Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant previously pleaded guilty to selling cocaine in Minnesota on two separate occasions. The district court held that these two convictions were not "serious drug offense[s]" under the Armed Career Criminal Act because Minnesota law defines "cocaine" more broadly than federal law.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that "a drug statute that criminalizes even one additional isomer does not qualify as a 'serious drug felony.'” Here, Minnesota law prohibits all isomers of cocaine, while federal law prohibits only optical and geometric isomers. Thus, because Minnesota law sweeps more broadly than federal law in this regard, Defendant's cocaine convictions do not count as "serious drug offense[s]" under the Armed Career Criminal Act. View "United States v. Maurice Owen" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty in 2021 to unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Applying circuit precedent, the district court1 determined that Larry’s Missouri offense constituted a “crime of violence” under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, see United States v. Pulliam, 566 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2009), and therefore increased his base offense level. Larry appeals, arguing that Pulliam is no longer good law in light of Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021), and that the district court thus committed procedural error in determining his Guidelines sentencing range. Defendant argued that Borden requires that the offender’s force be targeted at another person.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote, that when the plurality and concurring opinions are read together, then, Borden holds only that the force clause categorically excludes offenses that can be committed recklessly. Pulliam thus remains binding precedent. View "United States v. Keith Larry" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and the district court sentenced her to 42 months in prison. She maintained that her sentence is unreasonably high.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the record reflects that additional considerations drove the district court's sentence. For example, the court was concerned that the calculated Guidelines range didn't adequately account for the severity of Defendant’s offense conduct, which it characterized as a "series of serious criminal conduct . . . including the sexual abuse of a minor" that the court found "very troubling." The court also expressed concern about Defendant’s behavior during pretrial detention, where she incurred 25 separate violations of jail rules, including her possession of sharpened objects and drugs as well as a false allegation of rape against jail staff.  Thus, the court discerned no abuse of discretion in the court's treatment of the relevant sentencing criteria, and "reversal is not appropriate simply because the district court did not weigh" these considerations as Defendant prefers.   Further, the court wrote that though the court did not apply a sentencing enhancement based on this finding, it nevertheless took it into account in selecting a sentence. Finally, it is true that at one point during the sentencing hearing the district court remarked that Defendant could "get some treatment that she may need" while in prison. But the record as a whole demonstrates that the sentence was driven by her offense conduct, her criminal history, and the court's desire to protect the public. View "United States v. Keasia Morrow" on Justia Law

The district court convicted Defendant of two controlled substance offenses, and of being a felon in possession of ammunition. The issue on appeal is the third element of this offense, whether the Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knowingly possessed ammunition. Defendant argued on appeal, as he did in the district court, that there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the ammunition in question, which was found in a locked safe in a closet of what Defendant described as “my bedroom” in a Davenport, Iowa home where he was not then living.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there were gaps and inconsistencies between what Defendant told the officers and what officers found when they searched the safes in the bedroom closet at 1025 West Locust. But resolving fact discrepancies and drawing reasonable inferences are tasks reserved for the fact finder at trial, here, the district court. The errors in Defendant’s testimony can be reasonably attributed to his age, his decades of heroin and cocaine abuse, and the likely passage of time since he had accessed the safes in the bedroom closet. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s verdict the court concluded that Defendant’s statements to officers, when combined with the other evidence are sufficient for a rational factfinder to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant constructively possessed the ammunition found in the second safe. View "United States v. Donnie Spencer" on Justia Law

During proceedings to determine whether Defendant had violated the conditions of his supervised release, Defendant asked the district court to allow him to appear without a lawyer. The court granted his request and, after a hearing, revoked Defendant’s supervised release and sentenced him to thirteen months' imprisonment. Defendant maintains on appeal that the court erred in granting his request.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Defendant has not demonstrated reversible error but merely buyer's remorse for his decision to proceed pro se. The court wrote that the record shows that the court did not deny Defendant his right to proceed with appointed counsel; if anything, it shows that the court encouraged Defendant to proceed with his prior attorney as counsel. The court explained that a "district court does not violate the right to counsel when it gives a defendant the choice between adequate representation and self-representation," see Ivers, 44 F.4th at 756, and Defendant does not allege that his previous counsel was inadequate. In addition, Defendant has no right to standby counsel, as that option is available at the district court's discretion. View "United States v. Orlando Preston" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to violating the Travel Act by facilitating prostitution, served her fifteen-month prison sentence, and began a three-year period of supervised release in July 2020. In the following eighteen months, she violated supervised release conditions at least twenty-four times. The district court revoked supervised release and imposed an 18-month sentence, with 18 months of supervised release to follow. Defendant appealed, arguing that varying upward to a sentence greater than the 6-12 month advisory guidelines range is substantively unreasonable because a lesser sentence would have been sufficient.