Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion for postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255 arguing that his firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) should be vacated in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), holding that Defendant overcame the procedural default of his challenge to the firearm conviction and that relief was warranted.After the Supreme Court's decision in Davis, Defendant moved to vacate his conviction for brandishing a firearm during a conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery. In light of Davis, Defendant argued that his conviction under section 924(c) should be vacated because he did not brandish a firearm during a crime of violence. The Eighth Circuit agreed and remanded the case, holding (1) Defendant established cause for failing to raise the Davis issue on direct review; and (2) Defendant's conviction under section 924(c) was premised on a mistaken conclusion that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery was a crime of violence. View "Jones v. United States" on Justia Law

Isaiah Hammett was killed during the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department’s (SLMPD) execution of a search warrant at his grandfather’s home. Hammett’s surviving mother and grandfather, Gina Torres and Dennis Torres (Dennis), brought Fourth Amendment excessive force and unlawful seizure claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and state law wrongful death and infliction of emotional distress claims against the City of St. Louis and multiple SLMPD officers.The district court denied the City and defendant officers’ motion for summary judgment on these claims, and they appealed. The Eighth Circuit determined it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity "if at the heart of the argument is a dispute of fact." The Court found that in their essence, defendants' arguments were related to the of the sufficiency of the evidence, and whether certain opinion testimony presented at trial created a genuine issue of fact. To the extent that defendants asserted arguments beyond the scope of the Court's jurisdiction, the Eighth Circuit dismissed their appeal. On the few arguments that remained, the Court reversed the district court's denial of the defendant officers' qualified immunity claims: Dennis was not seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment; (2) the City could not have conspired with itself through the defendant officers acting within the scope of their employment; and (3) the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine did not apply to § 1983 conspiracy claims. Judgment was dismissed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Torres v. Coats" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Caesar Vaca lied to detectives when he told them he had never possessed a gun. He had pleaded guilty to a crime more than 20 years earlier that involved the use of one. The issue presented for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was whether evidence of the prior conviction was admissible. The district court said yes, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Vaca" on Justia Law

Herbert Green previously appealed the denial of his motion to suppress drugs and firearms discovered in his apartment during a law enforcement search outside the scope of the police’s warrant. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court to make factual findings necessary to determine whether the independent source doctrine supported denial of Green’s motion to suppress. After additional briefing and an evidentiary hearing, the district court found law enforcement would have requested and obtained a federal warrant to search the apartment notwithstanding the protective sweep. Based on this finding, the Eighth Circuit held that the independent source doctrine justified the district court’s denial of suppression. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to distributing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. Section 841. The district court imposed a bottom-of-Guidelines sentence of 87 months in prison. Defendant challenged his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court explained that “procedural error includes failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the Section 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009).   Where, as here, the defendant fails to object at sentencing, the court reviews for plain error. Plain error is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. The court wrote that contrary to Defendant’s argument, the court found that the safety valve applied. But safety valve eligibility does not guarantee Defendant a below-statutory minimum sentence; it just gives the court the opportunity to sentence below the minimum if it believes it is appropriate. Defendant argued that the court needed to specifically explain why it decided not to impose a below-minimum sentence— beyond the usual explanation for choosing a particular sentence. But he does not cite any cases from this circuit announcing such a rule, and the out-of-circuit cases he cites do not support his argument. Further, the court found that a within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable and the court’s Section 3553(a) analysis was proper. View "United States v. Jaamil Owens" on Justia Law

Petitioner is serving a life sentence for murder in Minnesota. He brought a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district court, alleging that the state trial court violated his right to a public trial and that the decision of the state supreme court upholding his conviction was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner challenged the state court’s disposition of his claim alleging a violation of the right to a public trial. The court wrote that it evaluates the reasonableness of the state court’s ultimate conclusion, not necessarily the reasoning used to justify the decision. The state supreme court’s decision, in this case, is not contrary to Waller and Presley. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984); Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010).   The court agreed with the district court that fair-minded jurists could take the view that the substantial reasons justifying witness sequestration during the evidentiary phase of a trial extend to jury voir dire. Thus, the court cannot say it was unreasonable for the state court to treat jury voir dire as an undifferentiated whole for purposes of sequestration of a key alibi witness. Therefore, the state court’s denial of the claim based on sequestration of Petitioner’s girlfriend did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Finally, a defendant may waive his right to a public trial by consenting to the closure of a proceeding. Under any standard of review, Petitioner waived his present claim that the exclusion of Stivers from the courtroom during jury selection violated the right to a public trial. View "Tracy Alan Zornes v. William Bolin" on Justia Law

