Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon. In calculating an advisory guideline range at sentencing, the district court found based on the evidence of drug trafficking that Defendant possessed the firearm “cited in the offense of conviction in connection with the commission . . . of another offense.” USSG Section 2K2.1(c)(1). Therefore, the court applied a cross-reference under Section 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) and applied Section 2X1.1 in respect to the offense of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. As a result, the base offense level under Section 2X1.1(a) was 32 based on USSG Section 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(5), and (b)(1), and Defendant’s guideline sentence was the statutory maximum term of 120 months’ imprisonment.   Defendant argues that the district court erred by applying the cross-reference and that the error increased his advisory guideline sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the Defendant’s sentence for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The court held that the district court properly applied the cross-reference under Section 2K2.1(c)(1). The court explained that by its plain terms the guideline extends beyond “use” to “possession,” as long as the possession is “in connection with the commission” of another offense. The guideline commentary specifies that the cross-reference applies “in the case of a drug trafficking offense in which a firearm is found in close proximity to drugs, drug-manufacturing materials, or drug paraphernalia.” USSG Section  2K2.1, comment. (n.14(B)). According to the plain meaning of Section 2K2.1(c), as explained more specifically by the commentary. View "United States v. Gregory Sewalson" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant, an officer, guilty of willfully depriving a man of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable force, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 242, and the district court sentenced Defendant to 72 months imprisonment and 3 years supervised release. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court committed both procedural and substantive errors.   On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court committed procedural error by failing to adequately explain the sentence imposed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed finding that the district court’s explanation of Defendant’s sentence was adequate. “In determining whether a district court has adequately explained its reasons for imposing a particular sentence, the context for the appellate court’s review is the entire sentencing record, not merely the district court’s statements at the hearing.”   Next, Defendant contended that the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. Upon careful review of the record, the court concluded that the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence, as it properly considered both the mitigating and aggravating factors listed in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553.   Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not give significant weight to any improper or irrelevant factor in fashioning Defendant’s sentence. The district court properly considered the victim's innocence and injuries. View "United States v. Brett Palkowitsch" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of civil disorder. The parties agreed that U.S.S.G. Section  2B1.1(a)(2), which deals with property damage or destruction, applied. The Presentence Report, however, recommended applying the higher base level in U.S.S.G. Section 2A2.4(a) for obstructing or impeding officers. Over objections from Defendant and the Government, the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Section 2A2.4(a) was the most analogous guideline to Defendant’s conduct.   Defendant appealed arguing that the court incorrectly calculated his Guidelines range by applying U.S.S.G. Section 2A2.4(a), obstructing or impeding officers.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the shared prohibition on obstructing, impeding, or interfering with law enforcement establishes that Section 2A2.4(a) is sufficiently analogous to 18 U.S.C. Section.  231(a)(3). View "United States v. Jonathan Montanez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of five offenses related to trafficking methamphetamine. He filed a post-conviction motion for a new trial, alleging a violation of the court’s trial procedure order and a Brady violation. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Defendant to 295 months in prison. He appealed, challenging the denial of his motion and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is nothing in the record reflecting what one of the government’s witnesses learned or whether it affected his testimony, another witness’s testimony, or Defendant’s rights. As a result, Defendant’s argument that he was prejudiced by the still-undefined discussion is baseless, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a new trial.   Next, Defendant argued that the DEA affidavit is favorable evidence because it provides a basis for impeaching Defendant’s cellmate and because it suggests that someone else, was responsible for trafficking drugs. The court held that because the evidence is immaterial to the outcome of the case, the Government’s failure to disclose the DEA affidavit was not a Brady violation. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying the motion for a new trial.   The court further concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s request for a downward variance. The court addressed Defendant’s arguments, considered all relevant factors, and concluded that a downward variance was not justified. View "United States v. Jason Corey" on Justia Law