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that on the sentencing record, the contention the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the Section 3553(a) factors by imposing a sentence outside the advisory guidelines range is without merit. The court wrote it has repeatedly held that it is not unreasonable for a sentencing court to demonstrate with an upward variance that contemptuous disregard for our laws can have serious consequences.   Further, here, the district court explained it was varying upward to promote Defendant’s respect for the law and to protect the public from further crimes, not to enable treatment or promote rehabilitation. View "United States v. Paisley Michels" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with and pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The presentence investigation report recommended an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 57 to 71 months imprisonment, based on Defendant’s prior conviction for a crime of violence (second-degree robbery) plus enhancements for possessing a stolen firearm and possession in connection with another felony offense. The district court adopted the PSR’s recommended guidelines range, and sentenced Defendant to 71 months imprisonment, the top of that range. Defendant appealed, arguing the sentence is substantively unreasonable.   Reviewing the sentence under the governing deferential abuse-of-discretion standard the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. The court wrote that after careful review, the court concludes this is not the “unusual case” where it should reverse a sentencing decision as substantively unreasonable. Properly applying the Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement did not result in a “disproportionately” unreasonable advisory guidelines range. Moreover, as the district court noted, there were other aggravating factors warranting a sentence at the top of the advisory range. District courts have “wide latitude” in weighing the relevant Section 3553 factors. This is not the rare case where a presumptively reasonable guidelines range sentence is substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. James Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of an unregistered National Firearms Act firearm. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the trailer he occupied. He contends that the warrant was invalid because it lacked probable cause and failed to describe with particularity the items that police intended to seize.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that the description of items found in the warrant meets the pragmatic standards imposed by the Fourth Amendment. Further, Defendant has not shown that the officers’ reliance on the warrant was objectively unreasonable. The warrant application affidavit passes muster. It was neither deceptive nor deficient. The district court did not err in admitting evidence found pursuant to the warrant. View "United States v. Philip Maccani" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of possessing materials containing child pornography. The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 also required the court to order restitution to the victims of Defendant’s child pornography offense. The government moved for an order directing the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to turn over $2,084 from Defendant’s inmate trust account to pay the remaining balance of his restitution obligation. The district court summarily denied Defendant’s motion requesting a hearing and granted the government’s turnover motion. The court concluded that funds in an inmate’s trust account are not exempt from the payment of restitution. Defendant appealed, raising all these issues. The district court stayed the collection or payment of restitution pending the appeal.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s Order of September 2, 2021. The court held that the district court must determine on remand whether the victim has been fully compensated for the trafficking losses proximately caused by Defendant’s offense. If she has then amended Section 2259(b)(2)(C) states the governing rule: Defendant’s liability to pay the restitution set forth in his February 2014 Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case “shall be terminated.” The court left for the district court’s determination on remand Defendant’s requests for appointment of counsel and discovery. View "United States v. Robert Evans" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a sentence of 240 months imprisonment imposed by the district court after he was convicted of a drug trafficking offense and two firearms offenses. The district court determined that Defendant was a career offender under the sentencing guidelines and calculated his advisory sentencing range accordingly. On appeal, Defendant challenged the career-offender determination.   The Eighth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded it for resentencing. The court explained that in light of intervening authority, the court concluded that one of Defendant’s prior felony convictions does not qualify as a crime of violence under the guidelines and that he is not properly classified as a career offender based on that conviction. Specifically, the court concluded that Defendant’s violation of Section 708.6(2) does not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force against the person of another. The offense thus does not qualify as a crime of violence under USSG Section 4B1.2(a)(1). View "United States v. Dreshon Frazier" on Justia Law