s Deputies. Petitione, relying on the same authority, filed an ex parte sealed motion in preparation for his clemency case—this time requesting that the court authorize a doctor to conduct bone-lead level testing on Petitioner, either in a private room in the prison or at another secure location of the prison’s choosing. The next day the district court granted the ex parte motion for bone-lead level testing. The district court entered an ex parte sealed order directing the Warden and Missouri Department of Corrections to transport Petitioner to the hospital on October 24, 2022, at 6:00 a.m. for medical testing. The State moved the district court to vacate and stay its orders, but before the district court ruled on the motions.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s orders directing state officials to transport or facilitate testing for purposes of Petitioner’s clemency case. The court held that because argument would not be helpful or assist us in analyzing this issue of statutory interpretation, Petitioner’s request for oral argument is denied. The court explained that Section 3599’s authorization for funding neither confers nor implies an additional grant of jurisdiction to order state officials to act to facilitate an inmate’s clemency application. View "Michael Tisius v. David Vandergriff" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of his peers for possession of child pornography. Defendant challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and admission of certain evidence. Defendant challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, arguing the warrant was not sufficiently particular and lacked the requisite nexus.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained In this case, multiple child pornography images were flagged by a search engine, those images were affiliated with four IP addresses, and those IP addresses were registered to the address that was searched. In addition, the state court was aware that Defendant had a previous conviction for possession of child pornography and lived at the address flagged for child pornography. Considering these circumstances, the court concluded there was a sufficient nexus between the evidence to be seized and the place to be searched. Further, the court agreed with the district court that Defendant’s prior conviction for possession of child pornography has probative value because of its similarity to the charged offense.   Finally, the court explained that the non-Rule 414 evidence connecting Defendant to the child pornography on his tablet was overwhelming. And the government’s case was only marginally strengthened by the excess propensity evidence. Accordingly, the court held any error in admitting evidence under Rule 414 was harmless. View "United States v. Gene Schave" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted and convicted on two counts of production of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a). The indictment focuses on two secretly recorded videos of M.B., Defendant’s then approximately fifteen-year-old cousin, before and after she took a shower in Defendant’s master bathroom. The district court sentenced Defendant to 210 months of imprisonment.   The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient. The court explained that the statute underlying the indictment prohibits a person from using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct. Congress, in turn, defined sexually explicit conduct as the lascivious exhibition of genitals—not mere nudity. Applying this statute to the evidence presented at trial, the court concluded no reasonable jury could have found Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. View "United States v. Matthew McCoy" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant on three counts in connection with his involvement in a methamphetamine and heroin conspiracy. The district court sentenced Defendant to 149 months imprisonment, followed by a 5-year term of supervised release. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion in limine and admitting certain testimony of a confidential informant (CI).   On appeal, Defendant raised the same arguments as he did before the district court: (1) that the CI’s testimony regarding the 2017 events is irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and constitutes a prior bad act, rendering the testimony inadmissible under Rules 402, 403, and 404(b), respectively, and (2) that the CI’s testimony identifying Defendant is inadmissible under Rule 403, given that he was unaware that the CI could identify him.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, as the district court noted, the Government did not introduce the evidence to establish that Defendant was acting in accordance with his character but rather offered it as direct evidence establishing Defendant’s participation in the instant conspiracy. Moreover, the evidence was offered to lay the foundation for how the CI knew Defendant and was able to identify him at the 2019 drug transaction. Accordingly, the court wrote that because substantial evidence other than the CI’s testimony supports the jury’s verdict, any error in admitting the CI’s testimony regarding the 2017 events was harmless and does not warrant reversal. View "United States v. Armondo Heredia, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm but preserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant appealed and asked the court to reverse the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that in addition to crediting law enforcement’s testimony, the magistrate judge discredited witness testimony to the extent it varied from the officers’ description of events. The magistrate judge noted that the witness originally told the Sheriff there were only two people in the house when there were actually three. The magistrate judge also noted that the witness appeared to admit he lied when he “dropped his head” after the Sergeant confronted him about the discrepancy. Defendant insists the magistrate judge “infers too much.” But, again, the magistrate judge’s credibility determination after personally hearing and observing the witness’s testimony is virtually unassailable on appeal. And the Sergeants’ testimony was not inconsistent or implausible. View "United States v. Michael Mitchell" on Justia Law