Co-Defendants each pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. On appeal, both claimed the district court erred at their respective sentencings. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in both cases.   Defendant 1 disputed the quantity and type of methamphetamine attributed to him in the calculation of his base offense level. He argued that he should only be held. He also objected to his classification as a career offender. He contended his Iowa convictions for delivery of a controlled substance under Iowa Code Section 124.401(1) do not count as predicate convictions for the career offender enhancement because Section 124.401(1) is overbroad. Here, the methamphetamine seized from the controlled buy was tested and shown to be ice, and the dealers and users in this case, including Defendant 1 referred to the drugs being sold as “ice.” This evidence is sufficient to support the district court’s conclusion that the methamphetamine Defendant 1 distributed was ice.   Defendant 2 sought to renew his argument that his 2011 cocaine conviction should have been classified as relevant conduct and therefore excluded from his criminal history calculation. However, where a defendant abandons and withdraws an objection to the PSR at the time of sentencing in exchange for a benefit, he has waived the objection and is not entitled to appellate review of that issue. By asserting this objection and then affirmatively withdrawing it as part of his deal with the government, Defendant 2 “demonstrated the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of his right to argue the point,” and the court may not consider it in on review. View "United States v. Lavelle Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant moved to suppress items found during a warrantless search of the apartment he shared with his girlfriend. The district court granted the motion as to the narcotics found in a black bag, concluding the search that led to the discovery of the narcotics exceeded the scope of his girlfriend’s consent to search the apartment. As to the other evidence, the court denied the motion.   The government filed an interlocutory appeal, asserting the district court erred when it focused on ownership of the bag rather than his girlfriend’s authority to give consent for the search and the Eighth Circuit reversed.   The question before the court was whether Defendant’s girlfriend had apparent authority to consent to the search of the bag. The court held that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement, which may be given by a third party with common authority or apparent authority over the premises or effects. Here, at the time of consent, law enforcement officers knew: (1) Defendant had directed his girlfriend to move the gun owned by and registered to her to a specific place within the apartment; (2) she voluntarily led the officers to the location of the gun; and (3) she had access to the bag and never indicated it was Defendant’s bag or that her ability to use or access the bag was limited. As the sole lessee, Defendant had actual and common authority over the apartment and consented to the search of the entire apartment for Fourth Amendment purposes. View "United States v. Mosley Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for various child sex trafficking, firearms, and drug charges. Forty-eight hours before trial, the government disclosed certain benefits it had provided to several minor victims. Defendant unsuccessfully sought dismissal of the indictment or, in the alternative, exclusion of the victim's testimony. Instead, the district court offered Defendant a continuance, instructed the jury accordingly and allowed broad cross-examination of the witnesses. Defendant was ultimately convicted and sentenced to 268 months in prison.Defendant appealed to the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed his convictions and sentence. The court explained that even if the government's late disclosure of benefits it had provided to the victims of Defendant's offenses was a discovery violation, the district court's chosen remedy was not an abuse of discretion. The Eighth Circuit also affirmed Defendant's sentence, finding that all three sentencing enhancements used to determine Defendant's sentence were properly applied and his 268-month sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Kendall Streb" on Justia Law

A driver crashed into Defendant's home, where he lived with his father. As the driver attempted to flee, Defendant and his father dragged the driver out of the car and Defendant's father beat him with a garden hoe. The driver died a few days later. Defendant was arrested for tampering with evidence after he admitted to hiding the garden hoe out of fear his father would get in trouble.At trial, the district court denied Defendant's request to add as an element of the crime that "the natural and probable effect of [the] defendant’s conduct would be the interference with the due administration of justice." Defendant was convicted and appealed.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction, finding the provided jury instruction still covered all the required elements of the offense. The requirement that Defendant’s action was likely to affect an official proceeding is implied in the mens rea requirement of the offense, which the challenged instruction covered. View "United States v. Samuel White Horse" on Justia Law

Defendant was pulled over after an officer observed excessive braking. During the stop, the officer observed both driver and passenger appeared to be nervous. Upon a subsequent pat-down, the officer observed a clear glass smoking device with burnt residue inside Defendant's open pocket. After another search, an additional 20 grams of methamphetamine were recovered from Defendant.The trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress. He ultimately entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to 216 months in prison.On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. The court affirmed the district court's decision, finding the officers did not unconstitutionally extend the traffic stop. The court also held that the officer was permitted to ask Defendant out of the car and that Defendant consented to the pat-down by raising his arms.The court also found that the district court did not commit any error in the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(a). View "United States v. William Kennedy" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He received a statutory-maximum ten-year sentence. In doing so, the district court varied upward from a guideline range of 51–63 months based on a prior felony assault conviction under Arkansas Code Annotated Sec, 5-13-204.On appeal, Defendant claimed that Sec, 5-13-204 is not a crime of violence. The statute provides, " A person commits aggravated assault if, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, he or she purposely ... Impedes or prevents the respiration of another person or the circulation of another person’s blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck or by blocking the nose or mouth of the other person."The Eighth Circuit found Sec, 5-13-204 qualifies as a crime of violence based on the fact that domestic abuse strangulation, which contains almost identical phrasing, was previously held to be a crime of violence. View "United States v. Jeremy Burnett" on Justia Law