Following a series of trial delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a jury convicted Defendant of two counts of interstate communication of a threat, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c). The district court sentenced him to a term of 60 months in prison.   Defendant appealed arguing that the government did not have sufficient evidence to prove he made “true threats” because his statements were ambiguous and/or political hyperbole. Further, he argued that; the jury instructions were erroneous; the indictment failed to state an essential element of his offense; and he was denied a right to a speedy trial.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court first held that a jury could have reasonably concluded that his messages constituted a true threat of present or future violence and that he intended to communicate a threat. Thus, because the statements were objectively threatening, and neither ambiguous nor political hyperbole. The evidence is sufficient to satisfy the elements required for convictions under Section 875(c).  Further, there was no reversible error, because when taken as a whole, the instructions sufficiently articulated the elements for the charges and the matters were fairly and adequately submitted to the jury.   Next, Defendant has not shown prejudice caused by the delay. While he points to a longer period of detention, repossession of his vehicle, increased pretrial anxiety, and an in-custody assault, none of these circumstances demonstrate he was deprived of an opportunity to properly defend himself at trial. Finally, Defendant’s constitutional claim fails because he has not shown that a nine-month delay was presumptively prejudicial. View "United States v. Cody Leveke" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit bank fraud, bank fraud, and four counts of aggravated identity theft. He entered into a non-binding Plea Agreement in which he pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count and two counts of aggravated identity theft. A magistrate judge found that the plea was knowing and voluntary. The district court adopted those findings, accepted the guilty plea, and sentenced him to 71 months imprisonment on the conspiracy count and 24 months imprisonment on each aggravated identity theft count, with the three sentences to be served consecutively, for a total of 119 months imprisonment.   Defendant appealed, challenging (i) the court’s compliance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and (ii) the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that a defendant who fails to object to the Rule 11 colloquy in the trial court “has the burden to satisfy the plain-error rule and [the] reviewing court may consult the whole record when considering the effect of any error on substantial rights.” Here, the court held that Defendant failed to meet his burden.   Further, Defendant argued the district court gave inadequate weight to mitigating factors and did not adequately explain why it imposed a sentence that was twice the parties’ joint recommendation. However, the court explained that a district court has “wide latitude” to weigh the relevant sentencing criteria, and has no obligation to accept the recommendation of the parties in a non-binding plea agreement. View "United States v. Gregory Harrison" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor. Defendant appealed, asserting four claims of error: (1) the district court abused its discretion when it made certain evidentiary rulings; (2) he was deprived of a fair trial due to behavior by members of the gallery; (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction; and (4) the district court improperly considered prior act evidence for purposes of sentencing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court took steps to ensure the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial by considering the cumulative effect and denying the proffered testimonies of two additional women. While some amount of prejudice is to be expected when evidence is admitted under Rule 414, it did not rise to the level of unfair prejudice in this case.   Next, during cross-examination of Defendant, a member of the gallery caught the district court’s attention. The district court addressed the behavior swiftly and succinctly. Defense counsel raised no questions or objections during trial and Defendant’s testimony continued without incident. The weight of the evidence was overwhelming, and there is no indication that any further problems or concerns occurred. No jurors complained or had questions about the incident. Without some indication that Defendant’s substantial rights were affected, the jury was influenced by the behavior, Defendant has failed to show plain error. Further, there was sufficient evidence in the record for the district court to find that Defendant committed a prior act of molestation. Thus, the district court did not err in applying the enhancement. View "United States v. Robert Dowty, Sr." on Justia Law

After Petitioner pled guilty to one count of receipt or possession of an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. Sections 5841 and 5861(c)-(d), the district court sentenced him to 100 months imprisonment, followed by 3 years of supervised release. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in calculating his base offense level under United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) Section 2K2.1(a)(3) and in applying a two-level enhancement under USSG Section 2K2.1(b)(3)(B) for an offense involving a destructive device.   The Eighth Circuit agreed with Defendant’s second point of error and remanded for resentencing without application of the destructive-device enhancement. The court explained that it is undisputed that the shotgun involved in the offense of conviction was a .410 caliber weapon, meaning that its bore diameter was less than one-half inch, and the government concedes error, suggesting that this Court remand for resentencing. The court agreed with Defendant and the government that the application of this enhancement when the weapon involved in the offense of conviction does not meet the definition of “destructive device” was plain error that affects Defendant’s substantial rights. View "United States v. Demetrius Bailey" on Justia Law